The 1974 Chrysler New Yorker is one of those cars that does not reek of tragedy in obvious ways. It looks like a perfectly normal big car from the mid-1970s. There’s nothing particularly exciting about it, but there’s also nothing disagreeable about it either. Yet this freshly redesigned C-body car was one of the more significant flops of the malaise era — a warning that the Chrysler Corporation was on its way to collapse.
To be fair, the new C-body had a few things going for it. For example, the beltline was lowered by around two inches from 1973 models. Robert Lund (1973) of Popular Mechanics noted that this improved visibility. However, Richard M. Langworth and Jan P. Norbye added that this change also made the cars “seem less fat and ungainly to some eyes” than the previous-generation’s “fuselage” styling (1985, p. 275).
Chrysler-brand offerings were also shorter by six inches, making these land yachts a wee bit easier to maneuver. The length reduction may have been partly possible because the C-body’s 5-mph bumpers were better integrated into the car’s styling than those of competitors. Even so, interior dimensions were slightly tighter (Zatz, 2026).
Beyond all that, in general new designs usually resulted in at least a modest sales bounce simply because of their fresh look. Alas, in 1974 the C-body saw total production decline by 51 percent — and kept on falling through 1978. That added up to under 1.08 million units over five years. This was less than a third of the fuselage C-body despite being in production the same number of years.
Chrysler reportedly spent around $100 million to update the 1974 C-body — “money they never recovered,” according to Sam Busic (2021). What went wrong? Let’s take a closer look at four interlocking factors.
Tragedy 1: Terrible timing for a major redesign
The biggest contributor to the collapse of C-body sales was a Middle East oil embargo. Pretty much all full-sized cars saw their sales tank.
The big Chrysler was down 49.9 percent for 1974. That was slightly more than Oldsmobile (-48.1) but less than Buick (-50.1), Plymouth (-54.7 percent) and Dodge (-51.5 percent). However, unlike each of these other brands, Chrysler did not yet offer smaller, more fuel-efficient cars.
The C-body enjoys the dubious distinction of being the final full-sized American car to be given a major redesign prior to the advent of the downsizing era. The last time General Motors had overhauled its big-car lineup was in 1971, and it kept them in production six years. Meanwhile, Ford’s full-sized line was last given a complete redesign 1969 — and kept in production for 10 years (with reskinnings in 1971 and 1973).
So even if the oil crisis hadn’t have occurred, Chrysler was taking a financial risk by redesigning its big cars more rapidly than GM and Ford because it was smaller — and thus had shakier economies of scale. The gas shortage accentuated that risk by speeding up a trend that had already been underway. Full-sized, low-priced cars, which in the 1960s had dominated the American car market, were outsold for the first time in 1970 by mid-sized cars.
So why did Chrysler redesign its big cars in 1974? “We came with a new car into a declining market to preserve and improve our position in it,” CEO Lynn Townsend explained at the time, adding, “and it’s still a substantial market” (Langworth and Norbye, 1985; p. 194).
Well, it was until the oil embargo. At any rate, Langworth and Norbye (1985) noted that even with the redesign, Chrysler’s big-car market share was still under 10 percent.
Tragedy 2: Trying too hard to sell ‘me-too’ styling
The 1974 C-body redesign arguably represented Chrysler management’s first major attempt to try boosting sales with “me-too” styling in the 1970s. You would be excused if you confused our featured car as a Buick or a Lincoln instead of a Chrysler because it stole design cues from those makes.
For example, the C-body’s new windshield looked suspiciously like it had been copied from a 1971-76 big GM car. Also note how the New Yorker’s front end sported butter-knife front fenders and a powerdome hood with a fully chromed radiator grille. That was like any number of cars from the Ford Motor Company except for the grille’s trapezoid shape, which harkened back to a Chrysler design theme from 1960.
At least the New Yorker had more distinctive design cues than other C-body cars. As a case in point, the full-width and thrust-forward taillights carried on a tradition that dated as far back as 1969.
In addition, a thick, lower-body trim piece echoed a New Yorker theme that had been consistently used for almost a decade.
