(EXPANDED FROM 11/29/2023)
A while back Indie Auto reader Jim Volgarino suggested that I check out the Internet Archive for hard-to-find automotive literature. That was terrific advice. One publication I have explored is Consumer Reports in the early postwar period.
For example, the October 1945 issue includes an article about what to expect from the first postwar models, which at press time had only begun to be introduced. When it came to what the magazine referred to as the “economy group” of cars, Consumer Reports wrote:
“In 1942, there were available four cars which cost less to operate than the ‘Big Three’ group. These were the Studebaker Champion (a consistent ‘Best Buy,’ and almost certain to remain so in the 1946 version), the Nash 600, Willys and Hudson 20. The Nash 600 for 1946 has already been announced, and it will have few changes over the earlier model. Willys has announced the ‘civilian jeep,’ but so far has said nothing about passenger cars.
Plans for the low-cost Studebaker have not yet been made public. It is likely that this ‘economy group’ will have some new members soon, for the new ‘light’ cars promised by Ford and Chevrolet for mid-1946 will undoubtedly fall into this classification, and Mr. Kaiser of ship-building fame may also have an entrant into this field.”
Studebaker initially offers the only light car . . . sort of
As it turned out, none of the Big Three introduced “light” cars, Willys did not return to passenger-car production until 1952, Hudson abandoned the low-priced field, and the new Kaiser was a large, premium-price entry.
That left Studebaker, which would initially produce a slightly modified 1942 Champion but in the spring of 1946 would bring out a new design that was larger, heavier and more expensive. The entry-level Studebaker was now roughly the same size as a mid-60s Dodge Dart.
In 1949 Nash would also plump up its entry-level 600. The car’s length grew to 201 inches and width to 77.5 inches. The wheelbase was still 112 inches — the same as the Champion’s — but the car was roughly eight inches longer and wider — which made it around 160 pounds heavier and $190 more expensive.
In other words, by 1949 there were only two “light” cars left and they did not offer as much of an advantage in size and weight over the Chevrolet, Ford and Plymouth as prior to World War II. Just as significantly, none had a price advantage.
For example, a base Champion four-door sedan listed for $1,688, which was well above the equivalent Chevrolet ($1,460), Ford ($1,472) and Plymouth ($1,551). This was quite a switch from 1941, when the base Studebaker was priced quite close its Big Three competition — and the Willys was a notch below.
Despite the higher price tag, the postwar Champion tended to be the best-selling nameplate of any early-postwar independent automaker. As a case in point, more than 343,000 Studebakers left the factory in 1950, and 79 percent of those were Champions.
1953 Willys Aero and Hudson Jet ads. Click on images to enlarge (Old Car Advertisements).
Rambler eventually dominates light car field
In the early-50s four independent automakers would come out with compacts, but initially only two-door models were offered. In 1953 the Willys Aero came out with a four-door sedan, which allowed it to be a plausible six-passenger family car. Alas, as we have discussed here, the Aero’s price was arguably too high to offer a strong alternative to Big Three cars. The 1953-54 Hudson Jet also fielded four-door models but succumbed to a similar fate as the Aero.
Only the Nash Rambler was able to generate decent sales during 1954-55. This may have been mostly because of newly lower prices and a broader range of body styles, such as a popular four-door wagon (go here for further discussion).
Meanwhile, Studebaker essentially walked away from the economy family car market by increasing the size and price of its Champion in the 1950s. For example, in 1954 the car now stretched 199 inches — longer than all of its Big Three competition. In addition, a base four-door sedan was priced $1,801, which was higher than the equivalent Chevrolet ($1,680), Ford ($1,701) and Plymouth ($1,765). The Rambler’s new four-door sedan was close in price ($1,795) but a two-door model was much lower ($1,550).
Is it surprising that Rambler output surpassed that of the Champion from 1954 onward? The Rambler essentially filled the void in the market left by Studebaker and went on to become a favorite of Consumer Reports . . . and one of the most successful American cars of the late-50s and early-60s.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on Nov. 29, 2023 and expanded on Feb. 9, 2026. Prices, specifications and production data from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006; 2002), Automobile Catalog (2023) and Flory (2009).
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- ——–; 2002. Cars of the Fascinating ’40s: A Decade of Challenges and Changes. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Automobile Catalog; 2023. “Search Automobile Catalog.” Accessed Nov. 22.
- Consumer Reports; 1945. “Advice for Buyers of Postwar Cars.” October issue: pp. 258-260.
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2009. American Cars, 1946-1959: Every Model, Year by Year. McFarland & Co.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Hudson Jet (1953); Studebaker (1949); Willys Aero (1953)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Nash (1949)
In October, 1945, almost all automakers were converting most of their manufacturing plants and foundries to automotive and truck production, but they were working with limited resources in terms of things like sheet metal and raw materials. This was part of the motivation behind Charlie Sorenson at Willys-Overland looking at simple ways to build Jeep-based post-war vehicles. Ford was thinking about the V-8 Ford 60 Vedette and Earle S. McPherson was dangling the “Cadet” at Chevrolet. No wonder there was talk of small light cars; but, when automakers had five years of selling everything they could make, why build small light cars ?
