(UPDATED FROM 6/26/2020)
The Saab 99/900 proved to be the box that crushed the tiny Swedish carmaker. I grant you that this platform was hardly an immediate failure. Even so, the design of the 99 and its modestly changed successor, the 900, was the single biggest mistake that Saab had control over.
The key problem with the 99/900 was that Saab stepped away from what made the brand so unique. That tends to be the key factor in the decline of such a small carmaker.
The weight of one decision proved unbearable
Carmakers rarely die because of one decision. Usually a series of choices made over years or even decades gradually constrict a company’s future options to the point where only a miracle can keep death’s door from swinging open.
The smaller the company, the larger the shadow that an individual decision may cast. Paul Niedermeyer (2011) has noted that Saab was so marginal that it created only two distinct platforms during its 60-year lifespan. According to Wikipedia, the 92/93/96 was produced from 1949 to 1980, and the 99/900 from 1968 to 1993.
Those are extraordinarily long production runs compared to those typical of Big Three passenger cars. During the post-war era all but the lowest-volume models received major redesigns within seven years. That put equally extraordinary pressure on Saab to anticipate customer tastes and technological change more than a decade down the road. Management failed to do so. Repeatedly.
The Saab 99/900 lost altitude too quickly
Saab’s greatest strength had been advanced design. Yet the 99 did not jump far enough ahead of its competitors to remain viable through its life cycle. By the same token, Saab was unable to carve out a clearly defined niche in a similar fashion to Porsche, Range Rover or Jeep. By the 1980s Saab’s products were both long in the tooth and dangerously confused as to what they stood for.
Of course, the 99 was not an immediate market failure like the advanced but fatally flawed NSU Ro80 (Severson, 2012). For a while Saab sales even increased. But in the end, the 99/900 crushed Saab’s long-term prospects as a passenger car producer.
One good platform deserved another
The 92/93/96 platform did a good job of getting Saab going in the car business. Adopting front-wheel drive was a key decision. This gave Saab a unique selling point — better bad-weather traction — that fit quite well with the carmaker’s snow-bound Swedish heritage.
Saab’s aerodynamics may not have been as compelling of a feature, but they gave the car one of the most iconic looks of the post-war era.
The 92/93/96 never sold very well in the U.S. even though it was a more modern and versatile car than the highly popular Volkswagen Beetle. Well, least once Saab ditched its two-stroke engine. That didn’t occur until 1967, when the party was almost over for the Beetle. No wonder that a press release from that year projected only 12,000 U.S. sales (Saabnet.com, 2013). In contrast, VW sales shot past 450,000 (further discussion here).
Saab had the potential to solidify its foothold in the U.S. market with the 99, which was introduced in the fall of 1968. Here was a chance to build on Saab’s strengths while broadening the brand’s appeal.
Saab wisely decided to go upmarket
The 99 was a size larger than the 96 and the first Saab available as a four-door sedan. Competitors included the Alfa Romeo, the small BMW and the Volvo 140 (Niedermeyer, 2013).
The late-60s and early-70s were a transition period for niche import brands. Whereas prices for entry-level cars rose modestly, they increased sharply for fancier models.
For 1969 a single Saab 99 model – a two-door sedan — was introduced in the U.S. with a list price of $2,899. Over the next few years a number of other models were added, included a four-door body style that sold for $3,795 in 1972. This price increase was in line with its nearest competitors, whose prices were now comparable to lower-premium U.S. models such as the full-sized Dodge and Pontiac.
Shifting upmarket was a good move. Saab arguably lacked the economies of scale to continue competing in the lower rungs of the market. Low volume necessitated a higher profit per vehicle. However, entering a new field was not without its risks, as NSU quickly found out.
An innovative box is still a box
Let’s start by looking at the positive aspects of the 99’s design. It was a more innovative design than that of its Swedish rival Volvo, whose 140 came out in 1966 (Wikipedia, 2021). The 99 carried over Saab’s still fairly exotic front-wheel drive. In addition, the 99’s basic shape was more aerodynamic than most passenger cars of the late-60s and early-70s.
The 99 was given a number of notable features over its life cycle. These included floor-mounted ignition lock, a heating duct leading to the rear window, side-impact beans, headlamp washers and self-repairing bumpers (Wikipedia, 2021). Perhaps most important were turbo-charged engines. General Motors considered this to be a signature feature after it bought a stake in Saab in 1989 and gradually switched to a product range dominated by reskinned Opels.
