(EXPANDED FROM 2/27/2023)
Indie Auto was partly created to spark more robust debates in U.S. auto history. As a case in point, a few years go I questioned a take by Richard M. Langworth and Jan P. Norbye about why automakers stuck with big cars for so long.
I give Langworth credit for responding to the essay below rather than hiding in his safe place. However, the multiple exchanges I had with him also illustrate the limits to a debate. I was frankly surprised by the weak quality of his arguments. He struck me as relying too much on cheap rhetorical gimmicks.
In saying that, my intent is not to personally attack Langworth — particularly after he has died. Instead, it is to point out that the way we debate can be powerfully informed by our background. Mine has been partly informed by experience in the academic realm, where you can get absolutely clobbered in a debate if your facts and logic aren’t air tight.
And Langworth? My sense is that he spent a goodly part of his career pumping out books and magazine articles for fairly low-brow car-buff publishers. Where was he going to get much practice defending his arguments? Certainly not in venues such as Collectible Automobile.
With that as prelude, here’s my essay and a link at the bottom to a lengthy comment he wrote in response — and then my response.
Detroit built what ‘people everywhere’ were buying
While updating our 1971-78 Cadillac Eldorado story, I pulled down from my bookshelf The Complete History of General Motors: 1908-1986. This Consumer Guide book written by Richard M. Langworth and Jan P. Norbye (1986) threw some punches, such as complaining that GM cars became increasingly homogenized in the 1970s. However, they also defended the automaker for placing so much emphasis on big cars in the 1960s.
“It is easy to say that overpaid Detroit executives — insulated in their Grosse Pointe estates and downtown ‘glass houses,’ driving the midwest’s wide boulevards and die-straight highways — built super-dinosaur cars to suit those conditions,” Langworth an Norbye argued. “But until the 1970s, people everywhere were buying those cars” (1986, p. 315; original italics).
Also see ‘Compact cars became the neglected stepchildren of U.S. automakers’
The authors may have been responding to Brock Yates’ (1983, 2018) contention that Detroit failed to adequately respond to a rising tide of foreign small cars because its top executives were “Grosse Pointe myopians” who lived such insular lives that they did not comprehend the cultural shifts taking place in the likes of California.
“Precious few auto executives understand the motives for purchasing an imported car, except for empirical values like low price and operating costs, but the social implications of such undersized vehicles escape them,” Yates (2018) wrote in a Car and Driver essay first published in 1968. “Most are still convinced that a majority of Americans aspire toward the ownership of a Cadillac (or replica thereof).”
Langworth and Norbye doubled down on their excuses
There is a kernel of truth to Langworth and Norbye’s (1986) argument. Foreign automakers’ share of the U.S. car and truck market fell to 4.8 percent in 1965 but a recession in 1970 helped push it to 13.6 percent.
One problem with Langworth and Norbye’s take is that they didn’t acknowledge how foreign vehicles had gradually increased in popularity during the second half of the 1960s. U.S. automakers largely chose to ignore that growth until they introduced some decontented compacts in 1970 and then all-new subcompacts in 1971. But all the while, bigger cars kept on getting bigger.
The authors then made a remarkably sweeping statement.
“Every time a manufacturer attempted a major downsizing movement (as opposed to adding a compact as a separate model), it took a beating,” Langworth and Norbye insisted. “The almost ideally sized Aero-Willys was a failure. The Rambler sold well only until people began asking for plusher, faster Ramblers. The downsized 1962-63 Dodge and Plymouth spelled disaster for Chrysler. The ‘compacts’ soon became ‘intermediates’ because the public bought more Chevelles, say, than Chevy IIs” (1986, p. 314).
I sort of get what they were trying to argue, but the examples they offered were problematic. Let’s take a quick look.
Willys Aero and post-1963 Rambler didn’t prove much
Aero-Willys was a market failure — That’s true. However, one could reasonably suggest that this had more to do with the multiple challenges of being the smallest independent automaker than the unpopularity of compacts per se (go here for further discussion).
As a counterpoint to Willys’ failure, from 1953 to 1957 the compact Rambler sold well enough that it single-handedly saved Nash — and its successor company, American Motors — while the sales of its big cars slowed to a trickle.
Rambler sales tapered off after 1963 — That’s also true. Even so, Langworth and Norbye (1986) don’t acknowledge that American Motors aggressively pushed “plusher, faster Ramblers.” The public proved to be uninterested in flashy Marlins, bigger Ambassadors, and compact Americans with big-block V8s.
Note that AMC’s market share collapsed just as foreign automakers saw theirs double in the second half of the 1960s (go here for further discussion).
