(EXPANDED FROM 15/19/2023)
The 1933-42 Willys gets far less attention than it deserves. The model 77 and its successors were important because they anticipated the American compacts of the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, the Willys’ somewhat smaller size and four-cylinder engine arguably could have better fought the imports than what U.S. automakers ended up producing.
Perhaps most provocatively, Willys could have helped change the auto industry’s dismissive attitude about entry-level compacts if it had continued to build a full line of passenger cars in the early-postwar years.
I have packed a lot speculation into the above two paragraphs, so let’s walk through it step by step — and begin with a frank acknowledgment. The compact Willys did not sell nearly as well as other pre-war efforts at downsizing, such as the Studebaker Champion.
For example, in 1941 Willys produced 22,102 passenger cars. That was a bit more than a fourth of the Champion’s output, which almost reached 85,000 units. Note that this was in addition to the larger Commander and President, which tallied another 49,000 units.
Compact Willys failed to lift automaker to former glory
In the 1920s Willys-Overland was one of the leading independents, with production peaking in 1928 at over 315,000 units. Alas, annual output for the compact Willys never rose higher than 51,418 units in 1937 — and that was a one-year blip. Output tended to hover around 20,000 units or less over its 10-year production run.
That said, the 77 and its successors did allow the brand to outlast Reo, Hupmobile and Graham. I would argue that this was not an insignificant feat — nor a coincidence. Unlike these other second-tier independents, the Willys offered a unique level of functional innovation rather than vainly trying to compete directly against the larger independents and Big Three automakers.
The 77 may have been too far ahead of its time
The theory behind the 77 sounds promising. “While the low-priced three were getting costlier and adding six and eight-cylinder engines, Willys believed that the Depression market needed an economical small car,” noted the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2021). “Price for the 1933 Coupe was $395.00. Advertised mileage for the vehicle topped 30 mpg.”
In practice, Willys may have downsized the 77 too much. Bill McGuire (2021) noted that the track of the 1933-36 models was five inches narrower than the standard for U.S. cars at that time, which was 56 inches. As a result, “the 77 didn’t fit in the ruts made by other cars in the snow or on the unimproved dirt roads of the day.”
That problem was rectified in 1937, when the Willys was given a wider body. In addition, the car’s 100-inch wheelbase was increased by two inches in 1939 and by another two inches in 1941 to improve rear-seat legroom.
Along the way the Willys was given a remarkably confusing succession of new names: the 37 (in 1937), the 38 (in 1938), the Overland (in 1939), the Speedway (in 1940) and the Americar (in 1941).
The pre-war Willys offered a much broader range of body styles than early-50s compacts. A 1940 brochure page shown below displays a two-door coupe, four-door sedan, wagon, panel van and truck.
Willys was smallest and lightest of U.S. compacts
As you can see from the table below, even after the size increases, the 1941 Willys was considerably smaller and lighter than its closest competitors, the Studebaker Champion and Nash 600.
The Willys was also smaller and lighter than any of the early-50s compacts. The Henry J came closest in size and weight, particularly in its four-cylinder model.
Even Willys’ own post-war compact, the Aero, was a step upmarket. It was two inches wider, had a four-inch-longer wheelbase and was only offered with six-cylinder engines for domestic sales (Wikipedia, 2023).
As a result, the Aero was almost 300 pounds heavier. Perhaps most importantly, its prices did not undercut the Big Three’s low-priced brands like the pre-war Willys did. Popular Science said of the 1952 model, “It costs considerably more than a Henry J and a bit more than a Rambler, Ford, Chevrolet or Plymouth” (Shaw, 1952, p. 118).
Among the front-engined compacts offered in the 1960s and early-70s, the Ford Falcon and Maverick coupe were most similar to the Willys in size and weight. However, neither offered a four-cylinder model.
Willys sold as an alternative to bigger and used cars
When the 77 was introduced in 1933, its factory price of $395 for a base two-door coupe was the least expensive U.S. car besides the diminutive American Austin (Kims and Clark, 1996).
Prices for Willys’ entry-level four-door sedan varied in the late-30s and early-40s but were comfortably below Ford and larger independents. That was the case even after Studebaker and Nash moved downmarket (in 1939 and 1941, respectively).
