(EXPANDED FROM 12/1/2019)
The Lincoln Zephyr is a more important car than is commonly assumed. Not only did it offer notably advanced styling and engineering, but it also represented the Ford Motor Company’s first meaningful attempt to compete outside of the low-priced field — and eventually surpass Chrysler as the second best-selling automaker.
A comparison with the Chrysler Airflow is revealing. The Zephyr’s streamlined looks and unit-body construction were arguably much better executed than the ugly and overweight Airflow.
One result is that more than twice as many Zephyrs left the factory during the nameplate’s seven-year production run as Airflows offered through the DeSoto and Chrysler brands. This was pretty remarkable because the Zephyr lineup was mostly higher priced than the Airflow’s. Even more remarkable was that this was Lincoln’s first mass-market entry.
Prior to the Zephyr’s introduction in 1936, the Ford Motor Company’s only other U.S. passenger-car entry beyond its low-priced Ford was the Lincoln. Even in the roaring-20s this was a second-tier luxury car brand. The Great Depression had so decimated sales of luxury cars that by 1935 Lincoln produced less than 1,500 units.
The Zephyr not only saved Lincoln, but it took the brand to new sales heights in the late-30s. That wasn’t enough to catch up with Cadillac or Packard, but it turned Lincoln into a mass-market brand.
The success of the Zephyr arguably paved the way for the introduction of the Mercury brand in 1939. And as Ford began to compete in larger portions of the U.S. marketplace, that would eventually give it a decisive advantage over arch-rival Chrysler, which outproduced Ford from 1937-48.
This is one reason why I would suggest that some historians go too far in blaming Chrysler management for the automaker falling behind Ford in postwar sales (go here for further discussion).
A much lower price helps fuel the Zephyr’s success
The Zephyr was an immediate (albeit minor) hit. In 1936 almost 15,000 cars left the factory. Production doubled in 1937. Output then hovered in the 20,000-unit range for the rest of the Zephyr’s production run, which ended in 1942 with the beginning of World War II.
Zephyr production soared above Lincoln’s, which had never topped 9,000 units per year. The Zephyr even outproduced Cadillac’s junior brand, the LaSalle, for a number of years.
The Zephyr was positioned at the top end of the premium-priced field. For 1936 list prices clustered around $1,300, which was within the same ballpark as a Buick Roadmaster, Chrysler Airflow Eight, Packard 120 and LaSalle.
This was new territory for Lincoln, whose entry-level prices had not dipped below $3,200 in the first half of the 1930s. In contrast, Cadillac’s entry-level prices were cut in half, from $3,295 in 1930 to $1,645 in 1936.
The above graph compares list prices in 1936 and 1940, the latter of which was the last year the LaSalle was in production. The Zephyr’s prices were consistently higher but the two brands were roughly competitive — and somewhat above the Packard 120’s.
Also see ‘Was the 1940-41 Lincoln Continental the all-time most influential U.S. halo car?’
By 1941 the Zephyr’s base prices rose to upwards of $1,400. This was similar to Cadillac’s new Series 61, which effectively replaced the LaSalle.
After war Lincoln sticks with Zephyr market sans name
When Lincoln production resumed after the war, the Zephyr name was dropped but the basic body was maintained through 1948.
Even after the introduction of an all-new design, Lincoln continued to straddle the premium-priced and luxury-car fields. It wasn’t until another major redesign in 1956 that Lincoln prices shifted upwards to more directly compete against Cadillac. So at least in pricing, an entry-level 1955 Lincoln was the spiritual heir to the 1936-42 Zephyr.
Also see ‘1958-60 Lincoln: Failing to beat GM at its own game’
In one other respect the Zephyr proved to be a short-lived experiment for the Ford Motor Company. Never again has the automaker offered a car in the upper reaches of the premium-priced or luxury classes that displayed much in the way of engineering leadership. Lincolns and high-end Mercurys have henceforth been sold primarily on styling, luxury and a prestigious image.
1936 (left image) and 1941 Lincoln Zephyr ads. Click on images to enlarge (Old Car Advertisements).
NOTES:
This story was originally posted Dec. 1, 2019 and expanded on April 11, 2022. Prices and production data are from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Gunnell (2002) and Bonsall (1981). Price graph does not include Chrysler Imperial models.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Bonsall, Thomas E.; 1981. The Lincoln Motorcar: Sixty Years of Excellence. Bookman Dan!, Baltimore, MD.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard; 1986. The Complete History of Ford Motor Company. Beekman House.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Lincoln (1937, 1941)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Lincoln (1936)
One reason the Zephyr doesn’t receive full credit for its advanced engineering features is that Edsel Ford couldn’t overcome his father’s stubborn resistance to hydraulic brakes and independent front suspension. Cadillac and LaSalle adopted both in 1934, and the Packard 120 had both when it debuted in 1935 (the senior Packards would adopt those features for 1937).
The Zephyr didn’t get hydraulic brakes until 1939, and Lincoln wouldn’t get independent front suspension until its first postwar design debuted as a 1949 model in mid-1948. Henry Ford I’s stubborn reluctance to adopt those features gave his company’s products a reputation for being outdated mechanically by the eve of World War II.
Yup. In addition, Richard Langworth wrote that the V12 had teething problems that sullied the Zephyr’s reputation. He also pointed to Lincoln’s relatively weak dealer network, which “wouldn’t be rectified until Lincoln-Mercury Division was formed after the war” (1987, p. 136).
In discussing why the Zephyr lost altitude in the early-40s, Langworth noted that Lincoln kept in production the same basic design longer than its rivals. He also pointed to GM’s ditching of the LaSalle in favor of an entry-level Cadillac that was lower priced than the Zephyr.
Langworth’s first point is well taken, but I wonder how important was the second point. The Zephyr wasn’t a stand-alone companion brand — it was sold as a Lincoln. Indeed, by the 1940 model year the brand’s entire lineup was based upon the Zephyr’s platform — including the Continental and Custom (the latter of which effectively replaced the K Series).
Regarding the dealer network, it’s my understanding that in the 1930s most Lincoln dealers were located in metropolitan areas where the bulk of luxury cars were sold. Rural and small-town Ford dealers did not want Lincolns, as they were very difficult to sell in their respective home markets, even prior to the Great Depression.
I’m sure that the urban dealers welcomed the Zephyr, but I wonder if the rural and small-town dealers still found it hard to sell, despite its lower price (compared to the “senior” Lincolns).
Hmn. This may have become the reason for Mercury. An upscale entry with ties to Ford parts bins.