CR stopped by to comment on our article, “1964 Studebaker: Brooks Stevens hammered final nail in the coffin.”
Absolutely this is a hatchet job on Brooks Stevens and a completely unnecessary and agenda-driven one at that!
Brooks Stevens didn’t drive the nail in Studebaker’s coffin, Sonnebend did, gleefully aided and abetted bt Byers Burlingame. The writer of this screed completely omitted the fact that Stevens paid for the three 1965 prototypes out of his own pocket.
There had been a program to build a subcompact four-cylinder car initiated by Harold Churchill and slated for 1962 introduction. The four likely was the trusty Champion six but shorn of two cylinders and fitted with overhead valves. A larger car was also planned, powered by the OHV Champion 6 with the 259 V-8 optional. The foundry had cast 15 of the four-cylinder blocks and one was built completely out and had more than 100 hours of run time on the dynamometer. Burlingame helped kill that project, convinced the Board to vote against it, even convincing Churchill himself to vote against it.
The upshot of this was “Church” was kicked upstairs to the board and removed from the presidency. This set the stage for the entrance of Egbert.
Stevens was on a ‘self-appointed mission’
Another facet of Stevens self-appointed mission to save Studebaker is that, like Churchill, Stevens also thought a four-cylinder subcompact would help the company, even after Churchill’s subcompact four had been killed. Stevens did this design at his own expense. It would have been a horizontally mounted four with front-wheel drive, named “Sparrow.” But Byers Burlingame, really even more than Sonnebend, was hell-bent on ending Studebaker auto production and Stevens’s four-cylinder project crashed into the same wall as Churchill’s.
Also forgotten today is that the U.S. economy went into a mini-recession in the wake of the assassination of JFK. Studebaker dealers had some 30,000 unsold 1963s in inventory that had to be sold at steep discounts, and that did as much as anything else to kill the sales of the 1964s. Apparently the writer here didn’t let the facts get in the way of his vitriol toward Stevens.
Additionally Studebaker was already offering four-wheel drive in its trucks, including the Champ. Four-wheel drive accounted for only about 2 percent of truck production. The idea that trucks in the idiom suggested by the author would have benefitted Studebaker glosses over the facts that at the time, sales of anything resembling modern SUVs (International Travelall, Chevrolet/GMC Suburban) didn’t sell in the volume Studebaker would have needed. Regarding the taxi business, Studebaker already offered the “Econ-o-miler” cab built on the 120.5″ wheelbase.
This is the worst article I’ve ever read at Indie Auto.
— CR
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CR may not be aware that Indie Auto is a journal of opinion. Of course I have a point of view! More curiously, he doesn’t acknowledge is that his letter does not present “just-the-facts” reporting either – his beef seems to be that I happen to hold a different opinion about Brooks Stevens than he does.
It was helpful for me to know that CR thinks that my take is “completely unnecessary.” I finally have permission to tackle the many other projects I could be working on rather than toiling away on Indie Auto. Thank you! But before I go, here’s my response. . . .
CR offers some interesting analysis about Studebaker’s final days, but I don’t think that his take is any more realistic than mine. For example, I doubt that Churchill’s proposed subcompact would have been viable if it had reached production – and the reported cost was so high that I can understand why it wasn’t built.
By the same token, although Stevens’s small-car ideas were interesting, I would question whether Studebaker could have come up with the money to build them even if the board had a commitment to staying in the automobile business.
Meanwhile, CR dismisses my basic argument with some tortured logic. For example, if four-wheel-drive vehicles sold so poorly, then how come Jeep managed to produce almost 121,000 units in the 1964 calendar year? That reached Studebaker’s reported breakeven point for passenger cars – and that breakeven point presumably could have been quite a bit lower with a slower-changing lineup of trucks, four-wheel-drive wagons and taxis.
In addition, Studebaker had a big advantage over Jeep and International – a greater dealer presence in suburban markets where growth would be strongest for trucks as the 1960s progressed.
CR also points to the sales of the Champ and “Econ-o-miler” as a realistic measure of what Studebaker could have expected if it switched from an emphasis in passenger cars. That’s silly. As a case in point, the Champ sold much more poorly than Studebaker trucks in the first half of the 1950s because it was such a horrible mish-mash of a design. That was fixable.