The Chrysler’s most unique styling touch was its concave C-pillar. But even here a derivative touch was added — a vinyl roof that ended well short of the door-window trim, similarly to the 1971-73 Cadillac Coupe de Ville.
Tragedy 3: Imperial’s death scrambled Chrysler line
The 1969-73 Imperial’s body was mostly shared with the Chrysler line, but had a three-inch-longer wheelbase and unique front sheet metal. For 1974 the Imperial lost even that differentiation. Its 124-inch wheelbase was now shared with the Chrysler and the only sheet metal differences involved front and rear fascias.
I give the designers credit because they did a good job with what they had to work with in differentiating the 1974 Imperial. Hidden headlights, a split waterfall grille and vertical turn signals gave the car an elegant look that paid homage to the Lincoln’s Mark series without slavishly copying it.
Imperial output for 1974 only fell 14 percent in 1974 . . . but then collapsed the following year to under 9,000 units. That was the lowest production level since 1954, before the Imperial was bumped up to a separate brand. Management rightly decided to finally pull the plug on the struggling car, but then did something unusual: The Imperial’s exterior styling was morphed onto the New Yorker and the New Yorker’s fancier grille and taillights were given to the lower-priced Newport Custom.
Despite the design upgrades, the Chrysler line continued to compete price-wise in the premium class. This gambit appears to have help bolster sales, particularly for the New Yorker. By 1977 output surpassed 76,000 units. This not only was almost triple the production in 1975, but it also was higher than the big Plymouth and Dodge. Thus it wasn’t surprising that only the big Chrysler was kept in production one final year in 1978.
Was the success of the Imperialized New Yorker an indicator that Chrysler should have killed the brand much earlier? Or should the automaker have stuck to its pre-1955 approach of only offering limited-production, Chrysler-branded models such as a limousine?
Tragedy 4: Quality issues undercut premium image
Bryan McTaggart (2025) of Hemmings described the 1974 C-bodies as “well build (sic) and durable.” However, J P Cavanaugh (2025) wrote about how a funeral director who bought a New Yorker found the car to be a “complete mess during its entire (short) life with the business. Everyone who worked there came to despise the car.”
It’s not terribly journalistic to make too much of anecdotal evidence, but Consumer Reports (1976) did find in its survey of car owners that the Chrysler brand’s frequency of repair was below average in 1974. Areas that rated much worse than average included body integrity, electric systems, steering and suspension.
That was the bad news; the “good” news was that the 1974 models weren’t any worse than their predecessors — and they got somewhat better in 1975.
Cavanaugh also noted that even the top-of-line 1974 New Yorker Brougham displayed highly visible cost cutting, such as the lack of a color-keyed steering wheel. You can see that in the photo below.
One could argue that the black steering wheel sort-of matched the decor of the instrument cluster, which was also black. But it still looked rather cheap, so it wasn’t surprising that a 1975 Chrysler brochure showed a color-keyed steering wheel for a New Yorker Brougham interior along with a bit more fake wood grain.
1974 New Yorker represented the end of an era
I was surprised to come across a New Yorker Brougham four-door hardtop in the eastern Washington farming community of Othello. I have seen very few 1970s big American family haulers at the car shows I attend. Perhaps that’s because they aren’t considered collectible like muscle cars.
That’s unfortunate because these cars tell an important story about the dramatic changes that have rocked the American auto industry. I thought it was particularly ironic that the featured car was parked next to a relatively new Chevrolet Tahoe sport-utility vehicle. The latter has become the current full-sized American car.
The above photo hints at how American design sensibilities have changed since the 1970s. Whereas the New Yorker emphasized lower, longer, wider styling, the Tahoe tilts toward practical qualities such as lots of cargo room, chair-high seating and all-wheel-drive traction. It’s more a mobile motel room rather than a Versailles chariot.
Chrysler refused to acknowledge a shifting market
Chrysler doubled down on big cars in 1974 because its CEO Lynn Townsend misread the market — even before the oil embargo. He told Forbes magazine that subcompacts were too small for Americans and that even compacts were a “little small. I would think that probably the most popular car size you’ll see 15 years from now will be like our intermediates today” (Hyde, 2003; p. 212).
