The Edsel is generally pointed to as the Ford Motor Company’s biggest post-war flop, but the 1958-60 Lincoln deserves a consolation prize. This car represents the disastrous final phase of Ford’s no-holds-barred assault on the luxury car field in the second-half of the 1950s.
By all rights Ford should have made inroads into General Motors’ dominance of the field. By 1956 Lincoln and its companion brand, the Continental, had a better pedigree than any other competitor to the market-leading Cadillac.
Even more importantly, for 1958 Ford invested an exceptionally large amount of money in an all-new body, engine and assembly plant. “Both the Lincoln and Continental had everything the planners thought they’d need back in ’55,” noted Richard M. Langworth (1987, p. 1966).
For 1958 the Continental was still treated as a separate brand but given a big price cut, shared the Lincoln’s body and included in the same brochure. A convertible was not shared with Lincoln (Automotive History Preservation Society).
This was one of the biggest product blitzes in U.S. automotive history. Yet Lincoln ended up losing around $60 million (Severson, 2009). Even in a depressed luxury-car market, Lincoln (including Continental) lost five percentage points of market share. How could things have gone so badly?
The dominant paradigm takes a big hit
Automotive historians have quite rightly blamed the Lincoln’s poor showing on its ungainly size and styling as well as quality-control lapses. They have also pointed to the onset of a recession, which undercut sales of higher-priced cars and turned the public against Detroit’s ostentatious fare (Bonsall, 1981; auto editors of Consumer Guide, 2013).
Production of luxury cars fell by almost 27 percent from its peak of almost 228,000 units in 1956 to under 170,000 units in 1958. Output didn’t recover until 1965, when the luxury car field hit roughly 241,000 units. During that time period the problem wasn’t just lower demand. The zeitgeist shifted. Detroit’s dominant paradigm of “bigger, glitzier, more powerful” was temporarily destabilized.
In the face of withering critiques, what used to be viewed as aspirational became dripping excess. The luxury car was pointed to as Exhibit A for what American Motors head George Romney decried as the “Dinosaur in the Driveway” (Hyde, 2009; p. 186).
Properly diagnosing the disease: GM envy
Conventional wisdom holds that the downsized 1961 Continental redeemed the Lincoln brand by setting the stage for two decades of sales growth. That’s empirically true but obscures what I think is the most important issue.
Over the long run Ford would have been most successful in building Lincoln’s brand equity by consistently offering a clear alternative to the usual Detroit fare rather than by trying to copy Cadillac.
The 1961-63 Lincoln went against luxury field norms by being downsized, dramatically reducing its model range to a single series with only two body styles, and not receiving major styling changes each year (Old Car Brochures).
Ford displayed a glimmer of independent thinking with the 1961 Continental, but only partially and for a few years. Indeed, the strategy that catalyzed the 1958 Lincoln was very little different from the one used in 1968 or 1978. They were all more or less grounded in what I have referred to as GM envy.
In 1970 the Lincoln (top image) was placed on the same platform as the full-sized Mercury (middle) and Ford. Two-door hardtop rooflines were similar but Lincoln had hidden windshield wipers, unlike the other two (Old Car Brochures).
It’s true that in the next two decades Ford did a more effective job of mimicking GM. In addition, market conditions were more hospitable to luxury cars than during 1958-61. This masked the long-term futility of trying to beat GM at its own game.
Suddenly it’s the 1960s
Before delving further into the problems with the 1958-60 Lincoln, let’s acknowledge the car’s positive aspects. The basic design doesn’t get the credit it deserves for trying to transcend Detroit groupthink in a number of ways. Practical features were emphasized such as unitized construction, a fairly roomy interior and a roll-down rear window on the higher-priced Continentals.
Lincoln adopted the then-unusual practice of giving its lower-priced models a different grille and taillights. The Continental was also distinguished by a slant-back roofline with a roll-down rear window (Old Car Brochures).
On the styling front, whereas GM and Chrysler were still locked in a death match to create the tallest tailfins, the Lincoln displayed understatement more in keeping with a 1962-64 Cadillac. The Lincoln’s ovoid-shaped rear design represented both a departure from the traditional upright trunk of the 1950s and anticipated a dominant look of U.S. cars in the mid-1960s.
In addition, the Lincoln’s sharply creased sides and squared-off roofline represented one of the first mass-market attempts to ditch the post-war pontoon look, which was characterized by rounded shoulders, slab-sided fenders and bubble-shaped roofs.
