A reader recently contributed a good question for our “Story Ideas Bank” — Why was the new-for-1955, Nash-based Hudson not successful?
After all, the reader noted, the Hudson “had up-to-date and pleasant styling with a Ferrari-inspired egg-crate grille that was even nicer than the 1955 Chevrolet, AMC’s Weather Eye HVAC systems with optional air-conditioning, Nash-developed interior comfort, and a choice of Hudson, AMC or Packard powerplants.”
One reason why only 20,321 big Hudsons were produced for the 1955 model year may have been because they were not introduced until late February (Foster, 2022). That translated into only nine months of sales before the 1956 models were unveiled at the end of November 1955. If you extrapolate Hudson’s output to 12 months, it could have jumped to around 27,000 units.
Also see ‘How would a facelifted Hudson have fared in 1955?’
That would have been less dire, but it still would have represented a 26-percent decline from the already disastrously low production of the 1954 big Hudsons. Meanwhile, in 1955 output soared 46 percent for the U.S. auto industry as a whole and 57 percent for the Big Three’s premium brands. Something was clearly wrong with the 1955 Hudson that went well beyond the number of months it was produced.
The Hudson was overpriced in more than one way
Our reader wondered whether one factor in Hudson’s decline was that it was overpriced compared to brands with “hotter styling.” That argument has some justification, although more than looks may have been an issue.
Also see ‘Would Hudson have been Packard’s best merger partner?’
The entry-level Hudson Wasp series had list prices in the same ballpark as the bottom end of other premium brands such as Oldsmobile, Buick and Mercury. However, the Wasp’s 114.3-inch wheelbase gave it a stubby look compared to the rest of the field, where wheelbases ranged from 119 to 122 inches.
In addition, the Wasp only came with a six, whereas everyone else in its price range sported a V8 as standard. Aside from corporate sibling Nash, the only other premium-priced brand that even offered a six in 1955 was Dodge. Yet even its lowest-priced V8 listed for around $100 less than a Wasp.
To make matters worse, for 1955 the Wasp was given a smaller six from the compact the Jet. Even Consumer Reports stated that the 202 cubic-inch, L-head powerplant “barely gives adequate power by today’s standards” (1956, p. 187). That undercut Hudson’s performance image.
Hudson’s new V8 engine was expensive
For 1955 Hudson offered a V8 purchased from Packard, but less than 31 percent of total production came with that engine. Tellingly, more Hornet buyers opted for the old-but-legendary six than the V8 in 1955.
Also see ‘Why V8 engines were less important in the 1950s than commonly believed’
This may have partly reflected the loyalty of returning Hudson customers, but a higher price may have also mattered. The V8 models listed for around $80 more than a Hornet six once you added the cost of an optional automatic transmission. The V8’s price included a standard automatic.
Hudson’s least-expensive V8 model, a Hornet Super four-door sedan, was priced at $2,825. Even when you factor in the cost of the automatic transmission, that put Hudson in fairly rarified territory. For example, a comparably-equipped, mid-level Oldsmobile Super Eight-Eight cost $157 less.
Was Hudson in an unstoppable death spiral?
Indie Auto commentator Kim Margosein (2022) suggested that by 1955 the car-buying public had “seen a dozen or so independent makes leave the car business or the nameplate merged out of existence. The car companies would enter a death spiral of low sales limiting funding for updates, ads, etc leading to even lower sales. By the end, the wonder is not why so few were sold, but why so many.”
Also see ‘1948 Hudson step-down was a brilliant car with tragic flaws’
Hudson certainly displayed the signs of a downward spiral. As a case in point, even if its 1955 full-sized cars had increased output by the same amount as its Big Three competitors, that would have amounted to only 65,000 units. This would have been 59 percent below Hudson’s postwar high in 1949 of 159,100 units.
The above graph shows Hudson’s steep decline from 1952 onward. Note that the brand’s entry-level big cars (successively called the Super 6, Pacemaker and Wasp) saw the most dramatic fall in output. As the 1950s progressed, the top-end Hudsons held their own much better than the rest of the line. That reflected the relative popularity of the high-performance Hornet, which was introduced in 1951.
Hudson’s trajectory wasn’t all that different from 1952 onward than its closest competitors among the independent automakers, Nash and Packard. They all saw their sales tank in a remarkably short three years.
The numbers look similarly catastrophic when it comes to market share. In 1949, the above-three brands plus Kaiser-Frazer captured 22.4 percent of the premium-priced field. By 1955 their share had dropped to 6.9 percent.