In addition to the lower purchase price, a Willys would supposedly save 50 percent in operating costs such as gas, oil and tires. Even so, a 1940 ad stated that the Willys offered “expensive car features” such as an all-steel body, hydraulic brakes and a steering-post gearshift. A 1939 ad went a step further by addressing one of Willys’ biggest competitors — the used car:
“The New Willys-Overland is the lowest priced, full-sized car on the market. Don’t buy an expensive used car when you can buy a new Willys-Overland for less than most good second-hand cars. Get a brand-new car. Pay less and save more. It’s money in the bank all the way.”
Note that the above-quoted ad refers to the Willys as a full-sized car. This was a major change from marketing for the 77, when 1933 ads emphasized that Willys engineers “eliminated 500 pounds of excess car weight.”
What if Willys had stayed the course after WWII?
From a historical standpoint, the most important aspect of the compact Willys is that it kept the company alive long enough to begin producing the Jeep during World War II. However, if events had played out a little differently, Willys could have given compact cars a boost during the early post-war years.
In late 1943 Joe Frazer resigned as president of Willys-Overland Motors. His departure may have been precipitated by differences between him and company Chairman Ward M. Canaday. Frazer appeared to have had bigger plans for re-entering passenger car production than Canaday (Langworth (1975). Willys stuck with manufacturing civilian Jeeps until belatedly introducing the ill-fated compact Aero in 1952.
Also see ‘How Brooks Stevens’s designs for a postwar compact Willys evolved’
What if Frazer had stayed at Willys and restarted production of its compact cars immediately after the war? If the experience of other independent automakers is any guide, Willys could have done reasonably well at least until the end of the seller’s market in the early-50s. That, in turn, would have provided evidence that there was a market for a smaller, entry-level compact. That would prove to be badly needed.
Each of the Big Three considered building small cars during the late-40s. For example, General Motors developed the Chevrolet Cadet. The car was shelved because of concerns that it would not earn a profit at a price far enough below the standard Chevy to sell in adequate numbers (auto editors of Consumer Guide, 1981). That left the field to the independents.
Compacts got a false start in the early-1950s
Four out of the six independent automakers came out with compacts in the early-50s. They were the Nash Rambler, Kaiser Henry J, Willys Aero and Hudson Jet.
As mentioned above, the entry that most closely approached the pre-war Willys was Henry J. In its introductory year of 1951, output almost reached 82,000 units — but then sales collapsed. That gave smaller, entry-level compacts a bad name.
The Nash Rambler was the only compact that survived the mid-50s. And even that car’s evolution served to dismiss the viability of a smaller, entry-level compact.
When the Rambler was introduced in 1950, it was positioned as a quirky halo model. Although the car had a 100-inch wheelbase, it had a trendy design, was well appointed, and priced at the high end of the low-priced brands.
Only in 1954 was the Rambler’s line broadened to include models that undercut the Big Three in price. That strategy lasted only two years, whereupon the Rambler was upsized. It wasn’t until 1958, when import sales were soaring, that the 100-inch-wheelbase Rambler was returned to production as an entry-level model called the American.
Could Willys have sped up Detroit’s transformation?
The bottom line is that the smaller, entry-level compact was not taken seriously by the U.S. auto industry until the late-50s. And even then the surviving passenger-car manufacturers largely stuck with six-cylinder engines and packaging that was a size or two larger than the early 77.
Only after a second wave of import sales in the late-60s did Detroit begin to make meaningful investments in four-cylinder engines and “subcompact” cars. Even so, it wasn’t until 1978 when U.S. automakers came out with a body style that had back doors. Chevrolet added a Chevette five-door hatchback and Chrysler’s new Omni/Horizon only came in that body style. Before then, if you wanted a more practical, family-oriented small car you had to buy an import (go here for further discussion).
Willys might have helped speed up Detroit’s transformation if it had returned to passenger-cars once the war ended. The tiny automaker might have gained at least some competitive advantage — and thus more staying power — by being the first to offer a post-war compact.
And if Willys stuck with a smaller compact that included a four-cylinder engine and a full range of body styles and models, that could have begun to legitimize the genre in the late-40s rather than more than two decades later.
Where would Willys have gotten its bodies after WWII?
That’s all well and good, you might say, but how would Willys have solved a problem that Patrick Foster (2014) said the automaker suffered from. He wrote that Willys ended up producing only civilian Jeeps immediately after the war because it could not find a body builder to produce the more complex parts needed for a passenger car.
Perhaps part of the problem was that the new design Willys had in mind didn’t draw on existing tooling. According to Glenn Adamson (2003), Brooks Stevens came up with an all-new compact body (go here for further discussion). However, before it could reach production, company president Frazer was pushed out of the company. His replacement, Charles Sorenson, wanted a vehicle that had a closer connection to war-time Jeeps and could be produced with unusually simple tooling. Thus was born the 1947 Jeep Wagon.