For 1959 Lincoln advertising emphasized the car’s understated styling compared to the sci-fi outrageousness of the Cadillac and Imperial. Click on image to enlarge (Old Car Advertisements).
The 1957 Plymouth used the advertising slogan, “Suddenly, it’s 1960!” but the Lincoln more fully predicted the design sensibility of the next decade.
Thomas Bonsall noted that the Lincolns were “better cars than they are remembered as having been. Most of the important automotive writers raved about them, when they first appeared on the scene, but they certainly bombed at the box office. . . .” (1981, p. 162).
A sales failure — except for the Continental
Where Ford went astray was by assuming that biggest was bestest. In a decade when American cars dramatically increased in size, the 1958 Lincoln was the most massive of them all — a whopping 12 inches longer than a Cadillac. Even when General Motors redesigned the Cadillac in 1959 it was still four inches shorter and a bit lighter than the Lincoln.
The unusually squared-off styling served to accentuate the Lincoln’s bulk. Meanwhile, gaudy detailing was too much of a break with both the 1956 Lincoln and Continental, which were among the cleanest designs of the 1950s. Particularly jarring were the slant-eye headlights and unusual front-wheel fender sculptings. The latter were lampooned in 1958 as “pre-dented” (Bonsall, 1981, p. 160).
John Gunnell described the 1956-57 Mark II as having as much in common with its 1958 successor as “a thoroughbred Kentucky Derby winner has with TV’s ‘Mr. ed.’ the talking horse” (2002, p. 499).
The 1958 Continental lineup was priced near the Cadillac Sixty Special Fleetwood and sold almost as well — almost 12,600 units. For 1959-60 output was fairly stable despite price increases. This is a 1959 model (Old Car Brochures).
The marketplace disagreed. The 1958-60 Continentals consistently sold better than any other Lincoln nameplate and represented almost 43 percent of total production. This was an important achievement. Lincoln was trying to reenter the upper reaches of the luxury car market after spending the first half of the 1950s straddling the top end of the premium-priced and bottom end of the luxury classes.
The graph below shows how the list prices for the 1958 Lincoln and Continental lineup had moved substantially upmarket, with the highest-priced Mark III model exceeding $6,000. That was more than $2,000 higher than the top-end Lincoln for 1955, which was the Capri.
The relative success of the 1958-60 Continentals may have given Lincoln the courage to offer for 1961 a narrow lineup priced above $6,000.Even so, Ford’s total share of the luxury car market dropped from 18.4 percent in 1957 to only 13.4 percent in 1960. Market share didn’t fully recover until 1966, when Lincoln reached 20.6 percent.
Cadillac enters 1960s even stronger than before
Cadillac weathered the recession more easily than any other luxury brand even though it was supposedly at a big disadvantage. Unlike Lincoln and Imperial, Cadillac shared its platform with GM’s more plebeian brands.
Cadillac’s popularity in the late-50s and early-60s suggested that sharing a platform with lower-priced brands was not a disadvantage with the right product and marketing. Pictured are 1961 models (Old Car Brochures).
Market-share figures show how easily GM beat back attacks by Ford and Chrysler. In 1957 Cadillac fell to a low of 65 percent in luxury car output but by 1961 inched up to almost 79 percent. This was even higher than its 1955 market share.
Ironically, the 1953-55 Lincoln sold 29 percent better than the 1958-60 models. This raises an interesting question: How might Lincoln have done if it had made no effort whatsoever to move upmarket in the second-half of the 1950s?
In 1953 Lincoln production reached almost 41,000. This was substantially higher than in 1958-60, when output averaged roughly 27,000 units per year, but that also may have at least reflected Lincoln moving upmarket (Old Car Brochures).
Note that Chrysler’s expansion effort was an even bigger failure. For 1957, the first year of Imperial’s stand-alone body, production surpassed 37,000 — almost matching Lincoln. Even so, by 1961 volume fell to under 13,000. That was only a few thousand units higher than in 1955-56, when the Imperial was only a stretched Chrysler.
Lincoln’s bean counters must have been locked up
I haven’t found specific figures, but the upfront costs of the 1958 models must have been astronomical. Almost everything about the Lincoln was new: its body, engine, transmission, rear suspension and even an assembly plant.
The 1958 body wasn’t merely a reskinning of an existing platform. This was a top-to-bottom redesign that adopted unitized construction. Lincoln and Thunderbird were the first Big Three passenger cars to switch to unibody.
Marketing for the 1958 Lincoln itemized everything that was new. Click on image to enlarge (Old Car Brochures).
