Kim in Lanark makes a useful point in arguing that if American Motors had “kept the Nash and Hudson nameplates any longer, the AMC executives could drive their 1959 Nashes and Hudsons to bankruptcy court.”
American Motors might not have collapsed — even Studebaker-Packard managed to make it into the 1960s — but the company could have done much worse without CEO George Romney’s decision to ditch big Nashes and Hudsons in favor of a single-minded focus on compact Ramblers.
This raises an awkward question: Why do automotive historians tend to oversell the capabilities of Romney’s predecessor, George Mason?
Mason benefits from ‘bigger = better’ mentality
Automotive historians tend to lionize Mason. For example, Richard Langworth called him “a visionary among his peers” (2021, p. 49) and Stuart R. Blond described him as “far-sighted” (2021, p. 42).
Perhaps this partly reflects the extra regard given to people who die prematurely. Mason, who was CEO of Nash-Kelvinator, unexpectedly succumbed to pneumonia in 1954 after he spearheaded the creation of American Motors by absorbing Hudson.
Another reason Mason has been given high marks is for embracing the popular management philosophy of “get big or get out.” As far back as 1946 he called for the major independents to band together in a grand merger (Foster, 1993).
Less often mentioned is that Mason had a pretty unrealistic ambition: To create a full-line automaker that was “bigger than Chrysler Corporation” (Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002; p. 557). The plausibility of that goal has not been seriously questioned even though the combined passenger-car output of all postwar independents never came close to matching Chrysler’s.
Nance partisans assign Mason a savior role
Mason’s reputation has also received a boost from those historians who have been champions of James Nance. They have apparently accepted at face value Nance’s highly questionable contention that he only became head of Packard after Mason agreed to a four-way merger. The first step was supposedly for Nash to merge with Hudson while Packard tied up with Studebaker. Mason died before the mega-merger could be consummated and Romney opposed it (Bonsall, 2000; Langworth, 2021; Blond, 2021; Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002).
Perhaps I’ve missed it, but I have not seen any of the historians who have espoused variations on this narrative respond to Patrick Foster’s point-by-point rebuttal — which strikes me as more convincing (go here for further discussion).
But for present purposes, what most matters is that Mason’s stature may have been enhanced because he is viewed as the man who would have saved Packard if he had lived longer.
Nash handles its compact better than competition
If sales figures mean anything, Mason navigated the first half of the 1950s better than any other leader of an independent automaker. Although Nash was initially eclipsed by Studebaker, by 1954 it was the best-selling brand primarily on the strength of the compact Rambler.
Mason is frequently lauded for introducing the Rambler as a fairly pricey personal coupe of sorts rather than an economy compact. However, Rambler sales didn’t begin to take off until 1954-55, when its lineup was expanded to include entry-level models that undercut the Big Three in price for the first time. In addition, the Rambler also received a longer-wheelbase, four-door sedan and wagon that better fit six passengers. This resulted in output topping 80,000 units in 1955, which was higher than the big Nash and Hudson combined.
Mason deserves credit for more adroitly navigating the compact market than any of the other independents, but his basic strategy could have backfired if he had continued to lead American Motors through the end of the decade.
Mason saw compacts as a supplement to big cars
Whereas Romney believed that the automaker should focus exclusively on compacts, Mason saw the Rambler as auxiliary to its big-car lineup (Lehman, 2011b). So if Mason had lived, he likely would have invested in a major redesign of big cars rather than the Rambler.
Even if a new-generation Nash and Hudson had been blockbuster designs, they still could have had trouble generating a profit for American Motors due to the collapse of the premium-priced field from 1956-59. And much like struggling Packard, AMC didn’t have much room for error because in 1955 it produced only around 60,000 big cars.
American Motors reportedly came close to insolvency under Romney during 1956-57 (Foster, 2017). Thus, it’s possible that spending scarce capital on a big-car redesign that didn’t sell well could have been the final nail in AMC’s coffin.