My question: If Willys had attempted to use existing tooling for two or three years like most other automakers, would the firm that built its pre-war Americar’s bodies have been amenable to continuing to do so?
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on Jan. 22, 2021 and expanded on May 19, 2023 and October 6, 2025. Product specifications and production figures were drawn from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006), Kimes and Clark (1996), Kowalke (1999) and Gunnell (2002), Automobile Catalog (2021) and the Classic Car Database (2021).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Adamson, Glenn; 2003. Industrial Strength Design: How Brooks Stevens Shaped Your World. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1981. Prototype Cars: Cars That Never Were. Classic Car Collectors Edition. Published Feb.
- ——; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- ——; 2021. “1933 Willys Model 77 Coupe.” How Stuff Works. Accessed Jan. 20; link no longer available.
- Automobile Catalog; 2021. “Search Automobile Catalog.” Accessed Jan. 21.
- Classic Car Database; 2021. “Search for specifications.” Accessed Jan. 21.
- Gunnell, John; 2002.Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Kimes, Beverly Rae and Henry Austin Clark, Jr.; 1996. Standard Catalog of American cars 1805-1942. Third Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WA.
- Kowalke, Ron; 1999. Standard Catalog of Independents: The Struggle to Survive Among Giants. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1975. Kaiser-Frazer: The Last Onslaught on Detroit. Princeton Publishing, Princeton, NJ.
- McGuire, Bill; 2021. “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Willys 77.” Posted Jan. 19.
- Shaw, Wilber and Devon Francis; 1952. “Your first ride in America’s new light car.” Popular Science. January issue: pp. 116-120, 240.
- Wikipedia; 2023. “Willys Aero.” Page last modified May 15.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcarbrochures.org: Henry J (1951); Nash Rambler (1950, 1954); Plymouth Horizon (1978); Rambler American (1963); Willys (1933, 1937, 1939, 1942)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Rambler American (1958); Willys (1934, 1942, 1953)
Okay Steve, you are right. The 1934 Willys seemed to have the look of a British car of the day, and both it and the 1937 have a poor man’s Graham look about them. One thing that puzzles me on chart 1. The 1951 Willys has an 8 inch longer wheelbase than the Rambler, yet is 5 inches shorter. I see the typically distorted ads but nothing looks odd. I did take a look at actual Willys photos and that painting’s car existed only in salesmen’s fevered imagination.
Kim, you caught a fact error. It looks like my original source for the Rambler’s specifications, Automobile Catalog, used the length of the car with a continental spare. The Standard Catalog states that the 1953 Rambler’s length without the spare was 176 inches. I have updated the table accordingly. Thank you saying something; I want Indie Auto to be as accurate as possible.
Note that when the Rambler was reskinned in 1961 it was five inches shorter than the previous year’s model. This is a useful example of how, all else being equal, a boxy shape can be more compact than the original Rambler’s more rounded, inverted-bathtub look.
A very interesting analysis on the 1930s-1941 Willys, although I believe that the tragic death of John North Willys in 1935 at age 61, trying to save the company he founded by returning with a renewed vision deprived Willys of the leadership the company needed. The Willys 77 was the right car for 1933, but maybe by 1937, the marketplace required more car. Certainly the changing branding of the Willys car was fraught with a total lack of continuity, a concept that is a problem in a crowded marketplace.
