When compact cars were introduced in the early-1960s, they represented a dramatic change for U.S. automakers. After spending the previous decade making its “standard-sized” cars bigger, glitzier and more powerful, Detroit responded to skyrocketing sales of imports by fielding compact entries for 10 out of 11 of its popularly priced brands.
Compacts did prove successful in substantially reducing the market share of imports by the mid-60s. But instead of keeping up the pressure, Detroit’s attention wandered. Compacts for Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick and Mercury were upsized to intermediates. Meanwhile, the Studebaker Lark and Chevrolet Corvair faded away. Those compacts that remained received relatively few redesigns and were pruned of body styles and trim levels. And when the above-mentioned premium-priced brands got back into the compact field in the 1970s, they flaunted some of the more blatant examples of badge engineering from that era.
In short, even after the early-70s revival of compact sales, Detroit treated this field with much less care than they did their intermediate offerings.
Compact output falls 77 percent between 1962-67
Corporate neglect contributed to the collapse of compacts from a peak of almost 2.3 million in 1962 to a low of roughly 524,000 units in 1967. The field would gradually rebound to almost 2.1 million units in 1976.
Compact sales collapsed again in 1979, but I am going to treat that as the end of an era because the traditional size designations of U.S. cars no longer had the same meaning once automakers downsized their fleet to meet CAFE fuel-economy standards and respond to another oil embargo.
Of course, the public did not completely abandon smaller cars in the second half of the 1960s — they instead flocked to compact-based sporty coupes such as the Mustang. Combine compacts and “pony cars” and total output only fell to around 1.5 million from 1964 through 1969.
(Whether it makes sense to add the two classes of cars together after that point is more debatable because of the subsequent upsizing and downsizing of some pony cars.)
Compacts rebound despite neglect by most automakers
In the late-60s and early-70s compact sales began to recover despite their shrunken lineups and often aging designs. While a recession in 1970 and an oil embargo in 1973 certainly helped spur this trend, the public began to shift to smaller cars in the second half of the 1960s. This was partly reflected in import market share, which doubled from 5 percent in 1965 to 10 percent in 1969 (Wards Auto, 2017).
How well an automaker did usually depended upon how much attention they gave to their compacts. General Motors and Ford most neglected their compact lineups in the late-60s — and their output fell accordingly. In contrast, Chrysler was rewarded for investing in a succession of redesigns that also offered a broader range of models than most of its competitors. Indeed, for eight years Chrysler produced the most number of compacts (1966-69 and 1971-74).
By the same token, Ford saw a blip in sales when it introduced the Maverick in the middle of 1969, but those cars would later prove to be too decontented to compete with GM and Chrysler’s older — but less austere — compacts.
You would think that AMC would have gotten more traction from the new-for-1970 Hornet. That car had the most substantial redesign of any early-70s U.S. compact — including the Maverick, which was heavily based on the 1969-70 Mustang.
Also see ‘Richard Teague’s styling helped to kill American Motors’
As a case in point, the Hornet was the only compact to offer then-trendy “fuselage” styling. Beginning in 1971 AMC also fielded the only compact wagon, albeit without a full liftgate. Even so, AMC’s compact sales were not nearly as competitive with the Big Three as they were in the early-60s.
Ford, Chevrolet and Plymouth take different paths
The graph below illustrates how Ford had the most faddish approach to the compact car market. Between 1969 and 1979 the Ford brand fielded four nameplates: the Falcon, Maverick, Granada and Fairmont. Each new name came with a substantial redesign and somewhat different market positioning.
Whereas the Maverick emphasized economy, the Granada brought luxury-car features to the compact field. The Fairmont, which represented Ford’s biggest redesign of its compact platform since 1960, was reduced in size and weight to better meet tightening CAFE fuel-economy standards.
In contrast, Ford’s arch-rival Chevrolet tinkered relatively little with its compact nomenclature once the Chevy II supplanted the Corvair as the brand’s economy compact. The main change was made in 1969, when the Nova name, which had been restricted to a top-end Chevy II series, was extended across the rest of the line.