Also see ‘Five (arguably) unresolved mysteries of postwar independent automakers’
As sales fell, dealers either died or switched to more profitable franchises. And as production levels slipped below an independent automaker’s breakeven point, that generated negative press coverage . . . . which led to greater public fear about buying a car that could become an “orphan.” So sales fell further. Thus, the death spiral.
GM was sole beneficiary of the independents’ collapse
The key thing to remember about the crash of the independents is that General Motors was the sole beneficiary. From 1949 to 1955, both Ford and Chrysler saw their share of the premium-priced field drift downward by a combined 4.3 percent. Meanwhile, GM’s share jumped from 43.7 percent to 63.5 percent. That increase was more than Chrysler’s share of the field in 1955, which was 18.4 percent.
Also see ‘1955-56 Chryslers: ‘Forward Look’ wasn’t as successful as sometimes assumed’
GM’s dominance of the premium-priced field may be most easily seen on the graph below. Output for Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick collectively increased from around 1 million units in 1949 to a peak of almost 1.9 million in 1955. That’s almost double!
During that same time period, Ford and Chrysler output increased modestly (by 10 and 14 percent, respectively). That wasn’t nearly enough to keep up with GM.
Of course, the early-postwar boom in premium-priced cars would go bust in the late-1950s. But before that happened all of the independents had been pushed out of this field.
Could American Motors have better handled Hudson?
I would suggest that the 1955 Hudson wasn’t given a distinct enough market niche in terms of pricing, styling and features. The car looked badge engineered even though it carried over a few unique features from previous years, such as a “Triple-Safe braking system” (Langworth, 1993).
It’s true that designers were under severe time constraints to get the Hudson to market. However, both both time and money were wasted giving the car a surprising amount of unique sheetmetal. Here is one situation where graphic add-ons could have been the better choice.
It also might have made more sense to put all Hudsons on the longer 121-inch wheelbase, drop the Wasp, and offer a somewhat lower-priced Hornet with the big, 308-cubic inch six. Presumably nothing could be done to lower the price of V8 models, but they could have been given fancier trim to better justify the cost.
The sales potential of all of these changes could have been neutralized in 1956 if Hudson had gone ahead with the disastrous facelift shown below (go here for further discussion).
Would Hudson have died regardless of what AMC did?
Even if AMC had not bungled the 1955 Hudson’s transition to a Nash body, the brand may not have been savable anyway. A few years later company head George Romney was arguably right to kill both the Nash and Hudson.
Also see ‘George Romney offered insights about his AMC years’
Romney scavenged at least some brand equity from Nash by repurposing its Ambassador nameplate as a luxury compact. As we have discussed here, a similar strategy could have been used to field a Hornet sporty compact. That would have broadened AMC’s overly narrow lineup.
Unfortunately, Romney seemed to be more interested in absorbing Hudson’s dealer network than salvaging at least some of the brand’s enviable reputation for performance, safety and engineering innovation.
NOTES:
Production figures and body specifications are from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Consumer Reports (1956); Gunnell (2002), Wikipedia (2013) and Automobile Catalog (2023).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International; Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Consumer Reports; 1956. “Lower-Medium-Priced Cars.” April issue: pp. 185-187.
- Foster, Patrick; 2022. “Testing the Theory: American Motors in 1955.” Collectible Automobile. December issue: pp. 8-19.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Hyde, Charles K.; 2009. Storied Independent Automakers: Nash, Hudson, and American Motors. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1993. Hudson 1946-1957: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI.
- Margosein, Kim; 2022. Commentator in “Readers brainstorm ideas for future Indie Auto stories.” Posted 10:52 a.m., October 31.
- Wikipedia; 2022. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Page last modified Jan. 26.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Buick (1955); Chrysler (1955); DeSoto (1955); Hudson (1955); Nash (1955)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Buick (1955); Hudson (1955, 1956)
The 1955 Hudson was simply too late to the marketplace, too expensive vis a vis Dodge, De Soto, Oldsmobile 88, Pontiac, Mercury, and the surging Buick Special, and one brand too many in a marketplace facing expanded model range and the availability of luxury options in every middle range full-size cars. I believe if state dealer franchise laws had been different, Romney would have killed Hudson and Nash after 1955. Too bad, as I rather like the ’55 Hudson.
As a collector of Packard cars, when I was offered a 1955 Hudson with the Packard V8 and Ultramatic, I bought it. It was all original and presented well enough to take to some car shows, and one of the most common statements I heard from the public was “It looks like a Nash”, often said with a negative slant. I suspect one of the bigger reasons for the 1955 drop in sales was the Nash connection, especially from prior Hudson buyers who didn’t want a Nash [or what I’ve heard many people call a “Hash”].