Nash’s quirky styling undercut merger potential
Mason had other weaknesses that could have undercut the survival of American Motors. Perhaps the most obvious one was that his stylistic tastes were rather quirky. The enclosed front wheels, inboard headlights and pontoon body curvature of the 1950s “Airflyte” Nashes have not withstood the test of time.
Also see ‘Did early-postwar independent automakers try too hard to be different?’
Even more importantly, Nash bodies were so distinctive that they did not lend themselves to being used as a basis for a multi-brand lineup. That would prove to be a particular problem with the Hudson tie up. If Mason was an early proponent of a grand merger, why didn’t he invest in more generic bodies, particularly when the big Nash was substantially redesigned in 1952?
Mason spread Nash too thin with niche products
Another Mason weakness is that he had a scattershot approach to product development. During the first half of the 1950s he introduced a compact (the Rambler), a sports car (the Nash-Healey) and an imported subcompact (the Metropolitan). While that gave Nash showrooms more variety, only the Rambler was very successful. The other niche cars worked against the automaker achieving adequate economies of scale.
Finally, Mason seemed to assume that maintaining a multi-brand lineup was a viable option. That might have been the case if a merger had occurred early enough after World War II that each brand had the resources to carve out a decent niche. However, by 1954 there simply wasn’t enough money to provide adequate differentiation.
One could give Mason credit for proposing in 1948 a merger of Nash and Packard (Blond, 2021). That might have worked relatively well for Packard for a while but it would have made it harder for the merged company to pivot to compact cars in the second half of the 1950s. So Mason arguably dodged a bullet when the Packard board turned down his proposal.
Mason might have had one advantage over Romney
Mason might have had one advantage — albeit inadvertent — over Romney in leading American Motors. When Romney had the Rambler redesigned in 1956 he decided to make it bigger and more expensive. That may have made the car more competitive against the Big Three but it also abandoned the bottom end of the market. This was arguably a problem in 1956-57 because an increasing number of buyers were shifting to imports.
Romney recounted that there was only enough money to redesign one platform, so he bet on the Rambler (Foster, 2017). If Mason had instead bet on big cars he presumably could have made only modest changes to the Rambler. And as the car’s design aged it would have made sense for Mason to have increasingly emphasized a low price.
One result is that Mason’s Rambler might have sold somewhat better in 1956-57 because it more substantially undercut the Big Three in prices. Indeed, that could have single-handedly saved his bacon if AMC’s big Nash and Hudson declined in synch with the rest of the premium-priced field.
Two-brand focus on big cars was less sustainable
Even under that more optimistic scenario, Mason could have been in a weaker position than Romney. For one thing, it’s hard to see how a two-brand strategy was sustainable. At some point Mason would likely have needed to ditch the Nash and Hudson in favor of the Rambler.
In addition, it was pretty much inevitable that Mason would need to abandon the big-car field. The longer he waited, the less likely American Motors could have carved out such a strong niche in the compact market.
Mason was good — but not as good as Romney
The point of this essay isn’t to dismiss Mason — he strikes me as the most effective leader of an independent automaker in the first half of the 1950s.
Romney quite rightly lauded Mason as a “real genius in this industry who has never been adequately recognized for what he did” (Lehman, 2011a). After World War II Mason predicted a growing need for smaller cars — and engaged in broad experimentation with four- and even three-wheeled concepts.
Mason had the right general direction but Romney mostly did a better job of implementation. A key reason why was that Romney had a much keener understanding of economies of scale. During his tenure as head of American Motors the automaker offered an exceptionally lean lineup. Indeed, Romney’s approach seemed to be a reaction to Mason’s dilettantism.
One of the most important marks of a great executive is the ability to recruit top talent. Could it be that Mason’s single greatest accomplishment was recruiting Romney, who had the ability to take his basic approach to the next level?
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Blond, Stuart R.; 2021. Spellbinder: The Life of James J. Nance — Volume One, 1900-1954; Volume Two, 1955-1984. Kindle Direct Publishing.
- Bonsall, Thomas E.; 2000. More Than They Promised: The Studebaker Story. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 1993. American Motors: The Last Independent. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- ——–; 2017. George Romney: An American Life. Waldorf Publishing, Grapevine, TX.
