(EXPANDED FROM 5/11/2022)
Back in 2019 David Burrell wrote one of the better overviews of the downsized 1962 Dodge and Plymouth. However, he went astray on some important details.
Unlike some other historical accounts, Burrell (2019) questioned the “legend” that Chrysler executive Bill Newberg unilaterally demanded that a just-completed redesign of the automaker’s lineup of full-sized cars — the S-series — be ditched in favor of an 11th-hour downsizing of its two lowest-priced brands. They were placed on a new mid-sized B-body.
Burrell quite rightly noted that it is “very rare” that a senior executive in a large, publicly-listed company “has the sole power to make such key strategic product changes without reference to at least a couple of other senior executives, the chief financial officer and Board members” (2019, p. 21).
S-series was questioned ‘for at least 12 months’
Burrell suggested that Newberg’s decision “was the outcome of a discussion which had been going on, possibly in secret, for at least 12 months within the most senior management ranks about costs, declining sales, unease over Exner’s design direction and Chrysler’s survival into the future” (2019, p. 21).
Below I quibble with one piece of evidence that Burrell presented. Despite this, his conclusion still makes sense because it may explain a lingering question that I have had: Why were Chrysler’s engineers able to engage in an ambitious rethinking of the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth whereas the stylists were supposedly so rushed that they could only come up with hastily shrunken versions of the S-series?
Could it be that the engineering department was somehow in on a plot to kill the S-series? And that they started to work on the B-body before Newberg announced the change of plans? If so, this would fit my “Machiavellian scenario” (go here for further discussion).
Burrell was fuzzy on when the S-series was halted
Burrell did not weigh in on when specifically the S-series was killed aside from recounting the “automotive folklore” that it was “sometime in late 1959” (2019, p. 19). However, he did offer an unusually comprehensive number of photographs of S-series mockups. Some photos were dated as late as July 22, 1959.
My guess is that the switch occurred in late summer or early fall in order for advanced B-body mockups to have been completed by February 1960. That was the date ascribed to a photograph of a shrunken Dodge which looks close to production ready (Langworth, 1993).
How could the Valiant have impacted the S-series?
Burrell’s timeline gets confusing when he stated that as Chrysler Corp. sales fell, the “design ideas for the S-series were starting to be challenged” (2019, p. 25). That makes sense in a general way, but then he added that small-car buyers “delivered the verdict” on the “S-series design theme” because the Valiant placed third behind the Ford Falcon and Chevrolet Corvair (Burrell, 2019; p. 25).
Really? The Valiant arguably sold respectably in 1960, tallying 19.4 percent of the entry-level compact market (the Ford Falcon, Chevrolet Corvair and Rambler American). This was 3.4 percent higher than the corporation’s overall passenger-car market share for that year.
In addition, management would have had only a few months of sales data if it made the decision to kill the S-series by late 1959.
A number of other key questions left unanswered
Burrell suggested that killing the S-series was part of an effort to “stem the financial losses and reassure investors and bankers” (2019, p. 26). That makes sense, particularly given that the cars had advanced features such as door frames that reached into the roof and V-shaped glass. This fancy styling resulted in technical problems “at a time when sales were dropping and money was scant” (2019, p. 25).
One point Burrell didn’t directly address was why, if money was so scarce, did management create a new platform only two years after introducing a new big-car body that switched to unitized construction?
However, Burrell did note that the a big increase in power that stylists had gained in the 1950s “caused resentment” by engineers and operations managers who had previously been “in charge of the business” (2019, p. 22). Did this add significant fuel to the backlash against the S-series?
Burrell also did not assess the accuracy of the folklore that Newberg’s crash downsizing program was precipitated by hearing about Chevrolet’s new 1962 compact, the Chevy II. Curtis Redgap (2019) stated that the wheelbase for the rumored car was around 115 inches. That was five inches longer than the Chevy II’s but the same size as the mid-sized 1964 Chevelle.
Styling’s primary problem wasn’t similarity to Valiant
One of Burrell’s most important themes was that Chrysler styling chief Virgil Exner made a mistake “to use the Valiant to launch the S-series design vision. The decision defied logic. The conventional automotive wisdom, which still operates in the 21st Century, is that new design ideas and technical/engineering advances are first applied to the expensive up-market brands and then cascaded down over subsequent years into lower order models” (Burrell, 2019; pp. 13-14).
Whatever the validity of this take, it doesn’t strike me as the most compelling criticism of the S-series’ styling. The biggest problem wasn’t that the cars had a family resemblance to the Valiant, but that they were either ugly or — in the case of the Plymouth — looked old hat compared to the angular styling of competitors.
Burrell’s narrative displayed a bias toward big cars
Burrell went on to argue that marketing for the 1962 Dodge Dart attempted to “cover up the downsizing project.” The key part of the pitch was that the Dart “features a new concept in standard-size car design which provides the owner with greater performance, economy and ease of handling. All useless weight and extra size have been ‘engineered out'” (Burrell, 2019; p. 17).
That doesn’t strike me as a cover up, but rather a clear description of the Dart’s advantages. A better target for criticism would be Plymouth’s marketing, which was more circumspect about the downsizing (go here for further discussion).
Burrell didn’t get B-body’s size and price points right
Burrell noted that the 1962 Dodge models were “shorter and narrower than the Ford Galaxie and Chevrolet Bel Air/Impala but do not cost any less” (2019, p. 34). Dodge’s lineup was priced slightly higher than Plymouth’s a base. Even so, the Dart two-door sedan listed for $2,241 compared to a Chevrolet Biscayne at $2,324 and a Ford Galaxie at $2,453.
Meanwhile, a base Ford Fairlane listed for $2,154. Burrell inaccurately noted that Ford’s new mid-sized entry was “approximately the same dimensions as the Dodge and Plymouth, but cheaper” (2019, p. 30).
The base Plymouth Savoy was only $52 more than a Fairlane but roughly five inches longer, four inches wider and more than 100 pounds heavier. The B-body was a roomier and more substantial family car than the Fairlane. This was because the Ford’s major components were often drawn from the compact Falcon (go here for further discussion).
I do give Burrell credit for stating that the styling of the 1962 models undercut their popularity more than the smaller size. However, he did so in a back-handed way: “The rebound in sales of the ’63 Plymouth is evidence that buyers overlooked the reduced dimensions provided the design was pleasing to the eye” (Burrell, 2019; p. 39).
Would Chrysler have done better without downsizing?
Burrell concluded by arguing that if Exner had “championed a more mainstream design direction for the S-series, as shown by the 1963 B-body reskinning, and then followed them with the 1963 Valiant, Chrysler’s future might have been very different and much less fraught” (2019, p. 40).
I grant you that curved side glass could have given Chrysler a short-term design advantage. Even so, the automaker would still have needed some kind of presence in the mid-sized field.
In addition, Chrysler may have had more potential in the mid-sized and compact markets. Paul Niedermeyer (2022) has argued that the 1961 full-sized Plymouth should have been the last one because that market would go into decline over the next decade.
Burrell got context right but fell short in places
Despite my nitpicks, Burrell gave the S-series’ demise some badly needed context. The frequently told narrative of Newberg unilaterally demanding a crash program to introduce the B-body in 1962 has the over-simplified quality of a made-for-TV drama.
The irony of the B-body is that if it had been driven by the engineers to take back power from the stylists, that gambit arguably failed. Shrinking the Dodge and Plymouth has been widely viewed as a mistake even though it anticipated GM’s downsized 1977 big cars.
Burrell acknowledged the weakness of Exner’s styling, but his coolness toward the downsizing shows the persistence of a “bigger = better” groupthink in the U.S. auto industry.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on May 11, 2022 and expanded on Sept. 8, 2025. Brand production figures come from Wikipedia (2013); figures for individual nameplates were calculated from base data from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006) and Gunnell (2002). Prices and specifications are from the above sources as well as Automobile Catalog (2022) and the Classic Car Database (2022).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International; Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Burrell, David; 2019. “Design to Driveway: Almost!! Chrysler’s Still-born 1962 S-Cars.” Retroautos. Sept. issue: pp. 6-41.
- Classic Car Database; 2022. “Search for specifications.” Accessed May 12.
- Gunnell, John; 2002.Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1993. Chrysler & Imperial 1946-1985: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2022. “Cohort Pic(k) of the Day: 1961 Plymouth – Maybe It Should Have Been The Last Big Plymouth Forever.” Curbside Classic. Posted May 8.
- Redgap, Curtis; 2019. “1962 Plymouth Sport Fury car reviews.” Allpar.com. Posting date unknown; first accessed August 16, 2019.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcarbrochures.org: Dodge Dart (1961, 1962)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Dodge Dart (1961); Ford Fairlane (1962); Plymouth (1961, 1964); Plymouth Valiant (1960)
In retrospect, the signs for a crisis at Chrysler were apparent in the fall of 1959 with the debut of the 1960 models. The Chrysler, DeSoto and Imperials had continuity with 1957-1959 models, and I love the 1960 Dodges, but the 1960 Plymouth was not an outstanding design. The Valiant was a take on a substantial compact car that was perhaps too European for American tastes. The 1961 Plymouths and Dodges were not good and thankfully the DeSoto went away quickly. While I think the 116-inch wheelbase “B’-bodies were a good future investment for Chrysler, because they were better cars than the intermediate Fords / Mercurys, the Dodges did not receive commercially-acceptible styling until 1964, which the Plymouths were put on the right road in 1963, although the 1964 Plymouths were much better. In retrospect, I now like the look of the 1962 Plymouths and Dodges, although the ’63 Dodges leave me cold (too bizarre). Elwood Engle cleaned up the Exner-inspired and approved cliches by 1964, and the restyled Valiant (and longer Dart) became the car(s) they should have been in the first place.
I have come to the conclusion that the real problem at Chrysler was turmoil in the executive suites: L.L. “Tex” Colbert had lost his touch, his protege, Bill Newburg, was compromised by conflict-of-interest allegations, and Virgil Exner Sr.’s health was deteriorating. On top of this was the dealer realignment with Plymouth and Dodge coupled with the end of DeSoto. Clearly, Chrysler needed competent leadership and in 1960-1961, the incumbent management had lost its way. In that environment, it is a miracle that the 1962 Plymouths and Dodges, down-sized as they were, ever made it to the showroom floors.
I’ll could go a step further, the first seeds of that turmoil go to where the desigers worked the 1959-60-61 models was done when Virgil Exner was in convalescence after he have an heart attack.
Then we could wonder what if Exner had gone for a more mainstream design like the 1962 Ford Fairlane or the 1963 Rambler if things could have been different?
It strikes me that in ’63 and ’64 Chrysler Corp. actually had the most rational product planning of all the big three. You had:
Plymouth A body — 106″ wb
Dodge A body — 111″ wb
Plymouth B body — 116″ wb
Dodge B body — 119″ wb
Dodge C body — 122″ wb
Chrysler C body — 122″ wb
Imperial — 129″ wb
In the case of the A and B body Dodges, the wheelbase stretch was aft of the B pillar rather than in front of the A pillar as on some other manufacturers’ stretched models, meaning they were actually a little roomier than their Plymouth siblings. So Chrysler was managing to cover many different customer needs without its brands and dealers competing directly with one another. And as far as intermediates go, the Dart was pretty darn close in size to the ’63 Fairlaine or Classic.
Was this a better model than Townsend’s shift to matching GM’s approach starting in ’65? It’s more logical but it’s hard to say it was likely to be more financially sustainable.
First, historically Chrysler needed to price the standard size Plymouth a bit higher than Chevrolet and Ford to make up for reduced economies of scale. It would have been hard to justify premium pricing for a large intermediate sized Plymouth over much bigger Chevrolets and Fords. The historical justification of superior engineering was less tangibly evidend.
Second, Dodge was a weak brand. The Dodge A and B bodies might have been just the right size for lots of families, but those families were much less likely to buy a Dodge than a Pontiac Tempest or Catalina.
I don’t think pricing would have been an insurmountable barrier to fewer platforms. The downsized 1969 Pontiac Grand Prix was successful despite its unusually high price for a mid-sized personal coupe. It all would have come down to quality of execution.
It’s interesting that you argue that Dodge was a weak brand. In the long run it overshadowed Plymouth. That may have been partly because of the market shift to trucks, but even in the second half of the 1960s Dodge’s compact and mid-sized entries tended to sell better than Plymouth’s. Dodge’s main problem was with its big cars (which it shouldn’t have bothered offering).
Platform streamlining would have been more difficult without also streamlining the dealer networks. Chrysler was too small to support both a Dodge and Chrysler-Plymouth network. They needed to be merged. Once that was done management could have shrunk the scope of each brand to a sustainable level.