Our discussion in the comment thread about the 1956 Packard Executive story all but inevitably brought up one of the most common criticisms of the automaker’s management — that it did not do enough in the early postwar period to maintain its position in the luxury-car field. My follow-up thoughts are too long for a comment, so I have created a new post. However, I am under the gun on another project, so consider this to be a first installment of a deeper data dive.
Before proceeding, I would like to caution folks about falling into one of the biggest analytical traps in American automotive history — what I call “GM envy.” This is the tendency to assume that if General Motors did X, then the road to success for all other U.S. automakers was to do X as well.
The historical record suggests that all too often this was not the case. During the postwar period (which I would define as lasting from 1946-79), the smaller the automaker, the more likely it would be successful if it tried to carve out unique market niches rather than playing follow the leader. For example, the Ford Motor Company did much better with its four-seater Thunderbird than the Edsel.
I say that recognizing how viewpoints can get quite entrenched. My intent with this essay isn’t to change anyone’s mind about Packard’s demise so much as it is to add some factual nuance to the debate.
Packard shifts its market position after WWII
When Packard began to ramp up production after World War II, it did not carry over the strategy that it used in the late-30s and early-40s to escape the Great Depression. Essentially the automaker moved up in the bottom end of the market and down at the top end.
So unlike in 1937-47, Packard no longer offered entry-level models with a six-cylinder engine. By the same token, it did not revive the high-end models with prices around $5,600.
In 1949 the lowest-priced Packard was an Eight four-door sedan, which listed for $2,249. This was above the Pontiac, Mercury, Dodge and DeSoto lineups, near the top of the Nash Ambassador series and just below the high-end Studebaker Land Cruiser. This Packard model was closest in price to a mid-level Buick Super, Chrysler Windsor or Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight. The only brands whose entry-level models were similarly priced to Packard’s were those from Hudson and Kaiser.
Also see ‘Ralph Kalal’s take on Packard raises useful questions but can be dogmatic’
Even though Lincoln straddled the premium-priced and luxury-car fields, its entry-level, four-door sedan ($2,574) was around $300 more expensive than Packard’s. However, Packard’s high-end Custom Eight four-door sedan listed for $3,975, which was well above the Lincoln Cosmopolitan ($3,238). The same was true of Packard’s two-door convertible, which listed for $4,520 versus Lincoln’s $3,948.
Cadillac’s 1949 lineup started at the highest price point of any domestic brand — $2,893 for a Series 61 four-door sedan. The closest Packard equivalent was the mid-level Super Eight Deluxe ($2,919), which was placed on the automaker’s longer, 127-inch wheelbase.
The top of Packard’s range did not reach as high into the luxury-car stratosphere as Cadillac’s, but it hardly abandoned the field. The Cadillac Series 75 Fleetwood six-passenger sedan ($4,750) was more expensive than the equivalent Packard Custom Eight ($3,975), but the latter was well above Cadillac’s most popular four-door sedan, the Series 62 ($3,050) and pricier Series 60 Special ($3,828).
Should Packard have kept up with Cadillac?
Let’s take a step back and summarize what we’ve learned. As of 1949, which is when all of the automakers had ramped back up from WWII, Packard competed against Cadillac on price more closely than any other brand — including Lincoln.
It’s true that Packard’s entry-level prices were somewhat lower than Lincoln’s, but they were above every premium-priced brand from the Big Three.
Richard Langworth (2022a, 2022b) criticized Packard’s lineup for not being competitive with Cadillac because it did not offer trendy styling, two-door hardtops and V8 engines. That was fair to a degree, but it begs the question: Was it possible for an independent automaker to keep up with mighty GM even if it was operating at the top of its game?
Also see ‘James Ward offers more nuanced take on Packard’s fall than other auto histories’
I would suggest that the answer was no. The best that Packard could do was to carve out a more modest corner of the market that did not require it to stay fully competitive with Cadillac’s rapid-fire redesigns and engineering advancements. That may not be a satisfying answer to those whose view of Packard is heavily colored by GM envy. However, if they are going to argue that Packard should have been more directly competitive then they need to articulate how that was possible given the automaker’s meager resources.
For example, Langworth (2022b) argued that if Packard required the added production generated from premium-priced cars, it should have fielded “an entirely separate make not bearing the Packard name.”
This may be one of the most popular narratives in American automobile history. Yet curiously enough I have yet to see someone explain in a thorough way how Packard could have fielded two viable brands with its relatively low production volume. It borders on magical thinking. That may be fine if we’re just doing barstool philosophizing, but it strikes me as sloppy historical analysis.
Entry-level models hurt Packard’s sales most in 1950s
Just because Packard had entries that competed directly against Cadillac didn’t mean that they sold very well. Before offering a few quick data points I should mention that sources of production data can vary. To be internally consistent, this article primarily draws from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006).