Just as importantly, Ford ditched the 1957 Lincoln and Continental bodies after only two-year production runs. That’s astonishing given that they were expensive new designs in their own right.
Ford management’s attitude seemed to be that it would spend whatever it took to catch up with GM. While there is some logic to that approach, cost controls were so loose that bad product decisions were made.
The 1956-57 Continental (top image) did not share any body parts with the Lincoln. It’s no wonder that Ford lost roughly $1,000 on each Mark II produced despite a $10,000 list price (auto editors of Consumer Guide, 2006).
1958 Lincoln: Too much, too fast
Ford’s biggest error was introducing too many changes at once. This resulted in quality-control issues that undercut ads trumpeting “standards of luxury and quality that are simply unattainable in any other motorcar.”
A Popular Mechanics survey of 1958 luxury car owners found that “Lincoln had by far the lowest approval ratings of the three marques, and a substantial 16.9 percent of those responding called their cars ‘poor.’ This was 3 ½ times the Imperial disapproval figure and nearly 9 ½ times the Cadillac figure” (Bonsall, 1981, p. 157). Complaints involved workmanship, body squeaks and rattles, and engine trouble.
Curbside Classic commentator Scott C. Anderson (2014) offered background on the 1958-60 Lincoln that aligns with Bonsall’s but included a few additional details that I can’t independently verify. For example, Anderson stated that there were “at least 6 huge recalls on the 58 models alone by mid year.”
You’d think Ford would have learned from Packard’s experience with its 1955 models. Sales were depressed by quality-control issues that resulted from the simultaneous introduction of a new assembly plant, V8 engine and electrically controlled suspension (Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002).
An interesting twist of fate was that James Nance, who had led Packard during its final collapse, became head of the newly formed Mercury-Edsel-Lincoln Division in the fall of 1957 (Bonsall, 1981). This was right around the time that the 1958 models were being introduced — far too late for him to have impacted their development one way or another. Nevertheless, he took the fall for the division’s disastrous sales.
Unibody Thunderbird scrambles Lincoln’s plans
The switch to a new body was reportedly hoisted upon Lincoln. The original plan was for the 1958 Lincoln and Continental to carry over their existing bodies for a third year. Instead, high-level Ford management decided that a new four-seat Thunderbird would adopt unitized construction. The rationale was that the elimination of the chassis frame would allow a lower body (Bonsall, 1981).
Switching to unibody construction made more sense for the Ford Thunderbird because it supposedly allowed a lower body — an asset for a sporty coupe (Automotive History Preservation Society).
The downside was that unibody required different production processes than an assembly plant producing body-on-frame vehicles. According to Bonsall (1981), the T-Bird’s projected volume wasn’t high enough to justify its own plant so Lincoln was ordered to share it. That meant a brand-new body needed to be developed in two years — an unusually short amount of time.
Lincoln’s chief engineer proved correct in arguing against this direction, both because of time constraints and uncertainly about whether unitized construction made sense in such a large car. The crash development efforts led to more than 500 pounds of bracing and reinforcement being added to the body, which in turn required a bigger engine (Bonsall, 1981).
“The end result was a heavy, uneconomical car that still suffered from rattles and torsional strains – the very things unibody was supposed to cure in the first place,” noted Bonsall (1981; p. 129).
After being renamed the Mark IV Continental (not the other way around) for 1959, top-end models in 1960 were simply called the Lincoln Continental. Click on image to enlarge (Automotive History Preservation Society).
More than a failure to execute
The 1958-60 Lincoln is a cautionary tale of how ungodly sums of money don’t guarantee success.
The most obvious alternative direction — albeit still grounded in Detroit groupthink – would have been for Lincoln to have carried over the 1957 body for another year or so. Then the brand could have been switched back to a fancied-up platform shared with Mercury and Ford. Sales reached historic highs in the 1970s when Ford re-adopted that GM-like approach.
As a thought experiment, I would suggest a more exotic scenario. The 1958 Lincoln, Continental and Thunderbird could have shared a platform in a somewhat similar vein as 1961. But instead of going unibody, which was arguably a bad idea for such large cars, Ford could have used an updated version of the 1957 body-on-frame design.
An updated — and toned-down — 1957 Lincoln could have been a refreshing alternative to the ponderous 1959 Cadillac and Imperial. Go here to see a photo gallery of a 1957 Lincoln Premiere.
That body’s relatively light weight would have made it a refreshing alternative to the increasingly ponderous competition in the late-50s.
