My recent story on Brooks Stevens’s redesign of the 1964 Studebaker generated enough controversy that I’d like to further flesh out an alternative scenario. I suggested that Studebaker would have had a better chance of survival if it eased out of passenger cars in favor of of compact trucks, sport-utility vehicles and taxis.
As usual, my goal in presenting a counterfactual is to gain greater insight into how deeply groupthink contributed to the dramatic decline of the U.S. automakers. I would suggest that the same limited thinking that kept the Big Three from adequately responding to the rise of the imports also kept Studebaker from pivoting to more viable markets than sporty coupes and mid-sized passenger cars.
If Studebaker had shifted to trucks and SUVs, it might have not only survived but potentially rivaled Jeep’s success in the 1970s. I’m not saying that to be provocative. As we will discuss, Studebaker had potential advantages over Jeep as well as International Harvester. The main ingredient necessary for Studebaker’s success was the ability of its management to think outside the box.
Note that this story has a subtext: Jeep’s remarkable success was, in a very real sense, a historical accident. If the past was any indication, International Harvester and even Studebaker should have exited the 1970s in a stronger position than Jeep. They did not due to fatal errors. American Motors made its own share of mistakes once it bought Jeep in 1969, but they were manageable.
Studebaker’s passenger cars were not salvageable
By the early-60s, Studebaker’s basic hardware was no longer competitive for mass-market passenger cars. Its family car and sporty coupe bodies were too tall, their shared chassis lacked a “step down,” and the engines were archaic.
At least in theory, all of these problems were solvable with enough money. However, Studebaker’s lenders were understandably hesitant about making big additional investments in an automaker with a weak record of profitability and more marginal economies of scale than even American Motors.
As a result, the only plausible card Studebaker had left was to develop new market niches using its existing hardware. For example, the automaker’s family car body may have been hopelessly uncompetitive with General Motors’ splashy new mid-sized cars in 1964, but it could have worked quite well for a lineup of compact trucks, sport-utility vehicles and taxis.
Indeed, Studebaker could have had more success than either Kaiser Jeep or International Harvester in riding the boom in truck and SUV sales that began in the 1960s. Before explaining why, let’s sketch a scenario.
A new lease on life for relatively little money
The basic idea was for Studebaker to have continued to update its family car body — but only to the extent that it helped build out its line of trucks, SUVs and taxis. That would have given Stevens a different set of priorities for restyling the Lark for 1964. As a case in point, a new trunk lid with a low liftover height would have been more important for taxi sales than a brougham-style roofline.
By the same token, the Lark desperately needed a more modern front end, but it should have been designed to fit both passenger cars and the Champ truck.
Of course, the truck needed other changes to be viable, such as a new cab, doors and bed as well as a lower ride height. That really should have happened back when the Champ was introduced in 1960, but it still would have been a worthwhile investment in 1964.
Meanwhile, Studebaker could have easily entered the SUV market by giving the Wagonaire a four-wheel-drive variant. That could have been followed up with a short-wheelbase, Scout-type vehicle which used Champ parts such as doors and tailgate.
The cost of these new models would have been far lower than Stevens’s proposed new passenger-car body (go here for further discussion). Yet these vehicles may very well have generated decent sales up through the early-80s without a complete redesign.
Studebaker would have had structural advantages
Studebaker could have had three structural advantages over Kaiser Jeep and International Harvester if it had concentrated on the compact truck and SUV markets.
First, even though Studebaker’s dealer network was comparatively weak when it came to passenger-car sales, Patrick Foster (2015) noted that it had a much stronger presence in cities and medium-sized towns than International Harvester’s. Kaiser Jeep’s dealer network was also “neither large nor strong” (Foster, 2014; p. 83).
This is why Studebaker may have had a better chance of tapping into sales from suburbanites, who were a crucial factor in the light-truck market’s significant growth during the 1960s (Foster, 2015).
Second, Studebaker could have fielded a broad lineup using only one platform. That would have been a big advantage over International and Jeep, which split their scarce resources between larger and smaller platforms. International saw its light-truck sales collapse in the 1970s partly because it couldn’t afford to keep both its full-sized and compact platforms current.
Also see ‘Patrick Foster shows how International Harvester failed to adapt’
Jeep sales soared in the 1970s, arguably because of its access to AMC’s larger dealer network. However, output might have been even better if AMC had not overextended itself with so many passenger-car and truck platforms. That may have been the biggest reason why the large Jeep didn’t receive even minor improvements such as more modern front sheetmetal.
Third, the Studebaker’s body had been in production since 1953. Thus, a greater portion of its development costs had already been paid for than with the much newer Jeep Wagoneer and International Scout. This, combined with Studebaker’s modular platform, could have resulted in a lower breakeven point.