I don’t say all of this to change CR’s mind. If a 2,800-word essay was indeed the “worst article I’ve ever read at Indie Auto,” perhaps this website isn’t his cup of tea.
J stopped by to write: “This article was a joke, yes? Or are you simply ignorant to what occurred between 1950-1963? Compact trucks. 😂 hahaha This nonsense is as bad as the NYT.”
It’s nice to see J model how to make a sophisticated, fact-based rebuttal. Argumentation in America is alive and well.
However, to be responsive to J’s point, the entire Jeep lineup was relatively compact yet in 1964 production almost reached 121,000 units. Note that this was before Jeep even offered a V8 and almost half of its vehicles were equipped with four-cylinder engines.
Also note that Jeep’s 1964 production was higher than Studebaker’s annual passenger-car output from 1961 onward. To steal a line from Bob Dylan: Something is happening here but you don’t know what it is . . . do you, Mr. J?
In 1964 Jeep had the CJ and just started the Gladiator full sized pickup and Cherokee. They also had a plethora of military and government products. How much of their product line was government/commercial vehicles? It seems to me that the only fit for the suburban Stude dealers would be the Cherokee (is that the right name>) Although the Cherokee certainly blended well with the new Brook Stevens cars I think International would have been a better fit with a more extenive line of true SUVs including the Scout. A Cherokee with a sliding roof would be cool, though.
Now this is a little OT, but where were Jeep dealerships located? I understand Internatioal’s problem. Who is going to look for a personal vehicle where combines or dump trucks are sold? I get that. But Jeep? Pre-WWII Willy sold regular cars to regular people, and in the 1920s were a major player. Location should have been no proble.
You mean the Wagoneer — the Cherokee didn’t show up until AMC took over (go here). I would guess that a meaningful portion of Jeep production went to government and commercial vehicles, but on a certain level that was neither here nor there — it still kept the factory humming.
Jeep illustrates better than any other postwar independent that avoiding direct competition with the Big Three and finding niches that allowed exceptionally long production runs were the key to survival. In contrast, trying to keep up with rapid-fire restylings was a recipe for failure.
My impression is that one attraction of American Motors buying Jeep was that its passenger-car dealer network could considerably boost Jeep sales, particularly in suburban areas. Note that the major growth in suburbs was a postwar phenomenon, so even if Willys had held onto its pre-WWII dealer network — a questionable proposition — it would not have been in sync with demographic shifts.
Good point. Got me thinking. I remember two old Jeep only dealerships well into the70s in Chicago. They were neighborhood double wide storefronts with vacant lot a few doors away for other cars. There was formerly a third across the street from y high school but by the time I was there they were selling second ti9er British imports.
It’s always sad to see a storied marque exit the business, but we have to remember that the automobile business is just that…a business.
In 1963, Studebaker didn’t just need fresh models. Its production facilities were seriously outdated, and its dealer body was very weak. Building new facilities – or even seriously overhauling existing ones – is a huge commitment for a manufacturer. The Big Three had to do this in the 1980s and 1990s, and the expense was huge. A low-margin subcompact was not going to generate the profits necessary to support this endeavor.
Studebaker also needed to expand and grow its dealer body, which was another serious impediment to the success of any new passenger car.
Burlingame would have taken this into account when considering these proposals. He had a duty to the corporation’s stockholders, and by 1963, betting what money the corporation had left on a renewed effort to attack the North American auto market would have been a very risky move.
I’m also baffled by the claim that there was a “mini-recession” in the wake of the Kennedy Assassination. There may have been a brief slowdown in sales after the assassination that lasted through the (televised) funeral, but everything I’ve read says that 1963 and 1964 were boom years for the U.S. auto industry. At that time, the U.S. auto industry was on an upward trajectory that would peak with the 1965 model year.
As I said, it’s sad to see the end of a storied brand. I was sad to see GM shutter Oldsmobile, but the bitter truth is that the Sloan Brand Ladder had been dead for at least 30+ years before GM made that move. “Real” Oldsmobiles had been long gone by that point. The divisions had simply become marketing entities, and nothing more, by 2000.
I have read that when American Motors was considering whether to buy Jeep, some executives were concerned that the Toledo factory was too old and inefficient. My guess is that Studebaker’s main plant would have been in at least somewhat better shape because it had considerably higher volume in the early-postwar years.