Lance Cole argued that the 99 “was one of Saab’s finest achievements” and that without it the automaker “would never have survived” (2012, p. 164). In a narrow sense this is true — the 96 needed a more modern replacement. And the 99 did prove to be a somewhat more visionary design than many of Saab’s contemporaries.
Nevertheless, the 99 was both figuratively and literally a more “in-the-box” design than the 96. For one thing, Saab did not offer any new technological breakthroughs on par with front-wheel drive. The boxier shape also translated into a drag coefficient higher than the 96 — .37 versus .32 (Saabhistory.com, 2007).
The 99 was too heavy and unaerodynamic
The 99’s external dimensions were closer to those of the Alfa Romeo Berlina and BMW 2002 than the Peugeot 504, Volvo and Audi 100. One might assume that a smaller footprint and front-wheel drive would give the Saab a weight advantage.
Oddly enough, the opposite was the case — the 99 was the heaviest of the bunch. Most notably, the Saab was 200 pounds heavier than the Audi 100, which was one of its first U.S. competitors to use front-wheel drive.
By the late-70s Saab had lost much of its competitive edge. Front-wheel drive was increasingly common and aerodynamic styling was only a few years behind. Instead of looking futuristic, Saabs were merely weird.
Meanwhile, the 96’s styling DNA was largely thrown away. At first glance you couldn’t tell whether the 99 was a Saab except for the grille’s faint family resemblance to the 96. That was a dangerous waste of brand equity; Saab was so small it could not afford to reinvent its basic look.
In short, Saab ran away from its uniqueness. The 99 didn’t look like a Saab. And, unlike its predecessors, the 99 didn’t offer major advancements that could keep the car ahead of the pack. This one-two punch would eventually crush the tiny automaker.
Yes, but: The counterargument
You could argue that the 99’s more conservative design was inevitable. The 92 was among the most visionary cars of the early post-war era. What major breakthroughs could Saab have developed that topped front-wheel drive? And, as NSU found out with the Ro80, too much innovation could backfire. The Ro80’s rotary engine suffered from chronic reliability issues.
One could also argue that the 99’s boxier body reflected Saab’s understandable desire to offer a roomy family car. Aerodynamic designs can intrude upon rear seat and trunk space because of their greater curvature. The 99’s relatively flat roofline was designed with a wagon in mind, although one was never offered (Wikipedia, 2021; Cole, 2012).
In addition, the 99’s angular contours better fit the dominant design fashion of that era. Even Citroen, another leading post-war disciple of aerodynamics, adopted a boxier profile for its SM (Wikipedia, 2021).
Also see ‘Citroen SM: A surprisingly conventional next step’
The SM, which was introduced in 1970, offered a few aerodynamic features such as glass-covered headlamps. However, the overall look was surprisingly conventional — even vaguely Americanesque. Indeed, Citroen is an example of how almost all smaller automakers were reinventing their stylistic DNA during the Vietnam era. Most became more mainstream.
These are all reasonable points. They are also colored with Detroit groupthink. Might we take the risk of crawling outside the box?
Following Porsche and anticipating Subaru
Compare Saab’s approach to that of Porsche’s when the 356 was replaced with the 911 in the mid-60s (Wikipedia, 2013). No one would confuse a 911 with its predecessor — this was a much more modern car. Yet the 911 was clearly a Porsche, with its iconic swept-back front and teardrop rear end.
I don’t see any technical reasons why Saab couldn’t have gone a similar route. Keeping the Saab look did not require a slavish adherence to the past. For example, decent space utilization could have been achieved with a less-pronounced curve to the 96’s roofline and a more kammback rear.
If Saab had stayed the course stylistically, it could have entered the 1980s with one of the most aerodynamically advanced cars on the market.
By the same token, the Swedish automaker could have maintained its leadership in bad-weather traction by pioneering four-wheel drive. At that point only Jensen, the tiny British sports car brand, offered this feature on a passenger car (Wikipedia, 2021). Subaru’s future market niche could — should — have been Saab’s.