James, you may well be right that the seller’s market worked against the development of light cars. However, a countervailing trend was also at play — the growth of suburbia. In the 1940s the Automobile Manufacturers Association did a study of car-usage patterns and found that most trips were for 13 miles or less, recalled George Romney. He was general manager of the industry trade group from 1942 to 1948.
“I concluded way back then that you didn’t need a great big, several-ton car to go to the drug store to get a pack of bobby pins,” Romney said in a 1994 presentation (go here for further discussion).
Yes, that is true. However when you want to haul the family and all its gear to to some cabin in the North Woods or visit Grandma for Christmas it is essential. The postwar era was one of prosperity but two car families were still uncommon and the second car was usually a used one.
It depends on what we’re talking about. A late-40s Studebaker Champion could work fine as single car for a young family. Also keep in mind that even a relatively small demographic slice can add up to enough of a market for a niche product.
The Automobile in American Life and Society has an essay on how suburbanization and changes in gender roles led to meaningful shifts in automotive usage between the end of WWII and the late-1960s (go here). Some key points:
— By 1955, 55 percent of those with incomes over $10,000 lived in suburbs.
— By 1960, 15 percent of families owned two or more cars — which would rise to 28 percent only one decade later.
I assume Studebaker grew the Champion in 1947 because it consolidated its whole line onto the smaller chassis rather than using the larger chassis the Commander was on before WWII. They couldn’t plausibly have sold the 1947 Commander on an even smaller body. So keeping the Champion small would have meant either maintaining two bodies or dropping their upper priced line.
I could see how management might have come to that conclusion — particularly given the general trend toward larger cars. However, I suspect that a smaller Champion body might have been the better choice, particularly if that helped to keep the lineup’s price down. Studebaker’s future arguably belonged in the low-priced rather than the premium-priced class.
I go into more detail on my view on the economics of independents competing in the low price field below Stewdi’s comment. You’ll notice notice the four surviving indies from October 1929 to post-WWII plus Kaiser were all in the medium/premium price field. Studebaker dipped its toes into the low price field in the late 30s, but it was new for them. Until the Lark they never really gave up on the mid price field. Unfortunately this was the area that started being squeezed in the mid-50s.
PS, thanks Stewdi for your posts. You’re always willing to correct my misconceptions and in doing so, help me become better informed.
Kim, you’ve explained it much clearer and more succinctly than my poor attempt. That’ll teach me to post too late in the evening!
To perhaps millions of Americans at the time the war ended, Studebaker’s niche was as a manufacturer of cars in the middle or upper middle price field and traditionally competed with Olds, Pontiac, Dodge, Nash, and Hudson and the like, before any of them made a smaller car (despite poor endings like the Erskine and Rockne). GM and Chrysler (and eventually Ford) had the luxury of fielding a car for “every purse and purpose” but the independents had shallower pockets when trying to increase their market penetration.
You guys should have looked up the dimensions – the post-war ’47 Champion was actually shorter than the ’46, prewar-based car, by about 6 inches! The wheelbase was increased by only 2 inches to 112. Interior usable space, however, was wider and much, much better on the ’47, of course. In fact the engine was placed so far forward that the deeper part of the engine oil pan was actually forward of the front axle (Champion only , l believe). The hood was commensurately short. Eureka! A “miracle” of modern American auto engineering!
And then Studebaker and others used a “trick”, in that the body of the Champion and the Commander was exactly the same. On a Commander, the chassis was lengthened to 119 inches, longer front fenders installed, plus a more powerful, longer 6 cylinder. With appropriate trim upgrades, better standard equipment, different dashboard and grill, the postwar Commander was born! But the body was basically the same (the 4 inch longer Land Cruiser model body was the exception).The big differences were forward of the cowl. Nash, did the same to make an Ambassador out of a 600, and Hudson made a Wasp out of a Commodore as well.
It’s late. Going to bed!
Well, prewar most of the independents and GM flirted with smaller companion makes that for the most part did not do well. However Plymouth had a car broadly in the Champion range. It sold relatively well considering the dated appearance. I’m pretty sure GM did the same wheelbase trick on the BOPs. The senior lines had a longer wheelbase all forward of the cowl. What Studebaker was doing was in the air at that time, and, IIRC sales for them were never better with postwar sheetmetal a year or two ahead of everyone else.
I grant you that the new-for-1947 Champion had similar dimensions to the previous-generation models, but they were also more “substantial” cars. Shipping weight was up from 144 to 169 pounds in base models, depending on the body style. Note that this was even though the same engine was carried over. In addition, a base four-door sedan was almost $400 more expensive than the equivalent model in 1946. Presumably some portion of that reflected postwar inflation, but that extra mass would also need to get paid for.
One piece of evidence in favor of my hypothesis is that Studebaker’s prices jumped more sharply than its Big Three competitors in 1947. The Champions’s list price for a base four-door sedan was $1,478. This was around $200 more than the Chevrolet ($1,276), Ford ($1,270) and Plymouth ($1,284).
