Patrick Foster shows how International Harvester failed to adapt

(UPDATED FROM 9/4/2020)

International Harvester is the post-war U.S. automaker that has received the least attention from historians. Thus, Patrick Foster’s book, International Harvester: The Complete Story, is a particularly welcome addition.

The format is similar to his other recent books — an oversized hard cover with lots of big pictures (many color). The text in this 210-page book has Foster’s usual mix of product information and business analysis.

His narrative has a less dramatic tone than AMC: The Rise and Fall of Americaโ€™s Last Independent Automaker (Foster, 2013). However, this turns out to be a good thing. Foster is able to assess International’s management with greater detachment than AMC’s (go here for further discussion about the latter).

Rat Kool International pickup

An unflinching critique of International

Foster offers a strong argument that International failed to adapt to dramatic changes that began sweeping the light-truck market in the early-60s.

Whereas light trucks had previously been used primarily for commercial purposes (such as by farmers and construction companies), sales began to soar for models that appealed to suburbanites. International did not quickly enough shift with the times, so essentially got left behind. To illustrate this, Foster noted that by 1969 both Dodge and GMC would roar past International in sales.

Also see ‘1969 International was too little, too late to save brandโ€™s big-truck ambitions’

What was the truck maker to do? Foster states that International made a big mistake by rejecting a merger proposal from the Studebaker Corporation in 1963. Studebaker’s auto operations were teetering on the brink of death but the firm still “had approximately 2,000 automotive dealers, most of them in exactly the places where International needed to be” (p. 115).

Foster also points to International’s penchant for giving out big dividends regardless of economic conditions. This undercut the company’s ability to keep its product line competitive and long-term debt at reasonable levels.

1969 International pickup

Book offers interesting historical tidbits

The Complete Story is sprinkled with interesting historical items. For example, a new logo introduced in 1953 was designed by Raymond Loewy. The logo consisted of a capital black letter H and a lower-case red i. The dot on the i represented the head of a farmer driving a tractor.

My biggest criticism of the book is that Foster is overly kind about the last International D-series pickup and Travelall. These were introduced in 1969. He described their styling as “clean, contemporary, and ruggedly handsome” (p. 131). In actuality, the design became obsolete within only a few years because International did not invest in what would soon become essential features such as curved side glass.

All in all, this is a workmanly effort about a firm that is surprisingly interesting even if one isn’t all that into trucks. Given the huge growth in truck sales over the last 50 years, International plausibly could have enjoyed Jeep-like success. Instead, management faced a test of leadership and “it would earn a failing grade” (p. 106).

International Harvester: The Complete Story

  • Foster, Patrick; 2015
  • Quarto Publishing Group, Minneapolis, MN

“Meanwhile, the company’s sales department kept pushing for more and more new models and variations of trucks, and production lines began to get snarled as a bewildering array of trucks came down the line with very specific requirements that tended to slow things down. . . . In comparison, the volume producers of light trucks — Ford, Chevy, GMC, and Dodge — didn’t offer nearly as many models, and their productivity was much higher and their costs lower.” (p. 89)

“When it was introduced the Scout seemed almost like a revelation. Priced at $2,139 for the four-wheel-drive model, it was the first real competition that Willys Motors’ CJ line had ever encountered, and it was the closest in concept to the Jeep of any American vehicle that would ever be produced. Over 28,000 of them were built during the first year.” (p. 110)

“To explain its abandonment of a key market, management said that it felt its light-duty trucks were far too robust for what it called the ‘second car’ market. They had researched the cost of redesigning the vehicles; however, the reality was that International had slipped too far behind its competitors to try to catch up now. It should have made its move during the 1950s or early mid-1960s, but management failed to grasp the changes the market was going through.” (p. 149)

OTHER REVIEWS:

Amazon | Hemmings


RE:SOURCES

Foster, Patrick R.;ย 2013.ย American Motors Corporation: The Rise and Fall of Americaโ€™s Last Independent Automaker. MBI Publishing Co., Minneapolis, MN.

This review was originally posted August 31, 2016 and updated on Sept. 4, 2020 and May 13, 2026.

5 Comments

  1. I vaguely recall that IH offered both a 4 door pickup, a true pickup with a separate bed, and a a Travelall with an open bed aft of the C pillar, something akin to the new Ford Maverick. Can someone confirm or deny?

    • The 1969 body style Travelall had the d pillar and roof offers to create The Wagonmaster with 5th wheel hitch. Due to placement of 5th wheel it wasn’t a great vehicle to pull trailers with. The Travelette was the first 3 door pickup and by I think 1961 offered 4 doors on the revised C Series models.

