(EXPANDED FROM 7/11/2023)
Car-buff writers didn’t know it at the time, but the new-for-1967 Imperial would be Chrysler’s last big push in the luxury-car field. Although the brand lost its exclusive platform — just like Lincoln would three years later — Chrysler Corporation gave the Imperial unique sheetmetal, an expanded lineup, and a splashy ad campaign headlined, “the newest prestige automobile in a decade.”
That headline hinted that the last time America had a new prestige automobile was in 1957, when Imperial challenged Lincoln for second place in sales with dramatic neo-classical styling that sported innovations such as curved side glass (go here for further discussion).
Alas, that would prove to be beginner’s luck. By 1966 the Imperial’s share of the luxury-car field had fallen by two-thirds to only 5.2 percent. This was likely not enough to justify the expense of a stand-alone brand.
Something had to be done, so for 1967 the Imperial was given not just a new, more modern body — but also a very different look. Car Life magazine described it as “in unity with the remainder of the corporate fleet. Relatively clean lines weren’t objectionable — or particularly exciting” (1967, p. 65).
That was a more positive take than that of Richard M. Langworth and Jan P. Norbye, who called the design “conservative and not very distinguished” (1985, p. 207).
Chrysler tries to make retrenchment look good
The 1967 Imperial was based on Chrysler’s full-sized, unit-body platform. But unlike Imperials built from 1969 onward, the 1967-68 models did not share any sheetmetal with lower-priced Chryslers except for some rooflines.
Imperials were also given a three-inch-longer wheelbase ahead of the cowl, but the roughly $1,000 extra for an entry-level model over a top-end Chrysler New Yorker did not buy you any additional interior space.
What your extra money did buy was Chrysler Corp.’s biggest dinosaur in the driveway, stretching almost 225 inches in length. That was a hair longer than the lower-priced Cadillacs and almost four inches more than the Lincoln.
You also got a 440-cubic-inch V8, which for one more year would win the “mine’s-bigger-than-yours” contest with Cadillac (but not Lincoln). On the other hand, this engine lacked the exclusivity of its competitors, for those who cared about such things.
For 1967 the Imperial’s lineup was expanded to include a new entry-level model. Called simply the Imperial sedan, it listed for $5,374. That was almost $500 less than the mid-level Crown series and in the same ballpark as Cadillac’s low-end Calais.
Otherwise, the Imperial’s lineup tended to be priced a notch higher than Cadillac’s. For example, whereas the Imperial convertible was priced at $6,146, the equivalent DeVille body style went for $5,608. Meanwhile, the Imperial’s top-of-line LeBaron listed at $6,540, which was slightly above a Fleetwood Sixty Special’s price of $6,423.
Car Life: Imperial indistinguishable in blindfold test
A Car Life road test of the Imperial was fairly upbeat: “It is clear that Chrysler, after running a poor third to Cadillac and Continental for longer than Chrysler management cares to remember, is aiming for a larger slice of the booming luxury market. And it might just earn that bigger piece of the action, provided Imperial can overcome its rich-little-old-lady’s-car image” (1967, p. 65).
When assessing a Crown four-door hardtop, Car Life suggested that one “comparison that came to mind during several days of living with the car was that it would be quite interesting to blindfold a series of subjects and drive them in one example each of the Luxury Three. Though it wasn’t practical to conduct this experiment, there was little doubt that test subjects would have been unable to distinguish Imperial from Cadillac or Continental by virtue of shortcomings in any of the sensory areas — ride, noise level, seating comfort, acceleration or cornering sway” (1967, p. 65).
Car Life concluded its road test with an awkwardly worded punt: “Taken as a package, and relating to its two traditional luxury competitors, the Imperial is well worth the consideration of anyone ready to purchase in this price range. Does it have the indefinable quality of prestige which equates closely with the appeal inherent in Continental and Cadillac? Who can say? The sales figures a year from now will be the only positive indicator” (1967, p. 69).
All that fanfare doesn’t move the needle much
Imperial output grew by 28 percent in 1967, but it was still under 18,000 units. That was well below the last major redesign in 1964, when production surpassed 23,000 units. This was doubly problematic because the luxury-car field had grown almost 17 percent over the last four years. During that time period Lincoln production increased by 26 percent.
Meanwhile, Cadillac’s regular lineup was up almost 10 percent between 1964-67 even when you subtract output of the Eldorado. Indeed, Cadillac’s new-for-1967 personal coupe outsold the entire Imperial lineup despite an almost $6,300 price tag, which topped every Imperial model except the LeBaron.
Also see ‘1964 Imperial could have been a better Lincoln Continental’
Simply put, Imperial wasn’t keeping up. Whereas in 1957 the brand garnered almost 16.6 percent of the luxury-car field, 10 years later it only captured 6.7 percent. That was even lower than the bad-old days of 1961-63.
