(EXPANDED FROM 10/21/2022)
A few years ago J P Cavanaugh (2020) received pushback from some Curbside Classic commentators for calling the fuselage Chryslers a “Deadly Sin.” As a case in point, Moparlee (2020) wrote, “I want to see the numbers of how badly (Chrysler) was beaten in the market by its competitors.”
At the risk of nerding out on you, what follows is a deep dive into production and market-share data. What I found was that the fuselage Chryslers, which were produced from 1969-73, were not hugely successful in the premium-priced field — but they were not sales disasters either.
Chrysler’s early-70s output falls more than competitors
Let’s start with a graph that compares Chrysler brand output from 1962-73 with its nearest competitors. We are only including full-sized cars.
Output for Chrysler held fairly steady in 1969 but then dropped by 30.7 percent in 1970. This was close to twice as much as the full-sized, premium-priced field as a whole, which fell 16.6 percent.
Beginning in 1972 Chrysler volume inched back up, but it only reached roughly 234,000 units, well below its all-time record of almost 265,000 units in 1968. That’s despite the premium-priced, big-car field as a whole reaching 1.78 million units in 1973.
Both the New Yorker and Newport fall behind
Part of the problem was that Chrysler was not keeping pace with growth in the high end of the premium-priced field. Between 1965 and 1973 the Oldsmobile Ninety-Eight saw output increase by almost 50 percent and the Buick Electra by more than 74 percent. Mercury went up even more — by almost 300 percent on the strength of its Marquis series. In contrast, New Yorker volume only grew 20 percent.
At least the New Yorker achieved record production levels in 1972-73. In contrast, Chrysler’s entry-level Newport failed to fully bounce back from the early-70s recession. This was too bad because in 1968 the nameplate had caught up to both the Eighty-Eight and the LeSabre.
The Newport hit bottom at around 110,000 units in 1970-71. Production began to rebound in 1972. This may have partly reflected an improving economy, but new sheetmetal and some nomenclature changes may have also helped. The mid-level 300 was discontinued after 1971, which may have given the Newport Custom more breathing room.
Also see ‘1968 Chrysler New Yorker: The peak of ‘peak Chrysler?’
Meanwhile, during the 1971 model year a new entry-level series called the Newport Royal was introduced. This may have been in response to consumer sticker shock, when major price increases resulted in the lowest-priced Chrysler topping $4,000 (Langworth and Norbye, 1985).
Premium-priced big cars struggle in 1970-71
The graph below gives a clearer sense of the relationship between individual brands and the entire field. The late-60s peak of the market was reached in 1969, when total production almost hit 1.75 million units. Only two years later annual output had fallen almost 23 percent to 1.35 million units. This may have mostly reflected a recession. However, in the fall of 1970 GM was hit with a 67-day strike.
Premium big-car output bounced back in 1972 and the following year topped 1.78 million. This surpassed 1969 and 1965 but fell well short of the almost 3.0 million built in 1955.
In 1973 both Oldsmobile and Buick produced more than 400,000 big cars, and aside from Dodge were the only brands to surpass their 1969 output. In contrast, Chrysler was off by 10 percent, which was the most of any premium brand.
Chrysler gets more competition with big wagons
Chrysler initially scored a minor victory in the wagon market. For 1969 its Town & Country saw output almost reach 25,000 units. Not only was this an all-time high, but it was more than twice as much as in 1965. I suspect that a key reason why the wagon did so well was because the fuselage body was particularly well suited to this body style.
Another reason may have been that Chrysler still shared the premium-priced, big-wagon market with only one other brand. In 1969 Mercury’s wagon entries outsold Chrysler’s by only 3,000 units despite being a notch lower in price. Whereas the Town & Country was priced upwards of $4,600, the base Mercury listed for around $3,600 and the top-end Colony Park topped out at under $3,800.
Perhaps envious of Chrysler’s success, Buick reentered the big-wagon market in 1970 and Oldsmobile followed in 1971. That appears to have taken a dent out of Town & Country sales, which settled in at around 20,000 units in 1972-73. In contrast, in 1973 Buick’s Estate Wagon almost hit 36,000 units while Oldsmobile’s Custom Cruiser soared to almost 39,000 units. If it was any consolation, Mercury languished behind both GM brands, producing under 26,000 units in 1973.
Chrysler market share lower but steady in early-70s
The data analysis in our above-mentioned stories focused mostly on production totals. Paul Niedermeyer (2020) noted in a Curbside Classic comment that “showing raw sales numbers is not nearly enough to tell a complete story, because the total car market was much more volatile back then.” Good point, so let’s take a look at market-share data.
