(EXPANDED FROM 10/3/2023)
Stephen Pellegrino has sparked a debate about the value of automotive brands by arguing that Hudson, Nash and Rambler were worth saving. His punchline is that “brand names mean something, and the intangibles they represent can be hard to duplicate once they’re gone. And when they’re gone, it’s almost impossible to revive the names once again” (2023, 2025, original italics).
I have some sympathy for his view, particularly when applied to a smaller automaker. Building a strong brand can take lots of resources invested over many years. During the postwar period that was more easily done by larger automakers because they had deeper pockets. Yet even the Big Three had trouble establishing new brands, such as the Edsel and Imperial.
In just 12 years American Motors killed off not one, not two, but three brands. This required the automaker to establish replacement brands. The resources spent on them could have arguably been better invested in improving marketing or keeping their products up to date.
So am I agreeing with Pellegrino that none of AMC’s brands should have been killed? Not necessarily. Auto executives still need to be realistic about whether a brand is viable. A good example was Plymouth. From 1978 until its death in 2001 — 23 years later — the brand failed to offer any high-volume products that were not thinly disguised Dodges, Chryslers or Mitsubishis. Keeping alive this brand was arguably more costly that eliminating it. In addition, doing so would have made possible the long-overdue step of consolidating redundant Dodge and Chrysler-Plymouth dealer networks.
Why the Rambler was turned into a brand
Elevating the Rambler from a nameplate to a brand was apparently done for two reasons. First, because it would ease the consolidation of Hudson and Nash dealer networks after the two automakers merged to form American Motors. Second, at that point Rambler was far more popular than either Hudson or Nash, whose sales were in such steep decline that resale values were weak.
The most obvious alternative would have been for Rambler to have been continued as Nash’s compact nameplate while Hudson was given its own version. For the sake of discussion, let’s call it the Jet.
This scenario might have been plausible if the Jet had enough differences from the Rambler — such as sportier models — to carve out a distinct market niche. However, even the full-sized Hudson was not differentiated enough to do so.
Perhaps just as importantly, maintaining parallel lineups could have delayed consolidating Hudson and Nash dealer networks, which was arguably essential to increasing the automaker’s shaky economies of scale.
American Motors got around the problem of fielding two compacts by elevating Rambler to a brand and selling it at all dealers. That also allowed a unified marketing effort rather than separate ad campaigns for the Jet and Rambler.
Elevating the Rambler to a brand did undercut the viability of Hudson and Nash because they could no longer offer lower-priced models. Even so, they could have still been kept around as boutique brands with a narrow range of models. That’s essentially what Pellegrino says was the better way to go.
What’s in a name if the car is badge engineered?
Pellegrino argues that Hudson and Nash could have helped the automaker better compete in mid- or full-size fields. For example, the Rambler Ambassador might have sold better if it had a more prestigious brand name.
“When you’re spending a little over $3000 for a car once a few optional extras are added on, you want something that will impress the neighbors,” Pellegrino (2023) argues. “Despite the Ambassador’s added length and slightly better trim, most people will see it as just another Rambler. And Rambler is perceived as being a low-priced, economy car.”
Was that necessarily true? As a case in point, in its early years the four-seater Thunderbird was quite competitive sales-wise with high-end Buicks and Oldsmobiles despite being given a plebeian Ford badge (go here). What arguably most mattered was the caliber of the product.
Why would a Hudson and Nash have been perceived as more prestigious than a Rambler if it didn’t have more sheetmetal differentiation and features than an Ambassador? Absent that, their brand equity would have quickly evaporated.
How could Hudson and Nash have been positioned?
That question becomes more difficult because we’re talking about two brands with similar market positioning. Do you give each brand a more distinctive market niche or ditch one of them? And if you do the latter, which brand goes?
This would have been less of a problem if the 1956-62 Rambler body had been more flexible. Nash might have focused on a luxurious four-door sedan and wagon while Hudson highlighted a sporty two-door hardtop and convertible. The latter wasn’t a great option because the Rambler body was too tall and boxy to be competitive, particularly once the industry switched to low-slung bodies.
Also see ‘Automotive News treats Gerald C. Meyers’ tenure at AMC with kid gloves’
That said, let’s assume AMC did field a broader range of body styles and gave both the Hudson and Nash at least somewhat distinctive styling. Would it have been worth the added costs? Perhaps even more importantly, given AMC’s close brush with bankruptcy in 1956-57, could the automaker have afforded a more ambitious product range in the 1958 model year? I suspect not.
