(EXPANDED FROM 5/28/2025)
The Society of Automotive Historians (2026) recently gave the 2026 E. P. Ingersoll Award to The Last Independent American Automaker. This television documentary about American Motors strikes me as an obvious choice, but it also brings up some uncomfortable questions about journalistic-quality and ethical standards.
The most controversial part of the six-part, 30-minute series was arguably its fourth episode. Here Ligo (2025) and co-producers Patrick Foster and Jimm Needle focus on AMC’s two final major passenger-car redesigns before losing its independence: the 1974 Matador coupe and 1976 Pacer.
This episode offers some interesting historical nuggets, but Ligo and Co. present such a sanitized view of management’s reckless decisions that the script could have been written by the automaker’s media-relations office with only a few fairly modest exceptions.
That raises a painfully obvious question: Why the lack of journalistic independence? After all, the series was originally developed for airing on the Public Broadcasting Service, which has a proud tradition of tough-minded documentaries such as the Frontline (2026) program.
Why sanewash a long-dead company’s management?
I could better understand the public-relations tone of the episode if it had addressed a current controversy. Automakers have been known to retaliate against media outlets that run what they perceive to be negative coverage. A particularly visible example of that was General Motors pulling all of its advertising from the Los Angeles Times in 2005 in response to critical reviews by Pulitzer Prize-winning automotive writer Dan Neil (NBC, 2005).
Unless one is afraid of ghosts, it is hard to see how American Motors could push back against critical coverage. The automaker disappeared decades ago and most of its mid-70s leadership have died. In addition, PBS isn’t dependent on advertising revenue like many car-buff media outlets. So why the sanewashing?
Perhaps one reason for the episode’s lack of journalistic rigor was lead writer Patrick Foster. Although he may be one the most knowledgeable AMC historians, Foster also has biases, such as a publicly stated friendship with then-CEO of AMC, Roy D. Chapin Jr. (2018). His writings have largely given Chapin a free pass, yet Foster’s first AMC book (1993) was still more critical of mid-70s management than Episode 4.
Why? My perception is that as Foster has achieved more prominence, his punditry has taken on an increasingly p.r. tone. For example, he told Automotive News that the revived Jeep Wagoneer was as historic and game changing as the original (Bond, 2020). Even at the time that struck me as high-octane marketing bullshit (go here for further discussion).
Were they afraid of offending AMC fanboys?
Another factor that may have helped to fuel sanewashing AMC management could have been that Ligo — who is listed as the lead producer of the series — appeared to have more background with feature stories than “hard news” (The Drive, 2025). As a result, he may not have recognized the limitations of Foster’s analysis — or didn’t think he had the expertise to challenge it.
It struck me as telling that in an article Ligo (2025b) wrote about the series, he focused on the logistics of finding vehicles to film. Sure, visuals are important — but not in the absence of strong historical analysis.
I also wonder whether funding may have colored the tone of coverage. Ligo (2025c) raised almost $23,000 in donations through a gofundme.com portal and landed a number of grants. Even if there were not explicit strings attached to any funding source, might Ligo have tried to avoid ruffling the feathers of contributors whose views aligned with AMC management?
This brings us to what I suspect is a core reason why so much automotive history fails to rise very far about nostalgic pabulum: Fanboys tend to be its biggest market. A key reason why is that the field doesn’t have much of a beachhead in academia, which could be more supportive of rigorous historical analysis.
Matador coupe was shown in an overly positive light
The biggest problem with the episode’s script is that it has a stenographic quality — it repeats with only modest questioning the talking points of management.
For example, the Matador coupe was presented in a mostly positive light: “With strong initial sales, a few NASCAR wins and a role in a James Bond movie, it was off to a good start.” The main negative noted was that the coupe did not share body panels with the sedan and wagon, thereby “making it more expensive to manufacture.” However, this was stated so obliquely that the casual viewer might not pick up its significance to AMC’s survival as an independent automaker.
The Matador coupe was one of AMC’s three most costly new designs of the 1970s, but over a five-year production run output totaled only around 106,000 units. In his first AMC book, Foster estimated that the coupe’s develop costs were so great that it “had to sell over 80,000 units” per year (1993, p. 190).
If that was correct, then American Motors may have taken a financial bath on the coupe. And because it was a stand-alone design, the automaker’s mid-sized sedans and wagons had to soldier on with one of the oldest bodies in the U.S. auto industry — and a 1974 facelift that was downright ugly.
