The February 2024 issue of Collectible Automobile has a story about the 1974-83 Jeep Cherokee. As is typical for this magazine, you will find lots of nice photos and a comprehensive recitation of product specifications by model year. However, what is lacking in the article by Patrick Foster (2024) is an analysis of why Jeep’s pioneering mid-sized, sport-utility vehicle wasn’t more successful.
The Cherokee is one of the biggest success stories of the last 40 years, but production of first-generation models peaked at under 41,000 units in 1978. That wasn’t nearly enough to save American Motors from having to partner with the French automaker Renault once passenger-car sales tanked in the late-70s.
What’s unfortunate is that Jeep might have kept the automaker independent if management had been more adroit in navigating a shifting SUV market. This is an interesting story that Collectible Automobile mostly sidesteps. Why?
American Motors wanted a Chevy Blazer on the cheap
According to Foster, the Cherokee was launched because the Commando, Jeep’s existing entry near the lower end of the SUV class, “was hopelessly uncompetitive.” Product planners decided that Jeep needed a “bigger SUV to compete with the Chevrolet Blazer” (2024, p. 64).
Foster didn’t raise an eyebrow about that strategy even though the Commando was similar in size to the compact International Scout II and first-generation Ford Bronco. Both of those SUVs saw decent volume for that time period — in 1973 roughly 34,000 for the Scout and 22,000 units for the Bronco.
Approximately 9,500 Commandos left the factory in 1973. That wasn’t great, but the vehicle’s more direct successor, the CJ-7, did much better in sales (more on that in a moment). Meanwhile, almost 45,000 Blazers were produced that same year (this includes both two- and four-wheel-drive models).
Why didn’t American Motors follow the approach used by the Big Three with their entry-level SUVs, all of which would eventually become shortened versions of their full-sized pickups? Chevrolet came out with the Blazer in 1969, Dodge introduced the Ramcharger in 1974 and Ford upsized the Bronco in 1978. Foster argued that AMC lacked the money to follow suit and “the market wasn’t large enough to justify the investment” (2024, p. 64).
Also see ‘The downside of auto historians writing about their friends’
Jeep’s mid-sized platform, which had been shared by the Wagoneer and a line of trucks, could have been the basis for a Blazer-type SUV by shortening it to the Commando’s size. That would have cut 10 inches in length and four inches in wheelbase from the Wagoneer. The resulting SUV would have been more maneuverable and better proportioned than the Cherokee turned out to be.
I suspect that the primary reason American Motors didn’t go in this direction was because it generally starved Jeep for product-development funds because of the high cost of passenger-car redesigns such as the 1974 Matador coupe.
Cherokee was part of Jeep’s attempt to go upmarket
Foster seemed to buy into the logic that launching a new nameplate made sense because Jeep’s mid-sized SUV platform “was the right size” but the Wagoneer was “positioned upmarket and was already attracting an older, richer demographic, one that valued comfort and elegance” (2024, p. 64).
What he didn’t say was that the Wagoneer had been a plebeian nameplate given a big price hike with the Cherokee’s unveiling in 1974.
It’s true that the list price for an entry-level Cherokee was $4,161 — a good $340 less than the previous year’s base Wagoneer. However, the base Cherokee was decontented and initially only offered in a two-door model whereas the Wagoneer came with four doors. A nicely trimmed Cherokee S was priced at $4,724, which was close to the cost of a top-end 1973 Wagoneer Custom.
For 1974 all Wagoneer models saw price increases of upwards of $900. While competing SUVs also had meaningful price hikes, the Wagoneer Custom now listed for $5,704. That was almost $400 higher than a 4WD International Travelall and roughly $800 more than the equivalent Chevrolet Suburban. Jeep was betting that the Wagoneer’s more car-like qualities would compensate for its much smaller size.
American Motors was apparently focused more on boosting Jeep’s profits than its output. While that may have made some sense given the limitations of Jeep’s Toledo Ohio assembly plant, the automaker would prove to have a bigger need for expanded production.