One might also question whether American Motors was being too ambitious to try selling a compact car in the $3,000 range. The Rambler Ambassador’s pricing was somewhat higher than Studebaker’s poor-selling President models. In addition, the Studebaker-based 1957-58 Packard was priced higher than the Ambassador and sold in even more modest numbers. If a prestigious brand name was such a big deal, why didn’t Packard do better?
Pellegrino is right about AMC’s disregard for branding
All this is a long way of saying that AMC head George Romney made a reasonable decision in killing the Hudson and Nash brands. However, he could have done more to preserve useful elements of Hudson’s heritage by offering a sporty Hornet model to go along with the Rambler-based Ambassador. The 1957 Rebel was a good blueprint for such a model (go here for further discussion).
On the other hand, Pellegrino was right to question killing the Rambler. While reasonable people can debate whether it was beyond redemption as a brand, it strikes me as a no-brainer that Rambler should have at least been kept around as a nameplate for AMC’s compact sedans and wagons.
Why? Because it would have been cheaper to update the Rambler’s stodgy image than throw away its hard-earned name recognition.
Pellegrino also quite rightly complains about other AMC decisions, such as naming the Rambler’s replacement the Hornet. That nameplate was much better suited to a sporty coupe like the Javelin than an economy compact.
By the same token, Pellegrino criticizes the identity crisis AMC created by introducing the Matador. That was the second name change for the automaker’s mid-sized models in only five years. Might sales have declined less precipitously if they had kept the Classic nameplate (go here for further discussion)?
Pellegrino is on to something by pointing out the importance of branding in the auto industry. However, there are times when it is appropriate to let a brand die — regardless of how cherished it might be by car buffs.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on Oct. 3, 2023 and expanded on Nov. 11, 2025. Prices, specifications and general historical background from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006) and Gunnell (2002).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Pellegrino, Stephen; 2023. “CC Formerly For Sale: 1958 Ambassador – Something For Nash And Hudson Loyalists To Buy in ’58.” Curbside Classic Posted Sept. 2; updated on Aug. 4, 2025.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcaradvertising.com: Packard (1957); Plymouth Sapporo (1980); Rambler (1956)
- oldcarbrochures.org: AMC Ambassador (1971); AMC Hornet (1970); AMC Matador (1971); Hudson (1957); Rambler Rebel (1957)
Going Classic to Rebel to Matador was pointless. But keeping Nash and Hudson around was also pointless. There was differentiation between AMC Nash and Hudson bodies, rather more than between the South Bend Studes and Packards. Obviously they still looked similar, but there was a family resemblance in the Ford, GM, and Chrysler lines. AMC did what they could with the resources they had. There were too many mid-price/premium brands then. AMC gave it their best shot, and Nash and Hudson sales plummeted.
Interesting to note then VAM (Vehículos Automotores Mexicanos), a company who built AMC models in Mexico, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vehículos_Automotores_Mexicanos still used the Rambler name until it was sold to Renault. They kept the Classic nameplate instead of rename it Rebel and Matador. There’s some interesting photos on this Spanish site. https://www.clubramblermexico.org/historia-vam.php
And the Hornet was also built Down Under in Australia as the Hornet and badget as a Rambler.
https://www.tradeuniquecars.com.au/feature-cars/1304/ami-rambler-review-aussie-classic
https://oldcarbrochures.org/Australia/Australian-Motor-Industries/1970-Rambler-Hornet-Brochure/index.html
I have the same thought about this that I do about whether Chrysler could have done something better to differentiate Plymouth and Dodge after separating the dealer networks. I think one could have maintained two brands and networks for essentially the same lineup if one brand was oriented towards the conventional Detroit pricing model of low advertised base price and lots of options while the other brand offered a value proposition by following the Japanese model of high levels of standard equipment and little in the way of options.
Spot on!
I think A.M.C.’s terrible results for both 1955 and 1956 should have the impetus to end both Nash and Hudson production as early as the fall of 1955 rather than delaying the end of both of those brands in the summer of 1957. There is nothing in the model-year 1956 that would have convinced Romney not to go forward with axing Nash and Hudson. 1956’s fiscal results almost cost Romney the chance to save A.M.C.