Let’s start by taking a look at 1948. The entry-level Cadillac Series 61 saw production of around 8,500 units whereas the Packard Super Eight almost hit 13,000 units. The mid-level Cadillac Series 62 surpassed 34,000 units whereas the Packard Custom Eight tallied under 6,000 units. Where Packard generated most of its sales was with the premium-priced Eight and Deluxe Eight, which almost reached 61,000 units. This is why Packard handily outproduced Cadillac this year as well as in 1949.
The 1950 model year was an entirely different story. Output fell a whopping 67 percent to under 43,000 units. Even more alarmingly, sales of the senior Packards slowed to a trickle, with Custom Eight production falling to under 2,000 units. This was the same year that Cadillac cracked 100,000 units.
Also see ‘1951 Packard 300: The double-edged sword of an anonymous design’
In 1951 Packard attempted a comeback with a brand-new design and a reconfigured lineup. Total output almost hit 101,000 units, which was the second-highest number that Packard would reach after the war. It was mostly downhill from there.
The redesign resulted in a big jump in senior Packard production to more than 29,000 units in 1951. That was well behind Cadillac’s total output of around 110,000 units but within the ballpark of Lincoln’s almost 33,000 units. However, Packard would never again get that close in sales to Lincoln.
Junior Packards comprised almost 71 percent of total 1951 production. That would prove to be on the low side for the next few years. In 1952 it went up to 74 percent; in 1953 a bit down to 71 percent; in 1954 up to almost 74 percent. In 1955 junior Packard output dropped to 69 percent and then in 1956 to only 64 percent.
Could it be that Nance was barking up the wrong tree?
Between 1951 and 1956 the junior Packards saw output fall by 74 percent whereas the senior Packards decreased by under 65 percent. This illustrates how Packard needed a reasonable amount of volume to survive and its biggest problem was with its entry-level cars — not with its luxury models.
Nance’s emphasis on luxury models may have been a costly mistake because it deprived the automaker’s volume models of the attention they needed to stay competitive in a rapidly changing market segment.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 2022a. “Why Packard Failed (1): Patrician and its Relatives 1951-53.” Posted Feb. 15.
- ——; 2022b. “Why Packard Failed (2): The End of the Road, 1954-56.” Posted March 26.
Interesting analysis. One thing to keep in mind is that Packard greatly overproduced during the 1949 model year. The company thus had to seriously scale back production for 1950. It’s my understanding that some 1949 models were reserialized as 1950 models (which was legal in those days). Packard had to offer discounts to move the stock, which demoralized the dealers and hurt resale values – at a time when that was becoming a Cadillac selling point.
That is a big reason why the Packard Board of Directors forced out George Christopher.
This suggests that sales actually started to soften during the 1949 model year, when Packard felt the full force of its primary competition – Buick, Oldsmobile and Cadillac.
Except for the Special, Buicks had a new body for 1949, The Special would receive a new body for 1950. The rest of the Buick line-up would get that new body for 1950.
The Oldmsobile 98 had a new body for 1948, and the 88 and 76 received a new body for 1949. That year, the 88 and 98 had the new Rocket V-8.
Cadillac got the new ohv V-8 for 1949.
All three divisions received a stylish hardtop coupe body style for 1949.
It’s not surprising that Packard sales in general, and senior Packards in particular, softened during 1949, and plunged for 1950 (which was not a bad year for the auto industry). Buyers in those segments place a high priority on style and image. During 1948-50, the GM divisions established themselves as style and performance pacesetters.
Packard went from okay to old hat virtually overnight. One could argue that it never recovered.
You add a lot to the discussion. So Packard followed along the same lines as Kaiser in aggressively overproducing in 1949 — and paying the consequences. Nash saw its sales increase but it had the new airflytes. Hudson also went up but the stepdown was in only its second year of sales. Studebaker was meaningfully down for 1949, perhaps because its lineup was in its third year of production. The common thread here is that fresh product was the key to competing against the Big Three’s new offerings.
Packard management’s meta mistake appears to be that it assumed postwar competition would be relatively similar to in the prewar period. That didn’t turn out to be true. GM was much more aggressive in updating its product line while Ford began to invest in Lincoln far more than it did before the war. Then, in 1955, Chrysler spun off the Imperial as a luxury-car brand. That added up to far more intense competition than Packard faced in the late-30s and early-40s.
What if Packard had adopted a more aggressive approach to updating its lineup like Studebaker did? It’s production numbers might have looked more like Hudson’s in 1948-51.
‘ The best that Packard could do was to carve out a more modest corner of the market that did not require it to stay fully competitive with Cadillac’s rapid-fire redesigns and engineering advancements.” Unfortunately that’s not good enough. If you can’t compete on styling or engineering all that is left is trading on the increasingly shopworn name. “For example, Langworth (2022b) argued that if Packard required the added production generated from premium-priced cars, it should have fielded “an entirely separate make not bearing the Packard name.”” That’s going to be an extremely outside the box decision for Packard. Looking back only 20 years previously companion makes came and went. The only one that lasted was Pontiac. Meanwhile, the 110 and 120 kept the doors open during the depression. Heck, when they did do it with the 55 Clipper, buyers demanded a Packard script be put on the car. ” Between 1951 and 1956 the junior Packards saw output fall by 74 percent whereas the senior Packards decreased by under 65 percent. This illustrates how Packard needed a reasonable amount of volume to survive and its biggest problem was with its entry-level cars — not with its luxury models.” Yes, true as it stands but hardly what you call good news. Packard probably played the postwar hand they were dealt poorly. However when you’re holding a pair of deuces and have three white chips it doesn’t matter what you do.
