Recently a retired Ford designer stopped by to offer a response to our story, “How 1960s car design reflected the good old (boy) days.”
“I started my career at Ford styling in 1960. Retired in 1998. I have lots and lots of true stories about the real world at the Ford styling studios. So much baloney has been written that just wasn’t true. Being surrounded every day in a working environment with the most talented creative people on earth I viewed as a gift. Ford styling!”
Indie Auto is interested in hearing the stories of those who have worked in the industry – including designers. However, one caveat is that we are not a fanboy website. Instead, our focus is on analyzing why the U.S. auto industry experienced one of the biggest industrial collapses of the 20th Century. Doing so requires going beyond slapping each other’s backs and only talking about the good times. All too often that’s what other auto history websites do.
The retired designer did not state what, if anything, he found to be “baloney” in our story. However, he also didn’t address the point of the piece, which was that Ford’s inability to respond to a rising tide of imports may have been at least partly the result of a lack of diversity in its design studios. That lack of diversity was reflected in a promotional film produced by the automaker in what appears to be the late-60s.
Why did Ford go into decline with all that talent?
The designer lauded his colleagues as “the most talented creative people on earth.” That raises the question: Why did Ford see its U.S. and Canada production fall from almost 3.5 million in 1968 to under 2.26 million in 1982 (The Henry Ford, 2026)?
It’s true that after that point Ford saw substantial sales gains, arguably at least partly because of successful designs such as the aerodynamic 1983 Ford Thunderbird and the 1986 Taurus. However, the focus of our series of stories was the late-60s to early-80s.
Also see ‘Ford design in the 1970s was a real step down from the previous decade’
Should we give Ford a free pass on questionable designs such as the 1970, 1972 and 1980 Thunderbird? What about the 1977 Lincoln Versailles? Or even the 1971 Ford Pinto?
Those strike me as questions that reasonable people can debate. And whatever our views about those and other Ford cars and trucks during that time period, that doesn’t mean we need to think less of individual designers.
Designers gave management what they wanted
A popular dictum in organizational studies is that if you put good people in bad systems that the outcome is likely to be bad. This is because it is very difficult for even the most talented individuals to perform miracles on their own.
In addition, the attitude of top management can matter a great deal. As David Halberstam (1986) has written, Henry Ford II and Lee Iacocca tilted toward big, broughamy cars. And that’s what head designer Eugene Bordinet gave them (Yates, 1983).
This is why I think it is entirely appropriate to criticize Ford during this time period without in any way belittling the caliber of rank-and-file designers in its American studios. After all, under the direction of John Telnack they did stellar work in the 1980s (go here for further discussion).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Halberstam, David; 1986. The Reckoning. William Morrow & Co., New York, NY.
- The Henry Ford; 2026. “Research Guide: Ford Motor Company Production Statistics.” Accessed Aug. 14.
- Yates, Brock; 1983. The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry. Empire Books, New York, NY.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- fordheritagevault.com: Ford Thunderbird (1972, 1980); Lincoln Versailles (1977)
Jack Telmack excepted, Ford design was pretty meh, if not worse, by the mid-late ’60s, and on through the ’80s. Whether that was due to the designers themselves or dictates from Lido or Hank the Deuce is unknown, but starting with the ’65 Fairlane and ’67 T-Bird re-do, on to the awful ’80 T-birds and Lincolns and ’79 LTD and other unimaginative boxes, the evidence and it’s sales result is plain to see.
The 65 Fairlane was a one year anomaly. From 66 til the new 72 Torino, Ford’s midsizers were good looking cars. Ford didn’t adapt to 5mph bumpers well.
My understanding is Ford designers wanted the 1980 Thunderbird to have sportier styling, but Iacocca dictated its looks before his firing. The upscale K car derivatives in the 1980’s and early 1990’s had the same styling themes as the 1980 Thunderbird. So I would blame Iacocca and HF II for the outcomes. I prefer the traditional Ford styling, but I’m not in the mainstream.
I know I’m in the minority here, but I actually like both the Lincoln Versailles and the 1980-1982 Ford Thunderbird. I’ve never understood the hate these two receive. I remember seeing plenty of this generation Thunderbird on the road as a child. They were very contemporary for the times. And I can say the same for the Versailles. I didn’t see as many of them, but they were a more expensive automobile. Anyway, all companies share platforms, which is just smart and economical. But like I said, I know not everyone agrees.
I have heard this before. The maligning of the 1980 – 82 Tbird. This was not the consensus at the time. They were popular and sought after cars at the time – secretaries and business dads alike appreciated them and BOUGHT THEM. In my apartment’parkings lot in 1981 there were 3 white Birds of those years – one of them was mine.
I told my jealous friends at the time that the car was better than even I thought it would be – and that there was no other car on the market for me – no matter who.
The 2nd edition Lincoln Versailles was no raving beauty but was appropriate for the time frame – as surprizing as that may sound today. The brochure asked – Why would you invest in a Versailles? and then answers its own question with –” Because it is an engineering achievement”.
From 1979 to 1980, T bird sales dropped from about 285K to about 85K.
From 1979 to 1980, Cutlass sales dropped from about 560K to about 470K.
The 1980 Cutlass number includes a significant uptick for 4-door sedans because of the new notchback roofline.
I worked for Ford in the Phoenix District Office from 1977 to 1982. Sales of the “brogham” models rocked, we couldn’t get enough built until the oil taps shut off in January 1979. Full stop. Couldn’t give them away.