One other thing to consider was the other car in the Hudson showroom for 1954-56 that bore Hudson emblems: The Metropolitan. For the first model year of AMC [1954] having the Hudson and Nash cars together in the same showroom was okay. By 1955 You had Nash-based and Metropolitan cars as the only vehicles in a Hudson showroom bearing Hudson name plates. As more and more dealerships became dual Nash and Hudson dealers, parked side-by-side it was obvious to the public that both Hudson & Nash were based on the same chassis/body. Changing the little Austin-built car to the Metropolitan brand was wise, but it was too late — the public called them “Nash Metropolitans”, and many Americans in their 70s and 80s still do.
Studebaker-Packard showrooms thru 1956 showed 2 different lines of vehicles, and it was clear What car was Studebaker, or Packard. But for the 1957 model year, on walking into a S-P showroom, it was obvious all the 1957 cars there were made in South Bend. Total Packard sales dropped to around 4,000 cars for ’57.
I’ve owned 1957 and ’58 Packards too. Even 20 years later, Back in the 1970s when I would drive my ’57 Packard Clipper to a Packard club show, they often suggested I “park it over there” instead of with all the Detroit-built Packards. A couple of times when I took the ’55 Hudson to a Hudson club event, I got a similar comment.
Back then the cars were treated as an embarrassment by the die-hard Hudson and Packard guys. Now 40-50 years later, they are welcomed by the car clubs and the general public as part of each Marque’s history.
Bill, I would guess you were dealing with two different cultures. Between my father and I we owned about 8 Corvairs in the 70s. We, especially my father, were cultist. Back in the day these one make events were run by such cultists. Now you are dealing with collectors who are dealing with a nameplate. You want to blow their minds, see if you can get a hold of the Packard badge engineered 1959 Stude pickups that were exported to Argentina.
Great article as usual Steve. Comments also insightful, with Bill putting a finger on one of the problems: Hudson and Nash buyers since 1949 had chosen their preferred brand. To expect the former to happily switch to the latter was perhaps misguided. Kim’s comment about the death spiral was also a painful reality.
The Nash body was imho, not nearly as compelling as the Step-Down despite the latter’s dumpy sedan greenhouse. An important factor between the ’54 and ’55 Hudson was an almost 2-inch difference in height. This was a big deal back then, where every inch mattered.
An opportunity for Hudson would have been to extend the rear overhang to the rear-mounted spare’s bumper position. It would have been costly but would have given the car needed length and sweep.
To Steve’s question of whether AMC could have better handled Hudson, I would add this question: Could Hudson have better handled Nash? Specifically, could Barit instead of rolling over, have better handled Mason, with the outcome being the Step-Down body and Hudson manufacture as AMC’s large car strategy.
Nash could have used the 119 chassi while Hudson used the 124. The shared body would have needed a few changes, the first being to add a 4-door based on the Hollywood’s hardtop, to move away from Hudson’s old fashioned 2-1/2 box design. It could have been offered in pillared version and possibly as a hardtop if the articulating rear windows were able to fully roll down in the existing Hudson rear doors. For the hardtops the beltline would have needed to drop down to just above the bodies outward bulge, to make the car look more modern and open up the interior.
Nash’s fully underhood, low cost A/C could have been integrated into the cars, and maybe Packard’s V8 and Ultramatic could have been waved, AMC holding out until its new V8 arrived in ’56.
Still not a good situation overall but the Nudsons might have sold better than the Hashes. New bodies would have been needed for ’57, a tall order.
Paul, Hudson’s Ed Barit has commonly been represented in automotive histories as a hard bargainer in his negotiations with Nash’s George Mason. The problem was that he didn’t have much room to maneuver given Hudson’s dismal financial condition. My sense is that it wasn’t so much a merger of equals as it was Nash trying to salvage some assets from a dying Hudson.
It would have been cool if the step-down could have been modernized enough to stay in production, but I don’t know if that was possible without costly revisions. And unless those revisions were already in the pipeline in 1954, they couldn’t have been introduced by the beginning of the 1955 model year. Mason was right to insist on immediately consolidating the big AMCs onto one platform produced at the Kenosha plant; to do otherwise would have been too costly.
The step-down was a fascinating design but had meaningful flaws, such as inboard rear wheels. In addition, by 1955 the cowl was too high and the deck too short. None of that was easily fixable. Hudson presumably could have done so in 1953, when it instead blew its last wad of money on the Jet.
Whatever else one can say about the Nash body, it was relatively modern. With less weird stylistic details and better market positioning the Hudson and Nash could plausibly have done better in 1955-56.
