(EXPANDED FROM 11/1/2019)
The dominant tendency of the U.S. auto industry has been to make its vehicles bigger, glitzier and more powerful. In recent decades both domestic and foreign automakers have embraced this practice. Indeed, fealty to this business model is so strong that it borders on being a secular religion. This is why Indie Auto refers to bigger, glitzier and more powerful as a holy trinity.
The domestic automakers were the most evangelical disciples of the holy trinity through the late-70s. However, after that point foreign automakers began to mimic General Motors’ hierarchy of brands strategy. This resulted in their cars growing in size, glitz and power. Below you will find examples. The Auto Paedia entry for “GM envy” also includes examples because the holy trinity is a key element of this phenomenon.
Today the U.S. auto market does not have a single firm that does not adhere to the holy trinity. This stands in stark contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, when imports generally acted as a counterbalance to Detroit’s ever-larger land yachts.
Occasional downsizing efforts haven’t lasted
Once in a while the industry has stepped back from making its vehicles ever bigger. This occurred most dramatically after the enactment of CAFE fuel economy regulations in the mid-70s. U.S. automakers downsized its fleet of cars more substantially than even during the early-60s. However, within a decade the Big Three was back to its usual tricks — even when it negatively impacted sales.
See also ‘CO2 emissions: Automakers still partying like it’s 1975’
A case in point is the Ford Mustang. Over the course of the pony car’s lifetime it has mostly outsold the Chevrolet Camaro when it was smaller and lighter. Even so, Ford blimped out the Mustang with redesigns in 2004 and 2015. The result: Output consistently fell below 100,000 units per year for the first time in the Mustang’s long life (go here and here for further discussion).
Auto industry debated car size after World War II
The drive to make cars bigger arguably began with the industry itself. However, it gained steam right around World War II. Ironically, this was the same time period when a major debate raged among U.S. automakers about whether the market needed smaller cars.
In the 1940s the Automobile Manufacturers Association did a study of car-usage patterns. Its research found that most trips were for 13 miles or less, recalled George Romney. He was general manager of the industry trade group from 1942 to 1948.
“I concluded way back then that you didn’t need a great big, several-ton car to go to the drug store to get a pack of bobby pins,” Romney said in a 1994 presentation. He also observed that the number of cars in a household was becoming more important than the prestige of an individual car (go here for further discussion).
The Big Three rejected smaller cars
The Big Three considered introducing compacts but ultimately rejected the idea. For example, a 1953 study by the Ford Motor Company concluded, “To the average American our present car and its size represent an outward symbol of prestige and well-being” (Nevins and Hill 1962; p. 379).
To a certain degree this was not an irrational argument. Most of the compacts introduced in the early-50s did not sell very well. However, one could argue that this was partly an economies-of-scale problem. All four compact entries were introduced by independent automakers. Only Nash was able to lower the price of its Rambler (beginning in 1954) so it was competitive with the Big Three’s lowest-priced “standard-sized” cars.
Also see ‘1933-42 Willys offered a better template for an import beater’
Another important point is that GM, Ford and Chrysler didn’t merely refuse to offer compacts in the 1950s — they significantly increased the size, weight and power of their entire range of passenger cars. Those efforts went into overdrive in the second half of the 1950s, when a veritable arms race ensued to make the longest, most elaborately tail-finned and hotly-powered cars.
Making cars bigger didn’t always result in more sales
A key battle area was waged in the premium-priced class. The graph below compares the domestic market share of premium-priced brands in relation to the length of a Buick. I chose this GM brand because for much of the decade it was the most popular in the premium-priced field, which led others to follow its lead.
Market share for the premium-priced class — and Buick in particular — went down as the length of the brand’s entry level model grew (go here for further discussion).
Cars got so big during the late-50s that even business-friendly Republicans balked. As a case in point, Senator Alexander Wiley lectured General Motors executives about the negative impacts they were creating:
“I think you have got to consider the cities, the highways in relation to your cars. . . . You are going to make tremendous expenditures necessary if these cars keep growing bigger and bigger, and I think more and more people want medium-sized cars. . . . I have talked to municipal people who are very concerned about this tremendous car business, what it means in the life of the community, what it means in parking not only on the thoroughfares, but parking places, what it means for the convenience of the other fellow.” (Cray, 1980; p. 394)
“Standard-sized” cars did shrink a bit in the early-60s in response to widespread criticism. But as you can see from our discussion here, they started to grow again as the 1960s progressed and reached a peak in size and weight in the mid-70s. This was partly due to federal bumper standards, but cars had been steadily growing prior to that point. Even though GM and Ford introduced subcompact cars in 1971 to compete more directly against a rising tide of imports, bigger was still considered better for the rest of their lineup.