Episode treated the Pacer somewhat more critically
By the same token, the Pacer was presented as an innovative idea that suffered from bad luck, such as General Motors’ failure to sell AMC a Wankel engine. Voice-over commentators argued that a last-minute switch to a six-cylinder engine was the reason for the production Pacer’s increased weight — which resulted in mediocre gas mileage for such a short car.
Left unexplained was why the Pacer was almost as heavy as much larger cars such as the Ford Granada and Plymouth Volare even though they had similar drivetrains. I would have also liked to have seen Meyers pressed on why the Pacer had not been designed from the outset to fit a six given long-standing development issues with the Wankel, GM’s spotty record with new technology and the extra cost of not building their own engine (go here for further discussion).
Unlike with the Matador coupe, the episode acknowledged that the Pacer had serious problems. Those included controversial styling, quality lapses and questionable marketing. Also acknowledged was that Pacer sales collapsed after its promising first year and that by 1977 overall AMC passenger-car sales fell to dangerously low levels.
I was most surprised by Foster’s response to Vice Chairman R. W. McNealey’s proposed strategy of dropping passenger cars to focus on the still-hot-selling Jeep line. Foster said that “probably his idea was the best, but it was just too painful.” That struck me as a shift. In one of Foster’s (2013) AMC books he lamented the phasing out of the brand name by its new-found foreign partner Renault.
Lauding Ligo’s effort while calling for deeper analysis
Am I suggesting that this series did not deserve the award? No — quite the contrary. We should encourage the creation of automotive documentaries — particularly when the producers represent the next generation. We should also have some grace when criticizing first-time efforts. If Ligo dares to embark on another big project, I would imagine that he would find ways to do it better. For example, might he pay more attention to deepening the script’s analytical rigor while still being entertaining to a general audience?
My frustration is that television programs have the potential to reach far more people than small-scale blogs like mine. Because of this, the narratives that Ligo and Co. present in this documentary could color the viewpoints of many more people about why American Motors lost its independence.
As I typed that last sentence I heard in the back of my head other automotive historians who have insisted that AMC was “doomed” anyway. Over the long run that may have been the case, but I would ask: Why can’t we be analytically sophisticated enough to hold more than one idea at a time in our heads?
Yes, tightening regulations and foreign competition were making it harder for American Motors to survive on its own. However, the automaker might have lasted longer as an independent — or at least negotiated a better deal with a partner — if AMC’s management in the 1970s had not operated in such a consistently reckless fashion. Historians should not be in the business of “normalizing” incompetence by automotive management — even if they count some of them as friends.
Where should journalism standards be addressed?
Award programs can help the automotive history field advance. However, they can also devolve into little more than a mutual back-slapping club if basic journalism standards are not discussed.
As a case in point, the Society of Professional Journalists (2026) has a code of ethics. Among its tenets are to “Act independently.” This can be done partly by denying “favored treatment to advertisers, donors or any other special interests, and resist internal and external pressure to influence coverage.” The code further states that when conflicts of interest cannot be avoided, they should be disclosed.
How might this principle be applied to an automotive media outlet? As a case in point, Peter DeLorenzo’s Auto Extremist website would disclose when it was writing about automakers that his consulting firm has worked with. Perhaps I missed it, I have not seen DeLorenzo ever do so (go here for further discussion).
Auto history is a bit different than the rest of the auto media, so arguably deserves its own code of ethics. Imagine if the likes of SAH developed one. Among the topics addressed might be conflicts of interest, citing information sources and respecting copyright. The resulting code might be fairly vague and aspirational because of differences among the field’s leaders. Even so, simply having this debate would be an important step forward.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on May 28, 2025 and expanded on Oct. 6, 2026. The entire series can be viewed here or here. Specifications and production figures are from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006). Automobile Catalog (2025), Flory (2013) and Gunnell (2002).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Automobile Catalog; 2025. “Full detailed specifications listing and photo gallery.” Accessed May 28.
- Bond, Vince Jr.; 2020. “Grand Wagoneer goes boldly into the future.” Automotive News. Posted September 7; accessed September 7.
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2013. American Cars, 1973-1980. McFarland & Co., Inc.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 1993. American Motors: The Last Independent. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- ——; 2013. American Motors Corporation: The Rise and Fall of America’s Last Independent Automaker. MBI Publishing Co., Minneapolis, MN.
- ——; 2018. “My Friend Roy.” Hemmings. Posted Sept. 23.
- Frontline; 2026. YouTube page accessed Oct. 6.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Ligo, Joe; 2025a. “The Pacer.” Episode 4 of The Last Independent Automaker. Aired on PBS May 5.
