(EXPANDED FROM 6/30/2023)
Did Ford make the right move by pulling the plug on a U.S.-built subcompact slated to be introduced in the fall of 1962? The car, initially called the Cardinal but later renamed the Redwing, was a front-wheel-drive economy car intended to compete against the Volkswagen Beetle. The American version of the car was cancelled at the last minute but a German version — called the Taunus P4 and P6 — was built from 1962 to 1970 (Wikipedia, 2021).
I wrote the original version of this post a few years ago in response to comments made about Indie Auto’s story about Lee Iacocca, who reportedly played a central role in killing the Cardinal (go here). Paul Niedermeyer (2018) had already done a deep dive over at Curbside Classic, so I wanted to put some additional thoughts on the table without duplicated his efforts.
I see this topic as breaking out into three questions:
- In the 1960s should Ford have built a subcompact in the United States?
- If so, was it better for Ford to use front wheel drive rather than a traditional design?
- If you answer “yes” to both of the above two questions, was the Cardinal worth producing?
Addressing each question in turn can avoid the confusion that can result from conflating them.
Should Ford have built a 1960s U.S. subcompact?
Popular Mechanics summarized the reasons Ford gave for not building the Cardinal in the United States. A decline in the demand for smaller economy cars resulted in Ford no longer being able to “justify the cost of setting up assembly lines and channels of distribution for cars and parts.”
Another factor was supposedly that the appearance of compacts in the used-car market could further erode the viability of a subcompact. “Detroit Listening Post” writer Jim Whipple insisted that the cancellation was not because Ford management feared a “buyer reaction to front wheel drive” (Whipple, 1962; p. 72).
Also see ‘If you ran VW in 1959 how would you prepare for Detroit’s compacts?’
Ford’s excuses made some sense. By 1962 smaller economy cars were beginning to be eclipsed in sales by larger and sportier models. This shift was symbolized by Rambler, that paragon of compact probity, who was bumped out of third place in sales by Pontiac in 1962. Even so, American compacts had succeeded in cutting import market share.
With the luxury of hindsight we know that the imports would be held in check only temporarily. The market share of foreign cars and trucks would shoot up from under 5 percent in 1963 to almost 14 percent in 1970. A key reason why this happened was arguably because all of the American automakers shifted their attention to bigger, glitzier and more powerful models.
Iacocca pushed bigger, glitzier, more powerful models
For example, Iacocca not only killed the Cardinal, but he moved the compact Falcon to a mid-sized platform in 1966. That led to the nameplate’s sales falling substantially, although for a time it was compensated for by the sporty Mustang.
Eventually Ford would respond to rising import sales, first with the strippo compact Maverick in mid-1969 and then with the subcompact Pinto for 1971. Of course, General Motors would also come out with its first U.S.-built subcompact called the Vega.
The problem with waiting so long to directly compete with the imports is that Detroit arguably let the cow out of the barn, never to return. Volkswagen sales eventually tapered off as the aging Beetle lost its luster, but other imports saw surging sales. By 1981 — a decade after Detroit unveiled the subcompacts that were supposed to drive the imports back into the sea — foreign automakers had captured 25 percent of the market.
Ford was in the best position to enter the subcompact market
I would suggest that American automakers would have had a much better chance of holding back the imports in the 1970s if they had entered the subcompact market in the previous decade. And of the Big Four automakers, Ford was in the best position to do so.
During the 1960s General Motors was too successful in the upper reaches of the market to take the subcompact field seriously. Meanwhile, Chrysler and American Motors were arguably too small to field a viable entry.
Not only did Ford have adequate scale, but while Robert McNamara was an upper-level executive he championed practical economy cars. Indeed, the Cardinal was initially approved when he was company president (Kisiel, 2003).
Should front-wheel drive have been used?
One could reasonably argue that front-wheel drive was not ready for prime time in the 1960s. Even in the early-70s rear-wheel drive still predominated among leading entry-level imports. A big reason why was that FWD reportedly cost more than a traditional drivetrain layout — which could be particularly problematic with entry-level cars that already had thin profit margins.
As a case in point, stories about the Cardinal invariably mention a Ford cost analysis that found that the British Motor Corp. sold early Minis “at a substantial loss” (Severson, 2013).