Now, let’s look at 1946, when the base Champion four-door sedan listed for $1,097, which was around $100 below the Chevrolet ($1,205), Ford ($1,234) and Plymouth ($1,189). Note that these prices are from Flory, whose figures can sometimes vary slightly from the Encyclopedia of American Cars.
I suppose you could argue that the 1947 Champion gave you “more car for your money” than the previous models. However, the Champion now cost more than its Big Three competitors even though it was still from 350 to 500 pounds lighter than a Chevrolet, Ford or Plymouth. Perhaps management thought that trend-setting styling would help justify the higher price — and arguably it did in some years. However, that was a risky strategy in years when Studebaker made fewer design changes than its rivals or had less successful facelifts, such as in 1952.
My guess is that Studebaker would have had a more stable market niche if it had continued to undercut the Big Three in price. That presumably could have more easily been done if the automaker had stuck with a lighter car.
In the words of Montgomery Scott “You canna’ change the laws o’ physics” Nor, the laws of economics. Undercutting the low priced 3 at their own game is impossible. I’m not sure how Studebaker did it for 1946, but per Wikipedia all Studebakers were Chapion models assuredly making production easier. In 47 they had to start amortizing the new tooling etc, which had to be amortized over maybe 1/3 of of the production of the low price 3. Another iron law is that size and features shrink faster than price. A quick glance and adding up in my head from Classic Cars database indicated about 100k Champions and 63k Commanders. Again, adding up in my head from the same source Chevrolet in 1947 produce about 674k cars,over four times Studebaker’s entire production. This means pre-production costs are about 4 times per car for Studebaker. If Studebaker had a crystal ball maybe accept the Champ would simply be costlier than the low price 3 and beat Nash to the gate with a well appointed car on the Champion platform keeping their spot in the medium price range with a right sized modern car. With the carmakers selling anything they could push out the factory door it would take a real leap into the unknown. Looking at it that way it’s amazing Nash ever got the Rambler project approved.
I get your basic argument but would suggest that history points to a much more complex situation than you present.
For example, American Motors competed relatively well for years at the bottom of the market. How could they have done that given their relatively small production levels compared to the Big Three’s? A number of analysts have pointed to the potential of a postwar independent automaker being reasonably profitable if their production facilities operated at high enough capacity. In addition, Romney showed how an independent could increase its economies of scale by offering an unusually narrow range of models that were not significantly redesigned nearly as quickly as the Big Three’s higher-volume passenger cars.
Note that Romney also got more bang for his advertising buck by maintaining unusually consistent talking points for a postwar domestic automaker. Only VW was more consistent in its approach to selling the Beetle — and it paid off handsomely for them.
It was also possible to undercut the Big Three by decontenting. As a case in point, the Henry J came with a standard four- rather than a typical six-cylinder engine and was the smallest and lightest of the postwar compacts. That helped Kaiser keep the price lower than its three independent competitors — and the Big Three’s entry-level models.
I find the pre-WWII Willys passenger cars to be particularly interesting because they consistently undercut the Big Three — and the Champion — in price. In addition, like the Henry J, the Willys were much smaller than any other major domestic car on the market and came with a four-cylinder engine. Unlike the Henry J, the pre-war Willys fielded a full line of models that gave them much greater coverage of the bottom end of the market.
One could argue that the post-war Studebaker sold much better than either the Henry J or pre-war Willys. True, but that was arguably colored at least partly by Studebaker’s greater capacity (e.g., a stronger brand, better marketing and a bigger dealer network). In addition, the Romney-era Ramblers sold even better than the 1947-52 Studebakers.
In other words, I would suggest that there were ways for postwar independents to at least reduce their economies-of-scale disadvantages, but that required them to deviate from the usual ways of Detroit. Groupthink was so strong during that era that few automotive executives were willing to do so.
Interestingly, you can still see echoes of that groupthink today in the way many historians — both professional and armchair — repeat the same old talking points as if they were physical facts rather than viewpoints that could be questioned on a number of grounds.
I agree with you. However decontenting in that era doesn’t leave you much. I was on another site this morning discussing a 1946 Olds 98. The article pointed out that on this near=luxury car turn signals, backup lights, and lighters were optional. The upholstery also looked like mattress ticking. There’s not much content to leave out. However I did notice that Studebaker’s Scotsman which I always thought was a joke sold 9500 cars in 1957 and 21,000 in 1958. For Studebaker that was an impressive number. The Willys Americar seemsed to sell about 25-35k per year, oddly about half the model 77! Enough to keep the doors open, but not enough to retool for newer models.
Look, after September, 1945, the peace-time promises out of governments in the U.S. was better roads and highways. “Seeing the U.S.A.” in your car was a priority: No trains, no buses, no airlines ! People expected better cars with smoother suspensions and other driver / passenger aids for riding comfort. That meant heavier cars with more insulation and richer upholstery.
That may be true for some people, but in the postwar years we also saw the rise of suburbs and two-car households. While head of an auto industry association, George Romney saw research that showed that a growing number of people wouldn’t need a large and expensive car just to drive down to the local drug store. That’s why he was convinced that the compact Rambler would succeed. And he was right.