If Lynn Townsend had truly wanted to fix Chrysler, in my opinion, the last Plymouth would have rolled off the assembly line at the end of the 1961 model year, with the Valiant becoming a Dodge and Chrysler dealerships selling only Chryslers and Imperials. After all, the brand name of Plymouth was selected by Walter P. Chrysler for 1928 because it was familiar to farmers: Plymouth Binder Twine.
I wonder if Romney didn’t axe the big Hudson and Nash earlier partly because it took awhile to integrate Hudson and Nash dealers. In addition, according to Patrick Foster’s biography of George Romney, there was resistance within the company to a compact-only lineup. So Romney may have felt like he needed to consolidate his power before going in for the kill.
One other factor was that in 1956 American Motors was teetering on the brink of insolvency. The big Hudson and Nash sold poorly, but they still added up to almost 25,000 units — and those were relatively high-profit cars compared to the compact Ramblers. Meanwhile, the rushed-to-market redesign of the Rambler resulted in production delays that presumably cost AMC sales. Perhaps this could have been counterbalanced by Romney keeping in production the 100-inch-wheelbase Ramblers, which would have given the automaker cheaper entry-level products . . . and compact two-door models.
Another option would have been to move the Nash and Hudson to the new Rambler platform in 1956, somewhat like American Motors toyed with doing in 1958 but instead came out with the Ambassador.
Chrysler would have looked like it was in dire straits if they killed both Plymouth and DeSoto in the same year. That would place them with AMC in the public eye as a secondary discount brand. Dodge and Plymouth grew more alike in the ’70s and ’80s so I would place the cutoff at 1971.
I feel that AMC didn’t have a broad enough line to sustain the Nash, Hudson and Rambler brands. Nor two brands. One Nash Ambassador does not make a brand. And the Rambler name was seen as dowdy in the swinging Sixties so I can’t fault AMC for ditching it. But the Seventies and Eighties were a more austere time and the name might have been more pertinent if applied only to the Hornet. As a model name, not a brand.
“When you’re spending a little over $3000 for a car once a few optional extras are added on, you want something that will impress the neighbors,” That attitude is what bankrupted GM. Establish one solid brand name and let the higher end cars throw prestige down on the lesser ones. Both Ford and Chevrolet practice that mantra now.
If they kept the Nash and Hudson nameplates any longer, the AMC executives could drive their 1959 Nashes and Hudsons to bankruptcy court.
The Rebel could had been named the Hudson Hornet
The same with the Ambassador, as Nash Ambassador
All the three cars (the same Rambler with three wheelbases) should had been sold of course at the same dealership
Last but not least, why the small Rambler (when AMC finally had avoided the bankruptcy and had the funds) didn’t have the design of the bigger cars? Like what BMW did and does with the 3,5 and 7 series
“From 1978 until its death in 2001 — 23 years later — (Plymouth)failed to offer any high-volume products that were not thinly disguised Dodges, Chryslers or Mitsubishis. Keeping alive this brand was arguably more costly that eliminating it.”
You’d think Chrysler would have learned what happens when you carry badge engineering too far…BMC’s experience was all too clear by that time. (For that matter, GM didn’t learn anything either, based on their own excessive badge engineering in the late eighties/early nineties).
I think much of the problem were the state dealer franchise laws. How Ford eliminated Edsel dealers so fast is probably a case study of great crisis management and the strategic planning of Robert McNamara who was never on board with the Reith five-brand FoMoCo. Romney needed to transfer his 1956 Rambler to Hudson and Nash dealers and did so in a way that did not put Hudson dealers in a position where they could go after the corporation for violation of franchise laws. If long-time Nash and Hudson dealers wanted to leave the fold, it was on them.
Does anybody know about why the British car companies maintained so many brands of the same basic car (usually differing in engines and trim – interior and exterior dependent on price)? It even extended to Rolls-Royce / Bentley !
I think after 1961, badge engineering proliferated because G.M., Ford and Chrysler could not manage their dealer bodies, so if one division got a platform, the other divisions wanted a variant (and usually got it).
The British car companies suffered from lots of mergers, internal competition among the makes that were formerly rivals but now competing for corporate attention (MG vs. Triumph being just one example), strikes, overlapping dealership networks…
Kind of like the US independents!