Mid-sized sales often didn’t bolster their argument
The 1962-63 Plymouth/Dodge failed because they were downsized — We have already devoted considerable attention to challenging this argument (go here). So for the moment, let’s just note that once the downsized Plymouth received more normal styling in 1963-64, it outsold big Plymouths in 1960, 1961 and through the 1970s. Meanwhile, the downsized 1963-64 Dodge always outsold its larger successors from 1965-77.
Compacts became intermediates because of public demand — It’s true that sales of compacts fell considerably between 1962 and 1967. However, a goodly portion of car buyers moved over to compact pony cars in the second half of the 1960s. That resulted in combined output that was respectable — upwards of 1.5 million annually in the second half of the 1960s.
Meanwhile, the popularity of intermediates grew to the point where in 1968 their total output almost caught up with low-priced big cars — and two years later surpassed them. This partly occurred because big cars saw their production decline by 27 percent between 1965 and 1970. Does this not show a shift away from “super-dinosaur” cars? Go here for further discussion.
But the public bought more Chevelles than Chevy IIs!
So far I have only offered a fairly high-level response to Langworth and Norbye’s argument, so let’s drill down in one area. Is it true that “‘compacts’ soon became ‘intermediates’ because the public bought more Chevelles, say, than Chevy IIs” (1986, p. 314)?
The data show that the Chevelle outsold the Chevy II by substantial margins in the second half of the 1960s. Nevertheless, I find Langworth and Norbye’s argument disingenuous.
First, it strikes me as reaching to imply that the Chevelle was created because the public demanded a bigger car than the Chevy II. In 1963 Chevy II output almost hit 373,000 units — which was substantially higher than the Chevelle’s in its first two years. In addition, all of Chevrolet’s compacts together mostly sold at similar or better levels than the Chevelle during the 1960s.
Yeah, but there were extenuating circumstances. . .
Of course, Chevy II output fell by almost 49 percent when the Chevelle was introduced in 1964. That could partly reflect some seeking a bigger car, but other factors were also likely at play.
For example, in those days new styling could turbocharge sales. By 1964 the Chevy II was three years old whereas the Chevelle was among the first mass-market U.S. cars to sport curved side windows and coke-bottle hips. The Chevy II didn’t get fully modern styling until 1968, whereupon sales almost doubled even though its range of models and body styles was considerably reduced.
Langworth and Norbye would have been on more solid ground to note how the Y-body compacts offered by Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick in 1961-63 did not sell nearly as well as their mid-sized successors introduced in 1964 (go here for further discussion).
But even here we should consider other factors. Along with a larger body, all of these cars received expanded model ranges and more distinctive styling. GM also ditched the Y-cars’ problematic mechanical features.
Why does it have to be an either/or debate?
At the end of their diatribe, Langworth and Norbye apparently felt the need to pull back from sounding too definitive. They thus concluded, “How responsible GM was for all this really depends upon your position. You either think they shoved those oversized, underbraked, thirsty behemoths on us, or you think that we demanded they build the things” (1986, p. 315).
My take is more subtle than that: That it would be fairest to say that these two dynamics reinforced each other. As a case in point, the data show that as the economy improved in the early-60s, a growing proportion of car buyers gravitated to larger and fancier cars. For example, in 1962 Pontiac overtook the Rambler in output. And as previously mentioned, import market share bottomed out in 1965. However, in only four more years import market share more than doubled.
One lesson we can draw from the data is that the U.S. automotive market did not change in a monolithic way. For example, a subsequent Indie Auto story discussed how import sales rose to a remarkably high 32.2 percent in the Pacific Coast states in 1971 whereas it was only 15.2 nationally and 8.4 percent in East North Central states. The latter region included Michigan, where U.S. auto executives tended to live (go here for further discussion).
This may help explain why U.S. automakers had a tendency to make their cars bigger, glitzier and more powerful even when import sales soared, particularly on the coasts.
What if the Detroit had stopped making its cars bigger?
As a mental exercise, let’s imagine what would have happened in the mid-1960s if GM had stopped increasing the size of its cars. One way that could have played out was that the Y-body triumvirate were not upsized. If they had otherwise been given the same type of improvements, would they have sold more poorly than as intermediates?
I don’t think that answer is clearcut. For example, the compact Mercury Comet sold better than its intermediate brother, the 1962-63 Meteor even though the latter had more distinctive sheetmetal.
By the same token, both the compact Dodge Dart and its intermediate sibling, Coronet/Charge always outsold the full-sized Dodge from 1965 onward. And from 1968 onward, AMC’s small-car platform always outproduced the one used for its mid-sized and big cars (go here).
Just to be clear: My point isn’t that smaller always sold better. Quite the contrary. Instead, I am suggesting that the postwar era saw an increasing fragmentation of the market. And while bigger cars often sold quite well, one can also point to numerous examples of smaller cars gaining a greater foothold in the market. Detroit’s tendency to cater more to buyers of bigger, glitzier, more powerful cars made it more difficult for them to respond to a growing number of people drawn to imports.
One challenge with offering a more subtle perspective is that it means avoiding the human tendency to resort to simple, either/or narratives. We can only transcend those narratives if we look at historical data with fresh eyes. (Go here for Richard Langworth’s response to this essay.)
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on Feb. 27, 2023 and expanded on June 9, 2026. Production and market share figures were calculated from data published by the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006), Gunnell (2002), Wards Auto (2017) and Wikipedia (2013).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International; Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1986. The Complete History of General Motors 1908-1986. Publications International, Skokie, IL.
- Wards Auto; 2017. “U.S. Total Vehicle Sales Market Share by Company.”
- Wikipedia; 2013. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed July 5 (page no longer online).
- Yates, Brock; 1983. The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry. Empire Books, New York, NY.
- ——; 2018. “The Grosse Pointe Myopians.” Car and Driver. Posted May 2.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcaradvertising.com: Chevrolet Chevelle (1964); Chevrolet Chevy II (1962)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Cadillac (1968); Cadillac Eldorado (1968); Chevrolet (1954, 1969); Dodge Dart (1965); Mercury Comet (1965); Oldsmobile (1967); Willys (1953)
Steve,
I’m in general agrement with what you discuss above. However when it came to American consumers purchasing foreign cars in ever-increasing numbers, there are a few rarely discussed factors that came into play.
I worked for a very large car dealership in the northwestern Washington DC area where they sold Datsun, Subaru, Triumph and BMW brands. Years later I discussed the various reason why they were successful, and one of the owners said there were 2 major reasons they did well.
1. The 2 foreign car family.
As a result of the first gas crisis, Customers came in and bought a new or used foreign car for the first time, but kept their main family car American made. But what we saw when the 2nd gas crisis hit, was the same people coming back and trading the US family car in on another foreigh car, often because of their satisfaction with the first car.
2. Options list differences.
In the late ’60s and ’70s the big 3 US automakers encouraged car buyers who wanted better option choices or small standard equipment items [cup holders for example], to buy a more expensive car in their brand offerings. Japanese car companies began shipping cars to the USA, equipped with the options Americans were already enjoying in their larger cars. Shipping most of their cars as well optioned examples also made it easier for Japanese car makers to provide the cars Americans wanted, without having to wait 4 to 6 months to order a car the way the buyer wanted.
3. Big cars are more profitable.
Big cars were generally well-optioned, and smaller cars were not. One of the ways the big 3 made more money was by selling well-optioned big cars. But foreign car makers like Volvo and Toyota found they made more profit when they made the vast majority of their cars optioned to the point they could meet or exceed the US cars. This was in many instances because by making a higher percentage of cars loaded with options, the cost per vehicle/option came down.
My parents were good examples of the above commment. Mom drove a full size and well optioned American car, and starting in the mid 1960s dad began buying European cars, starting with a used Peugeot 403 wagon. After the first gas crisis hit, in 1975 dad decided to replace the family’s well optioned Chrysler product with a new Volvo 240. Years later they both said they never regretted the decision to downsize. They never bought a US full size car again [except for dad’s Packards].
Just my 2 cents!
Steve: This is an interesting observation; however, it requires further disassembly of the marketplace and times. I think Chrysler’s issue in 1960 was styling that was falling out of the mainstream of public taste, especially the Plymouth and Imperial. Ford reined in it styling excesses by 1961, and the Bill Mitchell-led G.M. cars were superbly styled for 1961, which continued through the 1966 model year, in my opinion. But G.M. perhaps more than the other automakers were ruled by the financial staff in New York, and as a public company, the whims of Wall Street were the focus of the highest echelons of the firm. The introduction of the Chevy II / Nova was simply a stop-gap matter to blunt the impact of the Falcon / Comet and the relatively modest sales of the Y-body senior compacts. But the bean counters came to the realization that the cost of producing the Corvair and the Y-bodies were not as profitable as a conventional car, so for 1964 G.M. launched the intermediates. I still believe 115 / 116-inch wheelbases were and are optimal for most vehicle applications. The intermediates and the full-size cars were most profitable for all parties in the process of manufacturing and selling the cars, i.e. the adage “Small cars equal small profits !” The “car guys” might have wanted smaller, more efficient cars, but G.M.’s executive committee would have over-ruled them every time in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Given the volumes generated by their full-size platforms, I can see why GM and Ford would keep big cars in their respective line-ups. The full-size Chevrolet alone sold over a million units annually in the 1960s…add sales of the Buick, Oldsmobile and Pontiac B-bodies, and it doesn’t take a GM bean counter to see why they make financial sense. Same with the full-size Ford, which generally sold at least 800,000 units annually in the 1960s, with another 150,000 Mercury sales thrown in for good measure.
The real question here is with Chrysler Corporation. The two C-bodies that sold the best – the Plymouth and the Chrysler – were sold by the same dealer body. Taking away the weakling of the bunch – the Dodge – would have resulted in howls of protest by the Dodge dealers. Ideally, Plymouth would have been the natural candidate to give up a true full-size car, and go with an extra-deluxe B-body. But Chrysler-Plymouth dealers weren’t about to give up one of their best-sellers.
Whether those cars should have gotten bigger than they did in 1965 is another issue. The upward march in size in the later 1960s was pointless, and didn’t provide any real benefit to the customer.
As for responding to the imports – I think the problem was less size than not moving fast enough to improve braking, handling and quality control. By 1969, every GM division except for Cadillac offered at least two sizes of cars. If a Delta 88 or Impala was too big, the dealer would happily show a potential customer a Cutlass or Malibu. People who didn’t want a land yacht did have choices at their Big Three dealer.
I would argue that, for Americans, a late 1960s GM A-body optioned with power steering, power front disc brakes, automatic transmission, V-8, air conditioning, AM radio and the deluxe interior was a perfectly sized car for most Americans.
The real failing was insufficient effort to improve handling and braking (disc brakes were still optional on the A-bodies through 1972!) and tighten up quality control. Road & Track tested a 1968 Chevrolet Malibu with the handling package and front disc brakes and really liked it (and were surprised at how much they liked it). Perhaps the answer was to make EVERY A-body (and X-body) that good, and take more steps to ensure consistently good build quality.
Geeber: You are absolutely correct about a well put-together, disc-braked and handling-tire packaged G.M. A-body offered between 1964-1972. I remember the “Road & Track” test in 1968. Same with Plymouth and Dodges upgraded with the police packages. Fords of that period were not quite as good in my personal experience, due to imprecise steering.
By and Large I believe Langworth was mostly correct. So many factors were at play but in any market-driven concern the primary directive is to read the tea leaves in order to best meet actual public demand, the problem was in getting it right.
In the era of still typical 2/3/4 kid families that I grew up in, profit was still to be had in full-size vehicles, albeit it may have been smarter to rein in the bloat and retain the ’55 Chevy as the ideal size and concentrated on better tech for brakes and improve quality and other areas the Euros were ahead in. But I’d also posit that many Europeans would have loved to own the kind of big and powerful US-type cars we had here, if only they could have afforded them.
There’s some danger of attempting to over-apply academic strictures to an area of “study” so dependent on so many non-empirical factors. Automobile sales that are commonly driven by emotion, and other difficult to quantify factors that are outside of economics, perhaps the most applicable discipline to an academic study of auto sales. Yet the “dismal science” itself I, as an academic bio-chemist, would maintain as being at best a quasi- science,. It’s difficult to quantify styling’s role in purchase decisions. There’s far too much psychology as well as data and statistics involved. And we all know what Twain (Disraeli actually) once said about statistics, there’s danger there as well.
I really enjoy the thought provoking discussions here, it’s a valuable addition to the historical automotive scene.
I’ve reread the overall string of discussion and still find his argument to be too tilted toward excusing bigness for its own sake.
Part of what was frustrating to me was that in defending his position he used pretty lame debating tactics, such as misquoting me on when the Big Three came out with compacts. Nor did he squarely address the substance of my critique, such as that the 1963-64 Plymouth and Dodge often actually sold better than when they were full sized. Then, to top it off, he moved the goal posts by saying that he agreed with my overarching argument when that wasn’t actually the case in the book under discussion. Why not acknowledge that he shifted his position in response to the critique?
This struck me as bush league argumentation — and it was shocking to see given Langworth’s standing within the American auto history field.
I grant you that a goodly portion of the people within the field may very well consider his level of debate “good enough.” Each to his own, I suppose, but I don’t find it compelling . . . and it informs how I think about where to spend my limited time.