- ——; 2025b. “How My Team Tracked Down Over 35 Weird, Original AMC Cars To Film For Our Documentary.” The Autopian. Posted May 23.
- ——; 2025c. “The Last Independent Automaker – a documentary.” gofundme.com. Accessed May 28.
- NBC; 2005. “GM pulls ads from L.A. Times over coverage.” Posted April 7.
- Society of Automotive Historians; 2026. “2026 Society of Automotive Historians Annual Awards Banquet Results.” Page accessed Oct. 6.
- The Drive; 2025. “Joe Ligo.” Accessed May 28.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: AMC (1974)
- oldcarbrochures.org: AMC Matador (1974)
About the only thing AMC did correctly in terms of product development in the seventies was the Hornet. The Matador, Pacer and Gremlin were truly different, but not necessarily in a good way. It is my opinion these products irreparably harmed AMC. At least the downsized Jeep and the crossover derivatives from the Hornet were delivered in the 1980’s but by that time AMC was pretty much a lost cause.
I wouldn’t include the Gremlin as one of AMC’s mistakes; given the state of their finances the Gremlin approach was a very innovative and cost-effective way to get into the subcompact field. Where AMC went off the rails was in designing the ‘74 Matador coupe as a standalone product instead of a more common design that would have included redoing the sedan and wagon; even if the coupe had sold well (which it didn’t), it condemned the already stale sedan and wagon to a slow death (and yes, their Jimmy Durante facelift should have resulted in Teague’s immediate firing).
Even worse, the failure of the Matador (and of the ‘75 Pacer) drained the company of the money it should have spent on redoing the Hornet, which was already in its fifth year on the market by 1974 and rapidly growing stale as well.
I agree that the Gremlin was a good way to plug a market segment with a very cheap solution.
As for the horrible nose job, I might want to temper the critisizm of Teague without understanding the corporate dymanics that got to that solution. It would make a large difference on how the blame gets spread around if that was something dictated by non-Design management and approved over the objection of Design.
As we look at this time period of AMC they had a long list of areas that needed addressing with a financial pie too small to do all that needed to be done.
The 1974 Matador sedan and wagon’s nose had a similar shape as the extended snout on an aborted 1972 reskinning. It arguably worked a lot better on the latter design because all of the sheetmetal was new, so the grille could be lower and better integrated. In addition, the prototypes shown in Foster’s 2013 AMC book didn’t have 5-mph bumpers, so they looked a lot less bulky. Meanwhile, if you look under the hood of a 1974 Matador coupe, you’ll see inner bracing for an elongated snout, so that leads me to wonder whether it was shared with the sedan and wagon.
I remember seeing sketches in car-buff magazines a few years earlier of a Hornet with an similar elongated snout, so that suggests to me that this was a theme that Teague had been developing for multiple models. In other words, it seems like a reasonable guess that he came up with the original idea. Perhaps once management decided that only minimal money would be spent on facelifting the 1974 Matador sedan and wagon, it was also decided to carry over the inner bracing from the aborted reskinning because it would also fit on the longer-nosed coupe.
So, in a sense Teague may have been stuck with the basic shape but was unable to make it work better by redesigning the front fenders as well as the hood. However, it would surprise me if management came up with the theme to begin with. In addition, I would be surprised if Teague was micromanaged on that truly ugly grille. If he had the clout to get management to produce the Matador coupe and the Pacer, surely he could have talked them into a better looking grille for the 1974 sedan/wagon.
My thought is what would Romney have done ? I believe he would have doubled down on the American / Classic / Ambassador line-up, but no AMX. The Javelin greenlight is a toss-up, but the transition to the Hornet was far more critical to AMC’s survival than the pony-car, in my opinion. The Ambassadors should have been positioned as the luxury AMC brougham coupe, sedan and station wagon to compete with Dodge, Mercury, Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick Le Sabre, fully equipped with power-everything. Did AMC need the Gremlin ? Maybe, but a four-cylinder base Hornet sedan makes more sense to me. Then a true compact with a four-banger and a five-speed transmission could have been developed instead of the woe-begotten Pacer. The Matador coupe was a mistake. Remember the 1974 national ad campaign: “What’s a Matador ?” It did not work for the big Dodge in 1960 and it did not register for AMC either.
The AMX, like the Gremlin, was a pretty cheap spinoff of another AMC product. The Javelin itself probably was a bigger miscue because it jumped in on a shrinking slice of the market. By 1971, muscle cars in general and pony cars in particular were evaporating. AMC put new fenders and quarters on the 1971 Javelin but that was a wasted effort.