A corollary to the above is that Saab should not have tried to compete in the sporty coupe field against BMW when it could have created new niches. This is what Audi did with its sporty yet practical Quattro (Wikipedia, 2021).
Such a strategy would have entailed different priorities when it came to body styles. For example, adding a wagon — in two- and four-wheel drive — would have made much more sense than a convertible.
Saab crawled further into the box with 9000
The final nail in the coffin was the 9000. Cole has described the car as “brilliant” and “encompassing all the crucial aspects of the Saab car ethos and the Saab spirit” (2012, p. 201). That sounds like the fawning praise of a fanboy.
Although the 9000 did possess some interesting features, the overall car was so lacking in a unique value proposition that it was gone within 13 years. This just wouldn’t do for such a tiny carmaker.
One could partially blame this on Saab sharing a platform with Fiat, Lancia and Alfa Romeo. However, few body parts ended up being interchangeable (Wikipedia, 2021; Cole, 2012). This should have given Saab at least some room to offer a more distinctive design. Instead, the 9000 was a generic box of a car with a few Saab styling flourishes added on.
Also see ‘Should Saab have come out with a retro 96 in the 1990s?‘
When GM took over Saab it did a decent job of protecting the brand’s look and feel. Unfortunately, the focus was on superficial stuff such as the kidney grille, floor-mounted ignition and turbocharged engines.
Saab could have been let loose to experiment with innovative ideas, but that happened only around the margins.
Even when it came to all-wheel drive, Saab was late to the party. GM seemed to see the brand as little more than a “retro” styling exercise. Or a European Oldsmobile of sorts.
Saab’s survival was less likely than even Volvo’s
Niedermeyer (2013) has argued that “Saab was an iffy proposition from the get-go” and its death was inevitable. In general, he strikes me as being overly negative about the potential viability of independent automakers. However, his point is well taken. The smaller the automaker, the less room for error. By mass-market standards, Saab was exceptionally tiny.
The graph below shows Saab’s challenge. The 99’s arrival helped worldwide sales almost double by the mid-70s. Even so, from 1959-82 sales never cracked 100,000. In contrast, Volvo’s sales almost reached a quarter million units per year by the 1970s. This resulted in better economies of scale.
To a greater degree than Volvo, Saab needed to consistently think a few steps ahead of its bigger competitors. It failed to do so with the 99 and 900. The automaker dug itself an even bigger hole with the 900’s emphasis on convertibles and turbo hatches targeted at BMW.
Did Saab require super-human management?
The leaders of independent automakers should not be expected to possess super-human abilities. That means their companies may eventually be too small to bounce back from short-sighted decisions by mere mortals. We could thus view Saab’s death as a normal part of the business life cycle.
However, let’s end with a caveat. Some independents wisely focused on utilitarian niches slow to change, such as delivery vans and, until recently, trucks and off-road vehicles. This is a big reason why Jeep survived longer than independents that focused on passenger cars. Building a financially sustainable automaker may not always feed the fevered dreams of sporty car enthusiasts.
That said, Saab might have survived longer as an independent maker of passenger cars if it had stayed outside the box.
NOTES:
This is an updated version of a story that was originally posted October 5, 2013 and expanded June 26, 2020. Sales figures, prices and dimensions were drawn from the Standard Catalog of Imported Cars, 1946-1990 (Flammang, 1992). Comparison of Saab and Volvo sales focuses on 1959-82 because that data was most complete. Prices for the 1972 Volvo 142 range should be treated as approximate; Flammang only provides one set of prices for the 1970-74 model years.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
Cole, Lance; 2012. Saab Cars: The Complete Story. Crowood Press, Wiltshire, UK.- Flammang, James M.; 1992. Standard Catalog of Imported Cars: 1946-1990. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 2014. “1956-73 Saab 93, 95, and 96: Unconventional Swedish Autos in the USA.” Collectible Automobile, April: 63-71.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2011. “Curbside Classic: 1968 Saab 96 — Healing The Emotions, If Not The Company.” Curbside Classic. Posted July 14; accessed Oct. 6.
- ——–; 2013. “Saab: The Eulogy.” Curbside Classic. Posted May 15; accessed Oct. 5.
- Saab History; 2007. “Aerodynamics of Saab automobiles.” saabhistory.com (website offline).