Also see ‘General Motors trumped Ford’s 1962 foray into mid-sized cars’
In general, GM invested the least in its compacts from the mid-60s onward. The automaker’s compact body received only one major redesign in 1968, and it was carried forward with remarkably minor changes through 1979. This may help explain why the Nova did not sell nearly as well as the Ford brand’s compacts in the second half of the 1970s.
The Plymouth Valiant didn’t really come into its own until 1970, when its two-door sedan was given a sportier coupe design and renamed the Duster. That model was the primary reason why the Valiant almost reached 460,000 units in 1974.
The Duster was pretty much the only major improvement to Chrysler’s compact body from when it was introduced in 1967 to when it was phased out in 1976. That’s a 10-year production run, which was unusually long for a high-volume Big Three car during that time period.
The Valiant’s successor, the Volare, was much less successful despite offering luxury models comparable to the Granada as well as a station wagon with a full liftgate — the first in the compact class since 1969. Quality issues may have played a key role in the car’s rapid decline.
Also see ‘Ford did better than Chrysler in differentiating its 1970s mid-sized coupes’
Let’s bring the above-three graphs together and compare. One takeaway is that the Valiant and Volare tracked fairly closely with the Nova from 1970 through 1979. One can also clearly see how Ford’s investments in new product generally gave it a competitive edge. That was particularly true from 1975-79.
Yes, but how did the premium brands impact sales?
The short answer is: Somewhat but not enough to change the relative strength of each Big Three automaker.
For example, in 1978 Ford produced a peak of almost 955,000 compacts. Mercury’s badge-engineered models made up under 26 percent of that total.
Compact models from GM’s three premium-priced brands were only slightly differentiated from the Nova but generated upwards of 40 percent of the automaker’s compact output between 1975 and 1979.
Also see ‘1965-68 GM big cars: The end of different strokes’
This could have been partly due to the increased popularity of luxury models. The Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick brand names may have been viewed as having more cachet than the Chevrolet. However, such strong sales could have also reflected the size of the dealer networks for these brands.
Interestingly, Buick’s compact sold the best of GM’s premium-priced triumvirate from 1975-79. The Skylark peaked in 1976 with output of almost 115,000 units. That same year the Oldsmobile Omega produced only 58,000 units, which was slightly below the Pontiac Ventura’s roughly 61,000 units.
The relative strength of Plymouth and Dodge compacts was the most complex of the Big Three automakers. In the early-60s the Valiant sold better than its Dodge counterpart. However, from 1965-69 the Dart outsold the Valiant by substantial margins. After a 1967 redesign this may have been partly because the Dart had a two-door hardtop and a number of then-popular performance models; the Valiant did not (presumably in an effort to leave more room for the Barracuda).
In 1969 almost 198,000 Darts left the factory compared to roughly 107,000 Valiants. However, the arrival of the Duster in 1970 made Plymouth the top dog for the rest of the decade.
Could more effort have led to more compact sales?
I suspect that if Detroit had invested more in compacts, they would have been amply rewarded with higher sales.
We can see that in the late-60s, when the Dart did much better than the Valiant due to a broader lineup. The initial success of the Maverick, Granada and Fairmont underscores that a fresh design can lead to at least a temporary boost in output. And the relatively high sales of the Volare wagon, which topped 41 percent of total production in 1977, suggests that there may have been more of a market for compact wagons than Detroit had assumed.
AMC may have made the biggest mistake by not offering a full line of compacts, but Chrysler could have also benefitted by keeping the Valiant/Dart more up to date in the first half of the 1970s. Instead, the automaker invested heavily in money-losing pony cars (go here) and underperforming intermediates (go here).
NOTES:
Production figures are from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Gunnell (2002), and Flammang and Kowalke (1999). Market share figures are usually from Wards Auto (2017). Note that these figures look somewhat different from those typically used at Indie Auto because they are for sales of cars and trucks of all types.
