James Nance bio, ‘Spellbinder,’ shows promise and pitfalls of self publishing

Stuart Blond's James Nance bio Vol. 1

Stuart R. Blond’s biography of Packard head James Nance is among the most unusual books in my automotive library.

James Nance
James J. Nance (Old Car Brochures)

For one thing, Spellbinder: The Life of James J. Nance, is a two-volume set that stretches past 520 pages. In contrast, Patrick Foster’s (2017) biography of George Romney runs only 270 pages — and the page size is half that of Blond’s 8.5-by-11-inch books.

This leads to the question: What makes Nance so special that he deserves such exhaustive treatment for a leader lacking the stature of contemporaries such as Henry Ford II . . . or even Romney?

Perhaps I missed it, but I didn’t see Blond specifically answer that question. Instead, he wrote in the introduction to both volumes about his frustration with historical accounts that derided Nance as “just an ‘appliance salesman'” (original italics). Spellbinder was intended to “set the record straight about the man, his career, and the times in which he lived.”

1956 Packard Patrician
Blond said “one of the highlights of my young life” was when he arranged for Nance to visit a Packard club — and drove his own 1956 Patrician to get him at the airport. The two stayed in touch (Automotive History Preservation Society).

Why did the author want to write a Nance biography?

Blond stated that he has had a longstanding fascination with Packard automobiles. That included getting involved with The Packard Club, where over the years he has edited regional, national and international newsletters and magazines.

This led me to assume that I would be reading a sympathetic portrayal of Nance. While that is arguably true, Blond mostly steered clear of the superlatives Foster (2017) lavished upon his biography subject in favor of an exhaustive documentation of basic facts. And when Blond was effusive in his praise of Nance, such as when using the word “spellbinder” in the books’ title, at least he was quoting someone else’s description of the man (Vol. 1, p. 63).

Also see ‘The downside of auto historians writing about their friends’

Other automotive historians have dug through Packard corporate records, but they have generally summarized them in relatively pithy ways. Not Blond, who quoted extensively from memos and other written records. Indeed, Spellbinder often reads more like a term paper than a typical book because of the predominance of lengthy quote blocks.

Those who only want a superficial overview of Nance’s career may get impatient with Blond’s level of detail. However, fellow historians will appreciate being able to document obscure facts that other Packard books may gloss over (or get wrong). Another plus: Blond used a scholarly citation method.

1957 Packard Clipper
Blond responded to criticism that Nance put Packard “out of business” by arguing that “they just stopped manufacturing automobiles” (Vol. 1, p. 64). That’s a surprisingly glib response given the author’s emphasis on fact checking myths.

Spellbinder’s counterfactual was realistic but limited

Don’t look here for a sophisticated and original analysis about why Packard died. This is mostly a descriptive account that often reads more like a literature review than a standard book with a well-developed introduction and conclusion.

To the degree that Spellbinder offers a point of view, it mostly shows up in who Blond did — or did not — choose to quote. However, in Volume Two, 1955-1984, he briefly joined “Monday morning quarterbacks” such as those “who post on Internet forums” (p. 114).

Blond speculated that if the proposed 1957 redesign of the Clipper and Packard had reached production that they might not have succeeded. This was partly because the Clipper’s styling “was not as clean and unforced as the Packard” (Vol. 2, p. 116). In addition, the premium-priced market collapsed in the late-50s (see second quote below).

Also see ‘Counterfactuals and whether AMC had a chance of survival’

This is an admirably realistic counterfactual — as far as it goes. Blond didn’t grapple with whether Nance really could have afforded a two-brand lineup with distinctive sheetmetal when even wildly optimistic internal projections saw the Clipper and Packard totaling only 125,000 units by 1960 (Vol. 2, p. 109).

Spellbinder might not have addressed the long-term viability of a two-brand lineup because Blond apparently belongs to the school of thought that believes Packard suffered from the “dilution of its brand” by offering premium-priced and luxury models under the same name (Vol. 1, p. 65).

Blond is also among those who have judged Nash-Kelvinator head George Mason as “far-sighted” for assuming that a grand merger of independent automakers in the early postwar years was crucial to their survival (Vol. 1, p. 42). In other words, Blond’s narrative is grounded in debatable assumptions — but those debates are mostly ignored in Spellbinder.

1954 Packard Clipper trunk insignia
Blond stated that “Nance recognized early on the need to separate the luxury-class Packards from the medium-class Clippers” (Vol. 1, p. 71. This is an example of how Spellbinder can treat a questionable assumption as a given.

Blond took sides without showing his facts and logic

Despite Blond’s stated goal of setting the record straight, he could steer clear of information that presents Nance in a less-than-flattering light. For example, George Hamlin and Dwight Heinmuller pointed to a Nance interview where he recalled joining Packard only after Mason had agreed to help engineer a four-way merger. Mason would pull together Nash and Hudson while Nance would combine Packard and Studebaker. Then those two firms would be merged. “Nance was slated to be its president once Mason had everything running smoothly,” Hamlin and Heinmuller concluded (2002; p. 557).