CJ-7 shows ongoing value of Commando’s market niche
The Cherokee wasn’t a replacement for the Commando because it was priced $555 higher than the previous year’s wagon model. That made a base Cherokee more costly than a 4WD Scout ($3,943) and just under a Bronco ($4,182) in 1974.
In addition, the Jeep’s prices were higher than the Blazer’s, whose 4WD open utility model listed for $3,577. The Cherokee came with more standard equipment, but it was still less price-competitive than the Commando had been.
Jeep essentially abandoned the Commando’s market niche until 1976, when it came out with a somewhat larger and more civilized CJ-7 (Foster, 1994). Production topped 21,000 units, which was in addition to roughly 31,000 CJ-5s.
Note that the CJ-7’s output was only a few thousand short of the Cherokee’s 26,365 units in 1976. This illustrates how there was an ongoing market for a small SUV that was a step above a CJ-5 even during those years when gasoline was relatively cheap and interest rates made larger vehicles more affordable.
The CJ-7 would prove to be an astute addition to the Jeep lineup. However, American Motors could have done more in this size and price class, such as by adding a fixed-roof body style.
Once the Commando was discontinued, American Motors did not give the CJ’s platform the breadth of products that could have helped the automaker maintain sales when higher gas prices and interest rates tanked the popularity of its mid-sized vehicles.
What if the Wagoneer had instead been expanded?
The above is not to suggest that Jeep shouldn’t have expanded its mid-sized SUV lineup. To me the key question is whether it made more sense to increase the number of Wagoneer models rather than adding the Cherokee nameplate.
The reason this is worth asking is that the Cherokee and Wagoneer together almost hit 70,000 units in 1978. That edged past the upsized Bronco’s roughly 69,000 units and nipped at the heels of the Blazer’s 89,000 units. If Jeep had only fielded one nameplate it wouldn’t have had to split up its limited marketing and product-planning resources.
That arguably mattered because American Motors was struggling to keep both its passenger cars and Jeeps competitive in the 1970s. One can see that in the remarkably limited design updates that the Cherokee and Wagoneer received.
What the mid-sized Jeeps most needed was a restyling that included switching to curved side glass. But even updating the front and rear sheetmetal could have made them look less archaic.
That was not to be. American Motors instead tried to eek out sales by giving the Cherokee all manner of doodads, such as ultra-wide wheels and and wild paint schemes. It worked sort-of okay for a while but not enough to carry the company through the late-70s and early-80s.
I grant you that a second oil crisis and a punishing recession made the situation exceptionally challenging, but it didn’t help that Jeep had a balkanized lineup of out-of-date SUVs.
NOTES:
Prices, specifications and production figures from Gunnell (1996). Brand-specific sources for production figures: Chevrolet Blazer (Wikipedia, 2023), International Scout (Beebe, 2024) and Jeep (Jeepfan.com, 2024; Foster, 2024).
RE:SOURCES
- Beebe, Craig; 2024. “Scout II production figures and history.” Binder Planet. Accessed Jan. 9.
- Foster, Patrick; 1996. “1967-73 Jeepster Commando: Fighting the Good Fight.” Collectible Automobile. June issue: pp. 42-49.
- ——; 2024. “1974-83 Jeep Cherokee: The Start of Something Big.” Collectible Automobile. Feb. issue: pp. 62-73.
- Gunnell, John; 1993. Standard Catalog of American Light-Duty Trucks, 1896-1986. Second Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Jeepfan.com; 2024. “Jeep Production Dates, Models, & Numbers 1945-86.” Accessed Jan. 9.
- Wikipedia; 2023. “Chevrolet K5 Blazer.” Page last edited Dec. 30.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcarbrochures.org: Jeep (1972); Jeep CJ-7 (1976); Jeep Cherokee (1976, 1978, 1982); Jeep pickup (1978); Jeep Wagoneer (1976)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Jeep Cherokee (1974); Jeep Wagoneer (1968)
Would the Cherokee SJ based Blazer-sized Commando be produced to supplement or be in place of the Cherokee?
Additionally would a fixed-roof CJ-7 (if not also a fixed-roof CJ-6 unless present) like what was done on the first generation SsangYong (Keohwa / Dong-A) Korando have still been necessary in a scenario like above?
