I have been so busy lately that I have tended to only scan the stories at Dean’s Garage. However, this morning I got out of the canoe long enough to read the articles and comment threads in a five-part series about the development of the 1992 Cadillac Seville and Eldorado.
The personal anecdotes are fascinating. However, they are undercut by rather shrill rhetoric blaming the decline of General Motors on federal regulations and Japan.
People are entitled to their opinions, and it is understandable if some old-timers still make excuses for why Detroit experienced one of the biggest industrial collapses of the last century. After all, that was a hugely traumatic turn of events.
Even so, the discussion at Dean’s Garage illustrates a weakness of historical accounts by industry insiders. They can be colored by the biases and agendas of the participants.
Regulations and the Japanese blamed for GM’s downfall
As a case in point, article series co-author Dick Ruzzin wrote in a comment that “GM DID NOT DO IT TO ITSELF. Government rules for fuel economy, that overcame the market was the problem” (2025a).
In Cadillac’s case, Ruzzin argued that the brand was forced to downsize its lineup too much because of fuel-economy requirements that were the result of “pressure from Japanese industry” on the U.S. government (2025c). He went as far as to argue that “the Japanese auto industry wanted to kill the auto industry in the United States” (2025b).
The tone of the articles was less shrill, but Ruzzin nevertheless suggested that downsizing was a particular problem for Cadillac because switching to smaller, more efficient cars denied the luxury brand of its traditional “size advantage over the other five GM divisions” (Ruzzin and Little, 2025).
So Cadillac’s fall from dominating the luxury-car field was the government’s fault — aided and abetted by Japanese manipulations?
Other commentators don’t challenge Ruzzin’s take
As I write this, no one has yet pushed back against that narrative in the comment threads.Instead, Jason Houston (2025) asked: “Has government ever done something worthwhile?” The starkness of his rhetorical question might lead one to wonder whether he thinks that no regulations imposed on the U.S. auto industry have ever been useful. For example, does he think that requiring seatbelts or the most basic emissions controls where not needed?
The discussion conveniently ignored a commonsensical point made by car-buff writer Brock Yates: “All the government interference could have been avoided if the industry had demonstrated some social responsibility during the 1960s. Had the leadership at General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler been less fascinated with the big-car, big-profit merry-go-round, the overreaction from Washington could have been avoided” (1983, p. 254).
Ate Up With Motor weighs in on the series of articles
In the back of my mind I recalled that Aaron Severson (2025) had written about these articles. Thus, I paddled over to Ate Up With Motor’s Patreon account and got out of the canoe once again.
Severson’s (2025) two stories and accompanying comments focused on the styling of the 1992 Seville and Eldorado, which he described as a “breath of fresh air.” However, he argued that these designs should have come out six-to-seven years earlier. Severson also expressed astonishment that upper management initially favored a new iteration of the “bustleback” look for the Seville.
Also see ‘Did GM go too far in downsizing the 1986 Riviera, Toronado and Eldorado?’
Ruzzin and his team of designers were lauded by Severson (2025) for successfully talking management out of the bustleback in favor of a design that might better attract younger customers. Even so, Severson also stated that “I don’t have great feelings about Ruzzin, who was unaccountably nasty to me in a previous encounter some years [ago].”
Severson’s experience was interesting to me because a while back Ruzzin sent Indie Auto a note that criticized my 1966 Oldsmobile Toronado article in a decidedly condescending manner. It was quite the performance, and it leads me to wonder: Was arrogant behavior the ticket to success at GM back in the day? If so, I am not surprised that the automaker is a shadow of its former glory.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Houston, Jason; 2025. Commentator in “Design of the 1992 Cadillac Seville and Eldorado, Part 1.” Dean’s Garage. Posted April 22 at 7:16 p.m.
- Ruzzin, Dick; 2025a. Commentator in “Design of the 1992 Cadillac Seville and Eldorado, Part 1.” Dean’s Garage. Posted April 5 at 12:51 p.m.
- ——; 2025b. Commentator in “Design of the 1992 Cadillac Seville and Eldorado, Part 1.” Dean’s Garage. Posted April 20 at 6:49 a.m.
- ——; 2025c. Commentator in “Design of the 1992 Cadillac Seville and Eldorado, Part 2.” Dean’s Garage. Posted April 26 at 2:53 p.m.
- Ruzzin, Dick and Dennis Little; 2025. “Design of the 1992 Cadillac Seville and Eldorado, Part 1.” Dean’s Garage. Posted March 28.
- Severson, Aaron; 2025. “Seville and Eldorado Horror Stories.” Ate Up With Motor (Patreon subscription required). Posted April 11.
- Yates, Brock; 1983. The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry. Empire Books, New York, NY.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- oldcarbrochures.org: Cadillac Eldorado (1993); Cadillac Seville (1983, 1993)
Yeah, Ruzzin’s behavior as you described it sounds like what my wife referred to as “dick waving” at her work. It explains a lot how De Lorean got ahead at GM. Socially responsible manufactures without government compulsion sounds like a good idea. But who takes the hit and goes first?
