We have a lively debate going on in the 1953 Studebaker comment thread, so I thought I would add to the discussion by quoting Thomas E. Bonsall’s take on the car. In the introduction to his book, More Than They Promised: The Studebaker Story, he reflected on the reaction to an article he wrote summarizing his research.
“It is my view that the product program taken as a whole was one of the worst conceived and executed in the history of the industry, and played an enormous role in destroying the company as a viable vehicle manufacturer. That article drew intense criticism from a number of Studebaker enthusiasts, primarily, I think, because it is almost impossible for many of them to reconcile their understandable love for this particular design with the catastrophic effect it had on the company” (2000, p. 7).
Bonsall argued that part of the problem with the 1953 models was the decision to impose the Loewy coupe’s styling cues on the taller sedans, which “turned out to be as unappealing as the coupes were stunning” (2000, p. 270).
If that had been the only problem, Bonsall thought that “the company may have been able to limit the damage. Alas, the engineering and manufacturing systems in place in South Bend turned out to be utterly incapable of handling the complex demands of building two different lines of cars at the same time” (2000, p. 270).
Studebaker could have gone out of business in 1953
A variety of manufacturing problems emerged that proved costly to fix and resulted in quality-control problems with early cars.
“As a direct result of this mushrooming nightmare, the company stumbled along for half the model year before it finally recorded its first monthly profit in April,” Bonsall wrote. Studebaker ended the calendar year with a profit of only $2.7 million — “none of it, significantly, from the automotive operations. The situation was far worse than even that, however, for many of the company’s expenses in 1953 had been amortized” (2000, p. 272).
The bottom line is that 1953 should have been a very good year for Studebaker but instead its “cash position fell to a crisis level” and the “company would have faced insolvency had it not been able to draw down a $100 million line of credit connected to its defense contracts” (2000, p. 272).
I suspect that Studebaker would have weathered the end of the postwar seller’s market much more gracefully if, in 1953, it had treated the Loewy coupes as merely show cars and instead come out with a conventional restyling of its family cars. As beautiful as the Loewy coupes were, they simply didn’t pencil out for such a small and financially fragile automaker.
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RE:SOURCES
- Bonsall, Thomas E.; 2000. More Than They Promised: The Studebaker Story. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Studebaker (1953)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Studebaker (1953)
The 1953 Studebaker redesign project was without a doubt a turning point for Studebaker and not in a good way. The two door models and the variants which followed were wonderful cars after the production bugs were resolved. The biggest problem was availability as the company focused resources on bread and butter four door and wagon models. The four door and wagon variants were certainly different looking in their day. Unlike the Detroit competition, their bodies looked smaller and lower. However, they didn’t catch on. But was it the result of a bad design and a problem plagued rollout or the work of evolving market forces? I would argue that even if everything went perfectly for Studebaker, the market was changing and independents were being frozen out.
The Lark rollout provides insights. Studebaker rolled out the Lark rather successfully using the same 1953 architecture, only to see sales slow as the big three entered into the compact market. Studebaker was on the wrong side of history in a shifting market both in 53 and in 60.
Perhaps the 1953s were too early. The 1953 redesign was the last major engineering project for Studebaker as all future products built until 1966 relied on the 1953 undercarriages with incremental improvements thereafter. AMC was able to hold onto its sales in the compact segment, which it essentially created, while Studebaker could not, though one might argue Studebaker was the better product.
Robert, I agree that the market was changing in a way that made it harder for independents to survive. That said, it’s interesting to see how the experience of American Motors and Studebaker deviated. For example, in 1954 Nash outsold Studebaker for the first time in years on the strength of the expanded Rambler line, which received a four-door sedan and wagon that proved to be quite popular despite fairly high price tags. And as you noted, once the Big Three introduced its first wave of compacts in 1960-61, Rambler sales continued to be strong — unlike Studebaker’s.
Why did this occur? Bonsall wondered whether part of the problem was that Studebaker relied too heavily on dealers that also held GM franchises, and when their brand got a compact they dropped Studebaker. I suspect that it also helped that Consumer Reports tended to give Ramblers (or at least the Classic) better ratings than the Lark.