- Hamlin, George and Dwight Heinmuller; 2002. “All-New Contour Styling: The Twenty-Fourth and the Fifty-Fifth Series 1951-52.” In Kimes, Beverly Rae, ed., pp. 544-561. Packard: A History of the Motor Car and the Company. Automobile Quarterly Publications.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 2021. “1951-56 ‘Senior’ Packards: The Song was Over But the Melody Lingered On.” Collectible Automobile. December issue: pp. 47-57.
- Lehman, Paul; 2011a. “George Romney at the Nationals, July 7-10-1994: Part 1.” YouTube. Posted July 7; accessed July 15, 2013.
- ——; 2011b. “George Romney at the Nationals, July 7-10-1994: Part 2.” YouTube. Posted July 7; accessed July 15, 2013.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Nash (1955)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Nash (1951, 1956); Rambler (1954, 1958); Packard (1950)
To me the question is who would have positioned the company better to compete against the Big 3 once they turned to making smaller cars. My knock on Romney is that his ascetic approach resulted in Rambler acquiring a negative brand image by the mid ’60s. Ramblers were cars for nerds and maiden aunts. On that score, I think Mason would have done better. He better recognized that pride of ownership is an important factor in consumer choice.
By 1961-62 Romney was focusing heavily on boosting AMC’s manufacturing quality above typical American levels, and he later told Patrick Foster that that the new-for-1963 senior Rambler illustrated the design direction he sought to go: “If you’ll take a look at it, you’ll see that the styling was really very simple. The concept was that style was no longer a major factor with people who were basically interested in a good, dependable piece of transportation — one that still looked good, along the lines of a Mercedes-Benz (Foster, 1993, p. 98).
So would that have translated into AMC becoming an affordable American Mercedes of sorts? We can only speculate, but to me that’s an intriguing scenario given how badly the U.S. automakers were subsequently pummeled by the imports.
Regardless of whether that sounds compelling to you, two additional things to consider: 1) AMC under Mason may not have survived the 1950s because of the depth of the premium-priced market’s collapse; 2) by 1960 Mason would have been 69 years old.
It seems reasonable to assume that he would have retired before then, so the biggest questions revolve around where he invested AMC’s scarce development dollars in 1955-57 and who he handed off leadership to. How long would Romney have stuck around waiting his turn?
While I think George Mason was a visionary, his time was 1940 to the date of his death in 1954. G.M., Ford and Chrysler had set the pecking order with their 1955 models, which were previewed in the 1953-1955 G.M. Motoramas. From the time of Mason’s death, until 1964, Romney had to deal with A.M.C.’s existing platforms until the fall, 1962 debut of the Rambler Classic / Ambassador because of limited resources. The bets on the 287 / 327 V-8 and the 1956 Rambler platform were the right investments that saved A.M.C. and gave them the money to incrementally invest in the revival of the Rambler American and the ability to create the modern, lighter 232 / 258-cu.-in. sixes as well as replace the 1956 Rambler platform / body shell(s). Think about this: Romney and his team did for A.M.C. what Studebaker-Packard could not do after 1953…produce TWO new sets of bodies (on a unit-body, no less) while creating a unique position for the cars and station wagons that turned a profit. George Mason might have spent more money on sheet metal than Romney had Mason lived, but would Mason have sold more cars between 1955 and 1964 than Romney did at A.M.C.?
This poses a fascinating question about the focus of Studebaker-Packard management in 1955-1956, aside from trying to obtain loans from their bankers (denied) and figuring out what to do under Curtiss-Wright’s oversight in 1956: How focused was Studebaker-Packard on producing a market-competitive Studebaker and a limited-market upscale Packard to save the company ? I would suggest that James J. Nance had more resources under his control in 1955 than Romney had, but that Romney was much more resourceful, doing more with less. In 1955-1956, Studebaker and Packard had more and better dealers than Nash and Hudson, at least in urban centers like Indianapolis, IN. A.M.C. did not have up-to-date dealerships in Indiana, at least until 1959-1960, while after 1956, Studebaker dealers began their decline.