The 1956 Mercury represented the end — at least for a few years — of Edsel Ford’s original conception of the brand.
Since it was introduced 1939, Mercury had been positioned toward the lower end of the premium-priced field, where it competed most directly with Pontiac and Dodge.
For 1957 the Mercury would be bumped up a notch in size and price to compete with Buick. The prelude to that was a chrome-laden new four-door hardtop introduced in the middle of the 1956 model year (Popular Mechanics, 1956).
Yet that same year Mercury also added a new entry-level series, the Medalist, which moved the brand downmarket. This car was advertised as bringing “Mercury value to more people than ever before” and “priced among the models of the low-priced field.”
Lower roofline for four-door models set Mercury apart
The 1956 Mercury’s styling was mostly carried over from the previous year. The most obvious change was a new four-door hardtop referred to as a “phaeton.” That was an odd usage for a term that had previously referred to an open car.
The phaeton had an unusually low and sloping roofline similar to the two-door hardtop (I can’t tell from photos whether they are interchangeable). However, the phaeton’s roofline was clearly shared with a low-slung, four-door sedan introduced during the 1955 model year as a top-of-line Montclair. This so-called “sport sedan” was expanded to the mid-level Monterey series in 1956.
The new four-door models were only 58.6 inches high. This gave Mercury one of the lowest U.S.-built four-door models in 1956. In addition, the four-door sport sedan was the only Big Three car aside from the 1956 Lincoln to use thin door window frames.
As might be expected, Consumer Reports was not impressed with the swoopier styling. They described the new greenhouse as “chopped” — “reduced in height by lowering the roof and seats, but not the chassis.” They argued that this resulted in a “low, sporty silhouette at a sacrifice of nearly two inches in headroom, an uncomfortably low front seat, and restricted rear legroom” (1956, p. 189).
What was the point of the Medalist?
I find it curious that Mercury moved downmarket in 1956 with the Medalist. Why would they do that if the longer-term goal was to reposition Mercury upward? The 1958 Edsel’s lower-end Ranger and Pacer series would take the place of Mercury in the lower reaches of the premium-priced market.
Also see ‘1958 Edsel with retractable roof hints at why the brand failed’
The most significant impact of adding the Medalist was that it allowed Mercury to only modestly raise prices on its lowest-priced models. This made the brand more competitive with the bottom-end Dodge and Pontiac.
Meanwhile, Mercury’s three carry-over series — the Custom, Monterey and Montclair — were given more substantial price hikes. Because the rest of the auto industry was also raising prices, the top-end Montclair continued to compete most directly with equivalent models from Dodge and Pontiac.
Mercury’s prices went up a notch in 1957, when the entry-level, Monterey two-door sedan listed at $2,576. This put Mercury in direct competition with Buick’s bottom-end Special.
Meanwhile, the new top-of-line Turnpike Cruiser two-door convertible went for a stratospheric $4,103. Mercury was now matched against Buick’s high-end Roadmaster.
Mercury followed Ford’s 1956 emphasis on safety
Mercury adopted the same safety features that the Ford Division did in 1956. They included a padded instrument panel , safety door locks, an impact-absorbing deep-dish steering wheel, a breakaway rear-view mirror, and optional seat belts and padded sun visors.
Mercury marketing gave these features less prominence than Ford’s, but they were referred to as “Safety-First Design.”
Mercury did well in 1956 despite all the confusion
Nailing down Mercury’s 1956 lineup can be a challenge. A brochure that was apparently published around the beginning of the model year listed three series and 12 models (see below).
However, production numbers have been reported for four series and 18 models in both the Standard Catalog of American Cars (Gunnell, 2002) and the Encyclopedia of American Cars (auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006).
The difference in number of models is partly accounted for by the mid-year introduction of the four-door hardtop. In addition, the Medalist was at some point expanded to include a four-door sedan as well as a two- and four-door hardtop.