Where I would most fault Studebaker is for not continuing to focus on the nascent “intermediate” class that the late-40s Champion had essentially pioneered. Beginning with the 1953 redesign the Studebaker body got too big, which left an opening for the Rambler (particularly once it was upsized in 1956). That would prove to be a solid market niche — and Studebaker could have been the market leader if it hadn’t gotten distracted.
I agree with a lot of Robert’s comments above.
A few more thoughts:
The independents, the little guys, were very vulnerable after the “sellers market” ended. The important loss of military contracts at a bad time, the “Ford blitz” fall-out, the cost of faster-paced updating of bodies and powertrains in the ’50s, rising labour costs, unpredictable volumes, strikes – we could go on, but the point is that it was ALL going on in the early and mid ’50s. When a “miracle” came along, it was a gift!
Studebaker had successfully produced more than one car line at a time before. The ’39-’42 Champions shared very very little with the contemporary Commanders and Presidents. By 1951,the bodies of Champions and Commanders were all the same – even the wheelbases. Of course there were different engines, transmissions, brakes, springs, diffs, etc for six and eight cylinder models (oddly, instrument panels too), but the bodies were identical as least as far as the casual observer was concerned. Good for the “bean counters”, l guess, but bad for marketing excitement.
When Bob Bourke conjured up the fantastic coupe, it let the corporation have an exciting and innovative new genre of postwar car, AND it would let them use the same engines, transmissions, brakes, steering, suspension pieces and just modified frames as on sedans! AND they could be built on the same line. Basically, only the bodies would be different. It was a wonderful marketing opportunity to lead the company into their next century. Maybe even a miracle! It was beautiful and it “made everything else on the road look 10 years older”.
So, of course the corporation went ahead! A new exciting car using major, major bits in common with sedans. A miracle! But Bonsal sees a “catastrophe”?
The independents certainly needed the occasional miracle to keep them even near the forefront of the industry.
True, the sedans did not exactly deserve equal enthusiasm , but they were widely praised (except for Bonsal who said “homely”) and better styled than many other contemporaries (Mr. Bourke said they were “not bad”- but l don’t know if there was an exclamation point or just a period after Bob’s comment)!
But the new body may have seemed “tinny” in comparison to the previous generation and turned some folks off. I get that. Although – it was just a couple of years hence that the bodies of all competitors got tinnier too. My friend, a former GM service manager said that the rear quarter sheet metal on a ’59 Chevy could rust through in about a year in the rust belt and sometimes two days were spent by Chrysler mechanics trying to solve water leaks on their ’57 products!
Steve, you recently praised the ’58 T-bird for sales of 38,000 in a recession year. Looking at ’59 as well, it sold just over 105,000 units in total for those two years. What a success for Ford everyone says! Fact: Studebaker’s “Loewy coupes” (which were the true postwar beginnings of the “personal car”, not the T-bird) sold just under 106,000 in total for the two years of ’53 and ’54. This during the Ford Blitz (thanks, “Deuce”)! And Bonsal thinks it was the “worst conceived and executed program in the history of the industry”! Well, the proof is in the salesroom. Why isn’t Studebaker praised for its sales numbers – that out perform a much larger manufacturer?
My “intense criticism” has made me feel better. It’s late. To bed!
The poor launch in 53 was due to poor management. The coupes were delayed because of badly fitting panels (like the later Avanti). Management was not able to meet the demand the coupes initially faced. But the real knife in the back was the price war between Ford and GM, and GM using its might to “bend the rules” to move product. If GM and Ford had been held to the legal standards governing competition the results may have been very different.
Studebaker doomed anyway… Better to go out with styling coup (pun intended) bang as a legacy than has the bullet nose be what you are remembered for!
Interesting thought, Moi.
l’d direct your attention to a very recent Hagerty (last couple of days) article “A Long-dead Auto Maker Dominates Mexico’s Carrera Panamericana”. It verifies your coupe legacy vision.
Studebaker coupe-bodied racers took all 3 podium spots in the 2025 running of the race – and it wasn’t the first time! Basically it said that if you want the best chance to win, you have to use a local driver who knows the coarse best – and use a Studebaker (C/K models) body!
Wow. 73 years later and that body is still calling attention! Sensational then, sensational now!