From a styling standpoint the main problem with the 1956-57 Lincoln body was that its cowl was relatively high and curved, which would have been particularly problematic for the Thunderbird. Then what about using the Continental’s somewhat lower and flatter body?
The Thunderbird would not have been as low if had been placed on the 1957 Lincoln body. However, features such as a center console could have still given it cachet (Automotive History Preservation Society).
Perhaps just as importantly, sticking closer to the understated look of the Mark II could have started to pay off with a public increasingly tired of stylistic overkill. Lincoln missed a golden opportunity to provide a more practical alternative to the sci-fi excessiveness of the 1959-60 Cadillac and Imperial.
The luxury of hindsight allows us to see that the success of the four-seat Thunderbird pointed the way for Ford to carve out new market niches rather than vainly try to beat GM at its own game. It’s too bad Lincoln had to lose a boatload of money before trying something different — all too briefly — with the 1961 Continental.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on Sept. 1, 2013 and expanded on Aug. 14, 2020, Dec. 31, 2021 and Nov. 10, 2023. Market share and production figures for individual nameplates were calculated from base data by the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Gunnell (2002) and Wikipedia (2013). Prices and specifications were from the above sources and the Classic Car Database (2013). Price graph does not include limited-production models such as limousines.
Bonsall stated that in “three years Lincoln had lost exactly half of its market penetration” (1981, p. 162). I don’t know how he got there; perhaps Bonsall excluded the Continental even though for 1958-60 it effectively functioned as a top-end model rather than a distinct brand. Or perhaps he used 1956 as the baseline, which strikes me as artificially high because that was the second-best-selling model year in Lincoln history up through the 1950s.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
Hamlin, George and Dwight Heinmuller; 2002. “Let the Ride Decide: The Fifty-Fifth Series 1955.” In Kimes, Beverly Rae, ed., pp. 582–601. Packard: A History of the Motor Car and the Company. Automobile Quarterly Publications.
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10 Comments
The styling of these Lincolns is not that bad compared to the Cadillac and Imperial. The long lines of the sides ends in tastefully small tail fins and the lower skeg fin was a nice balance. The Continentals’s slanted roof and rear window was a nice touch, better than the curving rear glass of the standard Lincoln.The flat hood, simple grille, and small Dagmars were an improvement on their GM and Chrysler rivals. The ’59 and ’60 Cadillacs were even more tasteless, the Fleetwood models especially more so, with all the extra chrome trim.
In my opinion the slanted headlamps were the kiss of death. They dated the car immensely after just a couple of years. They are probably why so few of these cars survived, they were just too weird and became embarrassing to be seen in. Usually a two to three year old luxury car was still considered a desirable choice. Imagine a front end like a ’67-68 Cadillac with froward thrusting fenders with stacked head lamps. These would have been seen as aggressive but not outlandish. Yes the car was just too big. Just as Ford discovered when it brought out the Excursion SUV, sometimes bigger is not better.
My only comment about the Ford Excursion SUV is that Ford easily created the Excursion because its dealers were tired of sending their SUV customers to Chevrolet and G.M.C. dealers because they did not have anything to sell them to compete with the Suburban. It was to keep customers they already had, and the Excursion should be profitable for all concerned. If it is not, then Ford’s management needs a rethink.
The 1958-1960 Lincoln was definitely too-much, too-far, too-soon. First the Lincoln looked much more massive than the 1956-1957 Lincolns, the 1959-1960 Cadillacs and the 1957-1960 Imperials, but in a ponderous, tank-like way. I have come to make peace with the X-concept design idea, but the slant dual headlamps were as successful as the Chrysler use in 1961-1962, although Exner integrated them into the fenders and grill more successfully, in my opinion.
The “what-if” thinking that would have delayed the 1958 Lincoln to another year is interesting, although McNamara would have freaked if there had been another year of his two-seat Thunderbird with 1958 Ford styling clues! I still think that there was no compelling argument to switch the Lincoln and the Thunderbird to unit bodies until the engineering kinks were solved. If I were in charge, I would have stopped any further development with the words “bracing” and “reinforcements” to the tune of another 500-pounds of weight on an already large car.
In many ways, like a studio film that goes over-budget and gets out-of-control from the director(s), the producers and the studio (1960’s 20th-Century Fox production of “Cleopatra”, ironically of this same period), the automobile business in Detroit was a product of big ideas and clashing egos. It is fascinating that the most of the best of the 1960s, the 1961-1967 Lincolns, the 1961-1966 Thunderbird, the 1963 Buick Riviera, the 1964 G.M. intermediates, the 1964-1970 Chrysler intermediates, the 1960 Ford Falcon (Mustang base), the 1966 Toronado and the 1960 Corvair all came out in the wake of a period of extreme chrome excess.