A theory by one group of historians is that the Studebaker board was heavily motivated to pull the plug on automotive operations in order to get out from under pension obligations. Whether that’s true or not, the Studebaker board ended up having a very different attitude from American Motors’ board, which even after the sales collapse of 1977 still sought to stay in the passenger-car business — even if it meant tying up with a foreign automaker.
I agree that the “mini-recession” angle is baffling. The timing may not have been ideal for Studebaker, but overall sales figures for that model year suggest that other automakers did just fine. Simply put, the redesign of the family cars didn’t end up helping.
At that point nothing could help. Maybe that was Nash/AMCs secret. They took the risky moves doing the right thing at the right time, well, until the wrong moves at the wrong time.
Actually, maybe it did!
The corporation’s board decided to get out of the manufacture of autos and trucks and actually made moves in that direction months before December. When the doors closed at the South Bend final assembly, they actually had an attractive-looking, contemporary design in the Lark-type cars. Stevens’s “Different by Design” cars made on-going sales possible while dealers left of their own accord and liability was reduced.
If they had tried to sell products that looked like warmed-over ’63s, well, they very likely would not have had sales beyond handfuls in ’64 and even fewer the next – if there would have been a next year. Instead, they got to use up “old” mechanical inventory, stretch out the time for dealer cancellations and make the “story” of the move to Canada more plausible.
The Studebaker board was consciously avoiding putting non automotive assets at risk. The board wouldn’t approve borrowing on those assets.
How easy and effective could have been for Studebaker to produce body on frame fwd cars?
Just the 2 and 4 door sedans and wagons, not something like a fwd halo/ personal luxury coupe; the Toronado was a missed opportunity for Oldsmobile, instead for eg a fwd 88 (full series of its body types), which had the same wheelbase as the Toronado
All of this discussion thread forgets key parties to the Studebaker proceedings: THE BANKERS AND OTHER LENDERS !!!!! Who in their right mind would loan Studebaker for a major restyle, let alone a totally new line of cars ? Eisenhower saved Studebaker-Packard by forcing Curtiss-Wright into guaranteeing S-P’s military contracts, but 1963 was not 1956. Probably anything of value corporately was already mortgaged by S-P’s board to previous lenders !
I wouldn’t be inclined to give the Eisenhower administration a whole lot of credit for “saving” Studebaker-Packard in 1956 when its unwillingness to stop a brutal price war between Ford and Chevy in 1954 and its stripping of defense contracts from smaller automakers contributed to S-P’s mounting financial crisis.
Note that in the 1960s, Studebaker’s board of directors had a very different attitude than its counterpart at American Motors. Whereas Studebaker was focused on diversifying the company’s holdings, in 1967 American Motors shed non-automotive assets to pay for a shoring up of its passenger-car business. The main way that AMC diversified was to subsequently buy Kaiser-Jeep — a step that I have argued made more sense for Studebaker to have done (go here for further discussion).
Ironically while “JEEP” is a cash cow for every company, it always seems to leave the automotive part in shambles. Willys, Kaiser, AMC are gone. Chrysler/Dodge’s car lines are shadows of what they were, and Stellantis’ automobile line the US is a joke. I’m not saying it’s Jeep’s fault, but there seems to be a Jeep curse.
I suppose it comes down to whether one is superstitious or not. I would be more inclined to look at the “facts of the case,” such as that Jeep was repeatedly picked up by automakers with marginal passenger-car line ups.
For example, by 1953 Kaiser sales were collapsing and they had run out of money for a new wave of products. Buying Willys thus represented a good exit strategy. American Motors appears to have been primarily interested in augmenting its line up in the growing 4WD market, but Jeep did prove to be crucial in helping the automaker survive when it stopped being competitive in passenger-car fields. As for Chrysler, it had owned Jeep for quite a while before its passenger-car line up stopped being viable.
Given this trajectory, one could argue that the Jeep wasn’t a curse but rather the opposite — it proved to be a life saver for each of the automakers that purchased it. And in light of Jeep now being one of Stellantis’s strongest brands, management may look at it as anything but a curse.
To keep this game going, remember around the time Chrysler hooked up with Mitsubishi, M/B and then one or two bottom feeders that seemed more interested at the time in stripping the company for assets, IIRC. I am sure they will be happy with Jeep until the day they are taken over by Hyundyne or Weyland-Yutani. (: