The 1951 Kaiser was trumpeted as having “anatomic design” — that is, it was made to fit the needs of the human anatomy. Although the car’s unusually taunt body had some aesthetic appeal, it didn’t look right. The proportions were off . . . and something seemed missing. Kind of like a Barbie Doll.
So instead of becoming the car that saved the fledgling Kaiser-Frazer Corporation, the anatomic Kaiser helped to bury its passenger-car aspirations.
Let’s start by talking about the car’s positive attributes. When compared with the early postwar designs of other independent automakers, the anatomic Kaiser arguably showed the greatest potential of them all in two key respects.
First, the Kaiser had the lowest beltline of any early-50s big family car. That could have allowed the financially struggling automaker to stay more competitive with the Big Three’s lower-slung cars in the late-50s without a complete redesign. Of the other independents, only Studebaker offered such a sleek car — the 1953 “Loewy coupes” — but they were never given four-door models.
Second, the Kaiser had a “mid-sized” body that was narrower (by as much as six inches) and lighter (by as much as 600 pounds) than other full-sized cars but three inches wider than the more compact Studebaker.
The Kaiser’s length (208.5 inches) and wheelbase (118.5 inches) were more typical of its big competitors. However, the automaker could have pioneered a promising niche if it had been able to bring to production a proposed sedan that was based on the standard Kaiser but had a 10-inch-shorter wheelbase.
So what went wrong with the anatomic Kaiser?
The biggest problem was that the car’s chassis had an old-fashioned shape that robbed the rear seat of headroom without increasing the height of the greenhouse (Langworth, 1975). That led to a stylistic compromise — a weird, egg-shaped roofline.
In contrast, an early clay mockup had a lower roofline and thin door-window frames that looked outstanding. It could have been an instant classic.
A less discussed problem was how the car’s teardrop shape reduced trunk space — somewhat like on the Loewy coupes. Alas, that was less of an issue for a sporty car than a family sedan.
Also see ‘1955 Studebaker President hardtop hints at a road not taken’
This brings up one of the biggest tragedies of the 1951 Kaiser — its low-slung body was ideally suited for a two-door hardtop but one was never offered. Instead, the automaker bet on a two-door Traveler hatchback, a two-door coupe and a two-door sedan. These body styles sold poorly enough that Kaiser could have plausibly gotten by without them, much as the automaker had with the first-generation models.
The ideal anatomic Kaiser would have had a step-down chassis that made possible a roomy interior despite having a radically low roofline for the early-50s. A more squared-off beltline and deck could have resulted in a bigger trunk.
In addition, the automaker might have been able to afford a two-door hardtop if the four-door sedan used thin door-window frames that would have allowed the roofline to be shared by both body styles.
What about the lack of a V8 engine?
Richard M. Langworth argued that Kaiser’s inability to build or buy a V8 was “without doubt the single most important factor in the sales decline after 1950” (1975, p. 238). He went on to discuss what designer Howard “Dutch” Darrin had proposed to Kaiser management: Instead of developing a completely different body for the compact Henry J, it could have been based on a shortened version of the big Kaiser.
Also see ‘Why V8 engines were less important in the 1950s than commonly believed’
Darrin, a consultant who designed the anatomic Kaiser, told Langworth that a smaller two-door model would have been like “an early Mustang. And with the funds saved by use of the stock sheet metal we could have bought that V-8, used it in both the small car and the large Kaiser — and today K-F would be bigger than American Motors” (1975, p. 238).
Darrin’s Henry J wasn’t the most important possibility
I am skeptical that a Kaiser-based compact would have sold as well as the Nash Rambler. Such a car would have been too wide and heavy to be competitive in fuel economy.
However, a shortened Kaiser would have offered much better economies of scale than the Henry J. Indeed, Kaiser would have achieved a significant advantage over other independents that split their limited resources by offering a compact and big car using different platforms.
Langworth’s (1975) book showed diagrams of another proposed car that could have played an even bigger role in keeping Kaiser alive — a mid-sized sedan apparently priced at the low end of the market.
Here it is important to note that the big Kaisers were fairly expensive even for a premium-priced brand. The entry-level 1951 Kaiser four-door sedan listed for $2,212. That was higher than a bottom-end Hudson Pacemaker and a Buick Special as well as just a few dollars less than Oldsmobile’s mid-level Super 88.
