This oversized, almost 900-page hard-back book provides more narrative about products and industry background from 1930 through 2006 but has less complete data than the Standard Catalog of American Cars series. In addition, unlike the 1993 edition of the Encyclopedia, the 2006 edition does not include model-year production totals for brands, which was a handy feature.
Production figures for individual models are usually included but they may not always be accurate. Text may also display questionable accuracy. For example, the quote below about 1955 Plymouth production is, at best, confusing when compared to data from other sources (for further discussion go here; see Notes section).
That said, I have often found the production data in this book to be more accurate than in some of the Standard Catalogs. This has drawn me to routinely compare the numbers and, when finding discrepancies, to make an educated guess as to whose data is more accurate.
Encyclopedia of American Cars
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide, 1993, 2006
- Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill
“(Cadillac) Cimarron was a frank embarrassment to Cadillac, caught in a flagrant act of ‘badge-engineering.’ Still, it was a logical development: needed to boost the division’s fleet-average economy until its larger cars could be downsized again, and also to help stem a rising tide of upscale imports (typified by the BMW 3-Series) beginning to erode Cadillac sales. But the decision to field this gilded J came at the 11th hour, and it showed. The resulting criticism stung.” (p. 109)
“(Plymouth) Ads proclaimed the ’55 a ‘great new car for the young in heart.’ It was certainly a clean break from Plymouth’s plodding past. Customers rushed to buy — encouraged by prices little higher than in ’54 — but production lagged and Plymouth dropped to sixth for the model year at 401,000 units. But volume for calendar ’55 was a rousing 742,991 (including some ’56s, of course) — a record that would stand well into the ’60s.” (p. 691)
“Saturn’s labor agreement had few traditional industry ‘shop rules’ and gave employees more say in how they did their jobs. Workers were organized into teams responsible for monitoring the quality of parts and their own work, and any worker could stop the assembly line to fix safety or quality problems on the spot, a common practice in Japan but unknown in U.S. auto plants. That allowed doing away with separate quality-control inspection areas. In addition, workers sat alongside managers in meetings, helping to make decisions as ‘team members,’ and everyone ate in the same dining room. LeFauve even shared the executive suite with the UAW’s Saturn coordinator.” (p. 708)
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