Jim Dunne predicted in the January 1977 issue of Popular Science that the compact platform used for the Plymouth Volare and Dodge Aspen would be stretched for the Chrysler Corporation’s next-generation big cars:
“At least that is the plan for the full-size cars of the future from Chrysler Corporation. New Gran Fury, Royal Monaco, and Newport models that will debut before 1980 are scheduled for an elongated version of the Volare body. Wheelbase will be increased from the 112.5 inches of the Volare four-door to 116.5. That’s just about the size of Chrysler’s intermediate models right now.
Chrysler’s plans follow GM fairly closely. GM’s new big cars are approximately the same size as their intermediates. The smaller size will mean lighter weight, better fuel economy, and easier driving in traffic.
The new models are in addition to the [Chrysler] LeBaron and [Dodge] Diplomat that Chrysler will introduce later this year. It’s part of the shifting act the company plans, to downsize its entire lineup by 1980.”
— Jim Dunne, “Detroit Report” (1977, p. 30)
Of course, that’s not how things turned out. For the 1979 model year, Chrysler introduced new “R-body” big cars that were sized similarly to the automaker’s old intermediates. This made for a somewhat larger and heavier car than a stretched “F-body” Volare/Aspen would have been.
Note that in this story I will mostly refer to the F-body even though it was supplanted by the “M-body” in 1981. The latter had so few differences from the F-body that it arguably didn’t deserve its own nomenclature. The M-body may have been dreamed up by marketeers to avoid tarring the Diplomat/LeBaron with the bad reputation of the defect-riddled early Volare/Aspen.
Chrysler’s R-body big cars followed in GM’s footsteps
Chrysler’s “me-too” management apparently assumed that it needed to field entries that competed head-to-head with General Motors’ downsized big cars.
As a case in point, Dodge’s version of the R-body — the St. Regis — was similar in size to the Chevrolet Caprice. However, the new Dodge was slightly larger in external dimensions. This translated into slightly more interior room and truck space.
The St. Regis was actually closer in size to the mid-sized “B-body” Dodge Monaco, which was discontinued at the end of 1977.
Compared to the Volare, the St. Regis was 4.3 inches wider, which translated into around five more inches of front and rear shoulder room . . . but less than a half inch more hip room. Trunk space was up more than five cubic feet but the weight penalty was around 500 pounds.
Also see ‘Compact cars became the neglected stepchildren of U.S. automakers’
A stretched F-body would have been less competitive with GM and Ford’s big cars in shoulder room. However, a Volare-based design could have had a somewhat smaller footprint and weighed less. That might have become an advantage in the early-80s, when the buying public shifted to smaller, more fuel-efficient cars.
Did Dunne get it wrong or did Chrysler change plans?
I suspect that Dunne either heard an inaccurate rumor or stumbled across a scenario that had already been discarded. This is because his reporting likely occurred in late-1976. If the switch to the R-body occurred after that point, there presumably wouldn’t have been a whole lot of time left to come up with a new design by its introduction in October 1978 (Duricy, 2020).
Note that Lee Iacocca was not involved with the R-body’s development. He joined Chrysler shortly before the introduction of the cars (Duricy, 2020).
If Chrysler management had seriously considered switching their big cars to a stretched-F platform, it’s too bad that they changed their minds. The financially struggling automaker would have been much better off consolidating all of its remaining rear-wheel-drive passenger cars on variations of the F-body.
For starters, sticking with an F-body variant would have saved development dollars compared to the R-body, which was a substantially redesigned B-body (Duricy, 2020). In addition, over its life cycle a stretched-F could have generated considerably greater sales.
Stretched-F might have more easily survived early-80s
I am not suggesting that Volare-based big cars would have sold any better during 1979-81 than the R-body. As you can see from the above graph, the M-body variants of the Volare also struggled during that time period.
The great advantage of a stretched-F would have been better economies of scale. Even if the cars were given unique sheetmetal, they would have still shared more internal parts than an R-body. That could have allowed Chrysler’s big cars to be kept in production as long as the M-body, which was on the market through 1989 (Wikipedia, 2022).
In addition, whatever improvements were given to a stretched-F could have been shared with the M-body. By the early-80s the basic design was showing its age. More updating might have improved sales as the market for rear-wheel-drive cars revived in 1983-85.