That may well have been true, but it is also only one data point. What about the front-wheel-drive economy cars offered by other European automakers in the 1960s, such as Renault? And if the technology was so prohibitively expensive, why did it become so widely used by the mid-70s?
Ford presumably would have done fine if it had introduced a U.S.-built subcompact in 1962 that had a traditional layout like the English-built Cortina. The development costs — and thus the price points — would likely have been lower because the car used simpler, more off-the-shelf technology.
A front-drive platform plausibly could have been profitable
Over time Ford could have plausibly developed a profitable front-wheel-drive platform if it was kept around long enough — and the automaker was clever about coming up with variants that sold for higher prices.
For example, the layout was ideally suited for a minivan. In addition, the drivetrain lent itself to a mid-engined sports car. Indeed, the Mustang 1 two-seater concept car used Cardinal components (auto editors of Consumer Guide, 1981).
A downside of a front-wheel-drive platform was that by 1962 Ford had already invested in a broad line of compact vehicles. Thus, a subcompact minivan would likely have taken sales away from a Falcon-based van. Concerns about cannibalization might have reduced the number of variants offered on the subcompact to the point where its profitability was less viable.
Warts and all, was the Cardinal worth producing?
One could reasonably answer “yes” to the first two questions but say “no” to this one. As Niedermeyer (2018) noted, the car’s styling was weak, it had mechanical quirks, and the cost to produce it was reportedly higher than the Falcon’s.
Of those three issues, the styling was arguably the least problematic. The Beetle was popular despite being ugly. And even if the Cardinal’s looks did depress sales, a routine reskinning could have taken that issue off the table. By the same token, most of the car’s biggest mechanical issues could have been fixed, such as by improving handling and acceleration.
Whether the Cardinal could have achieved profitability is a murkier subject. Part of the problem is that we don’t know what assumptions were used in the calculations which concluded that the car cost more to build than the Falcon. What we can say is that even if the Cardinal didn’t sell well in its first few years, by the second half of the 1960s it should have benefitted from a booming subcompact market.
The Cardinal would have given Ford an eight-year head start
Also keep in mind that a platform’s initial cost can be mitigated by a longer production run. By the beginning of the 1971 model year, the Cardinal would have been in production eight years. Along the way any changes made to the car would not have been nearly as expensive as its initial development.
Another point in the Cardinal’s favor was that by the time Ford killed the car, $35 million had already been spent on its development (Halberstam, 1986).
It should also be noted that the total price tag for the Cardinal was reportedly only $45 million (Niedermeyer, 2018). In contrast, the Mustang reportedly cost around $75 million (Halberstam, 1986). One can quibble with whether those figures can be compared in an apples-to-apples way, but they suggest that the Cardinal was hardly an Edsel-scale financial risk.
Was killing the Cardinal Iacocca’s biggest mistake?
Another good reason to have gone ahead with the Cardinal was because it would have given Ford experience with a “world car.” A key reason the automaker lost competitive ground to the imports in the 1960s and 1970s was because its U.S. arm maintained a “not-invented-here” attitude. One way that manifested was that the Pinto’s design lacked the space efficiency of imports.
I suspect that the worst thing that could have happened with the Cardinal was that Ford didn’t begin to make money on it until the late-60s. Would that have been such a bad thing if the Cardinal had given the automaker a foothold in the subcompact class with a car that helped Ford to better utilize its global economies of scale and gain experience with front-wheel-drive technology?
This is a long way of saying that I would agree with Geeber (go here and here) that Ford would likely have done better both sales-wise and financially if it had introduced a Cortina-type subcompact in late 1962. However, if the choice was to do nothing or launch the Cardinal, the latter strikes me as the more promising option.
Coming out with the Cardinal wouldn’t have just helped Ford
Coming out with the Cardinal wouldn’t have just been a plus for Ford — it could have better inoculated the U.S. auto industry from rising import sales in the late-60s even if the rest of the Big Three didn’t follow suit until the 1970s. However, I suspect that GM might have introduced its own subcompact at least a few years sooner than the Vega if the Cardinal’s sales had risen to a decent level in the second half of the 1960s.