Perhaps, but I would caution against an overly “deterministic” attitude. For example, we know from the historical record that Romney was recruited by both Packard and Nash. What if he had gone with Packard? Mason’s successor could have very well continued his strategy of emphasizing big cars and treating the Rambler as supplemental. And that could have led the automaker to put its limited dollars on redesigning the big cars in 1956-57 — which likely would have sold poorly because the premium-priced market tanked . . . which could have resulted in the automaker quickly fading away.
If all that had happened, today you could reasonably argue that Mason’s successor was only holding a pair of deuces and three white chips. And if I argued that a better move would have been to focus entirely on compacts in the late-50s, you could has dismissed that, arguing that there was no tangible evidence that could have worked. And you would have been “right” but not right.
This is an example of how it is all too easy to fall back on repeating truisms rather than allowing for the fact that U.S. automotive history has had more than a few unexpected contingencies that served to turn conventional wisdom on its head.
You’re absolutely right. However my sense was that Romney was messianic about small cars. The 55+ Ramblers while not compacts in the 69s sense were smaller than their direct competitors and this was played up heavily in the ads, both print and TV. Hudson came too late to the first generation compact game and my sense is that Willys decided to get out of the US car business while the getting out was good. I haven’t read any biographies of George Romney. Was he really into the idea of a smaller car prior to AMC? Dropping GM Envy and concentrating on smaller cars was his Big Idea. What big idea could he bring to Packard?
We have a review of Foster’s biography here.
My impression of Romney is that he was fairly young and impressionable — and that his thinking evolved over time. It’s true that in his previous role he saw research that showed that suburbanization could lead to more two-car families where the second car might plausibly be smaller and more economical. However, he also may have made a pragmatic decision to focus on the Rambler because at that point it was outselling the automaker’s big cars and its resale value was much higher.
Where the messianic quality may have come in was once Romney made the decidedly unorthodox decision to focus on compacts. He needed to sell that idea not only to the public but to the automaker’s staff. His religious background made him well suited for that role.
I don’t know if Romney would have needed to have had a big idea going into Packard. I think it a good guess that he would have been a more sure-footed auto executive than Nance. For example, Romney seemed to have an unusually good understanding of economies of scale, so I could see him avoiding the dead end of creating a second brand. I could also see him avoiding the disaster that was switching to the Conner Ave. assembly plant. It would have been interesting to see how he would have handled the question of focusing on premium-priced versus luxury cars, although my guess is that he would have gone for higher volume (back to economies of scale).
I tend to see Packard in the postwar period as occupying the same market space as Chrysler. Chrysler got away with not introducing postwar styling until mid-1949. So might Packard have done. And Chrysler managed to get almost 6 years out of that body, albeit with a major restyling in ’53. True Chrysler had the Hemi long before Packard had a V8, but Packard had a full automatic long before Chrysler did. With better timing, I tend to think Packard could have made it to the mid-50s in better shape. After that, it would have been tough going as the premium market collapsed in the late ’50s.
Another better strategy might have been for the company to go the way of Rolls-Royce, and get out of the premium car business postwar in favor of investing in commercializing its XJ49 turbofan aero engine, with super luxury cars as a sideline.
Another thought-provoking article that applies facts to the conventional opinion/viewpoint – like your discussion of the 1953-54 Plymouth (disaster?) vs the 1955-58 Plymouth (much better styling, but not that great of a sales success relative to the market.) Thanks again Indie Auto!
I would comment that the early post-war Packards still had a substantial look to them (yes, you can insert a joke if you want to). They did not look “common.” I believe there was some resistance to the tail-finned Cadillac when it first came out in 1948 that may have benefitted Packard for a year or two. I seem to remember some drawings (a kit?) for shaving the fins off of the Cadillac’s fenders. By the early 50’s, they had the time to become more normal/acceptable in this conservative price class.
My main comment is that by 1951, Packard could not get by using the ballooned pre-war Clipper bodies. They introduced their new models, but they looked way to common. What I see is an Oldsmobile with higher headlights and door handles. Just not “special.” I would have preferred the Olds, even at equal prices. The Packards had a little technology, no “gotta-have-it” style, fading prestige, and perhaps a weaker dealer network than their competition.
It’s too bad we don’t have data on what people actually paid, versus the list price of models. New cars were in high demand after the war, then inflation was bad in ’48, and production caught up.
Odd that Cadillac sales rose sharply in ’50 when the cars were noticeably uglier than ’49.