I have read where it was Charlie Sorenson (ex-Ford production chief) who made the recommendation to Willys’ executive team and board to focus the resumption of vehicle production on Jeep-like cars and trucks, using appliance makers to make simple body stampings that did not require multiple compound curves. I have also read where Willys chairman Ward Canaday was looking for a merger partner as early as 1952. It fascinates me that a car as good as the Aero Willys did not find a lasting place in the automobile market. In 1954, my father had a base-model Aero Willys overnight as test-drive demo as he was going to replace our worn-out second-hand black 1948 Mercury coupe with his first new car. He eventually settled on a still new base-model gray 1953 Plymouth two-door sedan after driving a Ford tudor, a Chevrolet 210 and a Studebaker Champion, all with sixes. The Nash Statesman and the Rambler did not pass my mother’s approval. The Plymouth was the perfect first new car for my parents, and we owned it until 1960. When my father went to work for Allison Engineering Division of G.M., he bought a 1958 Chevrolet Bel Air with a six and Powerglide. Comfort and safety were the keys to my parent’s car purchases, but even with 29-cent gasoline, my parents wanted economy, reliability and dependability. My mother preferred the Chevy as it was an automatic, while the ’53 Plymouth was three-on-the-tree. Yes, when our neighbors bought Buicks, Olds, Fairlane 500s and fully-optioned Impalas, my parents took note, but frugal transportation for a family of five was the primary consideration. “Lulu”, the 1953 Plymouth was replaced with a new 1960 Chevrolet Parkwood wagon complete with a 283 and Powerglide. My parents thought my neighbors’ Corvair 700 four-door was too small. If the Chevy II 300 wagon had been available in 1960, my parents would have gone for the smaller wagon. I had a wonderful family, and while my father liked Chrysler products for their engineering, he drove G.M. products for obvious political reasons. My point to all this is that I believe that George Romney was right to focus on the 1956 Rambler and the great 1963 Ramblers. There was a large segment of average drivers whose focus was not on the hottest cars of the day, but wanted get to their destinations economically and dependably. Why Studebaker and Willys did not exploit this market opportunity after 1954 in retrospect is a source of wonderment to me. At least Ford, Chevrolet and Plymouth (until 1957-1958) kept economical base-models until the arrival of the Falcon, Valiant and Corvair. Yes, I do believe many wanted a bit of pizzaz in their basic transportation rides, which is why the Mustang hit the bulls-eye in April, 1964, for a few dollars more.
Beside the Willys 6-70 prototype, there were other then contemporary compact projects US manufacturers were developing from the Chevrolet Cadet (engine and rear suspension were reputedly reused in the Holden FX 48-215), Ford Light Car (that became the French Vedette) to Chrysler’s Cadet A-121 and Interceptor A-106 (?) projects.
Had the above four cars reached production would it have been a short-lived fad or something that could have likely annihilated the independents even those who already fielded the Rambler and Henry J? Did others like Studebaker have their own compact projects?
Thinking about it Ford UK’s MacPherson strut equipped Zephyr Six and smaller Consul was another that Ford could have made use of as a creditable rival in the US.
Hmn. Opel was sold through Buick dealers for a long time in the 60s, Vauxhall had a cup of coffee with Pontiac circa 1960, and various Ford products came and went. Nothing really before 1960. The big 3 clearly knew how to build decent small cars that that did well against the homegrown European cars in the European market. However it seemed the European branches were always treated as stepchildren by Detroit.
Opel and Vauxhall did not help GM’s cause with their bickering and lack of integration between the Kadett B and Ascona A with the Viva HB and HC / Firenza, it backfired on Opel in the short term with Vauxhall’s later problems particularly in Canada providing to be advantageous to Opel down the road in becoming the dominant part in GM Europe’s integration.
See what Holden achieved with the first two generations of the Viva based Torana and what the South Africans did with the Viva HC based Chevrolet Firenza and Hatch, including the latter’s usage of the 153 engines (not to mention the Firenza Can-Am V8) and one pretty much has a suitable alternative to the Vega.
Ford UK’s Zephyr 4/6-cylinder engines still had quite a bit of stretch and development potential left before Ford HQ issued the degree to their British and German divisions to develop parallel V4/V6 engines, with the Germans having to take on the cast-off Cardinal project at the expense of their own Escort-sized Glas-like OHC powered NPX-5 project (or a possible Ford UK designed pre-Pinto Kent-derived 1600-2000cc half relation).
It would have been interesting. Always the problem is you decrease content faster than you decrease price. However they had economics of scale going for them.
Yes, Studebaker did work up such a car. The project was given to two prominent veteran near-retirement engineers who came up with a unibody, 110 inch wheelbase car powered by a Champion engine (the very capable and reliable Champion engine was relatively light weight, and only 24 inches in length). Exner was initially the stylist for it but he left for Chrysler within a very short time. l did see a purported photo of a 4 door prototype that reminded me of a slab-sided, slightly squared-up 47-49 Champion. Unfortunately l can’t seem to find the photo reference today.
The car was tested at the proving ground, but nothing came of it (perhaps because of the same hesitancy shown by other manufacturers – and because of the relatively limited resources of an independent, they had to be sure) and it was finally destroyed in 1963 as Studebaker was closing it’s South Bend plant
Was the Studebaker Small Car project to be underpinned by a shortened Champion platform similar to what was done with the Lark?