In a graph with AMC production I have included the Rambler Classic from 1960-62 because that was arguably still a compact-sized body. After that point, only the American and its successors, the Hornet and Concord, are included.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International; Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Flammang, James M. and Ron Kowalke; 1999. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1976-1999. Third Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Wards Auto; 2017. “U.S. Total Vehicle Sales Market Share by Company.”
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcarbrochures.org: AMC Hornet (1971); Buick Skylark (1976); Chevrolet Nova (1978); Dodge Dart (1967); Ford Granada (1976); Oldsmobile Omega (1976); Pontiac Ventura (1976)
Look, people wanted value and comfort for the money. The Valiant and Dart offered, if it was built right, great dependability and economy. The Nova and its variants offered, if optioned will great comfort. I rank the Maverick / Granada and cousins as offering less, although the Granada / Monarch styling obviously was a hit. If you look at the times with “high” gas prices and runaway inflation, intermediates and compacts were very important. I owned a 1973 Nova Custom coupe powered by a 350-cu.-in. V-8, with air, power brakes and steering. It was a great car and with the optional suspension, handled and rode like a big Impala. Compared to the full-size G.M., Ford, and Chrysler land-yachts, that Nova seemed like it was right-sized for the times.
I remember the Maverick with the Luxury Decor Option (LDO) being surprisingly popular (the Comet version was the Comet Custom). They also forecast the idea behind the 1975 Granada and Monarch. The Maverick LDO and Comet Custom offered a very nice, bucket seat interior and upscale exterior trim in a compact, easy-to-handle size.
I agree that the LDO option was a good step for the Ford Maverick. The interior trim had a vaguely similar vibe as a Capri or Cougar. However, the Maverick was still a pretty bare-bones car, e.g., from what I can tell they didn’t offer a real glove box until 1974 — and they tacked it on rather than redesigning the full dashboard. The luxury version of the 1975 Valiant/Dart may have been more conservative (e.g., it had a bench front seat rather than buckets) but came off as a more substantial car.
What’s interesting with GM is that the front-wheel-drive X-cars offered more exterior differentiation than the rear-wheel-drive predecessors. The rear-wheel-drive models were differentiated by grille, headlight bezel and taillight design. From the side, they looked identical.
The front-wheel-drive models offered much greater differentiation. They did share doors, but the front and rear clips were distinctive. The divisions did not offer the same body styles – and compared to the 1978 A-body sedans, there was a better match between body style offerings and the division. Chevrolet and Pontiac offered five-door hatchbacks, while Oldsmobile and Buick, which were perceived as more “upscale” in those days, offered notchback four-door and two-door sedans.
A Chevrolet Citation did not look like an Oldsmobile Omega, which did not look like a Pontiac Phoenix. Too bad GM didn’t put the same effort into build quality and reliability.
The popularity of the Buick version carried over to the front-wheel-drive X-cars. If I recall correctly, the Skylark placed second, behind the Citation in sales. They seemed especially popular with older women, which, again was a carry over from the previous generation of X-car.
That’s a good point — GM did put some extra effort into differentiating the X-cars. Much like the big and mid-sized lines, door sheetmetal was shared between the Chevrolet and Pontiac, and the Oldsmobile and Buick models. However, as you say, there was more variation in rooflines. I haven’t spent much time with production data for the X-cars; that would be a good data dive.
The usual Fisher body pattern from the ’30s to the mid ’70s was bodies across divisions shared a roof, were different from the cowl forward and had somewhat different lower body tooling aft of the cowl so that other than the roof divisions didn’t share common sheetmetal.
As X bodies started to proliferate across divisions this pattern was broken, probably because the X had only ever been engineered to have a Chevrolet body.
The pattern was violated for the A body in ’75 when the Olds and Buick coupes were re-skinned with common door and trunk skins.
That new pattern repeated in ’77 for the B and C bodies, with 3 sets of door skins, one for Chevrolet and Pontiac, one for Olds and Buick, and only Cadillac getting unique sheetmetal.
The ’78 A bodies followed this new pattern, but broke the common roof rule, with Chevrolet and Pontiac getting a notchback and Olds and Buick getting a fastback.
The ’79 X bodies followed the ’78 A body pattern but in reverse.