The bottom line is that Mercury had an unusually fluid lineup in 1956. And as we have discussed, it also tried to simultaneously move upmarket with the glitzy new Montclair Phaeton and downmarket with the strippo Medalist. It would not be surprising if that confused the public.
Also see ‘The 1956 Lincoln’s styling proved to be a one-year wonder’
Yet despite all that, Mercury did unusually well in 1956. Even though total output in the premium-priced field was down almost 19 percent, Mercury held almost even at roughly 328,000 units. That pushed up the brand’s share of the premium-priced market to a healthy 13.6 percent.
Ditching Edsel Ford’s strategy was a total bust
It’s true that in 1957 Mercury’s market share jumped a whole point due to its complete redesign. Alas, the celebrations were short lived. By 1959 Mercury’s output fell to only 150,000 units. That was a whopping 54-percent drop from 1956! To make matters worse, Mercury’s share of the premium-priced field sunk to 9.9 percent — a postwar low.
Also see ‘1958 Mercury Turnpike Cruiser is a monument to Ford’s failed ambitions’
The Edsel may be widely known as a enormous flop, but moving the Mercury upmarket deserves an honorable mention. For all of the money showered on the Mercury, it ended the 1950s with 3.2 percent lower market share than 10 years earlier. Even if you add in the Edsel’s meager output, the Ford Motor Company still lost ground in the premium-priced field.
Meanwhile, General Motors’ market share soared from 44 percent to 69 percent. To get there GM devoured all of the independent automakers’ once-significant market share and nibbled at Ford and Chrysler’s as well.
The Ford Motor Company may have had greater success in the second half of the 1950s if it had stuck with Edsel Ford’s game plan of positioning the Mercury toward the lower-end of the premium-priced market. Not surprisingly, Mercury did better in the 1960s once it returned to its roots.
NOTES:
Prices and specifications are from Consumer Reports (1956) and Gunnell (2002). Production figures and market share were calculated from base data provided by the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006), Gunnell (2002) and Wikipedia (2022). List-price graph does not include limited-production halo models.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Consumer Reports; 1956. “Group 3: Upper Medium-Priced Cars.” April issue: pp. 188-189.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Popular Mechanics; 1956. “Parade of ’56 Cars.” February issue: pp. 170-185.
- Wikipedia; 2022. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Page last modified Jan. 26.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- wildaboutcarsonline.com (Automotive History Preservation Society): Mercury (1956)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Dodge (1956); Ford (1956); Mercury (1956); Pontiac (1956)
Looks like Ford and Chrysler remained about the same market share while GM absorbed the independents. In the first chart I see Chrysler is not listed. Is it counted in the Chrysler Corp premium? What about Lincoln? For this period I think it was mostly premium rather than luxury.
Kim, when looking at market share over time, so much depends upon which year(s) you use as a baseline. My comparison was 1949-59. Here are more granular figures:
— In the first half of the 1950s, Chrysler’s premium class market share peak was 24.9 percent in 1953. Although the automaker hit 27 percent in 1957, by 1959 it had fallen to 17.9 percent. That’s quite a drop.
— In the first half of the decade Ford’s best year was 1954 (oddly enough), when it captured 13.8 percent of the premium class. Although the automaker reached 16.3 percent in 1958, only one year later it was down to 12.8 percent.
I only included lower-end premium brands in the first graph to keep things readable. If you want to see more about Chrysler Corporation’s brands, here is a data-oriented article. For data on Lincoln and luxury car output go here.
The second graph on market share categorizes brands by their primary classification. I have placed Lincoln in the luxury car class throughout the postwar period. I get your point about the brand sometimes straddling the premium and luxury classes; I have only applied that level of granularity to Packard thus far (go here).
Why? Because the only data I have access to has to be manually inputted by individual series and body style by year, which can be time consuming (particularly when data sources can sometimes vary in their numbers or are clearly inaccurate). So I pick off topics that gradually increase the comprehensiveness of my database. I would invite those who would like to see more of this to make a donation to Indie Auto here.