In other words, Chrysler’s wrong bet in redesigning the C-body for 1974 was not merely an example of how the market can sometimes zig unexpectedly. Even though Townsend was a “numbers guy,” he refused to acknowledge an obvious shift toward smaller cars that began well before the energy crisis.
Imagine if the money spent on a major redo of the C-body had instead gone into an earlier update of the automaker’s aging compacts. Might that have eased Chrysler’s spiraling financial crisis?
NOTES:
Production figures and specifications came from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Gunnell (2002) and Zatz (2026).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Busic, Sam; 2021. “Sam Busic’s Post.” Posted on Facebook on Oct. 17.
- Cavanaugh, J P; 2025. “Car Show Classic: 1974 Chrysler Newport 4-Door Hardtop — Another Big Bet That Chrysler Never Got to Win.” Curbside Classic. Posted on June 25.
- Consumer Reports; 1976. “Frequency-of-Repair records: 1972-75.” April Annual Auto Issue (no link available).
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Hyde, Charles K.; 2003. Riding The Roller Coaster: A History of the Chrysler Corporation. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985. Publications International, Skokie, IL.
- Lund, Robert; 1973. “Chrysler’s new cars are designed for a quick fix.” Popular Mechanics. Oct. issue: pp. 116, 208.
- McTaggart, Brian; 2025. “What In The Heck Was Going On With Chrysler in the 1970s?” Hemmings. Posted on May 9.
- Zatz, David; 2026. “1974-75 Chrysler cars: a 42 year retrospective.” Allpar.com. Accessed on Sept. 16.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Cadillac (1971)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Buick Electra (1971); Chrysler Imperial (1954); Chrysler New Yorker (1965, 1970, 1975); Lincoln (1973)
of the vehicles, the Electra was the best looking. Large, but not ponderous like the others.
A few points. . .
The 76 to 78 New Yorkers and 74/75 Imperial had waterfall grills ripped from the Mark 3 and Mark 4 Lincolns. Chrysler Corp no longer viewed it worthy to toss dollars at the Imperial line in the long-term losing streak in sales to Cadillac and Lincoln.
For 1967 when Imperials ditched the same massive body on frame chassis dating to 1957. In its place was the adoption of New Yorker cowl, I think windshield, doors and some other parts.
Imperials from 1967 to 1973 did feature a different larger removable front sub frame with bigger engine cradle, distinct front fenders for both 1967 and 1968 and correct me if wrong but different rear axle size and rims.
Back to the 74 to 78 New Yorker/Newport, they were a generic in appearance. One unique attribute to me was the relation of the door top lines to the bottom of the roof. Those c body Mopars to me looked better than what followed with the R Body models sourced from the b body platform.
Fun idea. . . maybe the secret code phrase in internal documents for this 74 to 78 generation was “Build a Brougham”.
Agreed about an update of the compacts but also a more major reskin of its intermediates models might have helped as well, especially for the 4-door sedan and wagon.
Agreed.
The 1975 Cordoba was mostly extra volume.
Chrysler did a new 1975 midsize hardtop body for Dodge and Plymouth. The midsize volume was in coupes. Cutlass was the most popular car in America in 1976 with a new coupe lower and a carryover sedan.
One could argue that the Chrysler brand got what it needed in 1975 – the Corboba. That car was a huge hit. Unfortunately, for 1975, the Dodge Charger was turned into a rebadged Cordoba, and sales tanked. Dodge got it right with the 1978-79 Magnum, but by then it was too late.
While the 1974-78 C-body as a whole flopped, the Chrysler version held up better. Big car sales as a whole did increase after 1976, but they were still below the pre-embargo level. For example, the full-size Chevrolet was downsized for 1977, and it was hailed as a sales success. It sold about 600,000 units – which was far below the 1 million in sales it had hit during the early 1970s. Same with the full-size Ford.