You could argue that the 1967 Imperial didn’t stand out enough to make a sales breakthrough akin to 10 years earlier. This may have been partly due to inheriting a platform that wasn’t very innovative. But even unique touches such as the swivel seats didn’t have many takers — and disappeared from the Imperial brochure in 1968. There simply wasn’t enough there there to make the brand competitive.
NOTES:
This story was orginally posted July 11, 2023 and expanded on Aug. 20, 2025. Prices, specifications and production figures are from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Flory (2004) and Gunnell (2002). Market share calculated from these sources.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Car Life; 1967. “Imperial Crown: Comfort Competitor in the Luxury League.” January issue: pp. 65-69. Posted in Automotive History Preservation Society’s Digital Documents Library.
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2004. American Cars, 1960-1972. McFarland & Co., Inc.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985. Publications International, Skokie, IL.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Imperial (1967)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Imperial (1967, 1968, 1969)
You’ve hit on the main problem with the 1967 Imperial: “Imperials were also given a three-inch-longer wheelbase ahead of the cowl, but the roughly $1,000 extra for an entry-level model over a top-end Chrysler New Yorker did not buy you any additional interior space.”
That $1,000 wasn’t nothing at the time; it represented about a fifth of the Imperial’s base price. I’d certainly have gone with the Chrysler New Yorker.
Couldn’t the same be said about the differential between C body Cadillacs and the Ninety Eight or Electra?
I think dealer experience must have been a significant factor. When you bought and serviced a Cadillac, you dealt only with Cadillac people. You bought and serviced an Imperial dealing with people who also dealt with Plymouth customers. So not a very exclusive ownership experience.
When I was a kid I’d pore over automotive data much like a baseball fan would dwell on batting averages. Did all those numbers matter much to the average car buyer? In retrospect, I suspect that what mattered more was a potential car buyer’s sensory experience in checking out a car at the dealer or auto show. For example, whether the Imperial had the same back-seat room as a lowly Chrysler Newport may not have mattered as much as whether the customer fit comfortably in the car.
I didn’t mention dealer experience because I didn’t have enough information on it. In theory, it would make sense if a luxury-car owner felt more “special” at a Cadillac dealer than a Chrysler-Plymouth dealer. That said, I have no idea if the biggest Imperial dealers tried to mitigate that problem at least partially with the likes of separate showrooms or designated sales people. The other thing I wonder is whether a lot of Cadillac and Lincoln dealers were paired with popularly-priced makes in more rural areas — which make up a goodly portion of the nation’s geography. If so, how might that have impacted a buyer’s experience with sales and service?
My hometown had a Chevrolet-Cadillac-Oldsmobile dealer, and the neighboring town (11 miles away) had a Buick-Cadillac-Pontiac dealer.
Harrisburg – the nearest city – had a Cadillac-Oldsmobile dealer.
That arrangement didn’t seem to hamper sales of Cadillacs in the region.
Then again, a fair number of customers who bought full-size Buicks and Oldsmobiles during that time (1970s) were well-to-do, so I doubt they would have tolerated poor sales and service for long, even if they could quite not afford (or simply chose not to buy, for other reasons) a Cadillac.
Cadillac-Oldsmobile-GMC in my neck of the woods. Even at Cadillac prices, you couldn’t bring in enough money to keep the lights on all month.
My recollection of rural dealerships in the 50s-70s were usually Chevy-Olds and Buick-Pontiac-GMC. These were the small town dealers, little more than store fronts. I don’t recall Cadillac dealers either stand alone or combined in any of the small towns. I vaguely recall a Cadillac dealer in Green Bay paired with Studebaker, but don’t quote me.
How about Lincoln? (My memory is too foggy.)
Lincoln was always paired with Mercury as far as I recall. Which is a less plebeian pairing than Imperial with Plymouth, but does tend to indicate a competitive disadvantage of Lincoln relative to Cadillac.
Never any Lincoln/Mercury pairings with Ford dealers in smaller markets?
I don’t really recall. Offhand I;d say the Ford dealers were back from the Model T days. When Ford took on Lincoln in the 20s they had their own mostly urban dealer network, and Cheney’s Ford Sinclair and A &W in Lakewood Wisconsin (a real place back then) had no use for Lincolns. If I may add, cars from a given manufacturer have a certain corporate look. You don’t need potential customers for your flagship car noting a family resemblance to a more plebian car in the showroom.
