The late Thomas E. Bonsall was one of the better American automotive historians, but some of his takes could be rather “old-school.” For example, in his book about the Edsel, he concluded that the 1958 models were “actually a modest success that deserved continued support” (2002, p. 204).
Elsewhere in his book, Bonsall dismissed Consumer Reports’ harsh criticism of the 1958 Edsel. He argued that in this era the magazine “had a marked anti-Detroit bias and “constantly railed against useless frills, such as fancy styling, upgraded trim on the more deluxe models, and more powerful engines — in other words, all the ‘non-essentials’ that had been driving the market since Alfred Sloan cottoned onto them in the 1920” (2002, p. 146).
In an endnote, Bonsall added that Consumer Reports’ “attitude toward cars, in general, can perhaps best be divined by its conclusion on the 1959 Cadillac Sixty Special in its 1959 new car issue: ‘An expenditure sufficient to buy this Cadillac will also buy two other very satisfactory U.S. vehicles, which would provide more, and more various, services to facilitate a family’s motoring pleasure'” (2002, p. 219).
Consumer Reports viewed cars as mere appliances?
Bonsall juxtaposed Consumer Reports’ take on the Cadillac with that of David Wallace, an Edsel marketing specialist who later remarked, “We said to ourselves, ‘Let’s face it, there is no great difference in basic mechanism between a $2,000 Chevrolet and a $6,000 Cadillac. Nevertheless, there’s something — there’s got to be something — in the makeup of a certain number of people that gives them a yen for a Cadillac, in spite of its high price — or maybe because of it'” (2002, p. 109).
Also see ‘Should the Ford Motor Company have kept the Edsel alive?’
Wallace would engage in an extensive amount of “motivational research” to better target potential Edsel buyers. Bonsall noted that although Wallace started off not knowing “why someone would pay $6,000 for a Cadillac, either, he, at least, took the trouble to try and find out. Consumer Reports, apparently, didn’t know and didn’t care. Cars were only appliances to them” (2002, p. 219).
What did Consumer Reports say about the Edsel that rubbed Bonsall the wrong way? Here are major points it made in a road test:
“The Edsel has no important basic advantages over other brands. . . . The amount of shake in this Corsair body on rough roads — which wasn’t long in making itself heard as squeaks and rattles — went well beyond any acceptable limit. . . . As a matter of simple fact, combined with the car’s tendency to shake like jelly, Edsel handling represents regression rather than progress. . . . The center of the steering wheel is not, in CU’s opinion, a good push button location. . . . The ‘luxury loaded’ Edsel — as one magazine described it — will certainly please anyone who confuses gadgetry with luxury.” (Bonsall, 2002; p. 146)
But weren’t the Edsel criticisms accurate?
The most curious aspect of Bonsall’s dismissal of Consumer Reports was that he didn’t question the accuracy of its Edsel assessment. His was purely an ad hominem attack on the magazine. Although CU did focus on the cost-effectiveness of the products it tested, it was an exaggeration to say that the magazine would “would have loved the Model T and this alone made the Edsel Corsair they tested an unlikely favorite” (2002, p. 146).
Bonsall would later contradict that point when he noted Consumer Reports’ positive assessment of the 1959 Edsel, which it summed up as a “respectable and even likable automobile” (2002, p. 154).
He described this turn of events as “ironic,” but was it? Simply put, the 1958 models were not very well sorted whereas the 1959s were. Of course that’s going to show up in a credible road test.
The deeper problem with Bonsall’s take was that he bought into the continuing relevance of Sloan’s hierarchy-of-brands philosophy without addressing the 800-pound gorilla sitting in the living room: By the late-50s the functional differences between low-, medium- and high-priced brands had declined — yet the price differential had not.
This was most obviously seen with the 1959 Cadillac, which shared a stretched version of the same body used by Chevrolet. In addition, you could now get many of the same features in a Chevy that were once only available on more costly brands, such as a V8, automatic transmission and various power accessories.