That was a crucial consideration because Studebaker had struggled to make a profit since the end of the postwar seller’s market. When the Lark was introduced in 1959 the automaker’s breakeven point was reportedly 121,000 units (Ebert, 2013). However, Studebaker’s cost structure would presumably have declined at least somewhat once it had phased out passenger cars. One reason why is that in the postwar era trucks were not typically restyled as frequently.
The Studebaker’s compact size had a big advantage
A paradox is that even though Studebaker’s platform was far older than Jeep’s or International’s, the particulars of its design could have given it at least as much — if not more — marketplace longevity.
This was partly because the Studebaker was more car-like at a time when that was what a growing proportion of truck buyers wanted. However, Studebaker’s timing was also lucky in fielding a compact platform that would have been a good fit with the gas-price volatility of the 1970s.
Unlike International, Studebaker would not have had to abandon the full-sized truck market only a few years after investing in a major new design. Less obvious is that the Studebaker body was somewhat smaller than the large Jeeps.
The 1964 Wagonaire was nine inches longer than the Wagoneer but four inches narrower, eight inches lower and weighed 250 pounds less than the equivalent two-wheel-drive model. Even so, the Studebaker still had a higher seating position and a taller cargo area than many of its mid-60s passenger-car competitors. That made the Wagonaire a good compromise between the two.
Also see ‘1959 Studebaker: Throwing the baby out with the bath water’
By the same token, a revamped Champ would have been the first credible compact truck. In other words, it would have been meaningfully smaller and lighter than the mid-sized Jeep Gladiator while offering greater capabilities than pseudo-trucks such as the Ford Falcon Ranchero or International Scout with a pickup cab.
The Champ would have had the market all to itself as a compromise between Detroit iron and imported subcompact trucks of the 1970s.
Studebakers were priced below larger competitors
Studebaker consistently priced the Champ to be the lowest-priced U.S.-built “real” truck. Meanwhile, the automaker’s wagons straddled the compact and mid-sized passenger car fields.
Without four-wheel drive, the top-end, V8-powered 1964 Daytona Wagonaire was priced within the same ballpark as a base, six-cylinder Jeep Wagoneer and International Travelall in two-wheel drive.
Were trucks, SUVs and taxis a large enough market?
Those skeptical about this scenario might argue that there wasn’t a big enough market for Studebaker to have successfully transitioned away from passenger cars.
The problem wasn’t with the overall truck and SUV market, which roughly tripled in volume between 1960 and 1979. The real issue was that the Big Three’s control of the truck market increased from an already oligopolistic 77 percent in 1960 to more than 90 percent in 1979.
During the 1960s output was mostly flat for both International and Jeep. In the early-70s International experienced a brief boom in sales, presumably because all of its light trucks were redesigned. However, output dramatically fell in 1974-75, resulting in International abandoning the full-sized truck market.
Also see ‘Antitrust regulations: Lack of enforcement fueled U.S. industry’s decline’
The graph below, which uses data from the Standard Catalog of American Light-Duty Trucks (Gunnell, 1993), understates the scale of International’s collapse because it includes both light- and medium-duty trucks. In the 1978, when the U.S. truck market peaked at almost 3.5 million units, International produced less than 40,000 of its Scout-based light trucks.
If that sounds like a strikingly small number, note that calendar-year production for Jeep in 1970 was less than 46,000 units. The dramatic drop from 1969 appears to reflect the removal of vehicles built as part of government contracts. However, over the course of the 1970s Jeep output almost tripled — even outpacing the overall truck market’s growth during that time period.
Jeep’s growth may have counterbalanced International’s decline, but by 1979 all of the independents together only produced roughly the same number of trucks and SUVs that they did in the early-60s. The main good news was that Jeep’s performance after gaining access to AMC’s dealer network arguably validates the idea that Studebaker’s dealer network could have been a major advantage.
What about taxis? In Checker’s peak year of 1963 it produced almost 8,200 units, 860 of which were private passenger cars and the rest taxis. Even if Studebaker matched that volume it wouldn’t have been the automaker’s ticket to survival. That said, taxis would have offered incremental sales with a relatively small investment.
How would passenger cars have been phased out?
The trickiest part of Studebaker’s pivot could have been ramping up truck an SUV sales before passenger-car output fell too low. The longer management waited to roll out its new lineup, the more difficult the transition might have been.
Also see ‘Brooks Stevens’s 1965 Studebaker Lark concept: Almost a baby Continental’
Waiting until 1964 to redo the Champ and introduce a four-wheel-drive Wagonaire might have been too late if Studebaker’s board of directors was not willing to sustain potential short-term losses. Thus, the ideal scenario would have been for the pivot to have begun with the introduction of the Champ in 1960, perhaps followed by a four-wheel-drive wagon in 1961 and a Scout-type vehicle in 1962.