AMC sales went down as its cars got bigger
When Romney led American Motors, he was one of the few U.S. auto executives who challenged the holy trinity. Yet even though AMC under his tenure rose to third place in sales in 1961, his successors went in the opposite direction. They tried to compete directly against the Big Three with increasingly large, fancy and powerful cars.
AMC’s post-Romney strategy backfired. The automaker’s output of medium-sized and large cars mostly went down as the length of its top-of-line sedans went up (go here for further discussion).
American Motors made a similar mistake when it came to the performance of its cars. After its compact Rambler American was trashed by Car and Driver magazine for marginal acceleration, handling and braking, new management decided to try to catch up with the Big Three by introducing outrageous muscle cars such as the 1969 SC/Rambler and 1970 Rebel Machine. That made the automaker a card-carrying member of the high-performance tribe. Nevertheless, sales actually fell from the bad old days of dowdy Ramblers (go here for further discussion).
Industry consolidation has resulted in more converts
All of this is not to suggest that bigger, glitzier and more powerful car and truck designs have never sold well. The above examples are merely intended to suggest that the holy trinity should not be treated as infallible doctrine. That is what auto industry executives have generally done — particularly in recent decades.
Industry consolidation has tended to cultivate greater conformity among both domestic and foreign automakers. This has included a more widespread embrace of the holy trinity.
Auto histories have been colored by the holy trinity
American automotive journalism has mostly suffered from a lack of independence from the automakers. This has often resulted in a hesitation to question the holy trinity. Car and Driver and Road & Track magazines during the 1960s and 1970s were notable exceptions.
You would think that automotive historians might show more analytical independence than journalists, but they have also tended to downgrade automakers who have not displayed adequate devotion to the holy trinity. A case in point is the 1953-54 Plymouth. Historians have roundly criticized the car as being too small for the times. As discussed further here, the Plymouth was not the sales failure commonly ascribed to it.
The downsized 1962-64 Plymouth has been criticized almost as harshly by historians. In doing so they tend to downplay the inconvenient fact that once the Plymouth got more attractive styling in 1963-64, sales were quite good (go here for further discussion).
Poor Chrysler Corporation. It displayed the courage to try to break free from what automotive journalist Brock Yates (1983) referred to as “Detroit Mind” and didn’t even get credit for it in the history books. This is the face of industry groupthink.
NOTES:
This article was originally posted on Nov. 1, 2019 and expanded on Sept. 12, 2023.
RE:SOURCES
- Cray, Ed; 1980. Chrome Colossus: General Motors and its Times. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, NY.
- Lehman, Paul; 2011. “George Romney at the Nationals, July 7-10-1994: Part 2.” YouTube. Posted July 7; accessed July 15, 2013.
- Nevins, Allan and Frank Ernest Hill; 1962. Ford: Decline and Rebirth 1933-1962. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, NY.
- Yates, Brock; 1983. The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry. Empire Books, New York, NY.
It’s not just the automakers fault for building bigger and glitzier, I blame Detroit’s yin and yang relationship with the mass market. After WWII consumers said you need to WOW me to get my dollar, so each year the US automakers did just that until outside factors intervened. In the recession of 1958 many people realized these are chrome behemoths and bought sensible compacts but as times got better they wanted big again.
When a manufacturer like Chrysler tried to influence the market in 1962 with a smaller line of Plymouths and Dodges the consumer passed on them. Granted the styling was debatable but so were many wonky designs of the day, in the end the others were still big. Same time GM introduced the advanced Greenbriar van with the ability to efficiently haul a family in comfort, still not many takers.
As the 60s progressed the land yachts eclipsed the 50s until the OPEC embargo of 1973 and the CAFE standards of 1975, then due to econonomics most of the buying public once again felt unwittingly compelled to spend more wisely. For a while.
Another influencer of the yin and yang is regulation, enter the 80s and faced with click-it or ticket buyers found buckling up the family in a minivan is wonderfully convenient. In 1984 sales shot past 200,000/annually then enters the 1986 laws requiring child safety seats and sales shot up to 400,000. Even though 23 years prior GM’s Greenbriar offered the same vehicle in dimensions and weight it took Uncle Sam’s finger pointing to embrace it.
Come the 90’s and advancement in technology allows people to buy relatively efficient SUVs the same size yet heavier than cars decades before plus crew cab trucks with big diesel engines. Not only is Detroit cranking out truck based land yachts so is the import companies that ate up market share in the 70s with fuel efficient economy cars.
Despite boom and bust, crippling recessions and eventually Detroit bankruptcies America’s automakers are still giving the masses what they want; bigger, glitzier and more powerful.
Bill, you make good points — certainly both consumers and the government have also impacted automakers’ tendency to make their cars — and later their trucks — bigger, glitzier and more powerful.