There were Cadillac dealers who were paired with Olds, even Chevy dealers, but these were old-line dealerships in small markets in Indiana that dated from the 1930s. By the turn of the century, that changed. One dealership was Mark French Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac-G.M.C. in Brazil, IN (until the 2009 G.M. bankruptcy). The French’s also owned the Cadillac dealership down U.S. 40 in Terre Haute. There were was Inskeep Ford-Mercury-Lincoln in Greenfield, IN as well, also located on the National Road.
210delray and DECG50 are both right, in my opinion. While I like the 1967-1968 Imperials’ styling, both the added length only ahead of the cowl with no added rear-seat room and the dealership experience might put me off if I found a 1967-1968 Cadillac or Lincoln superior. I felt that Chrysler’s high-line interiors were superior in terms of opulence, but the build quality of full-size cars by 1967 were visible in the showrooms. Too bad for Lynn Townsend, but he could have demanded a fix to the problem.
Wealth is one thing, but having Jeeves drive you and the dogs out to the back forty so that you can shoot some pheasants is a level of privilege that I was not prepared for.
ALL Lincoln dealers were dualed with Mercury, plus Ford in small markets. Cadillac was able to maintain more exclusive stores in only cities, but an Oldsmobile/ Cadillac or other dual was very common even in suburbs. Imperial had Plymouth – and Chrysler.
The 67/68 models were a low end of the Engel box era at Chrylser IMHO. Interestingly, the fuselage 1969 Imperial sold a record 40K plus units despite being “derivative” as the 67/68 models. IMHO again the Cadillac of the era were pretty well screwed together, a sharp contrast to the sloppy assembly of most Chrysler products then, tanking sales despite many product and engineering advantages. L. Townsend’s major failure as CEO was an inability to get manufacturing in line.
Mark, I agree that a major failure of Townsend was to get manufacturing in line. The data I have access to says that for 1969 Imperial production totaled 22,077 units. That particular figure is from Richard Langworth’s Chrysler/Imperial book. His numbers are not identical to those those published by the auto editors of Consumer Guide, but they are close enough to make comparisons.
According to Langworth’s numbers, Imperial had its third-highest production level in 1969, behind 1964 and 1957. What’s interesting about the fuselage era is that after 1969 output fell substantially — to under 12,000 in 1970 and 1971. The reskinning in 1972 led to an uptick to around 16,000 in 1972-73. Of course, production data will inevitably vary from sales figures or registrations.
I remember a ChryCo staffer saying that a well assembled ChryCo was as well built as a GM or Ford. The problem was that a poorly assembled one was far, far worse though.
The sad part of Chrysler Corporation’s struggles with build quality in the late 1960s was that Lynn Townsend HAD presided over a dramatic improvement in quality in the early 1960s, when he first took over leadership of the corporation.
Beginning in 1962, and through 1965, Chrysler Corporation cars regularly received fewer complaints about poor workmanship and build quality than their GM and Ford competitors in the “Owners Reports” series published by Popular Mechanics.
Chrysler Corporation cars also scored well in Consumer Reports reliability surveys during those years. In the magazine’s 1965 Annual Auto Issue, the domestic manufacturer that rated tops in terms of the condition of cars that were delivered to customers was…Chrysler Corporation!
Unfortunately, build quality and reliability began declining in 1966, and that accelerated throughout the 1960s. By 1970, Consumer Reports noted that not only did Chrysler Corporation cars have more manufacturing defects than the AMC, Ford and GM competitors it had tested, but those defects tended to be more serious.
It’s interesting to note that Chrysler Corporation began using the Sales Bank as a method to artificially boost production 1966. This meant that cars were often built without a firm dealer order. These cars were often stored in outdoor lots for weeks until corporate sales personnel could persuade – or threaten – dealers to accept these cars. The cars were also supposedly rushed through the plants, as well.
Perhaps the deterioration of quality was linked to the corporation instituting the Sales Bank?
Those build quality issues also plagued the Imperial, which hardly helped it make inroads among Cadillac and Lincoln customers. The 1967-68 models are handsome – the basic design has a no-nonsense, broad-shouldered look that has worn well – but Imperial simply looked too much like a Chrysler. In retrospect, Chrysler should have done what it did in 1976. Namely, keep the Imperial’s unique styling, lower the price, and sell it as a New Yorker. It would have been a strong Buick Electra and Oldsmobile Ninety-Eight competitor.
I think there were three factors. In no particular order. One was that Chrysler under Townsend did not invest in plant and equipment at the rate required to sustain the capital stock, with the result that foundry and assembly was taking place on worn out lines and equipment. Another was that the way they improved quality in the early ’60s was to slow down the lines and add corrective quality control at the end of assembly, which is not a sustainable strategy in a capital intensive business (and why the Toyota Production System was the real innovation that elevated quality). Third Chrysler’s outside part sourcing system was cost rather than quality focused, with the result that it delivered cars to customers with a lot of defective parts manufactured by third parties.