I think the CAFE standards should have been increased more gradually so that the automakers didn’t have to rush new vehicles into production before they were ready. The X cars needed another year of development, but were rushed to meet CAFE (per Adam Wade at Rare Classic Cars and Automotive History You Tube channel). However, these Dean’s Garage articles were the first time I read about GM considering discontinuing the Cadillac brand. I remember reading talk of discontinuing Oldsmobile in the early 90’s in Automotive News because Oldsmobile sales collapsed after the 1986 model year, but never Cadillac.
In the absence of more evidence, I’m deeply skeptical that GM would have seriously considered discontinuing Cadillac prior to ditching another brand, such as Oldsmobile. It just doesn’t add up for a variety of reasons that we could discuss further if folks are interested. Note that I’m not suggesting that the idea wasn’t discussed or that contingency plans weren’t developed.
I got it directly from those that were there that yes, Cadillac was on the chopping block.
If you and I were sitting at a bar chatting and you stated what you just wrote in your comment, I might nod my head and move on in the conversation. However, when I’m wearing my journalism hat I need documentation rather than terse hearsay. So what can you bring to the table in the way of facts?
For example, who said what and when? What other brands, if any, were on the chopping block? If Cadillac was the only one, why was it a higher priority? How far along did things get? Why was Cadillac not killed? When was that decided?
I’m particularly interested in the logic behind killing Cadillac over another GM brand. In the late-80s GM tried to buy Jaguar and, when Ford swooped in, instead bought into Saab. So was GM thinking about exiting the luxury-car field altogether or did it have another idea in mind, such as moving another brand upmarket?
My skepticism about ditching Cadillac is partly grounded in GM having invested so much into building the brand in the postwar period. For years Cadillac was considered GM’s crown jewel. In addition, GM presumably generated a higher profit from Cadillac than its lower-priced offerings. Why would the automaker give that up, particularly with the growth of the luxury-car market? Indeed, why would GM pull the plug on Cadillac in the early-90s — before the new Japanese luxury brands were all that well established?
Another major factor in killing a brand is that it can be messy and expensive to wind down a dealer network. I could see that being a particular problem given that Cadillac had been selling pretty well until relatively recently, so I would guess that its dealer ranks were not threadbare.
Finally, what brand of car would GM’s top executives drive around in if Cadillac had been discontinued? Do you honestly believe that the leaders of what had been the world’s biggest automaker would find it acceptable to be seen in a Buick limo?
I cannot respond to any of the “what if” items of other brands being on the chopping block as that is not really part of the Cadillac discussion.
The idea that the top level execs would have a problem not getting to have a Cadillac to drive is a red herring. If the corporation question the financial viability of a brand then the $ are more important than a few egos. If it was important that they have something special they could run their car into the Tech Center shops for some special work. Also, at the high executive levels they got a new car every 6 months and had access to whatever cars were in the evaluation fleet which might even be cars not available for sale in the US.
When Bill Mitchell retired, the leading choices for his successor were Irv Rybicki and Chuck Jordan. Rybicki was, by all accounts, a very pleasant person, but also someone who wasn’t going to fight for design the way Harley Earl and Mitchell had done.
Jordan, meanwhile, was known as “Chrome Cobra” for his temperment.
Mitchell favored Jordan, as he felt that Jordan would continue to fight for design in the face of demands from top management and manufacturing for cost cutting and cheaper-to-produce designs. He had spent time at Opel, and his Opel designs were attractive. His experience in designing attractive, smaller vehicles for Opel could have helped GM as it developed more efficient designs for the 1980s.
Top management chose Rybicki because he was viewed as a “go-along, get-along” type of person. He also didn’t place much importance on keeping GM ahead of the competition when it came to styling.
The results were disasters like the 1986 Eldorado and Seville (and Buick Riviera and Oldsmobile Toronado). Outdated, dull designs were an important factor in GM’s catastrophic loss of market share during the 1980s.
Rybicki’s nice personality was not what GM needed as the corporation faced the turbulent market of the 1980s.
100% Mitchell did not just favor Jordan but had in fact recommended him.
Should add that Jordan’s design leadership at Opel did far more than just do some nice looking cars but he turned around a moribund “farmer car” maker into a hit machine and had the Design group become one of the hottest studios that was universally admired for what they were doing.
My father, who would have risen to a V.P. level at G.M. if he had been physical able to work one more week, but died of terminal lung cancer at age 46 (three packs of unfiltered Camels a day), and was a nice man to all and loving dad, did always say that being civil and fair was NOT the key to success at G.M., but Allison was not typical of G.M. as were the automotive and supplier divisions. Success was measured by results (projects as budgeted and sales).
I was at GM while these cars were being developed. A top GM VP, when asked about the threat posed by the new Japanese luxury brands, pointed at a clay model of the 1993 Fleetwood Brougham (18+ feet long, body-on-frame, pushrod V8) and said, “There’s our answer!” So, yes, there was some arrogance on the part of GM leadership…
Adam, that’s an interesting anecdote. Do you recall if folks were talking about Cadillac being discontinued? If so, what was the argument for that scenario?
No–I never heard any discussion or rumors about Cadillac being discontinued; the comment reflected the belief that Lexus (and Infiniti and Acura) were no threat to Cadillac’s way of life.