It should be acknowledged that Studebaker had a long way to go to generate decent sales for trucks, SUVs and taxis.
- The Champ would have had to triple its average annual output to match Studebaker’s 1955 truck production of roughly 27,000 units.
- The 1963 Wagonaire may not have been in production long enough to test how big of a market there was for a retractable roof, but in 1963 less than 11,000 U.S.-bound copies left the factory. In contrast, during 1959-60 the Lark wagon’s output hovered around 25,000 units per year.
- Studebaker’s best year for taxis was in 1962, when it produced around 2,600 units. That was half as many as Checker.
- A Scout-type vehicle would have been an inexpensive way to add sales, but if it had matched the International and Ford Bronco, that would have been around 20,000 units.
What this suggests is that hitting 75,000 units could have initially been a challenge. That said, even declining passenger-car production could have helped tip the scales to profitability.
Phasing out cars could have opened door to a merger
The above-mentioned timeline invariably brings up the question: Might Studebaker have been better off if it tried to merge with another automaker? Foster (2015) thought International Harvester should have bought Studebaker.
I’m more partial to a merger with Kaiser Jeep, which was better run and had a more complementary lineup. If the new combine was created early enough, it could have avoided the cost of developing the new large Jeep platform, which came out in 1963.
Indeed, Studebaker might have made a better merger partner than American Motors because both Jeep and Studebaker used separate body-on-frame construction. That would have allowed production to be more easily consolidated in one plant, thereby increasing the combine’s economies of scale.
Of course, Studebaker’s board might not have agreed to a pivot to trucks, let alone a merger with Kaiser Jeep, simply because it wanted to exit automobile manufacturing altogether. This sentiment may have been fueled by a desire to get out from under significant pension obligations (Beatty and Craig, 1983).
Letting go of a corporate identity is hard to do
Leaving the passenger-car business would have required Studebaker management to let go of the automaker’s long-held sense of identity. A succession of corporate leaders apparently couldn’t make that psychological leap — despite Studebaker being the only independent U.S. passenger-car manufacturer that also had a foothold in the truck field.
When the Lark proved to be initially successful, Studebaker head Harold Churchill tried to capitalize on it by developing a subcompact with a horizontally opposed four-cylinder engine (Ebert, 2013). He couldn’t come up with the funds to get the car into production.
Then Churchill’s successor, Sherwood Egbert, focused on sporty coupes while bumping up the Lark in size and price.
Brooks Stevens was obviously not the most powerful player in this drama. As a hypothetical, he could have been commissioned by Egbert to design a new Champ with the funding that otherwise would have been used to create the Avanti. After all, Stevens also designed the 1963 Wagoneer. That said, his proposals tended to push management in the wrong direction.
For example, in 1961 he came up with a concept car called the Lark Splendide, which slapped a broughamtastic roofline onto an otherwise plebeian Lark body. The Splendide symbolized the Egbert era — a vain attempt to stay competitive with hardware that was hopelessly obsolete. Yet that same hardware, when used in a somewhat different way, could have allowed Studebaker to follow in the footsteps of Jeep.
A variety of additional decisions would have determined whether Studebaker managed to rival Jeep by the end of the 1970s. But at the very least, by pivoting to trucks, SUVs and taxis in the 1960s, Studebaker could have had better chance of making it into the next decade.
NOTES:
Prices and product specifications are from the Automobile Catalog (2021) and the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006). Volume and market-share figures were calculated from John Gunnell (1993, 2002) and Richard Langworth (1979, 1993). Truck volume graphs should only be viewed for general patterns because its source, Gunnell (1993), frequently included inconsistent types of data, such as calendar vs. model years, production vs. sales, light trucks vs. total line, and U.S. vs. global output. Whenever possible I tried to use calendar-year U.S. production of light trucks. The list price graph does not include all specialized models. Jeep wagon’s price band for 1964 includes the aging F-134 as well as the Wagoneer, whose entry-level model listed for $2,629.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Beatty, Michael and Scott Craig; 1983. Less Than They Promised. Scott Craig Productions Inc. Posted on YouTube January 20, 2015 by Damian Penny.
- Automobile Catalog; 2021. “Full detailed specifications listing and photo gallery.” Accessed April 13.
- Ebert, Robert R.; 2013. Champion of the Lark: Harold Churchill and the Presidency of Studebaker-Packard, 1956-1961. McFarland & Company, London.
- Foster, Patrick; 2014. Jeep: The History of America’s Greatest Vehicle. Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
- ——–; 2015. International Harvester: The Complete History. Quarto Publishing Group, Minneapolis, MN: pp. 106, 132.