Or could be a different project like the one they did with the assistance of Porsche.
https://www.autoevolution.com/news/that-time-porsche-secretly-designed-and-built-a-car-for-studebaker-179152.html
https://macsmotorcitygarage.com/the-secret-studebaker-porsche-connection/
Find it baffling Porsche basically ignored Studebaker’s request for a front-engine rear-wheel drive car in the contract, only things that look worthwhile with Porsche were:
– The Type 542 V6 as a V6 with the same angle was on the drawing board of Ettore Zaccone Mina for the front-wheel drive Lancia Gamma before it was abandoned, even though it would have likely cost about as much to build as the Studebaker V8 IIRC.
– The 83 hp 2-litre air-cooled Boxer Type 633 that with hindsight was like a VW Type 3 notchback sized car with a VW Type 4 85 hp 1800 sized engine, however it would probably have a similar early-to-mid 1970s shelf life, unless converted to a front-engine front-wheel drive layout with water-cooling like a bigger Subaru Leone sans 4WD.
There was a later Studebaker sketch for a small 4-door sub-compact 100-inch wheelbase 4-to-5-seater car with a four-cylinder air-cooled rear engine of 65-75 horsepower in early-1961, yet it is unclear if it was still Type 633 or a later development that built upon Porsche’s Type 633 idea.
Funny enough the rear-engine cars would appear to be well-suited for an Avanti type styling language.
Had preceding events played out differently for Studebaker later Studebaker-Packard, could it enter into a short-term alliance with AMC to replace its aging platforms with AMC’s Rambler American and Classic/Rebel/Ambassador whilst being able to pitch the Type 633 or later development at the lower-end of the range?
Not if the report was correct and the prototype was unibody. l doubt that Studebaker would have used a unibody structure at the time (late ’40’s), but that’s just my own opinion.
Slightly smaller than the contemporary Commander. Fancy V-6, unit construction, independent rear suspension. Way too rich for Studebaker’s blood. Sad.
The June 1st comment was a reply to Lotus Rebel’s May 21 comment – but the computer did not place my comment under it for some reason.
This article popped up as a see also on Indie Auto. I see Willys dropped from, 315k in 1928 to 244k in 1929 and 60k in 1930. This was an 80% drop! Did any other mainstream brands get hit so badly? I see in the Willys ads they are pitching the car against used cars. This made some sense as cars did not last nearly as long as they did today. By four or five years old they were looking worn. To continue that theme post war, remember there was no car production for nearly four years and in 1946 a good used car was simply not to be had. Heck, Willys puts out the mildly facelifted prewar with lots of adspeak about Jeep sturdiness. PS- The cheap 29 cent gas of 1960 works out to about 3.16 today. I live in NW Illinois where it’s around 3.35 and in Wisconsin it’s about 2.80, and Iowa 3.00. So broadly gas is around where it was in the good old days.
The market was in a flux between 1927 and 1930 – and not just because of the Great Crash in October 1929.
When Ford stopped production of the Model T in May 1927, it gave other manufacturers an opportunity. Willys and Hudson-Essex, in particular, temporarily benefitted, but were then hit hard.
By 1929, Ford factories were back up to speed turning out the new Model A, and Chevrolet had introduced its new six-cylinder engine. Also note that Chrysler Corporation had introduced the new Plymouth on July 7, 1928. By 1931, Plymouth had nailed down the number-three spot in sales.
That’s a good point. I’m curious as to why Chrysler ended up being the breakout automaker rather than Willys or Hudson given that it was the relative newcomer. During that era a variety of low-priced brands were launched, but Plymouth was the only one that got traction. Perhaps it was partly due to the strength of the Dodge dealer network.
Not only the Dodge dealer network, Plymouth was also sold at DeSoto and Chrysler dealers networks as well, it worked well during the Great Depression but that strategy will lost steam during the 1950s.
Right. I mention Dodge because as of 1930 it was the best-selling Chrysler brand and ranked No. 5 in output behind Ford, Chevrolet, Buick and Studebaker. Meanwhile, Plymouth was in seventh place and only 10,000 units above Essex. Plymouth wouldn’t move up to the No. 3 spot until 1932.
During that era, Walter P. Chrysler had a sterling reputation. Any move he made was going to generate lots of interest among both buyers and the press.
It didn’t hurt that the Plymouth boasted such standard features as hydraulic brakes and full-pressure engine lubrication. During the late 1920s, even Cadillac, Lincoln, Packard and Pierce-Arrow didn’t offer hydraulic brakes.