Everyone was then desperate for the promised new efficient models until we saw them or drove them. The T-Bird was the worst, it looked like a larger car’s body adapted to a roller skate, and the standard vinyl top accentuated the odd lines of the car. The Lincoln Town Car was OK but the MarkVI had a distorted shape in front, too much overhang on too little wheel base. The new Panther full size just looked plain. Fairmont, et al looked good but were rough riding and tinny, as compared to their predecessor Granadas. The anemic engines didnt help, I had a few 2.3L 4 banger Fairmonts and they were amazingly underpowered. Blame product planning, management, whomever, they were real failures, and sales showed it. Mark
The Mark VI looked like an LTD that had been to Choo Choo Customs. It lost all of the presence of the earlier Marks. Despite being smaller, the Mark VI actually is taller than the Mark V.
Ironically, the Eldorado went from weird and ridiculous to crisp and modern in 79.
I don’t doubt the lack of diversity in Ford‘s design studios at the time referenced, but I don’t think the issue there was any different than any other automaker, in any other country. Did Chrysler and General Motors have a more diverse staff of designers? And I’m sure Toyota’s studios were largely staffed with Japanese men, for example…
The primary goal of my story was to discuss how a film produced by Ford offered insights — often unintended — into how its car-design process may have influenced what what kind of cars ended up being produced. This illustrates my preference as an automotive historian to present specific case studies that collectively may add up to larger analytical patterns.
In general, my sense is that until relatively recently the auto industry has not had a very diverse workforce when it comes to its design staff. I don’t have a lot of granular information, but suspect that from the late-60s through early-80s other U.S. automakers had similar levels of diversity to Ford. However, I would question your statement about the Japanese. For one thing, Toyota opened a U.S. design studio as early as 1973 — and the automaker trumpeted how much it tried to design cars that appealed specifically to Americans.
I don’t see “diversity” as merely a numbers game, e.g., how many women or people of color one has on staff. It’s also about displaying a commitment to better understanding the needs of consumers who may be different in key ways from an automaker’s staff. Although the Japanese had a decidedly mixed record on automotive styling in the 1970s, I think it fair to say that some of their most successful cars were exceptionally well “Americanized,” such as the Datsun 510 and Toyota Celica.
Indeed, a key way that the Japanese secured a foothold in the American market was by better appealing to buyers in coastal states than Detroit did. Brock Yates noted how Detroit didn’t seem to understand the growing popularity of imported cars because they were focused on designing land yachts best suited for midwest turnpikes.
It gets tricky trying to nail down how a car’s design might have appealed to specific demographics, such as less-affluent people or women. However, we can easily see how Ford emphasized flashy but space-inefficient styling in the Pinto whereas imports usually did the opposite. Their cars could more often be used as family cars because they typically had more upright proportions and four- or even five-door body styles.
The best looking T-birds were the 1961-1963 models- full stop. I think it could be argued that Ford’s full line-up for 1961 were among the most attractive of the ’60s, followed closely by the ’63 Galaxie XL, and the ’64 Galaxie fastbacks, and the ’64 Fairlanes.
As has been noted, Ford’s styling studios were hardly any less diverse than the styling studios of GM and Chrysler, let alone the Japanese and German automakers.
Also note that, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the Japanese were not viewed as leaders in styling, even as they gained market share in this country. Most of their designs were regarded as 3/5s versions of American cars, with some fussy details thrown in to please the home market. As I recall, the first Japanese vehicles that were really lauded for their styling (and not seen as derivative of other designs) were the 1983 Honda Prelude and 1984 Honda Civic.
The selling points of Japanese vehicles were generous standard equipment, good workmanship and above-average reliability, not styling. In the case of some mid-1970s Datsuns, one bought the vehicle despite the styling, not because of it.
The Germans increasingly assumed the mantle of design leader. With their emphasis on function, and lack of gingerbread, German cars became the “anti-Brougham” offerings. The VW Rabbit and various Audis, BMWs and Mercedes-Benz vehicles increasingly set the pace. It should be noted that the Rabbit/Golf and other new-generation VWs were designed by Giorgetto Giugiaro and his design firm Italdesign.
As for Ford – the decline in market share was not continuous from 1968 through 1982. The corporation’s market share hovered between 25-28 percent until 1979, when it plunged and hit roughly 20 percent for 1980. The first problem was the second fuel crunch, which began during the spring of 1979, and hammered sales of larger cars.
The second problem was the downsized 1979-80 Panther cars and the 1980 personal luxury coupes. They debuted as the demand for all full-size and intermediate American cars took a big hit. But the cars themselves were not very attractive. The buyers who were still interested in that type of car went to the more attractive GM offerings.
The blame lies with Lee Iacocca. Iacocca demanded that the downsized cars retain the formal look of the previous-generation models, along with as much gingerbread as possible. The problem was that shrinking the basic design made it look awkward, and keeping the gingerbread only made it look worse.
For the first round of downsizing, GM simply did a much better job of giving its downsized models a fresh look while retaining the popular styling cues that buyers recognized.
This comment is probably irrelevant, but…Bill Elliott had some success in NASCAR’s top division in his beautiful red Thunderbird in the late eighties and nineties. But his first win was in the previous gen Bird, and that car looked like it was dragged out of a junkyard.