FYI that I gave the market share graph a new title to clarify that it includes all premium brands for each automaker. So, yes, it would include the Chrysler brand.
The 1956 Mercury had to be a headscratcher for the Ford corporate staff. The good news was that the 1956 sales did not fall with the same basic style as 1955. But the 1957-1959 Mercurys were production variations of the XM concept cars with ever increasing prices as Mercurys nudged up-market. I think one of the 1ssues for the 1957 Mercury, at the bottom end was the larger Ford Fairlane and especially the Fairlane 500. With the economy tightening, why spend more for the Mercury when the Fairlane 500 was stylish and reasonably luxurious ? Plus the 1957 Mercury’s competition was Dodge, De Soto, the Chrysler Windsor, Oldsmobile and Buick. In my opinion, in hindsight, maybe the signs that the Francis Reith “E”-car plan needed to be rethought in 1956, was that the brilliant Chrysler-De Soto redesigns of 1955-1956 did not trigger a huge sales increase for those brands, while the largely carry-over Mercury did well. If the effort Ford execs were putting into enlisting Edsel dealers for 1958 had been pushed into instead putting additional Lincoln-Mercury dealers in the mix, maybe Ford could have modestly moved Mercury more to the Olds-Buick and De Soto pricing range and Lincoln as a direct competitor for Chrysler New Yorker-Imperial and Buick Roadmaster-Cadillac.
If the Edsel fiasco was the result of Ford’s “GM Envy,” the expansion of Mercury in both directions could be described as Ford’s “Buick Envy.”
Buick had made hay in the mid-1950s with the less expensive Special. Meanwhile, it continued to offer the premium Roadmaster.
Buick sales had collapsed by 1958, due to a combination of a sharp recession, quality control woes in 1955-56, Chevrolet offering V-8s and upgraded interiors and unfortunate post-1956 styling. Mercury would not fare much better.
McNamara takes heat in some quarters today for scaling back Mercury’s ambitions and having plans to kill the Edsel. But he pushed the one model that did make inroads into GM’s medium-price market dominance – the 1958 Thunderbird.
Wasn’t the look of the 1957 Buick also played a role for Buick collasing sales where Plymouth regained its third position that year?
The problem with the styling of the 1957 Buick was that it didn’t look “new” compared to the Chrysler Corporation cars. Buyers were also wary of Buicks because of the quality issues with the 1955-56 models. It didn’t help that the entire medium-price segment was already in decline by 1957.
I suspect that there’s some truth to Buick’s styling being a factor in its sales decline. For 1957 the Buick received a substantial restyling that cut the car’s height by around two inches, which made it reasonably competitive with Chrysler and Ford in that department. However, the Buick was a good four inches narrower and as much as 10 inches shorter. That resulted in proportions which weren’t as trendy. One could also argue that the 1957 Buick was less attractive than the previous year’s models, e.g., the fascia had a weird, pouty look.
I vaguely recall reading in Consumer Reports that the 1957 Buicks were not very roomy; perhaps that was another factor. I don’t have any information on Buick’s quality control in the mid-50s (which doesn’t mean there weren’t problems), but do think it was all but inevitable that GM’s premium-priced brands were going to take a sales hit due to both Chrysler and Ford investing considerable resources in new models.
Yet another potential factor is that the low-priced brands were taking an increasingly large bite out of the premium class’s market share. In 1957 the premium brands captured only 31 percent of total domestic production. That was down 8 percent from the previous year. Meanwhile, the low-priced field went up 7 percent. That was significantly driven by Ford and Plymouth, which both saw major sales increases (Chevrolet output actually declined).
Note that in 1957 Ford introduced a larger Fairlane that may very well have stolen some sales from buyers who might have otherwise bought a premium-priced car.
If you find the numbers interesting, there’s more here.