Unfortunately for Chrysler, the Dodge and Plymouth had sold at a much lower rate even before the first gas crunch, so their decline in sales was more devastating. Even as their sales inched up after 1975, they still only sold at AMC Ambassador levels…and a fair number of those were sold as police cars and taxi cabs. The real story here is the complete collapse of Plymouth and Dodge full-size cars.
After 1975, the Chryslers sold at a respectable rate – in particular, I remember the 1976-78 New Yorker as being popular. It was the same at GM – if we compare the late 1970s to the early 1970s, sales of the full-size Oldsmobile and Buick held up better than sales of the Chevrolet and Pontiac.
The 1974-78 Chrysler did a lot of borrowing when it came to design, but it was a case of doing it well. The car is still attractive in my opinion, and, like its C-body cousins, it features the very best integration of the 5-mph bumpers of any car in its class.
The 1977 full size Chevy was the most popular car in America, overtaking the Cutlass.
Plymouth and Dodge dropped C bodies after 1977. Chrysler held out for 1978. Chrysler and Dodge sold R bodies for 1979. Plymouth later came back with the R body Gran Fury for fleets.
The Cordoba would have been the new Charger and the Plymouth would be the Grand Era. Dodge got stuck with the lesser model and also suffered by comparison of the novelty and prestige of the first small Chrysler.
In 1965, the full-size Chevrolet sold roughly 1,647,600 units. For 1977, the full-size Chevrolet sold roughly 662,000 units.
It was the most popular car in America, but its total production had declined by almost 1 million units since 1965. And note that the 1977 Chevrolet had scored a healthy increase over the 1976 model…so the sales drop had been even more severe before the car was downsized.
Meanwhile, the Oldsmobile F-85/Cutlass sold 180,097 units in 1965. In 1977, the Cutlass line sold 632,742 units, or triple the 1965 figure.
The 1975 Dodge Charger suffered because it became a badge-engineered version of the Corboba, and it no longer had any trace of sportiness. The 1973 model had sold well, but sales tanked with the 1975 model. In retrospect, Chrysler should have better differentiated it from the Cordoba.
In 1977, about 2.8 million imported cars were sold in the US.
In 1965, about 500,000 imported cars were sold in the US.
The people who switched to imported cars, and people like them who bought smaller American cars, weren’t full size Chevy prospects in 1977. That isn’t the 1977 full size Chevy’s fault. The world moves on.
Just 500,000, not 500,000 million. Damn you, missing edit function.
I fixed the typo but then added an edit function. I didn’t realize that I could find a freebie plug in. Check it out and see if it works okay.
The plug in also had a rating system. What do you all think about having that feature?
I see the rating feature, but not the edit function. But there may be, or should be, some login required to access the edit function on messages. I’ve never registered.
It’s a setting button on the bottom right. It was partly obscured for some reason.
My original post pointed out that sales of the full-size Oldsmobiles held up better from 1965 to 1977 than sales of the full-size Chevrolet did. And this was with the Cutlass sharing the same showroom as the Delta 88 and 98. But Cutlass sales for 1977 still rocketed upward compared to 1965.
Chevrolet sold about 500,000 Bel Airs and Biscaynes in 1965. Most of those buyers weren’t full size Chevy prospects in 1977.
Chevrolet sold about 240,000 Impala SS bucket seat models in 1965. Most of those buyers weren’t full size Chevy prospects in 1977.
Total Impala sales were roughly 1 million in 1965.
The bottom line is that sales of the full-size Oldsmobiles held up better than sales of the full-size Chevrolet. So did sales of the full-size Buick.
It was the same story over at Chrysler Corporation.
If people stopped buying sub Impala full size cars at more companies than Chevy, it definitely wasn’t Chevy’s fault. It wasn’t a flaw in Chevy’s product. Oldsmobile and Buick sales held up because they were direct competitors for the remaining prospects for Impala and Caprice, same as they had been in 1965 (first year for Caprice).
Impala sales dropped dramatically from 1965, too. The decline wasn’t limited to the Bel Air and Biscayne.
The main story was that among buyers who still wanted a full-size car, they were increasingly choosing the medium-price makes. This is why their sales held up better than that of the full-size Chevrolet, Ford and Plymouth.