      I have this IH book from Foster. He hits points on poor management, bad labor relations and lack of city directed dealerships. Those reasons and more by the dawn of the early 1960s doomed the Light Line from sustainable success. IH sold light vehicles, medium/heavy trucks, construction equipment plus a full line of agriculture equipment which resulted in each branch fighting for financial support from the mother company. Some of their tractors in the 50s might have been developed with good engineering only to have a weak transmission or was rushed to market by management. IH took on higher production costs with one example being they made their own bolts stamped with the IH logo. They had too many sectors under one company umbrella to really be able to focus on one or two in order to make them consistently profitable. For many years their large trucks were #1 in market share for a wide margin. The Fort Wayne, Indiana PBS station a couple of years ago produced a great documentary called Truck Town on the company establishment of their truck plant.

      There are two other books I’d highly recommend for further context. One is Corporate Tragedy by Barbara Marsh, an author from Chicago, written in the 1080s after Tennaco bought the agriculture division and IH trucks rebranded itself as Navistar building only big trucks. She explores the roots of the company up through the late 1970s when poor CEO selections, continued large dividend paid to stockholders limiting reinvestment, and a lack of use of computers in all facets of design/engineering/parts. It’s a good corporate history blueprint in how not to run a top 30 company.

      The other book is Fred Crimson with 100 Years of International Trucks first published in 1995 and the last revised edition from 2007 which I own. It’s a year by year run down focused in the truck division only with a virtual picture of ever conceivable model built. It was published before Foster’s book and I find it more thorough. A downside is 85% of pics are black and white.

      There has come a mini cottage book industry on all things IH over the last 20 years ranging from the standard full size tractors, four wheel drive tractors originated with Steiger,combines, Cub Cadet lawn mowers, the Farmall Cub, combines and trucks.

      • Thank you for the references — these look quite promising. I always appreciate suggestions for further reading.

  2. SR stopped by to offer this comment: I havenโ€™t had a chance to read Patrick Fosterโ€™s book, but he seems to have mistaken IHCโ€™s priorities toward the light truck line.

    Barbara Marsh wrote for Crainโ€™s Chicago Business at the time, and tells the full story of how the wheels and crawler tracks came off. (IHC was a tripartite company โ€” ag equipment, trucks, and construction equipment.)
    IHCโ€™s ownership, and and its management by behest, was self-satisfied and myopic, allowing it to be self-ambushed by the more agile and far-thinking Deere and The Cat. It didnโ€™t help that the newly-hired, highly-paid, and confrontational CEO from XEROX (white-collar and all but non-union) decided to teach those blue-collars who was boss, provoking a 183-day strike as the national economy was beginning to spiral and interest rates soared.

    Reading a library copy of โ€œA Corporate Tragedyโ€ was an indelible experience, and I have still have a copy in my archives.
    Fred Crismonโ€™ tome, โ€œInternational Trucksโ€ is the cyclopedia, but itโ€™s not a critique.

    Marsh states that IHC was never a major player in light trucks. Much of its truck business was through factory branches or dealerships that serviced the fleet market. The company did market research in the mid 60s prior to proceeding with the D-line (1969-75), and found that only ~ 20 % of new light truck prospects was AWARE that IHC MADE light trucks, and trucks, and only 5 % would even consider looking at them. Yet, they persisted down the trail. But the thought that IHC should have paired with Studebaker, skating on thin ice since the early 50s, was a bullet dodged.

    IHCโ€™s long suit was medium and and heavy trucks, which are built to order, so economies of scale arenโ€™t easily obtained. The D-cab was derived from the Fleetstar-A, (20xx-21xx) introduced in November 1967. The 1957 Anniversary Cab, modified for the 1961-68 light line, continued on the Loadstar 16xx-18xx through 1978. To my knowledge, cabs were stamped, (and perhaps even fuurnished โ€œin whiteโ€), by third-parties. Interiors were roomy and utilitarian, controls could be operated by gloved hands. My employerโ€™s 2110As had air-suspended seats, thick-rimmed steering wheels, and truck-grade instrument clusters. Loadstar 1624s were similar, except the seats were surprisingly long-lasting foam blocks, unlike the chintzy pickup-grade cabs of Chevy C60 mediums.

    Internet pic of 2110A, which happens to be a fire engine: https://www.facebook.com/groups/pevanpelt/posts/423276794490395/

  3. IH was more than vehicles. They also owned Wisconsin Steel on the East Side of Chicago. (About a mile south of the bridge jumped in Blues Brothers) It was old, had a disgruntled labor force, and had its own problems in the 60s. By this time Studebaker was something of a conglomerate, with Onan engines, etc, but anyone could tell the car portion of the business was circling the drain. If IH could get Stude’s car business which is all it really wanted, that would be worthwhile. IIRC there was some IH article here which I couldn’t find which had links to future Scout/Travelall plans. Broadly, Studebaker just walked away from South Bend in 63, so a relatively good deal could have been had. Boom! IH has dealerships with hungry dealers located on the city’s auto row and the suburban strips, and a turnkey factory to make the SUVs.

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