It’s hard to see how Kaiser could have had a chance of survival without moving downmarket. A mid-sized Kaiser would have fit nicely between a Rambler and a standard-sized big car.
Naught but the barbie doll of early postwar car designs
The 1951 anatomic Kaiser was one of the most interesting U.S. automotive designs of its time. Thus, it’s unfortunate that the car suffered from major weaknesses — most of which could have been avoided if management had listened to Darrin.
His early proposal would likely have sold better, and smaller variants could have given the automaker the breadth of lineup — and economies of scale — that it needed to survive. Instead, the big Kaiser saw output fall to a meager 32,000 units in 1952 after only one good (if extended) model year of production, when almost 140,000 cars left the factory. Henry J output collapsed in a similar fashion: from almost 82,000 units in 1951 to under 26,000 the next model year.
Also see ‘The 1949 Kaiser-Frazer’s new body styles showed the limits to innovation’
By 1953 output of the Kaiser and Henry J together fell to under 47,000 units. That was only slightly higher than Lincoln and well below Packard and Hudson.
The Kaiser-Frazer Corporation had so many things going against it — including inexperienced but arrogant management — that nothing might have kept alive the upstart automaker’s passenger-car ambitions. Nevertheless, the anatomic Kaiser had enough promise that it’s too bad management failed to get some crucial details right.
NOTES:
Specifications, prices and production figures are from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Gunnell (2002), Langworth (1975).
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2002. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1975. Kaiser-Frazer: The Last Onslaught on Detroit. Princeton Publishing, Princeton, NJ.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- wildaboutcarsonline.com (Automotive History Preservation Society): Kaiser (1951)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Kaiser (1951)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Kaiser (1951)
In a scenario where they are able to field a V8 what would have been the best course of action for Kaiser, a mid-sized sedan priced at the low end of the market followed by a smaller Henry J type model or a better styled / future-proofed Kaiser with mid-sized sedan and shortened 2-door model (assuming the latter two are not one and the same in practice)?
As mentioned in the article the odds are stacked against them, however did ponder what the likely best case scenario is for Kaiser (in tandem with a Willys-Overland in a position to produce a post-war Americar) before merging with AMC or another company (or embracing JVs) on a more equal footing later on and the effect it would have in posing a threat to Chrysler’s status as the last of the Big Three?
They missed the boat twice concerning the mid-sized car. Could not the Willys Aero have been properly face lifted/modified to be a mid-sized contender? It was a sound car – and with the 226 CID engine (as they did use in’55), it was a performer.
Perhaps it was just to late – or Henry K was stubborn enough to not let a non-Kaiser-developed machine become a success? Probably the former.
There are photos online of a proposed Willys major facelift that looks really good. The ideas to me seem to have too much sheetmetal sharing. Personally I like hatchback sedans and 3 doors, but Kaiser cornered a market that was not there at the time. They should have made a wagon.
The tiny people in their car ads remind me of a Bruce Mccall parody
Henry J. Kaiser would not listen to sales pro Joe Frazer. I doubt if he listened to much of what Dutch Darrin suggested. With Chrysler ramping up with the new Hemi V-8 in 1951 and then hiring Exner to make the styling go to the next level, FoMoCo stepping up to upgrade its suspensions and replace the flatheads with OHV-engines and General Motors doing everything for 1954 and 1955 to keep its leadership position, I do not think the Kaisers’ even thought about Nash, Studebaker or Hudson. Perhaps in 1952 and 1953, Joe Frazer was plugged in enough to sense what was coming from his Detroit auto colleagues. I wonder what Frazer’s reaction was when he realized that the 1954 model-year sales war between Ford and Chevrolet had escalated to a level never seen before ? Kaiser-Frazer’s body style options were no more as awful as those the existed with the 1953 Studebakers. I guess Henry J. more insulated from his automaking brethren than the rest, or, if he heard the gossip, he was in complete and utter denial. Poor radio, film and TV star John Larkin, who was the second TV spokesperson after Rex Marshall, looking straight into the camera, telling viewers of his trip to the Kaiser proving grounds, where he watched the 1953 Henry J being tested, so “If you see what I saw…,…you’ll rush down tomorrow to your Kaiser-Frazer dealer…!” I hope Larkin was paid a boatload of money and that the check cleared ! Kaiser never stood a chance, and I would bet that even Larkin knew it when he finished the filming. (There are clips of this commercial on YouTube.)