- Saabnet.com; 2013. “1967 Saab Proress in America.” (sic) Accessed Oct. 6.
- Severson, Aaron; 2012. “Rotary Revolution: The NSU Ro80.” Ate Up With Motor. Posted Aug. 24; accessed Oct. 5.
- Wikipedia; 2021. Audi Quattro, Citroen SM, Jensen, Porsche (356, 911 classic), Saab automobile (96, 99, 900), Volvo 140. Accessed Oct. 29.
The third-generation 900 launched in the early ’90s only as a sedan and with a V6 option instead of a turbo, at the same time as the 5-door Chevrolet Malibu Maxx. I said at the time that one was the best Chevy that Saab ever made and the other was the best Saab that Chevy ever made. A couple years later they came along with the 9-7x “Trollblazer”.
Right. Saab was not an ideal fit with GM’s mass-market sensibility.
Saab would have had to maintained closer ties with Triumph beyond the Slant-Four engine Triumph 1300-derived gearbox used in the 99 in order to benefit from 4WD, like a further development of the Triumph designed system used in the Pony / Dragoon as well as used by Triumph in rallying.
Both parties could have also benefited from a joint-development of a sub-99 model to directly replace both the Saab 96 and FWD Triumph 1300/1500.
https://www.canleyclassics.com/?product=pony-4wd-gearbox
I have to disagree pretty much entirely with this analysis.
I was a rabid Saab fan of the 92-96 era and saw the 99 as a near perfect sequence. Odd looking to Joe Sixpack, perhaps, but thoroughly Saab in execution. Its dimensions and weight, rather than drawbacks, was an attempt to position it for future evolution by a maker clearly unable to upgrade platforms like the big boys. Indeed, the 99 platform turned out to be too weak as the 900 sought competitive HP and speed yet it did provide the interior space expected of a premium car. The problem with all Saabs was lack of manufacturing scale to find and eliminate weak points. The 900’s reputation for being in the shop all too often was its major drawback. The only thing that kept it alive for so long, despite this reputation, was brand loyalty and cachet, factors that you claim were lost in the transition. Ironically, if Saab had been RWD, like most of its competitors in your chart, the reliability problems could have been attended to more effectively, given the simpler drive train.
Norm, welcome to Indie Auto. You make some good points, e.g., I have always found Saabs intriguing but never bought one because of their reliability issues.
That said, I would suggest that the factors I brought up in the article are worthy of consideration. What’s so controversial about saying that Saab might have found more buyers who looked past its reliability issues if the brand offered products you simply couldn’t get anywhere else? Or that a wagon was better suited to the 99’s basic design than a convertible?
I don’t think that Saab had the scale to even try to compete with the “big boys,” such as in the high-performance sweepstakes.
I agree that Saab survived as long as it did partly because of brand loyalty. However, Saab clearly didn’t develop a large enough base of support. And frankly, what’s so controversial about suggesting that Porsche had the right idea of maintaining more stylistic continuity than Saab did with the 99?
Hello again Steve,
Didn’t mean to suggest that Saab should have gone RWD, only that its competition enjoyed a better reliability reputation by sticking to the more traditional design.
You put a lot of emphasis on aerodynamics and certainly the 92 was that in spades. I am guessing that Saab needed to appeal to big spenders, for whom efficiency was not a priority, whereas performance and open top driving was.
Thanks for your reply. Look forward to more of your articles.
Yeah, I get your irony, although it didn’t fully register with me until after I posted my comment (so I edited it out).
The fundamental challenge of historical analysis is that we can’t do a lab experiment and test out each potential variable. All we can do is work with whatever data is available and then offer our best speculation, which will all but inevitably be colored by our life experience, values and whatnot. So thank you for at least entertaining my speculations.
Lance Cole here – he of whom you accussed of being a fawning fan boy.
Nope mate, I owned a 9000 and it was a great drive and great to own. I clearly cited its non- saab origins and somewhat shared underpinnings in my Saab book but reached a conclusion that despite its compromises it was ‘brilliant’ in the context i made clear. Please dont throw your opinion of me – as a fact – when it is just your opinion – to which you are entitled of course- but your opinion is an opinion. Facts are rather more nuanced. And i reckon we are in agreement about Saab – they threw away their brand foundations of the 92-96 series and put their egg in one basket. Imagine if in the 1970s Saab had recreated the 96 as a sort of Alfa Sud crossed with A VW Golf ? Theyd have sold a million at least. Anyway, bon chance, but do try to avoid the personal insults.