In short, I would suggest that Iacocca’s campaign to kill the Cardinal was not just penny-wise and pound foolish — it may have been the single worst mistake of his tenure at the Ford Motor Company. By the time the automaker came out with a subcompact it would be too late to hold back surging import sales.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on December 8, 2021, updated on June 30, 2023 and expanded on June 19, 2025. Market share figures are from Wards Auto (2017). Note that these figures look somewhat different from those typically used at Indie Auto because they are for sales of cars and trucks of all types. Production figures were calculated with data drawn from the following sources: Auto editors of Consumer Guide, 2006; Gunnell, 2002, 2004) and Wikipedia (2020).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1981. “Ford Cardinal: Dearborn’s Would-Be World Car.” Prototype Cars: Cars That Never Were. Published Feb.: pp. 46-49.
- ——; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- ——; 2004. Standard Catalog of Volkswagen, 1946-2004. KP Books, Iola, WI.
- Halberstam, David; 1986. The Reckoning. William Morrow & Co., New York, NY.
- Kisiel, Ralph; 2003. “Iacocca shot down the Cardinal.” Automotive News. Posted June 16.
- Koch, Jeff; 2008. “MK I and MK II Ford Cortina (1963-’70).” Hemmings. Published March issue.
- Ludvigsen, Karl; 2021. “Corvair Stories: Gone but by no means forgotten.” Collier Automedia. Unknown posting date; accessed Dec. 6.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2018. “Automotive History: The Real Story of How the American Ford FWD Cardinal Became the German Ford Taunus 12M – From Dearborn With Love.” Curbside Classic. Dec. 18.
- Severson, Aaron; 2013. “Party Downsize: The Ford Fiesta Mk1 and Mk2.” Ate Up With Motor. Posted Nov. 27.
- Whipple, Jim; 1962. “Ford’s Cardinal is no dead pigeon. Look for new shapes of old compacts in ’63.” Popular Mechanics. June issue: p. 72.
- Wards Auto; 2017. “U.S. Total Vehicle Sales Market Share by Company.”
- Wikipedia; 2020. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed March 28 (page no longer available).
- ——; 2021. “Ford Taunus P4.” Page last edited Nov. 18.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcarbrochures.org: Chevrolet Corvair (1960); Ford Cortina (1963, 1965, 1971); Ford Econoline (1962) Ford Pinto (1971)
PHOTOGRAPHY:
- Banner image is a 1965 Ford Taunus P4 taken by Berthold Werner via Wikipedia Creative Commons 2.0. Photo has been lightly edited to reduce background shadows.
The Paul Niedermeyer article has a sketch of a more stylish Cardinal proposal (whose original and distinctive front end it is claimed was eagerly copied in Dearborn for two of its most celebrated cars – the 1961 Continental and Thunderbird as well as the Cortina-based Ford Corsair), while suggesting the plain looking production version in the Ford Taunus P4 was essentially carrying over the styling theme of Ford Germany’s own alternative NPX-C5 project.
Cannot see a Cardinal-derived minivan overlapping with the Falcon-based E-Series, the former would make use of V4s (similar to the original RWD 1965 Ford Transit) while the latter would be powered by Straight-6s and V8s.
It is possible that a larger 1970s Cardinal-based FWD minivan would make use of a related V6 (like on the mk2 Ford Transit) provided it was not too heavy (and likely requiring Ford Vulcan-inspired modifications), yet it is also easily to envision the E-Series making use of the V6s in place of the Straight-6s.
Would consider a US Cardinal family of models to be a proto-World Car that would have done well outside of the Europe and would have particularly given the Volkswagen Beetle a difficult time (with the prospect of actually forcing Volkswagen into bankruptcy earlier), although the 60-degree V4 would have likely needed an additional balance shaft to mitigate the roughness and other developments that Ford HQ (unlike Ford Germany) would have been more than willing to sort out.
As for a mid-engined Cardinal-based sportscar similar to the Ford Mustang 1 concept, the likes of both the Matra M530 V4 and mid-engine Ford GT70 would give an approximate idea of what such a car could have been. That said what if Ford HQ decided to opt for a more conservative path with a safer FWD sportscar in the manner of the Saab Sonnet V4/III?
Was not aware GM once looked at a potential Corvair-derived all-independent sprung air-cooled flat-four powered FWD challenger to the Ford Cardinal in the US. The closest thing would seem to have been the FWD GM XP-714 project by Vauxhall, before it was merged with the RWD Opel 700 project to create the Viva HA and Kadett A respectively.
http://vauxpedianet.uk2sitebuilder.com/vauxhall-ha—viva-part-1
The Cardinal/Redwing is intriguing, but I still believe that a North American version of the first- or second-generation Cortina would have been a better fit for this market in the early 1960s. Simple, reasonably rugged, and nothing in the styling or technical specifications that would have scared off buyers.
I’ve always like the styling of the first- and second-generation Cortina, as well.
The low-cost architecture could have allowed Ford to offer “dressed up” versions, which would have kept the buyers interested, and made the Dearborn bean counters happy. That would have lessened the chances of Dearborn simply letting the car wither on the vine after it had been introduced. With new entries from Toyota and Nissan/Datsun in the mid-1960s that were ready for primetime in North America, I’m not sure that Ford could have treated the Cardinal/Redwing as Dearborn’s version of the Beetle.
Geeber, take another read of my last paragraph.
I was agreeing with the conclusion of the article, and expanding on why an American version of the Cortina would have been a better bet.
Ford suffered (as did all other manufacturers of N.I.H. syndrome. Don’t forget Saab used that V4 to good end. Comparing to VW does not give accurate comparisons . VW most likely would failed being anybody else’s stepchild . VW succeeded because of a uniquely VW combination of Heinz Nordhoff,a fanatical dealer network,fantastic build quality and a unique ad campaign all these elements never would of come together anywhere else. If Ford had a “world car” attitude it could of been a success. GM hubris killed the Vega. Opel should of helped design a US built car for the world but we all know how that went. Chrysler had it right with the Horizon concept. The Cardinal was a missed opportunity. (Chairman Lee had the minivan concept in mind in the early 70s and the Cardinal could of been the peg for that hat)
With Opel/Vauxhall help, GM could have embraced two paths for a more conventional US Cortina/Corsair-style World Car equivalent, powered by a Ford Kent-like (displacement-wise) 1.3-1.6 Vauxhall/Opel OHV and 2.0-2.5 Chevy 153 (plus 1.8 Opel K180) engines with potential for a larger Six and V8.
1 – An enlarged Viva/Kadett (aka Envoy Epic HA/HB) platform akin to the Aussie-built Holden Torana LC/LJ/TA and South African-built Viva HC-based Chevrolet Firenza (later Chevrolet 1300/1900), the latter was fitted with the 2.0-2.5 Chevy 153 engine while the limited-run Chevrolet Can-Am was equipped with a 302 SBC V8 from the 1969 Camaro Z/28.
Production of the real-life platform lasted from 1962-1963 until about 1979-1980.
2 – A shortened modified version of the 1966 GM V Platform that Vauxhall considered as an alternative known as the Cerian project to the Opel developed U-Car that became the Opel Ascona B / mk1 Vauxhall Cavalier.
Production of the regular 1966 V Platform lasted until about 2006-2007.
Having driven a 1967 and 1968 Ford Cortina on several occasions in and around Indianapolis, Indiana when the car was “new”, including the Lotus Cortina, it was a great little car. I think if Ford had developed a U.S.-version front-wheel-drive Cardinal for 1962, it would have led Ford to develop and sell a much better sub-compact than the marginal Pinto in 1971. But Lee Iacocca won his positions at Ford for his sales and marketing prowess, so sharing Falcon and Mustang sales with the Cardinal was NOT in the Iacocca playbook for his obtaining the presidency at Ford. So, Iacocca protected his strategy and killed the Cardinal to maximize sales of the Mustang-Falcon.
Seen claims it cost Ford of Britain around £12-19 million to develop the Cortina and met their cost targets for the Cortina well below their budget, it also likely factors in the Corsair. The Cortina was also at one time due to feature Detroit inspired independent rear suspension before it was ruled out on financial grounds.
Immediately thought back to the idea of Ford US producing a rear-wheel drive Cortina-type vehicle and how they would have likely approached it upon seeing the 1964 FSO Warszawa 210 prototype and not simply because it is essentially an Soviet Bloc copy of the Ford Falcon down to the engine with a slightly bigger displacement to 2510cc or 153 cubic inches.
Rather it is the fact they planned to introduce an economical four-cylinder engine by subtracting two cylinders from the 6-cylinder, resulting in a design with a capacity of approximately 1.65 litres (1673cc?) and a power output of 57 hp. Which to be fair does compare somewhat unfavourably to the original Ford Cortina 1500, though imagine Ford could have improved the cut-down four like Ford Australia would go on to do with their version of the pre-Barra Thriftpower Six including Crossflow later Alloy Heads and SOHC.
Unlike Ford of Britain, Ford in North America with its larger budget may have possibly been more inclined to invest in independent rear suspension and in lieu of the V4/V6 go on to transform the Thriftpower Six into a pre-Pinto large four and replicate their rivals at GM with their 153 four / Turbo-Thrift six.
I suspect FoMoCo might not have collaborated with UK Ford on a North American Cortina for 1963 because until early 1961, FoMoCo only owned 54% of the shares of UK Ford and UK Ford was still in the business of exporting to North America (and thereby helping Britain with its balance of payments problems).
Regardless, I think it would have been very hard to produce a good subcompact in the US at a competitive price during the Bretton Woods era.
It may have been difficult, but my point is that Detroit waited too long to come out with subcompacts — and when they did they weren’t fully competitive. Nor did it help that the Big Three neglected compacts from the mid-60s onward. They don’t seem to have learned much from their mistakes, because U.S. automakers have recently abandoned passenger cars and have placed too much emphasis on big trucks and SUVs.
Okay, but if the input costs for labor and materials are materially higher to manufacture in the US than in Japan or Germany because of fixed exchange rates, how do you deliver a competitive product at a competitive price? Until the US abandoned the gold standard, I don’t even think Toyota could have built cars in the US at a competitive price. I would agree that after 1971 there was really no excuse, and still isn’t. The Corolla is the modern Model T, and building something like that should be Ford’s core competency rather than the F-150. I just don’t think it would have been possible in the 1960s for macroeconomic reasons beyond Ford’s control.
I don’t pretend to have all of the right data in my hands to answer your question. Do you or are you spitballing? I would also point out that McNamara was relentlessly cost driven, yet he championed the Cardinal project. Why would he have tried to venture down this road if the financial numbers looked hopeless?
You also don’t seem to be factoring in variables such as the length of the product cycle and the platform’s product mix, which could include some higher-priced variants such as a sports car and minivan. In addition, over the years we have seen instances of automakers launching a loss leader with the idea that they simply needed to do it, either to build market share or protect what they had.
In the absence of more specific data, I’m inclined to think that McNamara was on the right track — he recognized that fielding compacts would not be enough to compete with the imports.
In one key aspect Iacocca was right on – the Cardinal was ugly as sin, and the styling alone could have killed it in the US, let alone the limited product offering (e.g., hardtop). Look at all of the breakout new models of the 60’s and they shared attractive to outstanding appearance, VW was an anomaly with its own unique success factors but in general in that era good looks sold well. Corvair was in trouble until they focused on sporty Monza variants.
As an aside, read the Gayle Warnock book “Innocents, Incidents & Indiscretions” for a real eye opening look at how the top of corporate America wortked in the “golden era”. I worked in OEM Detroit past that era but heard many of the same tales from the old timers.
Mark, thank you for the reference; I’ll check out Warnock’s book.
I’m going to push back on your argument about the Cardinal’s styling. The car would have come out as a 1963 model and might have had a three-year run before a reskinning, although a facelift before then was plausible if initial sales were weak. Between 1963-65 what other entry-level imports were all that attractive?
The shaver-nosed Toyota Corona didn’t appear until 1964 — and initially didn’t sell all that well, perhaps because Toyota wasn’t very well established in the United States. The coke-bottle Opel Kadett wasn’t introduced until 1965 and its sales didn’t approach 100,000 units until 1968. The Datsun 510 didn’t come out until 1968 and overall Datsun sales didn’t surpass 100,000 units until 1970 (go here for a table of leading import sales).
In other words, between 1963-65 only VW was selling well — and other prominent brands such as Renault were not very attractive if you go by traditional American tastes.