What do you mean, held up better? 1977 full size Chevy outsold Catalina, Bonneville, 88, and LeSabre combined, despite having only a frog’s hair of difference in price. Whatever their dim, distant history was, that was a knockout performance in 1977.
Compare sales of full-size cars by each GM division for 1965 to the 1977 sales figures.
No one is denying that the full-size Chevrolet was the best-selling full-size car. But it experienced a much greater decline in total sales from its peak (1965) compared to its Oldsmobile and Buick cousins.
The 1977 GM downsized cars were successful, but the entire segment was in a long-term downward trajectory, and sales of the medium-price marque offerings were holding up better compared to the offerings in this segment from the Low-Price Three.
In 1974, Dodge sold about 75K Chargers.
In 1975, Dodge sold about 40K Charger SEs and about 30K Coronet coupes.
In 1974, Plymouth sold about 50K Sebring coupes.
In 1975, Plymouth sold about 25K Fury coupes and Chrysler sold about 150K Cordobas.
In 1974, Chrysler Corporation sold about 125K Dodge and Plymouth midsize coupes.
In 1975, Chrysler Corporation sold about 150K Cordobas and about 95K Dodge and Plymouth midsize coupes.
Which proves that Chrysler was also stronger in the intermediate class than Dodge and Plymouth…just as it became stronger in full-size cars.
Meanwhile, sales of the Plymouth coupe tanked, while sales of the 1975 Coronet and Charger combined could not equal sales of the 1974 Charger.
The total 1975 Dodge coupe was nearly level despite the glamorous and novel new small Chrysler appealing to corporate loyalists. The Plymouth sold a little volume on the same lot as the glamorous new Cordoba.
Total 1975 midsize coupe volume was nearly double 1974. Aside from whining Dodge dealers who though they should always have the top product, every one was thrilled.
For 1975, Dodge had two separate intermediate coupes, and with that expansion came increased costs for distinctive sheetmetal and marketing. But their combined sales did not equal that of the 1974 Charger. That isn’t a winning formula in the car business.
Chrysler sold nearly twice as many midsize coupes in 1975. It’s touching that you think it matters which brand is on them, but that’s the formula for success in actual business business.
It was so successful that…the company was facing bankruptcy within four years.
We’re talking about Chrysler Corporation, not AMC. The company needed more than one intermediate to be successful.
Huh? Most of the most popular cars of 1981 were smaller, mostly FWD.
Top Selling Cars in the U.S. (1981)
The best-seller list for 1981 doesn’t change the fact that Chrysler was facing bankruptcy by 1979, or two years earlier. (And sources I’ve seen put the Buick Regal at rougly 240,00 units, or at least even with the Toyota Corolla.)
During the debate over the bailout, some legislators and pundits were criticizing Chrysler for selling too many large cars. Iacocca correctly pointed out that the problem was Chrysler didn’t sell ENOUGH of the more profitable intermediate and large cars. This was even though the success of the Cordoba was still recent (although sales would drop dramatically in 1980 due to combination of the 1979-82 recession, and customers concerned the company would go out of business).
Note that GM still sold plenty of profitable intermediates in 1981 – including personal luxury coupes. And then there were the B-, C- and E-body cars, which sold well when they debuted, and bounced back after the economy began improving in late 1982.
Chrysler Corporation still had only two midsize coupe bodies in 1975. Instead of a dedicated Plymouth body and a dedicated Dodge body the corporation had a plain body and a deluxe body, variously named and trimmed as appropriate. This new plain/deluxe two-body plan nearly doubled sales over the previous (your} Dodge/Plymouth two-body plan.
FWIW, the 1975 “Coronet” coupe became the 1976 “Charger” coupe if you think that made a difference to anyone. (NARRATOR: It didn’t make a difference to anyone.)
In 1977 Dodge’s plain midsize coupe became the “Monaco” and the name still didn’t make a fig of difference to anyone.
Dodge only sold about 50K 1974 Chargers in a hot midsize car market when Charger had its own body. Apparently, “Charger” and a unique body isn’t a recipe for success.
