This is a scholarly book with a bit more product information than typical of the genre. Robert R. Ebert’s prose can be stilted but offers nuances not found elsewhere due to his careful parsing of corporate documents such as board minutes.
For example, Ebert shows how the 1957 Packard made a profit (p. 38) and argues that a proposed four-cylinder junior Lark was dead before Sherwood Egbert showed up in early 1961 (p. 88). I particularly appreciate his thorough discussion of the economies of scale for an independent automaker (pp. 24-26).
On the other hand, Ebert is unduly charitable in his assessment of James Nance’s leadership of Studebaker-Packard, arguing that “it is necessary to temper any criticism of Nance with the realization that conditions in both the industry and at S-P looked quite different in early 1956 than when he took over Packard in 1952, or even when the merger with Studebaker was consummated” (p. 138). That assertion is questionable on a number of levels (for example, go here).
Champion of the Lark: Harold Churchill and the Presidency of Studebaker-Packard, 1956-1961
- Robert R. Ebert; 2013
- McFarland & Company, London, UK
“Economist Joe. S. Bain estimated in the 1950s, with production techniques existing then, that an integrated firm with a single assembly plant producing 100,000 to 150,000 cars per year might not achieve maximum efficiency, but could be profitable. Another economist analyzing the auto industry at about the same time, Charles E. Edwards, noted that the Big Three set volume targets of 200,000 units per year for new models during the 1050s.” (p. 24)
“In rankings, the (1960) Rambler 6, Valiant, Ford Falcon, Rambler American, and Rambler V8 were rated as better buys by Consumer Reports than the Lark 6 and V8. However, the Larks were rated above the Chevrolet Corvair, which the magazine classified as a a sports sedan, but got low marks as a family sedan.” (p. 122)
“Byers A. Burlingame can be characterized as a risk averter. He saw his primary responsibility as being to the shareholders (owners) of the Studebaker Corporation. His statements and his actions are consistent throughout the portion of his career for which we have a written record, i.e., the minutes of the Board of Directors and his public statements and correspondence. He appears to have seen profitable operations in the Automotive Division as being a function primarily of cost control. Product design, planning, and marketing were not his strong points and, probably, not his main areas of interest in his role as financier and as president of the company.” (p. 149)
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