R-body was part of a recklessly overambitious program
As the R-body was in development, Chrysler management was frantically slashing the corporation’s overhead. For example, in 1978 an unfinished assembly plant was offloaded to Volkswagen, the Airtemp air-conditioning division was sold, and the automaker’s entire European automotive operations went to Peugeot of France (Langworth and Norbye, 1985).
Also see ‘1970 Plymouth Barracuda should have been like an Australian Valiant Charger’
Despite all of those cuts, Chrysler’s product program for rear-wheel-drive passenger cars turned out to be recklessly overambitious. In addition to the R-body, management also invested scarce resources in a major redesign of its mid-sized personal coupes and brought back the Imperial.
The Chrysler Cordoba, Dodge Mirada (which replaced the Charger/Magnum) and Imperial coupes were given their own J-body. Although it pulled some components from the F-platform, the new design had more unique parts than the previous-generation Cordoba.
For example, whereas the 1975-79 Cordoba used the same windshield as other B-body coupes, the J-body’s was unique. This allowed swoopier styling, but it undercut Chrysler’s economies of scale even if the personal coupes sold well — which they did not.
The safer option would have been for Chrysler to base all of its remaining rear-wheel-drive passenger cars on an updated F-body.
NOTES:
Production figures are from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006) and Flammang and Kowalke (1999).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International; Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Dunne, Jim; 1977. “Detroit Report.” Popular Science. January issue: p. 30.
- Duricy, Dave 2020. “1979-81 Chrysler: Three Wrongs Don’t Make a Right.” Collectible Automobile. Published Feb. issue: pp. 28-39.
- Flammang, James M. and Ron Kowalke; 1999. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1976-1999. Third Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985. Publications International, Skokie, IL.
- Wikipedia; 2022. “Chrysler M Platform.” Page last modified Dec. 22.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Imperial (1980)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Dodge Diplomat (1980); Dodge Mirada (1980); Dodge St. Regis (1979); Imperial (1981); Plymouth Volare (1979)
This is an interesting take and analysis; however, it makes Chrysler Corporation as perhaps the dumbest and unluckiest of “The Big Three” in the 1970s. I agree that Chrysler lost its grip on controlling its dealers, its quality control and stuck with the sales bank to keep the U.A.W. producing cars that nowhere came up with realistic annual sales.
I still believe that on paper and from the engineering perspective, Chryslers cars were technically superior to those of General Motors and Ford, but the real sheet metal incarnations did not fell far short of expectations. Of course, Chrysler, like A.M.C., had to spread the costs of meeting government mandates over fewer cars, which put them at a competitive disadvantage. Then add the double whammy of introducing all brand-new full-size cars at the same time the first Arab oil embargo ended the era of relatively cheap gasoline with new cars that delivered on average 10-m.p.g. in the fall of 1973. Timing is everything in love, business and competition, and Chrysler, kept falling behind in product development. I remember reading in the early 1970s that Chrysler was planning to introduce the Volare / Aspens in the fall of 1974, only to delay these Valiant / Dart replacements until the late 1976 model year, forcing Chrysler’s best-selling vehicles to remain in production with worn-out dies and stale styling, which torpedoed those final models’ build quality. Chrysler’s Imperial became a New Yorker, so Chrysler and Dodge had to rely on the new for 1975 Cordoba and Charger (later Magnum) as “halo” cars. (I had well-optioned 1979 Cordoba with a T-top and a plush tan-leather interior with air and power everything as a company car for six-months. Even with the “lean-burn” 400, gas mileage was 10-m.p.g. city / 12-m.p.g. highway. I was lucky as the build quality was excellent and the only problem was when a severe Memphis overnight hailstorm shattered the tempered glass in the T-top panels!)
In my opinion, the M-bodies were the right cars at the right time for 1977, but would have been better as 1976-models, and if I put myself in the shoes of a Chrysler product planner, the R-body cars should have hit in the fall of 1977 instead of arriving with a dull thud as 1979 models. Timing doomed the R-body cars like other previous Chryslers as the Iranian hostage crisis triggered another jump in O.P.E.C. oil prices and launched a deeper recession. My wife’s uncle traded his 1978 Ford L.T.D. that he regretted buying and bought a beautiful (but flawed) triple-gray 1979 Chrysler New Yorker. It was a very quiet car, but the build quality was less than the Ford and he went back to buying Pontiacs in the summer of 1981.
If Chrysler had only built cars that could realistically be sold in the model year, thus concentrating on quality and perhaps reducing weight, while adhering to introducing its new cars sooner and much better developed, then perhaps the debacle of the Volare / Aspen and the diminished sales returns which pushed Chrysler to the brink of bankruptcy and the subsequent bailout, then maybe the R-bodys and M-bodys been more successful.