Bonsall was apparently too enshrouded in Detroit groupthink to see that the drive to maximize economies of scale — in combination with product proliferation — would increasingly undercut the viability of a hierarchy of brands.
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RE:SOURCES
- Bonsall, Thomas E.; 2002. Disaster in Dearborn: The Story of the Edsel. Stanford General Books, Stanford, CA.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- fordheritagevault.com: Edsel (1958)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Edsel (1959)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Cadillac (1959); Chevrolet (1959); Edsel (1958)
“By the late-50s the functional differences between low-, medium- and high-priced brands had declined — yet the price differential had not.” True, however the Sloan ladder was alives and well and printing GM money. Let’s jump back a year to 1958, the first year for the Impala. I recently found out the Impala had completely different sheetmetal than the Belair behind the B pillar including the roof. A Chevrolet El Dorado if you will. This went for around 2650. The cheapest Cadillac was 4500. I wasn’t able to find option prices, so I don’t know what items were standard on the Cadillac but not on the Impala. However I did see that items like air conditioning and power windows were optional on the cheapest Caddy so I would imagine there were a few simple and relatively inexpensive technical things, so let’s say $1500 between similarly equipped vehicles. Figure a little extra cost for the fancy fabric, extra material, etc. we will very conservatively say $1000 additional profit. That’s over 11k in 2025 money. Now Cadillac sold about 122k cars that year. You’re looking a 122 million in extra profit, say 1.4 billion today. However, there was a cloud on the horizon, no bigger than a man’s hand. The Impala sold 181k that year, about 50% more than all Cadillacs, for an exclusive unique well appointed car for quite a bit less. Okay, I’m talking out of both sides of my mouth here. Yeah, the Sloane ladder is dead, but in 1959 reports of its death were premature and it had a good two decades of profitable life ahead.
Note my last sentence: “Bonsall was apparently too enshrouded in Detroit groupthink to see that the drive to maximize economies of scale — in combination with product proliferation — would increasingly undercut the viability of a hierarchy of brands.”
Also note that the premium-priced field began to lose market share as early as 1953, with a temporary uptick in 1955. By 1959 the low-priced brands had taken a substantial bite out of their share. This would arguably not have happened if the Sloan ladder was still operating in peak condition (go here for further discussion).
One could argue that, by the early 1960s, the Sloan Brand Ladder was only relevant at GM and, to a very limited extent, Chrysler Corporation.
With Dodge moving downmarket in 1960 with the full-size, but low-price, Dart, the distinction between Dodge and Plymouth evaporated. There was still a perception that Chrysler was a step up from Dodge and Plymouth – a perception that lasted through the late 1970s.
Ford had repositioned Mercury so often during the 1950s and early 1960s that it left customers confused. The compact Comet kept the Lincoln-Mercury dealer body afloat in the early 1960s, although one could argue that the Comet was carried by as much by the compact boom as being a slightly larger and fancier Falcon. The 1967 Cougar and 1969 Marquis did help the brand find direction, but that effort had faded by 1974.
At GM, the brands possessed a strong enough identity that they could be sold as a “step up” from a Chevrolet. But even among GM brands, there was still a blurring of market positions. By 1969, I doubt that even many faithful GM buyers could explain exactly what made a Buick more prestigious than an Oldsmobile.
I can’t remember whether he put it in this book, but in his Review 85 / Preview 86 annual he did lay out a good case for the ’58 Edsel being a relative success. The goal was to achieve X percent of Pontiac’s 1955 volume – the peak of the mid-priced boom. But if you looked at Pontiac’s 1958 sales, they actually achieved a higher percentage. It was a bad year and they got caught out.
But the fatal mistake, in my opinion was that trying to cover both Pontiac and Dodge with the Ford based lines and Olds/Buick and DeSoto/Chrysler with the Mercury based lines was arguably too much of a stretch for a single brand in the waning but still viable Sloanian Ladder era.