For example, as discussed in our story about the Ford Mustang, sometimes bigger has sold better. The larger Camaro bested the Mustang in the mid-70s and again in the mid-80s. That said, automakers have had a tendency to push such trends too far. It’s kind of like an addiction cycle that is generally only broken by external factors, such as a market-shifting recession, new governmental regulations and even critical media attention.
By the same token, historians can often accept uncritically auto industry narratives about how they are only giving consumers what they want. You mention the 1962 downsized Plymouth and Dodge; that’s a great example of cars which sold poorly initially but saw reasonable sales once they were quickly given more conventional styling (go here for further discussion). A somewhat similar counter-argument can be made against critics of the 1953-54 Plymouth.
In saying all this, I don’t expect everyone to agree with me. My main goal is to encourage historians — both professional and armchair — to think more deeply about their assumptions. Sometimes, upon closer examination, they may look less clear cut.
When looking at the 1953-54 Plymouths one might also argue their problem was a frumpy look. Virgil Exner was brought in to solve this issue, which he did.
Whenever one talks about size, it may be of note how in one of the books by either DeLorean or Lutz it points out how the incremental cost for extra size was minimal but the sell price was notable. In other words, bigger meant more profit. The 1976 Seville was probably the first serious attempt to make smaller more expensive.
Pointing at the Greenbrier as the reasoning for the minivan is incorrect. In the 1970s there was the custom van craze. Although Chrysler brought out the minivan their credit should only be that they actually approved it for production not that it was an original concept – GM and Ford had played with the idea before Chrysler did. The thought of the minimvan was to have a van that fit inside a standard garage; something the regular vans did not do.
Another factor to take into account is demographics. Much of what changed in consumer preferences over time corresponds to the age and stage of boomers particularly and to some extent later and later millennials. When young, consumers will prefer less expensive vehicles and will be relatively indifferent to interior roominess relative to image. At the stage of having school age children, one will need to be able to transport not only one’s own family, but often others’ children, sports gear etc. When one is a younger empty nester, one might enjoy a convertible or coupe. When one becomes older, difficulty of ingress and egress will drive one to favor vehicles with an upright seating position over something low slung. Manufacturers who have anticipated changing preferences relative to changing demographics have done well in the market. Sometimes that has logically driven them to offer a product that was bigger.
As for making vehicles glitzier, I tend to think that most everyone thinks of an automobile as an avatar for their social self-image. While one might be inclined to judge negatively society’s overall trend towards glitz over the last half century, that dynamic applies to all manner of consumer goods. And manufacturers have generally done a good job of also delivering niche products for those whose self-image tends towards ‘tasteful’ modesty, whatever the general masses’ proclivities may be.
The trend towards vehicles with increasingly faster acceleration (barring the effects of CAFE) may also simply be reflective of the mass of consumers’ tastes rather than something foisted upon them. Yes, one can critique consumer preference as being intertwined or even conditioned by marketing. It’s a chicken and egg question. But ask yourself: why was Tesla such a big success among early adopters of EVs and yet the Nissan LEAF didn’t meet its manufacturer’s expectations. The attraction to speed, I think, has had a lot to do with that.
“In the 1940s the Automobile Manufacturers Association did a study of car-usage patterns. Its research found that most trips were for 13 miles or less, recalled George Romney. He was general manager of the industry trade group from 1942 to 1948.” Most is not all. I drive a Dakota clone about 5k miles a year, and the only things within 13 miles are a couple one horse towns and corn. 90 percent of the time the pickup bed is empty, but if I am carrying 20 bags of topsoil or a bunch of pavers nothing else will do. Most people can’t afford 1 car for the trip to Walgreen’s, another to take the family to Grandmas, and another to haul a bunch of bedding plants. The Kia Rio can do one. The 4 door pickup can do all three.
As you say, most is not all. My sense is that the study was looking at trends — and it did anticipate the rising popularity of smaller cars. From what I can tell it did not demand that all patriotic Americans drive compacts painted gray. It’s also worth keeping in mind that the study was done around 80 years ago — before trucks were commonly used as cars.
True. Heck, the community I live in would probably ban parking pickups outside back in the day. Even though I own one, I don’t quite understand the popularity of them. However, I think the popularity of the Truckosaurus will wane, and the future of non-commercial pickups will be something like the Ford Maverick. Were I younger, I would be interested in one.
When I left WIBC-AM, Indianapolis, in January, 1990 to try my hand at station ownership, I turned in my 1989 Mercury Sable. My recommended successor was twice my size. and the station owners, in order to keep him happy, leased him a Lincoln Town Car, so he could fit inside the car. In a nation of obese and aging people, entry and exit of vehicles is a really BIG DEAL, which is why the current infatuation with high-rise monster trucks completely baffle me. I understand why my late diminutive wife preferred the view from the cab of a Freightliner, but even she found the task of climbing in and out to be a challenge. What’s next for your Family Truckster, motorized lifts for each door and tailgate ?