Thanks for stopping by, Lance. Since you’re here you might also wish to take a look at my mini-review of one of your books (go here).
I’ve taken another read of your 9000 chapter and come to the same conclusion that I did in my story. Of course, it is an opinion — this being a journal of opinion. And you’re free to disagree.
Your idea of a cross between an Alfa Sud and a VW Golf sounds quite intriguing.
With the Sixten Saxon proposal on page 132 in mind as a smaller more direct replacement for the 96. Perhaps in the event BL never came to be Saab if they were inclined could have collaborated with Triumph on this Harry Webster project below to develop not only a joint-Alfasud/Golf model to make use of the unutilized 1200-1600cc Saab-Triumph engines beneath the 1709cc, but also possibly an even smaller Polo supermini model as well using the same Triumph engine at one time tested for the 96 before it lost out to the Ford V4?
Could see the Alfasud/Golf model with a similar Saab 99 and Toyota Tercel type longitudinal arrangement, short of the engine receiving the thorough redesigns it was said to have received to mount it transversely in the 9000 and 900 NG.
With the supermini idea it is difficult to see the above layout being carried over to the smaller car (though Volkswagen of Brazil did look at Polo type model known as the 1980 BY Project* based on the Gol platform), could see a layout and other elements being more along the lines of Harry Webster’s involvement with the ill-fated ADO74 project at BL that carries over the Herald / 1300 engine or an updated development of the former to reduce costs.
https://www.aronline.co.uk/opinion/triumph-supermini/
In this scenario Reliant of all companies would have also likely drawn closer to Triumph soon after buying Bond Cars in 1969, motivated by Bond Car’s pre-existing deal with Leyland that involved access to its international dealership network and servicing facilities in return for using the latter’s initially mainly Triumph-derived componentry for its cars (instead of sticking with Ford after the formation of BL scuppered plans) as well as striking a deal with SAAB via Jonas Kjellberg on his plan to design, engineer and assemble a new SAAB Sonett IV for the 1970s built alongside the Reliant Scimitar GTE.
* Volkswagen BY Project – https://motor1.uol.com.br/news/385161/vw-by-subcompacto-abaixo-do-gol/ (Portuguese)
There are several significant flaws in the article, not the least of which is its extreme US focus.
The logic that someone buying a 96 in 1968 will be a buyer for a 900 in 1985 doesn’t bear scrutiny.
What is sadly true is that Saab would not survive without a technical and production partner, and they tried that with the Type 4. GM was never a good fit, and when you compare the investment Ford made with Volvo ( which had much older heritage engineering than Saab) with GMs badge engineering approach, you’ll probably find the truth behind the company’s demise. GM saw the amazing engineers at Trollhattan and wanted that tech for other GM brands, but never allowed Saab to do its best work for itself. This became obvious when GM could have sold what was left of Saab, but wanted to hang onto the technology.
IMO, the second generation 9000 was Saabs best ever car, and it compared very favourably with contemporary offerings from BMW., MB, etc.
GM starved Saab of development funds which meant a NG900 couldn’t compete against an E36 BMW though a c900 was superior in most ways to an e30 320.
The writer has cherry picked data to prove his point with 20/20 hindsight.
Very sadly, all moot now.
Dan, Indie Auto’s focus is on the US auto industry. This is also a journal of opinion. You might want to read the “Introduction” to get a better sense of what we are — and are not — all about.
I don’t know where you got the idea that the story suggests that “someone buying a 96 in 1968 will be a buyer for a 900 in 1985.” That’s not what I argued. I did point to the need for more design continuity between the 96 and 99/900 akin to Porsche’s approach. What’s so controversial about that?
It’s entirely fine that you think the 9000 was Saab’s “best ever car.” We like what we like. However, at least here in the US the 9000 did not save Saab. I argue that the car didn’t have a clearly enough defined niche, so it faded into obscurity.
This website focuses primarily on automotive business strategy. A car like the 9000 can have wonderful attributes (such as in its engineering) yet still fail to keep a small automaker viable.