It’s in the book and we’ve talked a bit about it here. At least when basking in the luxury of hindsight, I don’t find Bonsall’s argument hugely persuasive. Part of the problem was that the Edsel did not merely launch at the wrong time — it was also widely perceived to be a flop, which is not helpful with a brand partly sold on its prestige value. Think about the level of investment that would have been needed to overcome that. This could have been particularly challenging given that the Edsel’s most direct competitor, Pontiac, was about to take off in popularity.
Note that the 1961-63 big Mercury was likely pretty similar to how the Edsel would have evolved. Production hovered around 115,000 units per year — less than the Comet and far behind the big Pontiac. I suspect that the Edsel wouldn’t have done even this well given its reputation-damaging launch.
Perhaps an Edsel-labeled Comet would have given the brand a needed lift, but then Ford would have been stuck with the added costs of feeding two premium-priced brands during an era of product proliferation. Look at how the automaker struggled to differentiate Mercury from Ford by the mid-1970s.
In its heyday Consumer Reports was the anecdote to advertising and really the only option. Mechanics Illustrated sometimes fairly critical coverage of cars but could succumb to an enthusiasts viewpoint. Consumer Reports helped navigate dubious advertising, unsafe proflducts, and helped people access what products were worth spending money on and how much. They covered the whole spectrum from appliances, household cleaning products, insurance, literally anything a household would spend money on. They were the grandmother telling you to save that quarter and not blow it on penny candy, and advising on what products wouldn’t rip you off or injure you when the time came to spend.part.of those saved quarters. I’m somewhat astonished they still exist given the state of print and people’s reluctance to spend for online content. What used to be exhaustive long form reporting is now short and soundbitish. I don’t know how many people rely on them now but clearly it’s enough to keep them going.
I still subscribe; I get the print magazine but tend to use the website more. I don’t particularly like the simplified format of either, which has washed out some of their analytical sophistication. They also haven’t kept pace with the times in some respects. For example, I would like to see more testing of environmental toxins in products and more criticism of gas-guzzling automobiles. Indeed, they seem to tilt toward appealing to yuppies. Even so, every once in a while I need to buy something and I have found their rankings to be at least a useful starting place.
The print magazine is no longer distributed through retail channels (book stores, newsstands, etc.). It is only sent to subscribers who request it. Individual print issues can be purchased through the magazine’s website. That is how I purchased the 2025 Annual Auto Issue.
The Edsel had no chance of being a ”good car” any better than it being a” good looking car ” Ford in the 1950’s was a Dantesque swirl of powerful men and egos and thier factions . At the top Henry II below him Ernest Breech- then the Whiz Kids battling like gladiators – cold ruthless Lewis Crusoe and then MacNamara – a force of his own – now making his precsence felt. OF course MAc Namara hated the Edsel and stated ”just give me a Ford and a few hundred bucks and I will make it whatever you want it to be”. The villians here at Breech who was past his usefulness and Crusoe who rushed the Edsel through ignoring the many questions. Elsewhere was the Mercury part – the Lincoln Question the birth of the Continental and Thunderbird. With all that an E car wasnt needed. Breech and Crusoe shouldve grasped that – even with all of the nagging MC Namara. OF course MC NAmara was correct and he finally put his imprimatur over the whole of Ford. A Ford and Mercury basically sharing the same body which was good sense.
. The Falcon whose importance cant be overstated and most of all – no untested new name and model to muddy up the waters. A gorgeous Thunderbird which promised to make money and fame – finally he saved Lincoln and the Continental franchise. REmarkable for a man they said was not a ”car guy”
Well, technically, it sounds like Bonsall did not, in fact, defend the Edsel at all. It sounds rather like the magazine pointed out some truths he found uncomfortable (especially since the 1959 fared better by the same team at CR), which triggered his personal attack on the staff.
“The most curious aspect of Bonsall’s dismissal of Consumer Reports was that he didn’t question the accuracy of its Edsel assessment. His was purely an ad hominem attack on the magazine.”
Attacking the credibility of a witness strikes me as a time-honored tactic of attorneys who recognize that their client doesn’t otherwise have a very good defense.