Giving Plymouth franchises to Chrysler, DeSoto and Dodge dealers also boosted sales during a difficult time.
It’s my understanding that, after World War II, body suppliers were not interested in producing Willys passenger cars because the volume was not there. They focused on order from car makers that promised considerably more volume.
The decision to go strictly with Jeeps after postwar production resumed may not have been entirely voluntarily on the part of Willys management.
If the Willys passenger cars had been reintroduced after World War II ended, the company could have sold every one it could build, given the postwar shortage of new cars.
That may have been the case but I would like to see more documentation. Foster doesn’t always get all of the details right.
It seems hard to believe that Willys management would have willingly walked away from the passenger car market (particularly since the corporation re-entered that market the first chance it got). Note that Crosley sales hit 20,000 in the immediate postwar years…and that was with vehicle even smaller than the prewar Willys.
Given the postwar car shortage, and a proven design from the immediate prewar years, I believe that Willys would easily have bettered that figure.
It may very well come down to what account you consider more credible. Foster said point blank that Willys couldn’t get passenger-car bodies. In contrast, Adamson wrote that Sorenson partly wanted to build on Jeep’s war-time reputation. If that was the case, I could see why he might not have liked Stevens’s proposed passenger-car design because it placed more of an emphasis on stylishness at the expense of utility than the pre-war Willys compacts.
I have found a number of problems with the factual specifics in Adamson’s book, so I’m not going to place a bet on his interpretation of events. Even so, I’m skeptical that they couldn’t find a body builder unless someone comes up with better documentation.
Great piece, Steve. I get that volume for Willy’s production vs that if the Big 3 would be smaller but as noted in other comments Willy’s could have sold everything they built in the immediate post-war seller’s market. Post-war styling and brand marketing would have had to be much more consistent than in the past. I expect that a broader dealer network would also have been needed. It’s also interesting to speculate what a redesign of the little Willys might have been like. If that had happened, the larger Aero could have been the ‘aspirational’ offering in the line-up. Jeep makes three, suddenly creating a multi-range manufacturer. Future models could have even shared basic architecture for greater economy of scale. Ah, what could have been.
What I don’t understand is why when Willys did get back into the car market with the Aero, why it cost so much? Any salable qualities the Aero had (and it did have several were instantly negated by the fact that it was actually MORE expensive than the Big Three offerings. When Willys was still selling its Americars before WW2 they undercut the Big Three by a wide margin (as it should have; it was visibly lass car)…was Willys trying to grab as much profit as possible with the Aero, when even the well-appointed Rambler was no more expensive than the Big Three offerings, and then undercut them starting with the decontented ‘54 models? I know they didn’t have the Big Three’s economy of scale, but even so…
I believe you kind of miss the point that the pre-war Willys was so cheap mostly due to being an extremely primitive body-on-frame car with live axles front & rear. Definitely not something post-war buyers would’ve wanted, even in an economy compact car. Even the plebeian Henry J was significantly more sophisticated in design. I doubt that a modern, competitive car could be sold by and independent manufacturer for much less that the Aero and still remain economically viable. A broader range of body styles would probably only have made it worse.
My thesis was that the pre-war Willys was a promising template in size, weight and number of cylinders for postwar compacts, particularly once the imports started to take off in sales. I was agnostic about technology except to wonder why Willys didn’t bring back into production its pre-war cars for a few years like almost every other U.S. automaker (e.g., a production run from 1946 to 1948ish). My guess is that the pent-up demand for new cars would have compensated for any of the Americar’s crudities. However, if you would like to argue differently, by all means do so.
As a point of process, I would note that this article was almost 2,400 words — which is quite a bit longer than what you will find in most other auto history websites. Even so, I inevitably need to choose what I’m going to boil down and what I’m going to leave out. I also strive to offer a unique story angle rather than regurgitate what one will find elsewhere. For example, there are other writers who do a particularly good job on gearhead details, so I tend to focus more on business strategy, styling and marketing (and even traffic in illicit counterfactuals). That’s not going to satisfy everyone, but then I’m not trying to.
Something that crops up in my brain now and then. How many dealers did Willys have in 1945? How big were they? Were they stand alone, paired with a viable brand, paired with another business? This could be almost book length, what was the dealership set up in general from the 30s to the 50s. This would make a hell of an article, or articles. From the charts, it looks like Willys was paralleling the fellow first tier indies, although slowly losing ground. Then in 1938 the bottom fell out. What happened?