At least Chrysler had introduced the Simca-based Omnirizon at the right time, and the K-cars, which if they had hit a year earlier might have stemmed the losses that Iacocca inherited. This poses a very interesting question: If the government had not bailed out Chrysler with its loan guarantees and let it fail or merge into another company (A.M.C., Renault or Citroen-Peugeot ?), what would the automotive universe look like today ? I think the mini-van would have come along anyway as the industry moved to unit bodies and front-wheel drive. I don’t know if Chrysler’s failure would have cured the groupthink and the “Grosse Point Myopia” that still afflicted the U.S. auto industry that carried through in the 1980s and 1990s.
Iaccoca was not involved in development of the R body, but Hal Sperlich who preceded him depating Ford to join as chief Chrysler product planner in 1977 was. Perhaps he decided against a stretched F/M body after his arrival.
I think that there’s a distinction that’s missing which is the then-recent successful reboot of the GM B-bodies via a heavy revision of the Colonnade midsizers. i’m sure Sperlich and others saw this and thought this is the path forward. Surely the powers that be at Ford saw the same thing, too. It may have been a consideration, but I think that it may have been a bridge too far.
Honestly, as much love as Iacocca gets for saving Chrysler, he was still very much part of the Grosse Pointe myopia that others complain about; as time revealed, he would have broughamed all of things. However, there was still a fair amount of demand for this kind of thing, but tastes would change radically in the 1980’s.
What Chrysler couldn’t overcome was their near-death experience. While Ford suffered quietly, Iacocca going hat in hand to the US Government for loan guarantees placed a lot of uncertainty in people’s minds. That and the many quality control issues for delivered cars kept many buyers away. I would know as I was advising two of my siblings purchase a new car during that time period and the viability of Chrysler Corporation as an entity entered into out conversations. One bought a Ford product, the other bought a Mitsubishi (Colt) via a Dodge dealer.
To further reinforce the issue, my to-be father-in-law worked for a Chrysler supplier; his company cars were all Chrysler products back then. His Fifth Avenue was a fabulous car, but the sloppy assembly and crappy electrical issues ruined an otherwise great car. The Slant Six Mirada that followed was better built, but a disappointment in terms of performance and fuel mileage. It wasn’t long after he switched job and went back to GM cars as his company cars.
I think that the way things played out were probably as good as they would have gotten at the time. Iacocca managed to split that line between Brougham and Techno (Euro and Japanese) well enough to keep the company viable into the 1990’s. One can criticize the revivial of the Imperial at that time, but there was little that Chrysler had that competed directly against Cadillac. The Chrysler brand competed more with Buick and Mercury, but teething problems and a high price with the Imperial effectively killed it’s competitveness.
As the decade wore on, the eventual change to the M-body was the right choice.
George, what’s interesting to me about the big-car field in the second-half of the 1970s is that it illustrated how there was no longer a Big Three. Ford was still somewhat competitive with GM but Chrysler’s new-for-1974 C-body bombed. That was a pretty remarkable turn of events because from 1974-76 Chrysler had the newest designs.
The failure of the last-generation C-body should have brought Chrysler management to engage in some agonizing reappraisal, e.g., could it afford to be a full-line automaker anymore? Instead, management continued to try to keep up with GM.
As you note, weak quality control could still drive away customers regardless of what platform Chrysler used. But even here, one advantage of placing all rear-wheel-drive passenger cars on the F/M platform is that it could have streamlined product development and manufacture. Perhaps less complexity might have led to at least somewhat better quality. But then again, maybe not.
I’d like to expand on your mention of the big car field in the later 1970’s. Standard size cars had grown to huge proportions by then. The introduction of midsize and compact cars 10-15 years earlier, standard size cars were free become the furthest-out logical expansion of longer, lower, wider by the late-1960’s to the mid-1970’s. This created a unique environment where the behemoths could survive, a condition that wouldn’t last forever. Add in the first oil embargo, new regulations and then stagflation, the landscape would change radically in a few years.
Chrysler’s leadership made some serious gaffes regarding finance, engineering and production and by 1975-76 it showed. With the R-bodies, I’m sure they looked over the fence at GM, saw what they were doing and the success GM achieved. I believe if I were in management’s shoes, I would have done something similar. To quote an old axiom, “you can’t you go wrong buying IBM”…
The “killer app” was the hiring of Sperlich and eventually Iacocca to spearhead a very radical change in the way Chrysler built cars. They were all-in on this whole front wheel drive thing. There were a few foreign manufacturers that had FWD products in the US market at the time, but no one was really committed as heavily to FWD as Sperlich and Iacocca were about to be.
The RWD cars were kept around long enough to service a shrinking market. Your original assumption is not wrong, but I think that management correctly predicted that the standard car market was shrinking rapidly and would wither away. Had we really experienced $5/gallon fuel price by 1985 as some predicted, the RWD cars would have seen their end no matter how inexpensive they were to build.
“Your original assumption is not wrong, but I think that management correctly predicted that the standard car market was shrinking rapidly and would wither away.”
One question I have about the Iacocca era at Chrysler is why he didn’t abort both the 1980 Cordoba/Mirada (at least as they were redesigned) and the 1981 Imperial. These cars have always struck me as moving in the wrong direction. Even though they were downsized, they were still too big and, as the story mentioned, they reduced Chrysler’s economies of scale with its rear-wheel-drive cars.
Chrysler may have had the newest full-size cars in 1974-76, but the Dodge and Plymouth didn’t look new…primarily because they looked like a warmed-over 1972 Buick LeSabre. The resemblance was particularly strong with the four-door hardtops. Why buy a brand-new car that looks like your neighbor’s two-year-old Buick?
It’s telling that the Chrysler full-size cars that experienced a revival in sales after 1975 were the Chrysler Newport and New Yorker. They were also the most distinctive full-size Mopars. They didn’t look like an old Buick.
Very interesting discussion and Steve, I agree that the four-inch longer F/M-body would have been a better strategy than R-body. The platform also needed a provision for IRS for premium versions. It’s too bad the ’81 Imperial’s fuel injection system was prone to failure when driving by, if I correctly recall reading, high voltage lines. A 116.7 WB 4-door Imperial with the four inches given to rear legroom, and with the Front overhang brought in, rear notch smoothed out and wrapped taillights unwrapped, might have been a compelling international luxury car (AACA Forum). The team would have needed to buy a 280E and match it in every measure, including fit, finish and solidity.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/1013396272_1981Imperial116_7WB.jpg.e351ab833b0e52c16ce5c768e671e723.jpg
Paul, that design works quite well. If I’m seeing correctly that there’s no bustleback, I offer two thumbs way up! I wasn’t a fan of the approach in general, but the Imperial’s execution struck me as particularly weak.
No bustle back! They needed to get back to basics… surface development and perceived quality. It all seemed to go away with Engel’s retirement. And given that Chrysler was supposed to be the engineer’s company, now was the time to deliver the goods in Chassis and Powertrain.
As a high schooler I thought the new K-cars were ugly pieces of garbage. Turns out they did have some tech, and of course the minivan was inspired. But if Chrysler Corp. had appeared out of thin air in the early 1980s with no brand loyalty I wonder if they would have survived.
Paul, we must be about the same age, as I was just starting University when the K-cars were released. I also had a similar thought at the time. This was coming from Chrysler Corporation, the home of the Hemi, Chrysler 300’s, etc., etc. “What were they thinking?”
When you posted that pic of the stretched 1981 Imperial, I thought of this car from one of the “Cannonball Run” movies: https://www.imcdb.org/v025425.html
However, this Imperial with the bustle still presents well: http://www.classiccarstodayonline.com/2014/04/05/owner-profile-1982-chrysler-imperial/20-1981-chrysler-imperial-24-inch-limousine/
or https://digitalcollections.detroitpubliclibrary.org/islandora/object/islandora%3A223477
If Chrysler was going to have seriously competed with Cadillac (and Lincoln) at the time, I think a four door version was an utter necessity. Iacocca was very good at marketing, particularly to people of his era, but not having a four door version of this era of Imperial was a fatal mistake. I was never a fan of the bustleback cars, as who in the US knew what Hooper was? There was little historical familiarity with that styling cliche in the US.
If nothing else, the Imperial bustleback was kind of an homage to the Hooper styling, but with that big box on the back, retained the usefulness of the trunk area. IMO, a rather large gaffe was the four door Lincoln Continental based on the Fox body. Unlike the Imperial, it’s saving grace was the utility of the sedan body and pricing.
George, glad you brought up the Imperial limousine. They didn’t sell many but at least they offered something. I agree the four door was key. They needed to target Mercedes even if there would have still been a gap. I’ve long elt that there was a magic blend of European and American attributes that the Big 3 should have tapped.
