How might Robert McNamara have influenced Ford if he had remained company president for a few more years? This is a question that emerged from the comment thread in our recent Don Frey story. Let’s flesh out this counterfactual by speculating about McNamara’s impact if he had stayed through the end of 1964.
One of the biggest wild cards could have been whether the subcompact Cardinal/Redwing was produced in the United States. The car was slated for introduction in the fall of 1962 but was reportedly cancelled due to lobbying by Lee Iacocca. However, McNamara was a champion of the Cardinal (Halberstam, 1986). So if the car had reached production, it could have influenced his thinking about the rest of Ford’s lineup below the full-sized class.
One reason why is that the Cardinal may have struggled to generate adequate volume in its first few years. After all, import sales were soft through 1965 before soaring over the next five years. Initially weak Cardinal sales could have pushed McNamara to increase the platform’s financial viability by boosting production as well as seeking more profitable market niches.

How the Cardinal platform could have been successful
One way to accomplish both of the above goals would have been to add variants. For example, Ford had been quick to build out the Falcon platform with a long-wheelbase wagon, Ranchero pickup, Mercury Comet and Econoline van. McNamara presumably had a hand in green lighting those vehicles before he left Ford in late 1960 (go here for further discussion).
Another way to boost the Cardinal platform’s volume would have been for Ford to ditch the compact platform. When the Falcon came up for a redesign in 1966, it was moved up to the mid-sized platform. However, it could have also been shifted down to the Cardinal platform. In the latter case, the Falcon could have been given a longer wheelbase, somewhat fancier styling and a V6 engine.
What other variants might the Cardinal platform had spawned? If the compact platform had been phased out, it could have made sense for the Econoline van to move down to the Cardinal platform. That could have anticipated Chrysler’s minivans because the Econoline would have benefitted by a lower cargo floor due to the platform’s front-wheel drive.
By the same token, this drivetrain could have been reconfigured for a mid-engined two seater akin to the 1962 concept car called the Mustang I (Mueller, 2010).

Shift the Mustang to the Cardinal platform?
What might McNamara have done with the Mustang? Despite his reputation for “granny cars,” he championed the four-seater Thunderbird and the 1961 Continental. This suggests that McNamara may have been receptive to the idea of a sporty coupe like the Mustang. However, I could see him pushing for it to be placed on the Cardinal platform.
The resulting car would presumably have catered to a somewhat different market than a compact Mustang, but it also might have done more to fight a rising tide of imports, whose market share more than doubled between 1965 and 1970.
Also see ‘Lee Iacocca got lucky with the 1964-66 Ford Mustang’
A front-wheel-drive Mustang might have been a disappointment to the enthusiasts who in the early-70s would flock to Ford’s rear-wheel-drive Capri, but it could have appealed to the potentially much larger pool of buyers who may have been perfectly happy with a good-looking subcompact coupe.
That said, I would imagine that today’s Mustang fanboys would feel grateful that McNamara became President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, leaving Ford to more meat-and-potatoes executives such as Iacocca. The automaker would come out with a few interesting cars in the 1960s, but paying little attention to the imports would prove to be a huge long-term mistake.
NOTES:
Market share figures are fromย Wards Autoย (2017). Note that these figures look somewhat different from those typically used atย Indie Autoย because they are for sales of cars and trucks of all types.ย Product information from the auto editors ofย Consumer Guide (2006) and Gunnell (2002).ย
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or aย note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors ofย Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006.ย Encyclopedia of American Cars.ย Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Gunnell, John; 2002.ย Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975.ย Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Halberstam, David; 1986.ย The Reckoning.ย William Morrow & Co., New York, NY.
- Mueller, Mike; 2010.ย The Complete Book of Mustang: Every Model Since 1964 1/2.ย Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
- Wards Auto; 2017. โU.S. Total Vehicle Sales Market Share by Company.โ
PHOTOGRAPHY:
- fordheritagevault.com: Ford Mustang I (1962)





“it could have appealed to the potentially much larger pool of buyers who may have been perfectly happy with a good-looking subcompact coupe”
Are you talking about out-selling the 680,000 Mustangs that flew out of showrooms in 1964-65? I don’t think so. Few cars have had such success and as much impact on the market. Now if they had flipped the chassis around and sold a mid-engine Mustang like the showcar, and also a FWD couple, then you have something.
A Mustang like that would have competed against the Corvair as well as the British imports and we would have had an entirely different scene. More sportscar than musclecar. The import situation at that time was mostly the Brits and Volkswagen. I don’t see a subcompact Falcon doing much against VW. Different demographics.
The Falcon/Mustang combo would have destroyed the Brits (#2 and #3) and remaining Renault/Opel/Simca/Fiat hangers-on. Volvo and Mercedes again were a different demographic. It would have prepared them for the front-wheel drive revolution although that wouldn’t happen for another decade.
I think too many people focus on Robert S. McNamara on his prowess as an accountant without understanding the entire picture of how he came to be President of the Ford Division: His success as a strategy planner with the follow-up to the 1949 (and ’50-’51) Ford: The brilliant 1952-1953-1954 Ford sedans, and the 1955-1956 Fords that were competitive although not as successful as the 1955-1956 Chevrolets. McNamara likely had studied G.M. enough (coupled with Ernie Breech’s knowledge and insight) to know that the 1957 Chevrolet would be based on a facelifted and tail lifted 1956 sedan and not a totally new body. The key to McNamara’s management was knowing when to strike at Chevrolet and G.M.: New fresh and stylish two-wheelbase Ford sedans for the 1957 model year…the smaller sedan targeting 150 and 210 buyers and the longer Fairlanes outclassing the shorter Bel Airs. But the real beneficiary of the increased sales of Ford Motor Company was its I.P.O. in 1956, which put McNamara on the inside track to replace Breech.
Thinking about McNamara staying at Ford and his impact if he had not left for the Kennedy Administration, McNamara survived at Ford to rise into the corporate hierarchy. Lee Iacocca probably would have met his match in R.S.M. McNamara had correctly predicted the failure of the 1952 Reith plan turning lemons into lemonade by taking the Edsel production capacity and selling over 420-thousand Falcons and Comets in 1960. Ford under McNamara would have passed on the Cardinal, I believe, but likely would have done the Mustang depending on how the business case was presented. I don’t think McNamara would have pursued Ferrari in 1963 or Le Mans but would have continued to use Holman & Moody, Carroll Shelby and the Fairlane-based Indianapolis race engine program. I think McNamara would have left Ford to become a C.E.O. of an organization like the job he took after leaving the government: The World Bank.