Would the Wrangler YJ however by itself have been an adequate successor to replace both the CJ-7 fixed-roof and Commando SJ or was there room in the range for a Grand Cherokee XJ based fixed-roof 2-door loosely drawing upon both the 1985 Cherokee 2-door Targa project and 1990 Cherokee Freedom concept?
Apologies for displaying not being well-versed in Jeep history (being a non-US reader), only just realised the Cherokee XJ was available as a 2-door.
Even so, it still comes back to the question of if it or a 2-door Grand Cherokee XJ have been suitable replacements.
I’d say that Jeep did OK. Look at the powerhouse that they have become! Hard to throw stones at the outcome!
John, styling is subjective, so we’re all entitled to our own viewpoints. That said, it’s a fact that by the early-70s the mid-sized Jeep’s body was the oldest in the U.S. industry (aside from the low-volume Checker). Even International’s light-truck lineup had newer sheetmetal. The Wagoneer/Cherokee/pickup body worked okay as long as American Motors only sought incremental sales, but it clearly wasn’t enough to carry the company once passenger-car sales tanked. I personally would have preferred that the automaker maintained its independence.
You make a good point that eventually Jeep became a “powerhouse,” but think about a big reason why: Renault and then Chrysler heavily invested in new product. That was the opposite of American Motors. Instead of keeping the Jeep line current, management threw money at the ill-fated Matador coupe and the Pacer.
While I do not think of Pat Foster as an unbiased commentator of A.M.C. history, in fairness, A.M.C. after 1974 was emulating Studebaker after 1954. When the boat is sinking with multiple leaks and the pumps are only working part-time, what does one fix first ? One certainly does NOT worry about curved side glass on Jeeps ! Given the fact that A.M.C. did not have the money in 1974 to redesign their 1963-era bread and butter intermediate sedans and wagons, every dollar spent was stretched over too many vehicles. (A.M.C. needed a younger equivalent of “The Whiz Kids” running the show.) I think A.M.C. treaded water reasonably okay in the 1970s and 1980s with Jeep. I think that those who bought Jeeps were not the consumers who bought them because they were manufactured by A.M.C.: They bought them because they were essentially Willys Jeeps from Toledo, Ohio U.S.A.
AMC spent around $106 million on the 1974 Matador coupe and the Pacer. That was a lot of money back then — and it plausibly could have been enough to at least give the mid-sized Jeeps a reskinning and move all AMC’s passenger cars to an updated Hornet platform.
As far as curved side glass, it all comes down to how much AMC wanted to build Jeep’s sales. Are you suggesting that Renault’s major Cherokee redesign should have stuck with flat glass?
No, Steve, not at all. The 1984 Jeep Wagoneer and Cherokee were clean sheet designs, so I don’t think curved side glass was an additional extravagant expense for a totally new vehicle body structure. But I don’t think the cost-benefit for putting curved side glass on the 1964-era Jeeps in 1972 would have yielded enough additional sales to have been worth the additional investment in design and tooling.
Jaguar gave the original XJ a new greenhouse with curved side glass. So did Ford when it reskinned the 1966 Fairlane and Lincoln Continental.
It should be noted that AMC did spend money during a portion of this period to create 4 wheel drive for the updated Hornet and Gremlin. I do not know to what extent, if any, the components were the same between the Jepp and the cars.
Was this a wise use of resources instead of committing further to the Jeep line? Later on AMC killed the 4 wheel drive cars which may not have been a great move as Subaru built much of their market presence with this feature.
Jeff, the Eagle strikes me as a pretty good idea because it was a low-cost way of carving out a new market that dovetailed with Jeep’s niches. By that point the cow was already out of the barn — AMC no longer had the money to come up with major redesigns on their own.
I would guess that for around the cost of the 1974 Matador coupe — $40 million — AMC could have given the senior Jeeps a decent updating. It’s pure speculation as to whether the new vehicles would have sold well enough to keep the automaker independent, but surely such a move would have generated more sales and profits than the ill-fated Matador.
AMC management expressed the right sentiment to not compete directly against the Big Three . . . but then they went ahead and did it anyway.