Foster offered a multi-point rebuttal of Nance’s claims. For example, he asked “why did Mason approach Packard in 1954 regarding a merger of Hudson Packard and Nash, without Studebaker” if there was already a deal (2008, p. 92)? Foster also quoted Romney as insisting that Mason had rejected including Studebaker because of its high labor costs and deep roots in South Bend, which could make consolidating production elsewhere harder (2017, p. 125).

Also see ‘James Ward offers more nuanced take on Packard’s fall than other auto histories’

Foster is the most prominent expert on American Motors and the author of one of the more recent Studebaker histories, so his perspective deserved a response. Instead, Blond ignored it and credulously repeated Nance’s narrative, albeit with a bit more nuance than Hamlin and Heinmuller. Spellbinder states that Mason would have become the chairman of the board of the four-way merger and Nance would have been tapped as president and CEO (Vol. 1, p. 45).

Blond did not list in his bibliography the two Foster books I have cited above. Presumably Blond would have come across them in his research, so that raises the question: Did he view Spellbinder as an advocacy piece rather than a full and honest portrayal of Nance?

1955 Packard 400 insignia
Nance’s tenure at Packard is presented in around 320 pages — which are awkwardly split between the two volumes. His brief stay at the Ford Motor Company takes up another 70 pages in Volume 2. Both topics could have fit in one book.

Spellbinder shows tradeoffs of self publishing

The biggest advantage of self publishing is that you can do it your way. This strikes me as an important consideration because publishing houses seem to be increasingly interested in glitzy coffee table books rather than substantive automotive histories.

As a case in point, Patrick Foster (2005) once lamented the difficulties in publishing his Romney biography. Although Foster ultimately landed a publisher, the resulting book seems surprisingly small. This brings me to wonder if Blond might have found it even harder to shop his manuscript. Not only was Romney a prominent leader in both business and politics, but his son Mitt — a recent presidential candidate and current U.S. senator — wrote the foreword to Foster’s book. Blond didn’t have a news hook like that.

Also see ‘Wheel spinning happens when car buffs and scholars don’t collaborate’

Thus, it made sense for Blond to go the self-publishing route. However, one downside is that he could have used an aggressive editor. Blond’s wordsmithing is okay but the narrative could have been tightened up considerably. I suspect that with careful pruning, the substance of the work could have been maintained in a one-volume book. (I say that as someone who had to cut my doctoral dissertation in half to get it approved by my committee.)

Self publishing can also be vulnerable to basic quality-control issues. My copy of Volume One was printed backwards. In other words, Page 1 begins at the end of the book and Page 193 is in front.

1958 Edsel Pacer
Blond included a 1957 quote from Nance: “I would not have taken a step down in a position of any company, other than Ford” (Vol. 2, p. 140). This aligns with Foster’s (2008) contention that Nance insisted on heading a four-way merger.

In key respects this is a useful model for an auto book

My criticisms are not intended to discourage people from buying Spellbinder. I see this book as essential reading for those who seek a detailed, factually grounded understanding of Packard’s final years. Blond has also developed an approach to automotive history that is worthy of emulating in a number of ways.

Spellbinder raises the possibility that self publishing may be a useful vehicle for increasing the number of substantive books which are available. This could be a particularly promising route if a major auto history organization could offer technical support, such as robust editing assistance.

Also see ‘Where do auto historians get their information?’

Blond also shows the value of books that focus on documenting basic facts rather than presenting a breezy narrative. We need more of this kind of research to advance U.S. automotive history. The market for such books may be limited, but it is hopefully big enough to make the effort worthwhile.

Alas, it would seem to take an exceptional level of commitment to research, write and self publish such an exhaustive work as Spellbinder.

Spellbinder: The Life of James J. Nance

Volume 1, 1900 to 1954 (2021, 1st ed.) — Volume Two, 1955-1984 (2022, 2nd ed.)