I also have to disagree with the analysis. Saab was never in a position to compete with major automakers. But as a niche maker, they couldn’t survive on one model either, and they ere living on old tech. So Saab made a car so unique in terms of design and technology in the 99, and later, the turbo, that it was able to carry the model for another two decades. The car set precedents in many different areas. It’s such a foreign and uncommonly read observation that the 99 and 900 were too traditional that it almost reads like a foreign language…or someone who hasn’t thought out their position.
Saab’s numbers increased at about the same rate when the 96 was introduced as they were increasing before the 99 was introduced, but the 900 eventually allowed Saab to ride a multiyear crest of over 100k sales…not too bad for a one-model niche brand.
The 900 2 door combi hatchback model might be one of the most recognizable profiles at-a-glance there is. Name 9 cars that have a more distinct silhouette at first glance. Even those who have never seen a 900 before recognize it as unique, all these years later. I can think of the 911 and a few others…and we all know how long the 911 was around and how often it was ridiculed for not changing. Calling the Saab shapes a box is as credible and meaningful as calling it a sphere.
Occam’s razor would suggest that Saab failed for the same reasons many other niche automakers did: there is either niche or mainstream. One only needs to look at VW or Subaru to see what they had to lose in terms of niche appeal to reach and survive in the mainstream market. And today, 900 turbo and SPG values are climbing pretty swiftly.
The 900 did a pretty nice job of prevailing as a niche maker line with a one-model lineup with some variations for about two decades. Your article contrasted with the scores of recent reviews describing the virtues of the classic 900 illustrates that it was successful in that it’s not for everyone.
Steve, am trying to understand what type of vehicle Saab would have offered as the decades progressed. Are you suggesting for example, that Saab in 2000 would have officered basically a larger, 4/5-passenger version of the 2000 Honda Insight? If so, would it have had a hybrid engine like the Honda did? Which vehicles would it have been priced similar to and how many cars would Saab have likely been selling per year?
Looking back from today’s perspective where we witnessed the market shift to compact and mid-sized crossovers, would your vision of an ideal Saab strategy shift too, or do you feel that the aero coupe model (and wagon version?) would still work? Or would it be an aero 4 or 5-door vehicle of compact size?
Regarding the Porsche 911, would it and the company still be around had Porsche not also begun offering SUVs?
Paul, are you asking about Saab in 2000 as an independent? If so, that would have depended on what they already had going. As my story argues, Saab had already screwed themselves up with the 99/900 and the 9000. They may have been too far gone to go it alone. And once they tied up with someone else, what they did would have depended on how their lineup fit into the parent company’s.
Of course Porsche needed to get into SUVs. The question is how did they get to the SUV era. I have argued that it was by 1) focusing on a narrow range of market niches and products that could be produced for an exceptionally long period of time to maximize economies of scale and 2) zealously cultivating one’s brand DNA. Even today’s Porsche SUVs have elements of the original 911’s styling.
Yes Steve, as an independent. And one who had followed your line of reasoning in terms of product, from the time that they only had the 96 to the year 2000. What would Saab’s showroom have looked like through these years if there had been no 99/900/9000 and GM acquisition. Just the products that you believe would have been vital, and ballpark volumes and pricing, or simply company size using a similar car company as comparator. I think you have something and I am trying better understand what it is.
I find myself hesitant to stretch a Saab counterfactual to the year 2000 if the automaker had stayed independent the whole time. It may be helpful to know why. Indie Auto’s counterfactuals are somewhat controversial among automotive historians, e.g., one of my articles was even rejected for publication elsewhere. The reason why is that historians — both professional and armchair — are quite rightly inclined to ground their analysis in facts whereas counterfactuals must inevitably engage in speculation. Thus, I try to keep my speculations as close as I can to “the facts of the case.”
For example, I feel entirely justified in arguing that AMC could have gotten a lot more bang for its buck if it had taken the roughly $108 million it spent on the 1974 Matador restyling and 1976-77 Pacer line and instead invested it in updating the Hornet and moving all of AMC’s passenger cars onto that platform over the second half of the 1970s. Note how my counterfactual operates within the time period when AMC was still functioning rather than extrapolating 10 to 20 years into the future.