Like the ’71 Riviera the bustleback seemed to signal Mitchell getting bored again, then acting out.
The bustle back Imperial was a proposal from the Cordoba/Mirada development. It had lost out in the selection process but management would not let the clay model be broken down.
The industry knew about the bustle back look from the published story on the Seville design development. Bill Mitchell had wanted that look for the 1976 car. It was a different approach that resonated with some of the more senior people; not with the younger ones.
Mitchell got his way with the second generation Seville (1980). Although a look that I do not like it was executed extremely well. Second best execution of the concept was the Imperial. Last was the Lincoln Versailles where it was just poorly done as a complete afterthought.
As for the K car design – absolutely simplistic execution that lacked finesse. Most likely its execution was done mostly under the direction of Delarossa, whose best claim to fame was being the drinking buddy of Bordinat while at Ford. [The lack of finesse was a trait that some of the Fords shared through that time period. SEE Fairmont.]
Dick Macadam was the VP Design that succeeded Engle. He was talented and the original Cordoba can attest to that. Unfortunately he was not a Ford man with the political connections with Sperlich and Iacocca. Sperlich was intent on copying Fords which were Fordized GMs anyway.
I want to pick up on something with the Cordoba and Mirada during its time. The first generation had been a success for ChryCo. It was a credible entrant in the personal luxury category along with the Monte Carlo, Grand Prix, Thunderbird and Cougar. It made perfect sense to continue in that market segment when doing the product planning in 5-7 year projections. One can look at how this market segment continued to be viable for GM and Ford through the evolution of their models into the 1990s. What would be a problem for the Cordoba and Mirada is that they lost the shared intermediate platform that this segment was normally based upon.
Right — the Cordoba was one of the automaker’s biggest successes of the 1970s. Thus, it made sense to maintain a foothold in the “mid-sized” personal coupe market. To me the question is how they could have best done that given Chrysler’s financial difficulties as well as the volatility of the early-80s market.
It would be interesting to see Chrysler’s financial assumptions about the redesigned 1980 models. Giving the Cordoba/Mirada a greater number of unique body parts made the cars more financially problematic even if sales stayed at previous levels . . . which they didn’t.
Using a less-modified F- or M-body would have made much more financial sense. Chrysler still could have come up with new sheetmetal (some of which could have been shared with a stretched “big” sedan), but the existing coupe windshield and inner doors really should have been used.
My guess is that Chrysler management were willing to take the financial risk of switching the Cordoba to a more distinct body because Iacocca and Sperlich both came from Ford, which tended to invest more in its personal coupes than GM did during the 1970s (go here for a discussion about the Eldorado versus the Continental Marks). Unfortunately, Chrysler’s gamble didn’t pay off.
I was in the Design Studio of the R body in the summer of 1977. It was in finalization. Iacocca had not come over yet. Sperlich had started at Chrysler at some point earlier in the year. Consider that the development time in that period would have been 4-5 years. That means that whatever Dunne was reporting as the platform decision had long ago been discarded as a possibility.
As for the design/styling on the R body, it was a turd while sitting in the clay on the studio floor. The industry knew where GM was going when the Seville came out in 1975 – the sheer look was the future. When the downsized GMs came out in late 1976 as 1977s the production numbers were monstrous – I remember Automotive news reporting 12,000 weekly totals for an extended period. The new R body was going in the wrong direction and that it got a resounding thud in the marketplace upon arrival was not any particular surprise. I did see photos of the interim design proposals that preceded the final R body – there had been some promising directions along the way but they always lost to the final turd.
Chrysler was a company in serious trouble. They had the brilliance to keep posting the weekly sales numbers in the cafeteria for all to see. All the sales chart showed was a precipitous decline in sales numbers. A true moral booster.
Jeff, I was hoping that you’d weigh in on the R-body given your direct experience at Chrysler. Management seemed to want a more “evolutionary” design than their counterparts at GM (or even Ford, for that matter). The R-body had the most old-school, “big car” look even though it was pruned quite a bit from its C-body predecessor.
Yes, but the conservatism was completely off the mark of where design was going.
The Cordoba and Mirada were in the correct aesthetic direction. Hal Sperlich did exert a lot of influence on these models.
If Chrysler Corporation had made the 1979 full-size cars stretched versions of the M-body, the corporation would have previewed Iacocca’s strategy with the K-car in the 1980s. The corporation’s offerings were essentially stretched (or chopped) version of the K-car.