- Gunnell, John; 1993. Standard Catalog of American Light-Duty Trucks, 1896-1986. Second Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- ——–; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1979, 1993. Studebaker 1946-1966: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- wildaboutcarsonline.com (Automotive History Preservation Society): Studebaker Avanti (1963)
- oldcaradvertising.com: International (1966 Studebaker (1958, 1960)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Checker (1969); Ford (1986); International (1975, 1976); Jeep (1965, 1967, 1979); Studebaker (1962, 1963, 1964)
PHOTOGRAPHY & SKETCHES:
- Milwaukee Art Museum Brooks Stevens Archives
While this is an interesting “what-if”, none of this actually addresses the problem of Studebaker and its high labor costs in South Bend, which was also becoming an issue in Fort Wayne (I-H) and in Toledo (Kaiser Jeep). Then there is the buzz-saw of what happened in the late 1960s and 1970s: Even Chrysler had fewer cars and trucks to spread costs of government mandates of emissions and safety development to stay solvent as the tumultuous 1970s wound out ! Critical mass (in business terms) was the key to survival in the late 1970s and into the 1980s. Studebaker, I-H, Kaiser-Jeep and A.M.C. had very little critical mass, while G.M. and Ford barely had enough. Chrysler survived on the strength of a government loan until the mini-van profits kicked in to pay off the loan guarantees. Who would have guaranteed loans for I-H / Studebaker or Kaiser-Jeep / Studebaker ?
My question for you: Were labor costs that big of problem for Studebaker by circa 1963? I don’t get that impression from what I’ve read about the 1962 strike that huge issues were at play like they were in 1955. This film offers some interesting interviews about the 1962 strike.
I get that safety and emission regulations would make it more difficult for the smaller-scale automakers to compete with the Big Three as well as a rising tide of imports. However, AMC could have gotten through the 1970s just fine if it hadn’t overextended itself with too many platforms and trendy designs that didn’t pay for themselves (go here for further discussion). I don’t say that to suggest AMC could have survived indefinitely — it would have taken some extremely talented management and some lucky breaks for that to have occurred. And even in the rosiest scenario a merger or strong partnership would have been likely at some point.
Here is my punchline: The standard Detroit argument that scale is pretty much all that matters has some utility but can also obscure other factors. Those include the quality of management decisions. Studebaker and International made a series of really bad decisions. Jeep did not.
It seems the best choice would be a Studebaker-IH merger because of their complimentary dealer networks. Also, they both had plenty of non-automotive endeavors that could tide over the feast or famine independent existence. However, something would have to be done about that godawful platform. Look at that Champ picture, and keep in mind this is from a sales brochure. You have 4wd ride hight on a 2wd platform. what could happen is make a true midsize pickup on the IH frame with some carlike features and call it the Champ, and something to compete with the Jeep Commando, call it the Daytona. This would be done hopefully to introduce the Brooks Stevens sheetmetal for those two vehicles. Say, an earlier ’62 merger in time for the ’64 model year. This is about the only worthwhile hardware Studebaker had to offer.
That’s an interesting idea. I haven’t come across complete dimensions for the 1958-68 International pickup. It doesn’t look “full-sized” — but looks can be deceiving. Do you know how wide the body is?
Um, no. I lived in Chicago from the early 60s to 2010. As a kid in Green Bay, I remember the IH pickups were looked upon as the vehicle of choice for penny pinching old men. In Chicago, there was no real IH presence except for the occasional Scout.
Steve, you hit the nail right on the head with your comment about Stude corp leaders not being able to make the psychological leap necessary to put the company ahead of any of their perceived legacies. An Avanti may be a desirable collector car now but it was an ill-afforded attempt at saving Studebaker then… 0 legacy wins all-around.
A couple things. I’ve always thought that Studebaker would have been a better merger partner with Kaiser Jeep in the early 60’s for a few reasons:
1. Studebaker was in the military vehicle production business which would have been a good fit with Kaiser due to the profitability of military contract. Kaiser did acquire in 1964 Studebaker’s military division.
2. Brooks Stevens was doing the design work for both companies, he could have developed something for Studebaker in 1964 more SUV like similar to the Wagoneer and then had a truck based off it too.
3. You’ve left out Studebaker’s ownership of Mercedes Benz of North American. Studebaker’s dealers were weak selling Studebakers but the MB dealership was very strong due to the Luxury car image and this too could have help Kaiser with Luxury Jeep Market.
The real problem with all of this is that the Management of Studebaker from 1958 forward were not really ever committed to staying in the car business. They had funds but used it to diversified. There was plenty of money to spend, particularly after 1959 and 1960. but it got diverted. I have no doubt it was something that could have been turned around had the BOD wanted to, but they weren’t committed. They used the funds to buy STP, Olan Engine, McCullagh chain saw Wheel Horse Tractor, etc etc etc.