The first graph below compares the Chrysler brand with its closest competitors. Note that the percentages represent the market share of the total premium-priced, full-sized market. That would include brands not shown here for space reasons (Pontiac and Dodge).
The main takeaway is that the Chrysler brand peaked in 1966-68, when it averaged 15.6 percent of the market. That was 2.9 percent higher than the brand’s market share from 1970-73. Chrysler’s top year was 1966, when it hit 15.8 percent — and was less than three points lower than Oldsmobile and Buick. By 1972 those brands were 9-12 percent ahead of Chrysler.
This story focuses on the full-sized field, but for context let’s compare Chrysler’s market share of the premium-priced field when entire lineups are included. Of course, the Chrysler brand was at a marked disadvantage because it only offered full-sized cars whereas everyone else had a foothold in a number of other fields, such as mid-sized cars and personal coupes.
During the fuselage years, Chrysler’s market share hovered around 6 percent, which was roughly half that of Mercury’s. Meanwhile, Oldsmobile and Buick pulled in around 20 percent or more. In 1973 that translated into output of roughly 923,000 units for Olds and 821,000 units for Buick.
Chrysler Corp. market share falls as Ford grows
Now instead of focusing on brands, let’s view each automaker’s total production of premium-priced big cars from 1962 to 1973.
GM’s triumvirate of premium-priced brands — Buick, Oldsmobile and Pontiac — increased from 67.2 percent of the field in 1968 to 71.5 percent in 1970. During that same time period, Chrysler Corporation’s two premium-priced brands, Dodge and Chrysler, saw their collective market share drop from 25.2 percent to a low of 18.3 percent.
Meanwhile, the Ford Motor Company’s sole premium-priced brand, Mercury, saw its full-sized entries move up from 7.7 percent to 10.2 percent of that field.
For 1971, both Chrysler and Ford ate into GM’s market share, but that was likely the result of the GM strike. For 1972-73 GM settled in at 69 percent, Chrysler at around 21 percent and Ford at 10 percent.
The good news was that the Chrysler Corporation’s market share of the premium-priced, full-sized field was stable from 1971-73. The bad news was that its market share was an average of 2.1 percent lower than during 1965-68. Note that this reflected even weaker output by Dodge, whose market share of the premium big-car field fell to a dismal 6 percent in 1970 before bouncing back by two or three points in 1971-73.
So was the 1969-73 Chrysler a ‘deadly sin’?
Production data suggest that the 1969-73 Chrysler wasn’t anywhere near as big of a disaster as the early-70s E-Body pony cars (go here for further discussion). However, you should not read into this a dismissal of Cavanaugh’s critique.
Also see ‘1965-69 Chrysler: Selling prestige in a changing culture’
At the very least, the fuselage Chryslers failed to build upon the rousing success of their predecessor, which had begun to put a dent into GM’s dominance of the premium big-car field. Ford’s broughamization of the Mercury proved to be a more successful approach than Chrysler’s embrace of fuselage styling.
Mediocre sales of the 1969-73 Chrysler brand was doubly problematic because, unlike Dodge, it could not counterbalance weaker big-car sales with entries in other fields.
A more successful fuselage design could have helped to head off the automaker’s financial collapse in the late-70s. One might go a step further and suggest that Chrysler should have squeezed another two years from its 1965-68 big-car body. An adroit reskinning could have worked fine. After all, GM used that same strategy — and did well despite Ford introducing a nicely-executed new body in 1969. The fuselage Chryslers illustrate how “all new” isn’t always the better way to go.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted June 4, 2020, expanded on June 9, 2021, updated on Oct. 21, 2022 and expanded on March 12, 2024. Production figures and prices were from Gunnell (2002) and the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006). Data was mixed and matched to address discrepancies and potential errors.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Cavanaugh, J P; 2020. “Curbside Classic: 1971 Chrysler Newport Royal – Chrysler’s Deadly Sin #6, The Fuselage Years.” Curbside Classic. Posted Jan. 22.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985. Publications International, Skokie, IL.