Fun fact: the 1974 Matador coupe sold 62,269 units when Dodge and Plymouth sold about 75k together.
The Matador.
Sorry, about 125k Chrysler coupes. I started laughing so hard at the relative success of the Matador that I nearly blacked out.
I’m missing the part where I said the Matador was successful. I said Chrysler needed more than one intermediate to be successful.
Well, the 1974 Charger was in its fourth year of production whereas the Matador coupe was brand new, which resulted in heightened media attention. Meanwhile, the Satellite Sebring arguably sold better than the Charger because it had been completely (rather than partially) reskinned in 1973 and was somewhat more mainstream in its styling.
Im sorry, I screwed that up. I correctly wrote elsewhere that the Sebring did 50k and the Charger did 75.
The Arab Oil Embargo hit in December 1973, which caused a spike in gas prices and actual shortage of gasoline. It seriously hurt the market for larger cars.
While the full-size models bore the brunt of the impact, intermediates were affected, too. The 1974 model year thus was not a great year for intermediates. The midsize market was not “hot” in 1974.
The more realistic comparison would be total Chrysler Corporation intermediate coupe production for 1973, which was the last model year before the Embargo, and 1976, which was when the economy bounced back and customers started buying larger cars again.
The 1973 Charger had sold over 115,000 units for 1973. Plymouth sold over 100,000 Satellite coupes. Dodge never sold that many intermediate coupes again, even when it offered two intermediate coupes, instead of one.
The Cordoba was a success, but did it really increase Chrysler Corporation’s share of the intermediate market personal luxury coupe market as compared to the share garnered by the Plymouth Satellite Sebring/Plus and Dodge Charger in 1973?
The 1974 Chrysler full size redesign was a tragedy – one of the most unluckiest throws of the dice in US auto history. We all remember how some off shore villians turned off the oil supply in late ’73. The age of the super heroes was over.
But it wasnt all bad. The New Yorker was a big handsome vehicle tailored to prosperous middle America. The grill was the newly fashionable Mercedes look. But it perhaps disturbed some with memories of a german dictator with his vehicle of choice.
Its close relative the Imperial got in on the action as well.
The New Yorker had several reminders of Chryslers of the 1960’s.The so elegant roof line, the chromed rocker panels lighened up the vehicle apperance wise. The lower priced Newport sported a throw back Chrysler grille and no fender skirts. Reminicent of the ’63 models. The Imperial seemed ready to start a new chapter in its storied history – even if it and the NY shared the shorter 124” WB.
We will skip over sad 1975. As we know the New Yorker was perhaps saved by the donning of the Imperial costume – And finnaly became succesful. One magazine said of the Imperial travails – ”perhaps it was the name afterall” . Some gallows humour.
So Chrysler had some good years here – and Iacocca just arrived. Who can forget the Blues Brothers bombing around in Dodge Monaco’s of these years – and finally the Hill Street Blues preferred vehicles.
The Imperial was planned to be dropped for 1974. The story goes that Elwood Engel presented the models for the planned lines. Then Elwood announced “Gentlemen, this is the car you have decided not to build for 1974,” and whipped the cover off the Imperial.
It was, unfortunately, an ill timed decision to make the redesign of the flagship Chrysler without considering the potential for failure after the first embargo of 1973. I own 2 of these behemoths, and love the comfort, ride and handling of these cars. I think they were great cars, just brought to the market at exactly the wrong time, and by a poor management team. This was the start of huge problems for Chrysler that the corporation never really recovered from. A sad story.
Frankly, Chrysler has been falling down the staircase since 1957. I feel they’ve made more missteps, mistakes and bad decisions than AMC and Studebaker combined yet they continue to come back from near-death. I have more confidence in a Tesla Robotaxi than I do in a Chrysler product. It turns out that Rambler had it wrong. People don’t want a reliable and economical car, they want speed and gimmicks.
A challenge with talking about the American automobile market is that it isn’t one large, monolithic beast. For example, during the early-60s Pontiac began its rise at the same time that Rambler sales were at their peak. By the same token, in the late-60s muscle cars and pony cars sold particularly well . . . but so did imports such as the Volkswagen Beetle. In other words, some people wanted speed and gimmicks at the same time that others wanted a reliable and economical car.