I was 16 years old in 1974, pretty much all of the new cars that year horrified me. I hated the bumpers and the ill fated seat belt interlock. I remember the first Matador coupe I saw, it was being driven by a local sportscaster who shilled for a large AMC dealer, I don’t think he bought it on his own. To me, it symbolized the bloat and garish styling that seemed to hit a peak in 1974. It still strikes my eye as ridiculous. Not that I had the money to do it, but had I been in the market for a new car in 1974, I do know that there was a 100% chance it wouldn’t have been anything from AMC.
l would like to echo your comments on the Matador Coupe styling. “Horrific” was my reaction when new – and it still is.
A friend and l tested a “presentable” used Coupe in the very early 80’s. Yup, horrific build quality and fittings too. My boss inherited a well optioned one from his father-in-law. lt drove badly and he couldn’t wait to get rid of it. l’m hard-pressed to think of anything redeemable about this car. It almost makes a ’57 Scotsman look good!
The Sportabout and the Hornet Hatchback were pretty appealing to me in 1974. Hornets and Gremlins had cheap economy car interiors, but so did other American compacts. They weren’t worse than Mavericks and Mopars.
The 1974 model year was AMC’s all time high. It outsold any of the Romney Rambler years, tho it was a smaller share of the market. Rambler sometimes outsold Plymouth in the Romney days.
The Matador coupe was a dud when the market was switching to little luxury cars like Cutlass and Granada instead of sporty midsizers like the Charger. The Pacer sold REALLY well when it was introduced, then the market stopped buying it. The Pacer sold so well when it was introduced that AMC actually expanded capacity.
I imagine the rushed expanded capacity had something to do with build quality issues. Regarding the Wankel issue, was there any AMC engineering input perhaps leading to co production or was it just an understanding that AMC would buy the engines over the counter. I would think that AMC would be leery of the latter with Packard engine purchase some 15=20 years earlier. Don’t these companies have any institutional memory?
Chapin was around during the early days of American Motors, so I am surprised that he allowed a plan to go forward that relied on engines from another automaker — even if a goal had been to eventually build rotary engines themselves. I don’t know what they had planned on the latter front. However, Teague still seemed to still be enthusiastic about the prospects of the rotary engine when he participated in an oral history interview in the 1980s.
Alot of your readers despise the Matador coupe.Give me a fire engine red 1974 MatadorX with factory styled road wheels, factory white bucket seats,white stripes, the360 v8 or bigger, dual exhausts, GORGEOUS, and the style is not dated like the popular Ford Fairmont,the turtle shaped Ford Mustang,the various bulbus Plymouth Barracudas,or dramatic opera windowed COUPES. Then how they sold rust bucket Aspens with adding a new dimension of recalls along with theChevy Vega.Bottom line, have enough dealers and a good advertiser and you can sell a Yugo.Won ‘t forget the Citation,another home run until it wasn’t .The Chrysler rescue, OH MY!
This leads to a consideration of product timing. Is it a bad ill-conceived car or was its main failing that it arrived at the wrong time? The Matador was trying to be something straddling a sportiness effe3ct when the market moved brougham. Could this be trying to find a niche that the Big 3 abandoned?
I don’t have a hate for the Matador coupe. Though not a love for it the way that Glen does. It certainly was not a “go for baroque” design like the 2nd gen Monte Carlo or the stiff Thunderbird that lacked finesse.
I don’t despise the Matador coupe; it was an interesting design for the times. Teague was unusual in that he didn’t throw away his french curves like so many 1970s designers, who increasingly gravitated toward a boxy or broughamtastic look. That said, I do wish that the Matador coupe had been a size smaller, such as on the Hornet platform. In that scenario it would have been a next-generation Javelin pony car. But then I also think that AMC should have bumped the Ambassador down to the Hornet platform and marketed it as a Granada-style luxury compact.
AMC already had a Hornet sized fastback in the Sportabout. Couldn AMC get away with a luxury compact? They would have to have completely different exterior sheetmetal to do it right. You don’t need the AMC Versailles. In fact I’d go for the Cordoba market. If there’s any money left over I’d do a serious reskin of the Matador sedan and wagon, but keep it conventional.
If AMC decided to redesign the Javelin on the Hornet platform I would think that they might not have chosen to introduce the Hornet hatchback. Perhaps they would have come out with a semi-fastback coupe instead (the two-door sedan sold poorly compared to the sportier Duster, Nova and Maverick two-door models). They also could have made the Javelin a fancier Hornet, such as by sharing major sheet metal such as windshield and doors but perhaps having a swoopier front and rear end.