- Moparlee; 2020. Commentator in “Curbside Classic: 1971 Chrysler Newport Royal – Chrysler’s Deadly Sin #6, The Fuselage Years.” Curbside Classic. Posted 5:10 a.m., Jan. 22.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2020. Commentator in “Curbside Classic: 1971 Chrysler Newport Royal – Chrysler’s Deadly Sin #6, The Fuselage Years.” Curbside Classic. Posted 6:48 a.m., Jan. 22.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcaradvertising.com: Chrysler (1969)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Buick (1972); Chrysler (1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973); Dodge (1972); Mercury (1972); Oldsmobile (1972)
Another path then Chrysler could have used is to do what Lincoln did with the 1970 Continental when they replaced the 1969 model, being an evolution instead of a revolution. The 1974 Newport/New Yorker roofline of the 4-door sedan and hardtop seem to look like an updated version of the 1965-68 models (the C-bodies Dodge and Plymouth on the other hand, tried to copy a 1971 Buick). Imagine what if the 1974 Chrysler arrived in 1969 instead of the Fuselage?
I’ve purchased several Consumer Reports Annual Auto Issues from the 1960s and 1970s on ebay. What is striking is that, based on the magazine’s reliability surveys, Chrysler Corporation quality declined dramatically, starting in 1968.
From about 1962 through 1967, Chrysler Corporation cars scored BETTER than comparable GM cars in this regard.
Perhaps it was due to the good sales that year – the corporation’s market share hit a peak in 1968 – but Chrysler reliability declined in 1968.
And it wasn’t just reliability problems that dogged Chrysler Corporation in the late 1960s. In 1969, the magazine noted the sloppy assembly quality of the Mopars it tested (including the Chrysler itself).
No doubt this affected sales of the fuselage Chryslers.
FYI that I’ve also purchased Consumer Reports annual auto issues on eBay. After three purchases I got hit with identity theft of the credit card I had used for the transactions. Was that a coincidence? I don’t know, but it has made me more cautious.
In a very real sense the 1963-68 Chryslers were K. T. Keller’s revenge. They showed how well-engineered cars could be strong sellers if the styling was okay. The fuselage Chryslers — and here I would include both full-sized, mid-sized and pony cars — began to undercut the automaker’s reputation. It’s not surprising to me that the Valiant/Dart sold so well in the first half of the 1970s despite their aging looks. They were pretty good cars that harkened back to Chrysler’s golden era. I wouldn’t be surprised if some repeat Chrysler buyers went with a Duster rather than a Satellite or a Barracuda primarily because they felt more solid.
The above article was more focused on analyzing production numbers. “1969-71 Chrysler: An Exner idea fumbled again” delves more into the styling, quality, pricing and size issues.
Thank you for the head’s up regarding ebay. Fortunately, I’ve never had this happen, despite buying several things from the site.
Sometimes it takes a while to appreciate automotive styling. Back in the early 60s, my family was all Mopar. There was the ’58 Belvedere, a ’60 Valient, , ’61 Newport, a ’63 Newport, ’64, 300, a ’66 Imperial and a ’69 300, oh and a couple of ’76 Cordovas. Of course they all looked different and yet all unmistakably Chrysler s.I liked them all for what they were. I loved the ’66 Imperial most of all.I also thought the ’69 300 was great looking too. I also liked the ’69 300. I thought the fuselage look fit the full size Chryslers very well.But by 1969 the lack of quality, lower grade materials were all very apparent. The one event that singlehandedly changed the worldwide automotive industry was the 1973,-74 oil embargo. I often wonder where we would be today had that not happened. Very dark times. I was there, we had no clue where things were going.
I think the 1969-1971 Chryslers, especially the 300 and New Yorker were very exciting cars, but the two-door coupe styling from the rear and side could have been handled better, in my opinion, as the rear deck looked too long. The four-door hardtops and sedans were better proportioned from any angle. I believe the real problem for the fuselage Chryslers and Dodges were the quality issues that visibly appeared in the 1967-1968 and early 1969 full-size cars. I also think that while the “Your Next Car” campaign for the 1969-1970 Chrysler was good in terms of image, that once the customer got into the showroom and sat in the car, the Chrysler was just not in the same league as the comparable Buicks, Oldsmobiles and Mercurys of the same model years were exceptionally impressive. Plus, Chryslers were sold alongside Plymouths, while most urban Buick, Olds and Mercury dealers were stand-alone. For Dodge dealers, the image message for Polaras and Monacos just got lost with the Darts, Demons, Chargers and Challengers ! On paper and in the training films, the MoPars should have done better, but something got lost in translation !
The 1969 Plymouth Fury is very generic. It’s not ugly, just…there. The 1969 Dodge is better. All of the 1969 C-bodies suffer from a rear track that is too narrow (the corporation widened it for 1970), and an overall aura of cost-cutting. The cars just didn’t feel as solid as the previous generation. The quality issues you noted didn’t help.
I remember reading that, by the spring of 1969, Chrysler Corporation had over 400,000 cars in the infamous sales bank! I’m sure a fair percentage of them were C-bodies. No doubt moving those cars required hefty discounts, which probably stole some sales from the 1970 model year.
I remember seeing a fair number of fuselage Chryslers and Plymouths in the driveways of friends and neighbors. But the Dodges of that era – at least, those that were not police cars or taxis – were not commonly seen even when new. If I recall correctly, the full-size Dodges accounted for the lowest percentage of total division sales of any non-luxury full-size car.
The 1965-68 generation of C-bodies did have a very glassy and relatively tall greenhouse. The fuselage generation moved far away from that look.
The irony is that, in the early 1970s, this style came back into vogue, as upscale customers increasingly embraced BMW, Mercedes and Volvo, each of which featured those proportions.
That’s a good point. What’s interesting to me about the fuselage look is that it had pretty close to zero design continuity with the 1965-68 models even though they were highly successful. For example, Chrysler could have kept the upright shape but softened it up around the edges and added some coke bottle or wedge to the mix. The main “weakness” of the 1965-68 body was its relative lack of tuck-under at the rocker panels, but GM’s reskinned 1969-70 models were in a similar boat.
Chrysler probably could have continued with a facelifted version of the 1965-68 C-body. Too bad the corporation didn’t instead put the money into upgrading that basic platform with better quality interiors, improved noise suppression and more responsive steering and braking.
The turret-style coupe design used from 1969-71 looked completely out of place on the New Yorker and Imperial. The look was a step backward as Olds 98s and Buick Electra 225s had unique 2-door hardtop rooflines, necessary at that time for their price point. Compare a 1969 Imperial 2-door to a Coupe De Ville and what would you have chosen back then? Chrysler should have followed Ford’s brougham-look lead for both the New Yorker and Imperial. The 1972 re-style of the 2-door hardtops was a marginal improvement as they lacked the more elegant proportions seen on GM’s luxury trio (98, 225, CdV). The roofline actually looked better on the shorter Plymouth Fury body. It can also be argued that the loop front bumper on Chryslers and Imperials was seen as not traditional enough for buyers in this segment; great look on the 300, not so much on the New Yorker. Perhaps this is why the New Yorker, as one of your photo captions suggested, Steve, was not seen as prestigious as a Buick Electra 225 at that time. In the end, Chrysler dared not to be so different with their new GM-esque 1974 full-size designs going so far as to somewhat resurrect the 1965-68 tall greenhouse for the pillared 4-doors.
In addition to a major emphasis on quality, which declined markedly on Chrysler’s full-size cars after 1966 (K. T. Keller would have been appalled as one could count the defects on the showroom floor. I read in “Collectible Automobile” that even Chrysler stylists were concerned with the appearance of the side panels of the 1967-1968 Chryslers in terms of the waviness of the sheet metal.), two things might have helped sales, but at what cost ?: 1.) Separate dealerships for Plymouths and for Chryslers and Imperials; and 2.) a “halo” car for Chrysler, i.e. the Cordoba in 1971 or 1972. But maybe it would have cannibalized sales from the 300. Once again, trying to go after General Motor’s 1968-1972 “A-body” styling’s curves might have led Elwood Engel and his staff down a blind-alley. Interestingly, I have always thought that the 1971-1972 full-size Oldsmobiles featured “fuselage” styling with crisp angles over the wheel wells.
Chrysler should have had a Riviera and Toronado competitor by 1970…and left the intermediate personal luxury cars to Dodge, or Plymouth, or both.
Interestingly, the Cordoba was originally developed as the Plymouth Premier. It was decided late in the program to sell it as a Chrysler…which worked, although at the cost of Chrysler’s brand equity, as it was competing directly with the Chevrolet Monte Carlo, Ford Elite and Pontiac Grand Prix instead of the Buick Riviera and Oldsmobile Toronado.
Plymouth, meanwhile, began its slide to irrelevance. The Dodge Charger was turned into a badge-engineered Cordoba, and sales collapsed. At a minimum, Chrysler should have given the 1975 Charger the styling that was later used on the 1978-79 Dodge Magnum.
I remember thinking at the time that the 1972 restyle didn’t move far enough away from the fuselage look. At the very least, wraparound front bumpers should have been eliminated, avoiding the costly front end surgery that was necessary for the 1973 models. Newport, New Yorker and Imperial coupes should also have been given a unique formal roofline, different from the one on Furys, Monacos and Polaras, to better compete with the Olds 98 and Buick Electra hardtops. Or, maybe the 300 should have been given a complete re-skin to be spun off as a Toronado/Riviera, T-Bird/Mark IV competitor. Hindsight, eh?