If we are going to talk specifically about American Motors, we might also factor into the discussion that they didn’t need to sell at anywhere near Chevrolet levels. AMC could be reasonably profitable with passenger-car sales of around 350,000 units. That’s not a huge number of cars. During the early-70s Chrysler consistently sold more compact Valiants and Darts even though they were the contemporary equivalent of the Rambler — aging and fairly dowdy but reliable and economical.
Of course, another factor was that the market shifted over time. I do not think that the starkly utilitarian quality of 1960 Ramblers would have worked as well in 1970, both because the competition was more intense and the public was becoming increasingly acclimatized to imported cars that were both economical and fun to drive. Strippo compacts with three-on-the-tree, bench seats and mushy roadworthiness were less appealing (although entry-level Dusters and Mavericks still sold relatively well).
I suspect that Roy D. Chapin Jr. would have agreed with you that the “Rambler had it wrong,” because during his 10-year leadership of American Motors he emphasized speed and gimmicks in sporty coupes such as the AMX, Rebel Machine and Matador coupe. It’s also true that AMC passenger-car sales peaked under Chapin in 1974. However, that was arguably because of the oil crisis — and was mostly driven by sales of more fuel-efficient cars such as the Hornet and Gremlin. The sporty coupes that Chapin emphasized may today be prized by collectors, but back then they mostly didn’t sell very well — particularly compared to the Rambler in its heyday. Indeed, some of Chapin’s biggest initiatives were outright flops, such as the Matador coupe.
To make matters worse, by trying to compete in fields where styling changed quickly, Chapin was putting AMC at a financial disadvantage to the Big Three — which had much deeper pockets. Back in the Rambler days George Romney quite rightly decided that the best way to be competitive was to focus on niches where he could squeeze more years of production out of a relatively unchanging design. In the early-60s that happened to be smaller economy cars.
Funny that Townsend was essentially correct in his prediction for the future. By the 80s the Japanese were gradually increasing the size of their cars and the Americans had reduced their full-size cars to roughly equivalent to an intermediate of the late 60s early 70s.
Bruce, it’s true that Japanese cars gradually increased in size as the 1980s progressed. However, by 1990 the Toyota Camry and Honda Accord were still about the size of an early-60s compact — and so was a Ford Taurus.
For example, the Accord was 185 inches long, 68 inches wide and had a 107-inch wheelbase. That was close to the dimensions of a 1960 Plymouth Valiant (which was a bit larger than the Ford Falcon and Chevrolet Corvair but smaller than a Rambler Classic or a Mercury Comet).
By the late-60s American mid-sized cars had gradually grown to the point where a 1968 Chevrolet Chevelle four-door model was 201 inches long, 76 wide and had a wheelbase of 116 inches.
The 1972 Torino and its derivatives are a hair less than the maximum 80 inches wide.
I liked the imitation General Motors styling of the 74 C body cars. I thought in particular the 74 Monaco was a better looking Buick than a Buick (I even told a long time Buick owner that in 1974) and the Plymouth a better looking Oldsmobile than an Oldsmobile, especially the 4 door hardtop roofs that looked just like the 71 72 GM cars. And almost most important, the Chrysler products which had unitized contruction had much better 5 mph bumpers than the battering rams on the GM cars.
The rim of body color around the edge of the vinyl top wasn’t just aping Cadillac. Once the vinyl top got past its original function of simulating a convertible top, the vinyl top became a color/trim element like a painted roof or two toning. Designers generally didn’t like just covering the roof from window rail to window rail. If Cadillac pioneered, it was because no one else would spend the money until it was necessary to keep up.
“A vinyl roof or top on a classic car often looks unfinished or bare along the trim line if the body paint is not properly exposed or coordinated, making the edge look weak or unpolished.”
At a glance, it looks like Cutlass, Monte Carlo, Grand Prix have an exposed color edge around the vinyl top from about 1969 on.