Was Joe Frazer ever made whole for his Graham-Paige capital investment ?
A Time magazine report on the commencement of production at Willow Run says the cars sat on the existing Graham-Paige chassis. That would account for the relative narrowness and old style ladder construction.
As for a mid size, the problem is it isn’t much cheaper to build a smaller car. Material costs are marginally less, but capital and labor costs are the same. So absent similar economies of scale, competing on price with Chevrolet and Ford would have been a losing proposition.
That’s a reasonable theory about the chassis. I’ll take another look at Langworth’s book to see if he delves into the cost of revising the frame. If they had not given the Henry J a distinct body they might have had more wiggle room financially for a new chassis.
On competing with Ford and Chevy, I would think that Kaiser would have faced a similar situation as AMC. They were able to price the Rambler competitively, so why wouldn’t Kaiser have been able to follow suit — particularly if a mid-sized car shared major components with the big car and perhaps a compact? Kaiser could have had better economies of scale than the Rambler prior to it becoming AMC’s sole platform.
Despite its origins as the 1948 AMP prototype, would the Henry J and Allstate possessing a less distant body have allowed for it to receive a proper boot if not a Traveller and Vaganond style split-tailgate hatchback or was there another way they could have aimed for the Rambler?
Was it within the company’s ability to feature a 3 car range, from a Big Kaiser and mid-sized 108.5-inch model followed by a better conceived Henry J?
My point really was that as against the early 50s Chevrolet and Ford, which then were still smaller than mid priced cars like the Kaiser, there would be no competitive advantage to make up for the inferior economics.
As for Rambler, remember Mason originally positioned it as a niche product with a premium price relative to the offering. It survived competitive substitution by Chevrolets and Fords where the Hudson Jet and Aero Willys did not.
I know you valorize Romney, but I think his Rambler strategy was never going to remain successful long-term, for the same economic reasons. You might be able to sell Ramblers at a full-size Ford price and make a profit, but as soon as you establish there is a market for such a vehicle, you draw Ford to make a Fairlane with its superior manufacturing economics, and the GM to make the Chevelle. It is a classic case of competition driving reversion to the mean. In the meantime, Romney’s strategy eroded the brand equity Mason’s had built.
When I referred to a “mid-sized” car, I meant something like the proposed Kaiser with a 108.5-inch wheelbase. It would have essentially been a big Kaiser with 10 inches taken out of the wheelbase.
Note that Romney didn’t bring the Nash Rambler downmarket — Mason did in 1954, when he added a handful of body styles and slashed entry-level prices so they were competitive with those of Chevy and Ford. It’s a good thing Mason did that when he did because the Rambler’s strong sales in 1954-55 helped to compensate for the decline and fall of the big Nash.
It’s interesting to me how often Mason gets a free ride by historians, both professional and armchair. I suspect that if he had lived, AMC would not have navigated the late-50s nearly as easily as under Romney. Part of the problem was that Mason stuck with Airflyte styling too long. But even if Nashes hadn’t looked so weird, AMC was too small to keep two distinct platforms competitive. In addition, Mason likely would have invested in a major redesign of the big Nash rather than the compact Rambler in 1956 or 1957.
We know with the luxury of hindsight that the premium-priced market tanked in the late-50s, so it is hard to see how a big Nash and Hudson could have generated much, if any, profit. I suspect that if the 1955 Rambler body and lineup had been kept around for another four years that it could have saved the company, but Mason eventually would have been confronted with the question of whether to ditch the full-sized platform because its sales had become too marginal. And because Mason would have been much slower than Romney in updating the Rambler, it might not have gained the standing it had in the market that Romney’s Ramblers did.
During the early-60s the only Rambler models with prices approaching those of big Fords were the Ambassador. How do you account for AMC’s profitability during those years when the American and Classic were priced competitively against Big Three compacts and intermediates, respectively?
I think that Romney understood economies of scale better than other independent auto execs of the postwar era, but he made meaningful mistakes, which I itemize here. We don’t know what would have happened if Romney had stayed at AMC past 1962, but we do know that his successors’ attempts to play follow the leader failed (go here for further discussion).