(EXPANDED FROM 5/31/2023)
Joe Ligo’s six-part AMC series has completed its run on the Public Broadcasting Service and is now posted at AutoMoments on YouTube (go here). Documentaries such as this one can provide a helpful overview of automakers, but I also like to listen to primary sources of information.
A case in point is a presentation that former American Motors head George Romney made in 1994 at an AMC convention — a year before he died at the age of 88 (Wikipedia, 2025). The presentation was filmed by Paul Lehman, who broke it up into two parts and posted it on YouTube.
Romney, who went into politics after leaving American Motors in 1962, devoted a portion of his talk to public policy issues. However, earlier in his presentation he offered an insider’s perspective on the post-war American auto industry and how he kept AMC from going out of business.
Note that at the beginning of the first video a young Patrick Foster introduces Romney.
Romney offered high praise for his AMC predecessor
Romney lauded his predecessor, CEO George Mason, as a “real genius in this industry who has never been adequately recognized for what he did.” After World War II Mason predicted a growing need for smaller cars — and engaged in broad experimentation with four- and even three-wheeled concepts.
Mason was responsible for the original Rambler, which was unveiled in 1950. Romney saw prototypes of the car two years earlier, when he was being courted for two jobs — one as an assistant to Mason and the other as head of the Packard Motor Car Company. Romney said he chose to go with Mason because the compact Rambler looked to him like the car of the future.
Romney explained how he differed from Mason
In the second video, Romney discusses how his strategy with the Rambler had one crucial difference from that of Mason’s: Whereas Mason saw the Rambler as a supplement to American Motors’ big cars, Romney chose to focus solely on the compact car market.
This was partly because he saw significant growth potential for compacts. However, Romney also recognized the importance of maximizing economies of scale by narrowing the range of cars that AMC offered (see extended quote here).
In the video Romney argued that the Rambler could have continued to effectively compete against the Big Three and imports if AMC had maintained his basic strategy. Indeed, he goes as far as to argue that “American Motors would be one of the top, big automobile companies in this country today. But they didn’t do that” (go here for the extended quote).
That’s a pretty bold statement, but Romney had laid the groundwork for a corporate strategy not unlike that of Toyota’s, with its longtime emphasis on stolid but unusually good-quality products.
NOTES:
This is a story that was originally posted August 1, 2013 and updated on Dec. 18, 2020; May 31, 2023; and June 25, 2025.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Lehman, Paul; 2011. “George Romney at the Nationals, July 7-10-1994: Part 1.” YouTube. Posted July 7; accessed July 15, 2013.
- ——; 2011. “George Romney at the Nationals, July 7-10-1994: Part 2.” YouTube. Posted July 7; accessed July 15, 2013.
- Wikipedia; 2025. “George W. Romney.” Page last modified June 4.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Rambler (1956)
I attended this event (it was held at a restaurant located immediately off an exit of the Pennsylvania Turnpike). I bought a copy of Mr. Foster’s original AMC book, and had Mr. Romney sign it.
What still sticks in my mind is it was blazing hot that day, but Mr. Romney was wearing a shirt and tie, and he didn’t seem to be bothered by the heat!
While Abernethy did make make serious mistakes during his tenure, I’m not sure that simply sticking with Romney’s strategy was the answer. Note that AMC sales declined in 1964 – and that was with the line-up envisioned by Romney, which included an all-new American. And industry sales were booming in 1964.
Romney has said that Abernethy immediately “scrambled” his product and market strategy. I believe he is referring to Abernethy’s decision to offer the V-8 in the Classic halfway through the 1963 model year. In 1962, Romney had abandoned the strategy of using a longer wheelbase and a different front clip to distinguish the Classic from the Ambassador. The cars were differentiated by engine availability (the Classic offered only the six, while the Ambassador offered the V-8), exterior chrome and interior trim. That eliminated the need for the Ambassador to offer unique exterior sheet metal.
Sales of the Classic and Ambassador fell in 1964. The only deviation from Romney’s strategy was the availability of the V-8 in the Classic. That is not why AMC’s total sales fell that year (note that American sales increased in 1964, thanks to the debut of the all-new model).
Rambler sales were being attacked by the Mopar A-bodies and the GM A-bodies. The Plymouth Valiant and Dodge Dart, in particular, offered top-notch drivetrains and a superior chassis compared to the Ramblers, and the build quality was much-improved compared to the first generation A-bodies. The 1963 restyle was much more in line with the public’s tastes.
AMC sales would have still fallen after 1963, and ultimately the dealers, stockholders and business press would have been screaming at Romney to “do something” to reverse the sales slide by late 1965. Mild facelifts of the existing cars would have certainly saved on tooling costs, but would not have been sufficient to reverse the downward trend in sales. Dealers and stockholders would have demanded something to reverse the sales slide. They were not going to be satisfied with, “Think of all the tooling costs we are avoiding!”. (A constant refrain in business press stories about AMC’s struggles in the late 1960s was the steady shrinkage of the company’s dealer base.)
Also note that AMC still needed to spend money to stay competitive. Trunnions in the front suspension, vacuum-powered windshield wipers, non-synchro first gears in the manuals and the clunky, outdated Borg Warner automatic weren’t cutting it against the Mopar A-bodies and GM A-bodies, let alone the imports.
AMC was not going to be able to position itself as the domestic Mercedes – or even the domestic Volvo – as long as its cars sported those features. While Car and Driver’s roast of the 1964 American was somewhat over-the-top, even Consumer Reports was griping about the lackluster handling and outdated features of Ramblers by the mid-1960s.
Romney’s attention to tooling costs would have given the company more room to maneuver, but he still would have to contend with a sales slide after 1963. Modest facelifts of the 1963 senior cars, and 1964 American, weren’t going to be sufficient. And there still would have been pressure from the dealers on AMC management to enter new segments (pony cars, for example).
+1. Also, Romney did not successfully address Ramblers’ propensity to rust in his quality efforts, the aluminum 6 he introduced in ’61 proved to be unreliable, and his cars had a lasting image problem. As late as 1974, my mother refused to drive a Hornet Sportback which she otherwise preferred to the GM A body wagon we ended up with because she wouldn’t be caught dead driving a Rambler.
First person accounts have their uses in historical accounts, but one has to be careful about cognitive bias.
Sure about the rust? I don’t recall them being any rustier than their contemporaries. I do recall TV and print ads stressing the AMC rustproofing process in the Romney era.
All I know is the 1963 Classic and Ambassadors were a home run, especially against Chrysler’s Plymouths and Dodges and a hit with owners of older Ramblers. In my midwestern town of Whiteland and New Whiteland. Indiana, almost every existing Rambler owner bought a 1963 Classic or Ambassador. They were developed by Romney’s team before he left A.M.C. in 1962 for politics. The problem in my opinion was that the 1964 Classic, Ambassador and American were not truly competitive with the G.M. A-bodies and the 1964 Plymouths and Dodges, which was the result of Roy Abernathy’s product planning and lack of real development. Oh, and on the issue of rust, I believe A.M.C, was one of the first auto manufacturers to make aluminum muffers standard equipment.
Would A.M.C. have survived if Romney had not focused on the 1956-1957 Rambler and instead had put all of available resources into the big Nash and Hudsons ? If Packard and Studebaker could not survive on 1955-1956 sales levels, how could A.M.C with 121-inch wheelbase medium-priced cars with the same price-points as Chrysler, DeSoto, Buick, Olds, Pontiac and the Clipper ? As 1957 progressed, the Rambler was the right car as the “Eisenhower” recession killed big-car sales, proving Romney correct.,