So with Saab all I can really do is fall back on the basic elements I introduced in the story. A second-generation 96 should have had more evolutionary styling that was industry leading in aerodynamics. It would have made sense to move up a size class/price class but not so much as to compete directly with Volvo, who might have been needed as a merger partner someday. The new Saab body’s weight could have stood to have been lighter for its size, albeit not so much as to jeopardize its crashworthiness. The body styles offered should have tilted more toward long-term practicality, e.g., offering a station wagon rather than a convertible. And the addition of four-wheel-drive variants by the early-70s could have helped Saab carve out a more solid, long-term market niche than trying to compete against BMW with sporty coupes. Not that turbos were a bad idea, but that they weren’t enough to carry the automaker when it came to unique selling points.
My guess is that this strategy could have put Saab in a stronger position as it entered the 1980s. And once it was time for a new-generation body, Saab should not have bumped up to the 9000’s size — and shared a platform that too heavily compromised the uniqueness of Saab’s basic body architecture.
Would that have been enough for Saab to have stayed independent into the 1990s? I don’t know. With the rise of the Japanese automakers, Saab certainly would have needed to improve the reliability of its products. Perhaps a tie-up with Subaru might have been helpful. But what I think what would have been most interesting is if Saab had maintained its commitment to advanced engineering rather than just replaying old hits. So by 2000 Saab should have had something new to say about aerodynamics, the recyclability of parts and the elimination of toxins in interior components. No-dicker sticker prices and other distribution innovations would have been worth considering.
I would imagine that more than one reader would be underwhelmed by this laundry list. Which is fine. My key goal here is to get folks thinking outside the box. How could a car company of that era have provided a clear alternative to the standard fare available? What would you put on the list?
Excellent!!! Very thought-provoking and instructive.
I too have been a fan of a Subaru-Saab tie-up ever since their brief collaboration that led to the 2005 Saab 9-2X. That car didn’t have nearly enough differentiation with the Subaru Imprezza hatchback that it was based on but it did signal the opportunity. The later, aborted Subaru Tribeca-based 9-6 took that opportunity even further though I think the Saab version would have been better served had it been a 5 rather than 7-passenger crossover with a faster, Saab-like rear. I think the I/P for both was actually driven by Saab rather than Subaru design DNA, and it might have been that the whole car was designed first to be a Saab, excepting the grill/fascia.
https://www.motorauthority.com/news/1063368_the-subaru-tribeca-based-saab-9-6-crossover-that-never-was
I definitely believe the 2008 Imprezza hatchback was designed to look like a Saab inside and out, again excepting the grill/fascia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subaru_Impreza#/media/File:2007_Subaru_Impreza_(GH7_MY08)_R_hatchback_(2015-07-09)_02.jpg
Interestingly, Subaru also had its fling with aerodynamics, first with the 1985 XT and then with the follow-up SVX, both of which has an impressive 0.29 Cd. More Saab similarities…
Upon closer inspection those I/Ps look more Subaru than Saab.
I don’t get it.
I’ve owned a 900, several 9000’s, many 95’s and currently an NG 95.
I love them, I’ve tried the rest and they just don’t sparkle.
When Ford bought Volvo a team was dispatched to Sweden. The dialog went something like this. Ford ‘ you will use the Ford system’. Volvo ‘when you make cars a well as we do we will consider it’.
Ford team went back to Detroit and told of Volvo’s heresy, the Ford executives admitted that they had a point, leave them be. Ford slowly infiltrated with systems over time.
When GM got SAAB, unfortunately SAAB rolled over, that’s the nub of it. the GM parts bin killed SAAB especially the 94 SAAB 93, a wishy washy transition. Its the bold steps that sets cars apart, the SM is one of the most beautiful cars ever made, top of my wish list.
Mark
Mark, Ford got lucky with the execs attitude toward Volvo. I gather though that Volvo was in much better shape. The primary purpose of a giant buying out a niche maker like SAAB is to introduce economies of scale into their lineup. Such economies will inevitably lead to the purchasing coming filling lineup gaps and model updates with badge engineered vehicles, At least it died before it hit full badge engineering Hell.
That came out garbled and I did read it before sending. The last two sentences should read: Such economies will inevitably lead to the purchasing company filling lineup gaps and model updates with (at best) mild sheetmetal revisions of vehicles from other divisions. At least SAAB died before it hit full badge engineering Hell.