The basic shape wasn’t so bad. It may have been understated with regard to the fins, but the detailing everywhere else seemed to be gorped up beyond belief, waaaaay overdone. Imagine this without those ‘pre-dented’ fenders, and with the ’57’s front and rear end treatments. Nice. Or vertical instead of canted front lights. Or keep the horizontal-themed rear but lose the heavy chrome framing and ponderous bumper.
Did 1958 America need a luxury car a foot longer then the Cadillac? I think this Lincoln was the answer to a question few people outside Ford management were asking.
Peter, well put. Interestingly, while the Lincoln was first being developed the Continental still had its own design team. The chief designer of the Mark II, John Reinhart, came up with a number of proposed 1958 models that, in my view, look a lot better than what Ford management finally settled upon. You nicely sum up the problems with the Lincoln and Continental.
The cars that reached production were coordinated by John Najjar. Here is a quote from him that offers insight into his thinking at the time. I’m surprised that he didn’t acknowledge more directly that the design didn’t work well . . . regardless of how it was received by the public.
The oral history I draw this quote from goes on to talk about how Najjar was apparently removed as Lincoln chief stylist before the car was actually introduced — and he was never told why.
In reviewing all of the parts to this post, including the comments, it appears that the only person within Ford whom had a firm grip on reality in 1957 was Robert McNamara, As much as I love Frank Hersey’s two-seat Thunderbird, McNamara knew the 2+2 would sell better. Were the 1958 T-Birds plagued with quality problems as their bigger Lincoln assembly-mates were ? All I know as a kid in Indianapolis in 1958, the Thunderbird was a car more exciting than the Corvette. I have to believe that whatever misgivings McNamara had, he knew that most of the FoMoCo executive hierarchy, including Hank the Duece, still believed in the Reith plan of Ford, Edsel, the bigger Mercury, Lincoln and (now) Lincoln Continental. So, to have the “Super Mercury” (Park Lane ?), there had to be an even longer and wider Lincoln than the 1957 “Long, Low, Lovely” Julia Meade Lincoln.
The very impressive comparison graph in this post is the price comparison between luxury and near-luxury makes between 1955 and 1958. The rate of inflation was 1957 was 3.31 % and for 1958, 2.85 %. Combine that with the 1958 (beginning in late 1957) recession, the prices for the 1958 models, automakers had a double-whammy, so no wonder the Rambler was a big winner !
After Emmet Judge’s 1951 GM B/C/D Interchangeability Presentation to Ford management (per Thomas Bonsall’s Disaster in Dearborn), too bad Ford didn’t develop derivatives of the new 1957 Ford platform for Thunderbird (short wheelbase) and Lincoln (long wheelbase) instead of the expensive unibody program.
That’s a good point. Ford could have had a full and modern lineup with a much lower cost. In a way it is understandable that the bean counters at Ford subsequently became quite powerful because the lack of cost controls in the second half of the 1950s was remarkably reckless.
The styling of these Lincolns is not that bad compared to the Cadillac and Imperial. The long lines of the sides ends in tastefully small tail fins and the lower skeg fin was a nice balance. The Continentals’s slanted roof and rear window was a nice touch, better than the curving rear glass of the standard Lincoln.The flat hood, simple grille, and small Dagmars were an improvement on their GM and Chrysler rivals. The ’59 and ’60 Cadillacs were even more tasteless, the Fleetwood models especially more so, with all the extra chrome trim.
In my opinion the slanted headlamps were the kiss of death. They dated the car immensely after just a couple of years. They are probably why so few of these cars survived, they were just too weird and became embarrassing to be seen in. Usually a two to three year old luxury car was still considered a desirable choice. Imagine a front end like a ’67-68 Cadillac with froward thrusting fenders with stacked head lamps. These would have been seen as aggressive but not outlandish. Yes the car was just too big. Just as Ford discovered when it brought out the Excursion SUV, sometimes bigger is not better.
My only comment about the Ford Excursion SUV is that Ford easily created the Excursion because its dealers were tired of sending their SUV customers to Chevrolet and G.M.C. dealers because they did not have anything to sell them to compete with the Suburban. It was to keep customers they already had, and the Excursion should be profitable for all concerned. If it is not, then Ford’s management needs a rethink.
The 1958-1960 Lincoln was definitely too-much, too-far, too-soon. First the Lincoln looked much more massive than the 1956-1957 Lincolns, the 1959-1960 Cadillacs and the 1957-1960 Imperials, but in a ponderous, tank-like way. I have come to make peace with the X-concept design idea, but the slant dual headlamps were as successful as the Chrysler use in 1961-1962, although Exner integrated them into the fenders and grill more successfully, in my opinion.
The “what-if” thinking that would have delayed the 1958 Lincoln to another year is interesting, although McNamara would have freaked if there had been another year of his two-seat Thunderbird with 1958 Ford styling clues! I still think that there was no compelling argument to switch the Lincoln and the Thunderbird to unit bodies until the engineering kinks were solved. If I were in charge, I would have stopped any further development with the words “bracing” and “reinforcements” to the tune of another 500-pounds of weight on an already large car.
In many ways, like a studio film that goes over-budget and gets out-of-control from the director(s), the producers and the studio (1960’s 20th-Century Fox production of “Cleopatra”, ironically of this same period), the automobile business in Detroit was a product of big ideas and clashing egos. It is fascinating that the most of the best of the 1960s, the 1961-1967 Lincolns, the 1961-1966 Thunderbird, the 1963 Buick Riviera, the 1964 G.M. intermediates, the 1964-1970 Chrysler intermediates, the 1960 Ford Falcon (Mustang base), the 1966 Toronado and the 1960 Corvair all came out in the wake of a period of extreme chrome excess.
I’d be curious to see what some of the styling studies that led to the ’58 Lincoln looked like.
How Stuff Works has a few pictures (go here) and the AACA forum has a thread on the topic (go here).
The basic shape wasn’t so bad. It may have been understated with regard to the fins, but the detailing everywhere else seemed to be gorped up beyond belief, waaaaay overdone. Imagine this without those ‘pre-dented’ fenders, and with the ’57’s front and rear end treatments. Nice. Or vertical instead of canted front lights. Or keep the horizontal-themed rear but lose the heavy chrome framing and ponderous bumper.
Did 1958 America need a luxury car a foot longer then the Cadillac? I think this Lincoln was the answer to a question few people outside Ford management were asking.
Peter, well put. Interestingly, while the Lincoln was first being developed the Continental still had its own design team. The chief designer of the Mark II, John Reinhart, came up with a number of proposed 1958 models that, in my view, look a lot better than what Ford management finally settled upon. You nicely sum up the problems with the Lincoln and Continental.
The cars that reached production were coordinated by John Najjar. Here is a quote from him that offers insight into his thinking at the time. I’m surprised that he didn’t acknowledge more directly that the design didn’t work well . . . regardless of how it was received by the public.
The oral history I draw this quote from goes on to talk about how Najjar was apparently removed as Lincoln chief stylist before the car was actually introduced — and he was never told why.
In reviewing all of the parts to this post, including the comments, it appears that the only person within Ford whom had a firm grip on reality in 1957 was Robert McNamara, As much as I love Frank Hersey’s two-seat Thunderbird, McNamara knew the 2+2 would sell better. Were the 1958 T-Birds plagued with quality problems as their bigger Lincoln assembly-mates were ? All I know as a kid in Indianapolis in 1958, the Thunderbird was a car more exciting than the Corvette. I have to believe that whatever misgivings McNamara had, he knew that most of the FoMoCo executive hierarchy, including Hank the Duece, still believed in the Reith plan of Ford, Edsel, the bigger Mercury, Lincoln and (now) Lincoln Continental. So, to have the “Super Mercury” (Park Lane ?), there had to be an even longer and wider Lincoln than the 1957 “Long, Low, Lovely” Julia Meade Lincoln.
The very impressive comparison graph in this post is the price comparison between luxury and near-luxury makes between 1955 and 1958. The rate of inflation was 1957 was 3.31 % and for 1958, 2.85 %. Combine that with the 1958 (beginning in late 1957) recession, the prices for the 1958 models, automakers had a double-whammy, so no wonder the Rambler was a big winner !
After Emmet Judge’s 1951 GM B/C/D Interchangeability Presentation to Ford management (per Thomas Bonsall’s Disaster in Dearborn), too bad Ford didn’t develop derivatives of the new 1957 Ford platform for Thunderbird (short wheelbase) and Lincoln (long wheelbase) instead of the expensive unibody program.
That’s a good point. Ford could have had a full and modern lineup with a much lower cost. In a way it is understandable that the bean counters at Ford subsequently became quite powerful because the lack of cost controls in the second half of the 1950s was remarkably reckless.