This little revolution in body sharing seems to be tied to downsizing. As cars get shorter, the greenhouse reads as the most important styling element. The original Fisher shared roof pattern makes downsized cars look too mich alike even when they share nothing else. Witness the ’82 Celebrity and Ciera.
It was only with the GM10 W bodies that GM fully moved away from divisional roof sharing.
Setting aside the imports for a moment, the 1960s market would soon prove to value large, mid-size and compact American cars but only had large and compact cars to choose from in the decade’s first few years. Because of this, it makes sense that compact cars spiked initially.
In the Seventies it appears that the car companies began keeping old models in production longer than usual as they continued to respond to a broadening knowledge of market preference. The 1970-77 Maverick perhaps falls into this camp, continuing to sell to the physically smaller end of the market while Granada arrived not to replace it, but to sell to the larger end. Perhaps Maverick was a smallish because it initially targeted a different market; see Wiki link below for “It was originally conceived and marketed as a subcompact ‘import fighter’, intended to compete against the newer Japanese rivals for North America, then primarily from Datsun and Toyota.” and “Commercials and advertising [initially] compared the Maverick, at $1,995, to the smaller Volkswagen Beetle, which was about $500 less in price.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Maverick_(1970%E2%80%931977)
The 1968-74 Nova appears to have been a slightly different sort of outlier, arguably being the first GM car with the company’s changeover to ’70s rounded fuselage design. It seemed to get caught in a product cycle treadmill, perhaps due to several factors, the first being the new bumper recgs, which forced some investment to be redirected to all models regardless of where they were in their product life cycle. The ’70 Vega program may have also consumed some investment and engineering resources that would otherwise have gone towards Nova. And then there were the badge-engineered cars, which brought freshness to Nova’s body not by redesign but rebranding. As a result, Nova didn’t get a major refresh until 1975. Noteworthy, with the new sheet metal it didn’t try to grow in width like Granada. Why? Who knows. Perhaps it was content to sell to the middle of the compact segment’s physical size. Whatever the case, its physical, if not spiritual replacement, the ’78 Malibu, seemed to go after Granada not by offering increased width (Malibu was slightly smaller than Nova in length, width and wheelbase) but by adding height and finding interior space through more efficient packaging.
Another factor to consider when evaluating GM’s investment priorities was the reality that it had probably been working hard on the X-Cars since 1975, given the changeover to FWD and a new approach to vehicle engineering and assembly.
Paul, you make a good point about the Maverick. As I recall, when the car was introduced it was talked about as a stop-gap model to tide Ford over until the Pinto arrived. What’s perplexing is that the Maverick was kept around for eight model years with minimal changes. That’s a long run for a stop-gap model! In theory the Granada could have replaced the Maverick, but the bean counters presumably wanted to squeeze more production out of the latter. I suppose that made some sense, although one could argue that the Maverick’s rather decontented design didn’t age terribly well. I still wonder whether a four-door Pinto would have made more sense.
Regarding the Nova, I think I can see why you’d call the styling for 1968+ models as “fuselage.” The car didn’t have the pronounced beltline shoulders of the previous generation. At the the same time, I’d consider the AMC Hornet to have more of a true fuselage look because of its much more egg-shaped side appearance.
I don’t have a clear sense of timing for the X-cars. Do you think they received the green light in 1975? That’s the year when CAFE was passed, so it would have made sense for GM to rethink its plans.
With the Maverick, it’s my understanding that its sales held up much better than had been expected during 1973-74. Ford therefore decided to sell the Granada and Monarch as luxury compacts (even the base versions were well-trimmed for that time), and keep the Maverick and Comet for those customers interested primarily in low purchase price.