It’s too bad Dick Teague wasn’t head of AMC styling at that point. His approach at Packard may have been derivative, but it was well executed (go here for further discussion).
Let’s take a look at the two Hornets side by side. The top images are the ’55 and 54. On the bottom, the ’55 has had its roof crown lowered per ’57 while the ’54 has had its beltline lowered.
https://forums.aaca.org/topic/377724-74-matador-x-what-if/#comment-2424395
From a financial perspective its not exactly apple-to-apples. The starting point would need to be a ’54 Ambassador Hardtop versus the ’54 Hollywood shown.
In other words, the ’55 Hornet has already had a million or more spent to tool it, while the ’54 Hornet on top has had nothing done to it yet. Pour that same money into it and any number of things could have been changed in addition to the lower beltline. And a 4-door version could have fairly easily been created.
Both cars have worthy attributes. Of some importance, the Hudson had demonstrated an ability to drive higher pricing. It’s biggest problem in Hollywood form was, I believe, less rear legroom than the sedan or ’55 Hornet. But install a big Packard V8 and I bet folks would have wanted to drive it.
Here’s the correct link:
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/1916145088_1955HudsonHornetHollywood121.25andHudsonHornetHollywood124bingochart.jpg.e6776c20b1d92f95666d25ba7563b5e4.jpg
In the book, History of Hudson by Don Butler, there is a photo of the car Hudson had planned to offer for 1955. It is the Stepdown with a front that looks like the one featured on the real 1955 Hudson. The greenhouse has been modified (less crown in the roof, and a more upright rear window), but the car is still quite obviously a facelifted Stepdown. I doubt it would have sold any better than what Hudson did offer for 1955.
We have a story that draws out the scenario of the step-down staying in production in 1955 (go here). Included in the story is a link to a sketch of the proposed notchback. Be forewarned that you will never unsee that picture.
The real 1955 Hudson looks much better than that proposal.
I’ve always thought that the 1955 Hudson was a good-looking car – much better than that year’s full-size Nash, let alone the 1956 and 1957 Hudsons. I saw a 1956 Hudson two-door hardtop parked under a carport in Carlisle, Pa., this past weekend. It doesn’t look any better in real life than it does in the photos.
For very little cost and effort Hudson could have offered a 4-door pillared hardtop for 1954 that was a lot better looking than that ’55 sedan sketch.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/1767766036_1954HudsonHornetHollywood4-DoorPillaredHT124WB.jpg.57fa212742c887daafb35701d7431648.jpg
Here’s a version of the ’54 Hornet with brightwork on the B-pillar, and below it a ’55 4D hardtop with the beltline below the greenhouse lowered. I’d take this ’55 over the ’55 N/Hashes in an instant. GM was still selling high hoods through ’56 so Hudson would not have been alone.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/447320072_1954HudsonHornetHollywood4DPillaredHardtopand19554DHT.jpg.871dac18651b7bd7ffb9cfb197ed916b.jpg
When Hudson talked to Packard around August, 1953 to propose merger, had they included these intended cars as part of their proposal, and demonstrated line-of-sight on minimal losses for ’54 and breakeven for ’55 were they to include Packard’s V8, they might have given Nance pause a few months later when Colbert told him that Packard had to be out of Conner by the end of the year (which was quickly extended a year).
Now Nance would have had to consider an alternative strategy:
– Cancel the $8M makeover of Contour.
– Launch the V8, Twin-Ultramatic, Torsion-Level and integrated A/C in the existing Packards for ’55.
– Add a pillared 4-door hardtop to the Senior line.
– Deemphasis and eventually sunset Clipper.
– Terminate production at Conner at the end of 1954.
– Do an all-new shared body with Hudson for ’56 that Hudson would engineer and build, with Step-Down and possibly Monobilt (in full or partial form).
– Use the Panther show car as appearance starting point, with Spring lobbying unsuccessfully for his Italia theme but perhaps getting some of his progressive design features approved.
– Continue Jet and Italia production for the time being and entertain a future high-volume personal coupe using the platform.
Nance would have benefited from an industry-knowledgeable, penny-pincher like Barit to help guide him in matters involving Operations, and both companies needed each other’s dealers.
I omitted one element, and a significant one at that! Packard would need to set up a Conner lease deal with Chrysler to get them through 1955, with production terminating at the end of 1955 rather than 1954. Had Packard not been able to secure this lease the whole thing would have fallen apart.
A best case scenario for Packard and Hudson would have been for both to merge in January of ’54, with the big public event including a reveal of newly launched 4-door hardtops that would help save that year’s financials and make both divisions more competitive in ’55 with the arrival of the V8. The key is that to enable all of this they needed to figure the new body style all by themselves, with no schooling from GM. That’s what Independent success looked like in the auto industry at that time.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/1814757422_1954PackardandHudson.jpg.b62a17e996a457c5fd7423455bb194a9.jpg
Some clean-up of those hardtops.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/436074801_1954PackardandHudson4-DoorHardtops.jpg.89b5495381b3083e081e1a2a3f2458a4.jpg
With a new Packard-Hudson Corporation, Mason could have turned his attention to Studebaker. The timing might not have worked but if it had, the Statesman could have become the new President and Champion could have used Rambler’s body. South Bend would get the same hatchet job that Mason gave Jefferson Avenue but at least the 259 and 289 V8s would have continued.
If it had to be Nash that supplied the bodies, it is instructive to study DeSoto/Chrysler/Imperial for 1955 because they shared many parts. In fact, the DeSoto and Chrysler used the same body, externally differentiated only by front fascia, taillights, rear bumpers and side trim. The Imperial sat on a longer wheelbase, which for the sedan dictated longer rear doors and a longer roof. Imperial hardtop shared its roof with DeSoto/Chrysler so instead had longer body sides aft of the front doors (dies of which were probably used to create the shorter DeSoto and Chrysler panels), and a longer end panel between backlight and trunk. All Imperials had a unique front bumper too. In all, it was a very efficient, and rather shrewd strategy on Chrysler’s part. When AMC bragged that almost all of the ’55 Hudson’s body panels were new, from a profitability standpoint it was nothing to brag about.
These image work-ups show one way that AMC could have teed up its ’55s. (AACA)
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/1904496953_1955HudsonHornetvsNashHudsonPackard.jpg.c28b5f3a31332582e77bff6467d99328.jpg
The car on top is the starting point: a 1955 Hudson Hornet with rear mount. Its key dimensions are a 121.25-inch wheelbase, which is 10-inches longer than Hornet without rear mount, and a 219.25-inch OAL. Height is an uncompetitive 62.25 inches.
Consider the next three cars bodies in white, with each getting appearance differentiation front, side and rear per Chrysler’s strategy.
The first car is a ’55 Nash Ambassador, now on the shorter 114.25-inch wheelbase. Total length is 202.25-inches. Basically, its a ’55 Wasp body with fender skirts. It might have been stubby looking but at least it was balanced front to rear, whereas the longer hood version made the rear look that much stubbier. And it would have been an easier car to park and garage.
Would the big OHV Six have packaged? If not, the Statesman Six would have had to suffice until the 250 CID OHV V8 arrived. Two trims could have been offered to bring the entry price down. Maybe the low trim could have been called Statesman and the high trim Ambassador.
Ditto the Hudson Wasp/Hornet body below it. Here the 7-inch longer axle-dash is used, and the same length added to rear overhang to maintain balance. The 308 Six would stood in until the 327 V8 arrived.
Had Packard joined, its differentiation could have been through a a longer body, for class-leading rear legroom. Adding 5.75 inches to the front doors would have brought the wheelbase up to Packard’s traditional 127 inches and balanced the front and rear door glass width, which went away with the wrapped windshield. The lengthening strategy need not have been excessively costly, the front door outers being trimmed versions of the 2-door panels. And the Nash/Hudson roof dies could have been used to create longer Packard roof, with overlapping front and rear halves stamped and then welded together. The rest of the car’s unique appearance would have been per Chrysler’s strategy.
My mistake on where the Imperial’s four extra inches of wheelbase versus Chrysler came from. It was not the rear doors, it was the front doors. They probably started with the coupe’s front door outer stampings and trimmed them.
For 1955, AMC needed to stop goofing around with expensive junk design and get serious about running their business profitably. They spent way too much money on tooling that hurt rather than helped their cause. Am getting the impression that Mason presented Nance with a garbage proposal for Packard. Egos notwithstanding, it is likely there was little in it wrt product that got Packard excited.
I don’t know what kind of money AMC was working with, but a glaring hole in their lineup was full size station wagons and convertibles. An interesting thougnt for a halo model would be if possible dropping the big Packard engine in the Wasp body as sort of a proto rebel. Call it the Hornet, and think up some other name for the big Hudson.
Kim, your suggestion for a big engine the Wasp hardtop would have created quite the… buzz. Packard only made available its smallest V8 to AMC and in detuned form, but if the big 352 Caribbean engine could have been somehow been acquired, and with manual transmission… wow! Scary fast.
You would have something of a 300 fighter. Perhaps play around with the trim and two tone paint to make it sleeker looking.