  • Blond, Stuart R.
  • Kindle Direct Publishing

“When Nance returned to his desk at East Grand Boulevard, he was shaken by a blunt report written by the company’s treasurer, dated March 1 [1954]. ‘Basically,’ Walter Grant wrote, ‘the company is rapidly approaching bankruptcy.’ In it, Grant talked about sales that have ‘dwindled,’ a cash position that was ‘deteriorating,’ and ‘substantial expenditures’ needed to complete the new engine plant in Utica and the assembly plant at Conner Avenue. If expenses continued, Packard would have ‘no working capital left by June 30, 1955.'” (Vol. 1, p. 116)

“The recession that started in mid 1957 would kill the Edsel in its crib by late 1959, and fatally wound De Soto, which was killed in 1960. Would the all-new Clipper have soon followed? Sadly, we think that it would have. And the Packard would have been dragged down as well. Leaving us with exactly what happened in real life — no Packards or Clippers for 1959.” (Vol. 2, p. 116)

“The first week of October [1957] found Nance defending the trend towards ‘bigness’ in automotive design. Responding to AMC president George Romney, who had recently predicted that small ‘compact’ cars would account for 50 percent of U.S. auto sales by 1960, Nance stated: ‘All our consumer surveys show that Americans want a big package. And that’s what we’re going to give them.” (Vol. 2, p. 171)

OTHER REVIEWS:

Speedreaders.com | Packardinfo.com | Amazon.com


RE:SOURCES

3 Comments

  1. Over this past weekend [2-19-23] I finished both volumes of Spellbinder. As you correctly point out, this publication should be in every automotive library.

    I’ve been interested in the Packard Motor Car Company and the automobiles the company created, ever since I saw the Packard Predictor show car as a boy. I bought my first Packard at the age of 14, keeping it on the local Dodge dealer’s back lot, as the dealership owner was a former Packard man and my parents would have had a fit knowing I bought it. I drove Packards all thru high school & college. I’ve owned over 300 Packards, from the 1930s all the way to the end, even versions made in South Bend.

    I mention all of the above to illustrate the interest I have in Packard, and how my time associated with the marque took me thru the years when Nance was known as a traitor to Studebaker-Packard, to attending the Packard Club’s national meet In Annapolis, MD where I heard Nance speak publicly for the first time. Over the last 55 years I’ve read many articles and stories about Nance’s involvement with Packard, found in various trade papers, car magazines, and club publications, many of them filled with errors and contradictory.

    Stuart Blond’s book was created [in my opinion] to assemble the facts necessary to provide evidence as to exactly what took place, in some instances detailing hour by hour or day to day, accounts recorded by those who were there in the bunker. Because so much has already be written in error, it was necessary to publish the details, recorded by those who were there, so reasonable people interested in what really happened can have an understanding why Packard Motor Car Company ultimately failed, and just how many different outside groups [like insurance companies & the government] made decisions that hastened the organization’s rapid decline and final closure.

    As for Stuart showing favoritism towards Nance, he spent considerable time talking with Nance and was given unlimited access to Nance’s private notes by the family, so I would expect he has some positive bias towards the man, but I don’t see that his favoritism for James J Nance greatly influenced the book’s content.

    And Steve, thanks for discussing this book and it’s topic, and the ability for others to comment.

    • Bill, I appreciate the thoughtfulness of your comment. It may help to know that I approach automotive history as more of a scholar than a car buff. One way that plays out is I am particularly interested in nailing down factual nuances which may not be terribly interesting to a lot of other folks. (Go here for a further discussion about differences between scholarly and car buff writers.)

      For example, in reading the Studebaker-Packard literature, my sense is that one of the bigger lingering debates is whether Nance had a deal with Mason to create a four-way merger BEFORE he decided to join Packard. Blond was somewhat vague on this but seems to take Nance’s narrative at face value. Meanwhile, he ignored a major countervailing perspective from Foster.

      In the scholarly world, it’s not good form to ignore counter-arguments. You engage the perspective — and backing evidence — and rebut it. Blond didn’t do that. Foster has written one of the most recent histories of Studebaker and Romney, so Blond surely knew about both books but chose to steer clear of them. That’s particularly problematic because Foster made what strikes me as pretty logical points. They deserved to be addressed. By not doing so and instead repeating Nance’s narrative in a credulous manner, Blond effectively took sides on that topic.

      Just to be clear, I don’t look at this particular topic as a proxy for being pro or con on Nance. I just want to know what really happened. Here Blond was not very helpful.

  2. Author and Packard enthusiast Dwight Heinmuller recently released a two-book series on the 1955-56 Packards and proposed 1957 Packards. The books feature many photographs, but are ring-bound (but the set is still $145!).

    Interestingly, he places much of the blame for Packard’s demise on one decision – moving assembly from East Grand Boulevard to the Conner Avenue plant. He claims that Packard actually had sufficient funds to continue operating – if it had stayed at East Grand Boulevard, and continued to rely on Conner Avenue solely for bodies.

    If that had happened, production of the 1955 models would not have been delayed, and the serious quality problems would not have reared their ugly head during the model year. Unfortunately, Packard did not take that route, and thus burned through its financial reserves while losing precious sales early in the 1955 model year. The refusal by the insurance companies to extend additional financing in early 1956 was, in view of that fiasco, understandable.

    Heinmuller blames Nance for listening to bad advice regarding the decision to move everything to Conner Avenue. This is the critical area where Nance’s lack of expertise in the nuts-and-bolts of the auto industry showed.

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