Steve, here’s a link to the X-cars that says the program commenced April, 1974, with first prototype completed summer of 1976. Note the reverse-engineering of Lancia as impetus for transverse front-drive layout. See “Development”:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevrolet_Citation#Development
The long cycle life for Nova and Maverick became a pattern for the Big 3, with the ’68 Corvette and ’70 Camaro and Firebird lasting even longer. Ironically, Detroit’s largest sedans were some of the last to receive the elixir of life. My uncle bought a late 80’s Caprice sedan and was quite satisficed that it was the best choice for him. My first program at Ford was an engine update to the ’04 Town Car (eventually cancelled). The mid-late ’90s Panthers sold until when, the late 2000’s? 300C and Charger had a long run in first and second gen form, and original 2000’s Challenger is still going!
Then again, Model T, Beetle, Mini and Jeep all ran for decades. In Model T’s case the elixir eventually stopped working, only Henry not noticing. Beetle had a timeless, balanced appearance and zippy pusher engine that kept it satisfying, as did Porsche. Jeep had a timeless functionality, communicated in part by its appearance.
By the mid-Seventies the Maverick seemed to get the squeeze in that its design was still ’60s Italian while Dearborn shifted to Boxes-R-Us, predating even GM (my uncle had a ’74 LTD sedan), and its packaging was ripe to be replaced by more space-efficient FWD hatchbacks.
A 4-door Pinto with the wagon’s longer rear overhang and a longer wheelbase would have been a half class smaller than Maverick. Would it have brought in a significant number of new sales after substitution with Maverick was factored in? Would the revenue have paid for its development and delivered a decent return? Would there have been an opportunity cost? Answers would have been needed before anything got approved.
In those days, mass market small cars were not much less expensive than mass market large cars, and for 4-door models the sales numbers reflected it. Imagine a person shrinking everything they own – the kitchen and living room chairs they sit in, the bed they sleep in, the cloths they wear, their knife, their fork, the toilet seat. There is a right size for a person’s physical stature, and there is a wrong size. Ownership of a small car, depending on one’s physical stature, imposes a certain level of pain. Some folks are willing to accept it to get other benefits such as cost savings and ease of use, while other aren’t. A 2-door subcompact with long front doors at least makes the front compartment feel less constricted.
At GM over the last 10 years, Cruze sold in much higher numbers than Sonic despite Sonic’s lower price, and Sonic sold more than Spark despite Spark’s lower price. I spent two days at a Cruze clinic and can testify that the attendees noticed everything, including the sound that the front doors made when slammed shut. Cruze made a thunk, Sonic and Spark a clank. Attendees studied the doors and saw thickness in the Cruze, thinness in the smaller cars. Inside, they observed more distance from shoulder to door in the Cruze, less in the others. All of this and more fed into their perception of safety and quality. “What will be left of me if I get in an accident? “How will the car hold up over time?”
What does seem to be the case – and your writings have shined a bright light on it – is that deficient QUALITY and RELIABILITY were arguably the biggest reasons why Detroit failed. Yes, Japan initially sold small cars here, but look at what they sell now. After all these years what they are really selling are those same two things. The Beetle also sold this while Golf/Rabbit didn’t. The Europeans sold technology first and foremost, which was also important. My father got rid of our ’73 Continental in 1977 when he noticed rust after only 4 years. It and high fuel prices drove him to Datsun. Not the B-210 or 510, but the 810 sedan with 240Z engine and independent rear suspension. Quality, reliability AND technology… I loved that car! And would NOT have loved the smaller Datsuns nearly as much.
I agree with you. As an aside, I owned a 1979 Datsun 810 2-door that I bought in late 1980. It was fun to drive, and it was a quick car for that era. I held onto it for eight years with no major repairs.
My older brother owned a 1980 810 coupe with 5-speed. Was the first stick I ever drove. The car was incredibly quiet, noticeably more than the ’77 810 sedan and wagon that my parents owned. The Maxima that replaced the 810s was a complete downer. Nobody in my family had any interest in the new style.
The rampant badge engineering during this time plus the broughaming of the full sized low priced three is what I think led to the eventual destruction of the mid price and premium brands. The Chevys looked just like Buicks, and optioned correctly had all the bells and whistles. What does the Electra or Grand Marquis have that a Caprice or LTD doesn’t? If your Olds Rocket V8 is the same engine that’s in the equivalent Chevy, what is the point?