The styling of the R-bodies may not have helped their success, but they were undercut by terrible quality and growing concerns over Chrysler’s viability. In early 1979, Consumer Reports tested the Dodge St. Regis against the Chevrolet Caprice, Ford LTD and Mercury Marquis. The magazine noted that the first St. Regis it bought was riddled with defects and died during the test, so it was forced to purchase a second one to complete the test!
Neither Iacocca or Sperlich were at Chrysler while the R body platform decisions were made. Sperlich was only around in its late stage of its development.
You do raise some valid points that by the time the cars were introduced Chrysler Corporation had big questions about it remaining in business along with spotty quality. [As one Chrysler staffer said to me: Chrysler’s good quality car was as good as a GM or Ford build, but the quality on a badly assembled one was far worse.]
One other element in this period was that Chrysler was focusing on the Omni & Horizon (with the corresponding coupe versions) in the marketplace and getting ready for the K car introduction in 1981.
I might be interesting to see how the advertising placements/spend were in this time period. Also, to check into the assembly plants utilized with which models. I doubt the Omni/Horizon and the impending K car could be run on the same lines, even at the same assembly plants, as the R body and the Cordoba/Mirada.
E.O. offered the following comment:
“Chrysler’s problem in the 1970s was that their most respected and best selling car line was the Dart/Valiant, which was much less profitable than the profits GM and Ford were earning on their better selling full-size cars and mid-sized personal luxury cars. Chrysler didn’t have a lower cost structure that might make small cars profitable, and hence wanted to ‘trade-up’ and get some of those full-size profits for themselves, but didn’t have the resources to really pull it off while also being extremely unlucky with their gas shortage timing. Detroit’s dependence on big car profits that CAFE was forcing them to abandon were never really solved until profitable minivans, pickups, and SUVs became high volume products in the 1980s and 90s.”
Chrysler did extend the Dart/Valiant (renamed to Aspen and Volare) platform with the Dodge Diplomat and Chrysler Le Baron. These did move the platform more upscale as a semi-response to the Seville; not a real competitor but latching onto the smaller size high feature concept.
It sounds like Chrysler couldn’t exist as a Big 3rd.
Which means they needed to reposition themselves as the Small 1st.
Which means the big and even the medium cars had to go. And with them the salaried and hourly folks and plants supporting them.
Which means the compact cars had to expand their reach upward in price. Which means they needed to get content and quality. Which means there needed to be a Plymouth and Dodge share and a slightly longer, for rear legroom, Chrysler and Imperial share that began to target Mercedes. And not just the Mercedes sent to the U.S., which would be Imperial’s task, but the lower priced trim levels that Mercedes sold only in Europe to get scale, which would be Chrysler’s task (selling cars in the U.S.).
This all needed to happen while Chrysler Corp. was still strong. Which means on top of or before OPEC. Which means folks at high levels within Chrysler needed to be uncommonly prescient.
No idea where Dunne got that idea from, but I find it hard to credit as a serious proposal. However, the late Brian Bouwkamp referenced an earlier product planning proposal which got him in hot water in Highland Park: Treating the F-body as the replacement for both the A and B bodies. He’d done research which showed the customers were largely the same.
I’m not sure that would have worked either, but it draws me to the great mystery of Chrysler’s 1970s product planning: Why so little was done to update the B bodies in 1975. Yes, there were new coupes, but the sedans and wagons were relentlessly fuselage until the end. If they had done a thorough redesign of what was a stronger segment for Chrysler than the full sizes, they might have held their ground better and laid a better foundation for the R-body. Which was the right idea at the time but poorly executed.
Robert, you make good points. My guess as to why the B-body sedans weren’t updated very much was a general assumption common among U.S. automakers that only coupes really mattered in the mid-sized field. Look at how AMC gave its sedans and wagons minimal updates in 1974 but its Matador coupe a completely new body.
Note that when GM completely restyled the Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme and Buick Regal personal luxury coupes for 1976, it only changed the grille and headlights (going from round to rectangular) of the Oldsmobile and Buick sedans and wagons. The side sheet metal and greenhouse were unchanged.
Ford completely restyled and renamed its intermediate sedans for 1977, even giving the sedans a new greenhouse. (Ford left the wagons untouched, except for new front clip to match the sedans) Ford then tried to position them as alternatives to the downsized GM B- and C-bodies, while retaining its traditional full-size cars for customers who were not sure that “downsizing” was a good idea.