(EXPANDED FROM 12/13/2021)
In recent years a number of American Motors books have been published, but Patrick Foster’s 2013 history is still the best — sort of.
Foster (2024) was a co-author with Tom Glatch of The Complete Book of AMC Cars. As we discuss further here, that book is splashy but suffers from too much vapid pom-pom waving.
Meanwhile, Marc Cranswick’s (2022) The Legend of American Motors is a denser read and has information you won’t find in Foster’s books. However, it is undercut by a fanboy vibe mixed in with enough questionable historical analysis that I have not been able to motivate myself to write a review.
This brings us to Foster’s American Motors Corporation: The Rise and Fall of America’s Last Independent. Although its format is also overdone, this book has mostly better historical analysis than the above two — in addition to Joe Ligo’s “sanewashed” six-part PBS documentary (go here).
That said, I prefer Foster’s (1993) 20-year-older AMC book, The Last Independent, because it has a more detailed narrative and less pom-pom waving.
Look, Martha, another coffee-table car book!
I would imagine that Foster may have felt that he finally made it to the big leagues with his 2013 AMC book. It has an oversized hard-cover format, glossy paper, complex graphics and many large color photographs. This was quite the step up from his 1993 book, which had such a minimalist design that it looks almost self published.
The downside of the 2013 book’s splashy format is that the smaller type, particularly when overlaid onto a colored background, can be harder to read. In addition, the greater emphasis on white space and graphics apparently led to a pruning of Foster’s analysis. This included the deletion of his trenchant critique of the redesigned 1971 Javelin (go here for further discussion).
That said, the 2013 book would appear to benefit from additional research. Quite a bit of fresh material has been added, such as photos and illustrations of design proposals that never made it to production. So if you are a serious student of American Motors, the 2013 book represents a useful addendum to the 1993 book. However, if your interest is more casual and you can afford only one book, the 2013 book may be your best bet.
Foster indulges in a more dramatic story arc
The thing that I find most irritating about Foster’s 2013 book is that he attempted to give it a more dramatic narrative. Most notably, he played up 1986 as the pivotal year when AMC supposedly lost its independence. This was when Chrysler bought the company from Renault.
Foster argued that even though the French automaker gained effective control of AMC in 1980, “the company was still somewhat autonomous from Renault. It was still, the directors believed, an independent auto company. It was America’s last independent” (p. 13). In contrast, Chrysler quickly moved to fully absorb AMC into its own operations.
This narrative has nostalgic resonance but strikes me as overplaying AMC’s independence after 1980. From that point on, Renault dictated the direction of Jeep and began to phase out the AMC brand in favor of Renaults largely designed in France.
Foster went light on AMC head Roy D. Chapin Jr.
Even more so than his 1993 book, Foster dealt with CEO Roy D. Chapin Jr. in a schizoid manner. The narrative and visuals in his 2013 book give Chapin patron saint status. Yet Foster quite rightly criticized a string of fatally flawed decisions made during Chapin’s decade-long tenure as head of the corporation.
What’s odd is that Foster did not explicitly point a finger at Chapin even though he vilified his predecessor Roy Abernethy for arguably far smaller sins (go here for further discussion). Was Foster’s hesitance to directly criticize Chapin colored by his acknowledged friendship with him (go here)?
Also see ‘Richard Teague’s styling helped to kill American Motors’
By the same token, Foster painted Chapin’s early years as CEO in overly rosy colors. For example, he described the two-seater AMX in glowing terms even though it sold almost as poorly in its first two model years as the first-generation Marlin (go here for further discussion).
Meanwhile, Foster stated that making air conditioning standard equipment on the 1968 Ambassador was a “brilliant marketing move” and that “sales of the Ambassador began to rebound strongly” (p. 99). The Ambassador actually saw its production and market share modestly decline in 1968. The following year output did surpass 76,000 units, which was a peak for the post-Nash Ambassador. However, a facelift was arguably the main reason for that one-year sales spike. By 1971 — only two years later — Ambassador volume had fallen by 45 percent.
Foster criticized AMC for acting like a big automaker
As in his previous AMC book, Foster complained that the 1974 Matador coupe and 1976 Pacer did not share a body with any other AMC car. As he discussed in the second quote below, this would prove to be too expensive for such a small automaker. However, Foster did not include in his 2013 book other criticisms presented in his 1993 book. For example, he had referred to the Matador’s shape as “a bit odd” and the Pacer as lacking in features offered by imports, such as a five-speed manual transmission (1993, p. 186, 192-193).
Also see ‘Six mistakes that killed the AMC Pacer — and American Motors’
On the other hand, his 2013 book includes images of a proposed line of restyled AMC mid-sized cars that could have sold much better than the Matador coupe because they had more mainstream styling (as well as badly needed new sheetmetal for aging four-door models).
Foster did not explain AMC’s radical shift in plans aside from noting that a pictured mock up “was probably meant to go into production in either 1972 or 1973” (p. 134). Was this because of cashflow issues due to the purchase of Jeep and weak sales in the early-70s, or was the embrace of the ill-fated Matador coupe primarily a reflection of Chapin’s fixation with sporty coupes?
Analytical nuance versus big-and-glossy pictures?
The facts in Foster’s 2013 book don’t always align with those included in his 1993 book. In the latter book he stated that Abernethy called for the Marlin’s roofline to be raised one inch (1993, p. 109). In contrast, the 2013 book stated that it was three inches (p 85). As discussed here, that appears to be too large.
I find it ironic that the 2013 book’s dust jacket is dominated by a photograph of a 1970 Rebel Machine. This may attract the eyeballs of collectors infatuated with muscle cars, but the Machine also symbolizes the incompetence of post-Abernethy AMC management. The cartoonish model was not just a classic example of “too little, too late” — by that point the “muscle car” market had gone bust. The Machine also illustrates how Chapin’s so-called “Philosophy of Difference” mostly focused on superficial styling and cheesy marketing schemes that deviated little from Detroit groupthink.
Foster presumably would not say what I just did. He appears to be too attuned to catering to the collector crowd. I grant you that they buy most of the car books, but that can result in dumbed down automotive history. Thus, I was intrigued to see authors such as Cranswick and Glatch join the fray.
Alas, Foster’s earlier AMC books still offer the best overview of American Motors. And while his 1993 book has more detailed analysis, it won’t look as nice on a car collector’s coffee table as the 2013 book. Judging from Amazon’s current list of the top 100 auto history books, big and glossy usually sells the best.
American Motors Corporation: The Rise and Fall of America’s Last Independent Automaker
- Patrick Foster; 2013
- MBI Publishing Co., Minneapolis, MN
“Success didn’t come in 1956. Wholesale sales of cars to AMC’s dealer group were 126,575, down quite a bit for the year despite all the new product news. A big part of the problem was the 1956 Rambler; by moving it up a year earlier, the company ran into problems trying to ramp up production to a profitable pace and missed the market. Quality problems were rampant that year.” (p. 41)
“The shared-body idea was a strategy set down by George Romney back in AMC’s earlier days to reduce tooling costs dramatically, thereby offsetting some of the Big Three’s volume advantage. It began with the 1956 Rambler and was perfected in the 1963-1964 products. As the company found to its everlasting sorrow, when Roy Abernethy got away from that strategy and instead tried to match the Big Three car for car the company soon spent itself into financial trouble — the ‘dark days of 1967.’ Now, as could be seen in the annual report, the company product planners had two new cars planned, one for 1974, the other for 1975; neither would share a body with any other product and because of that capital expenses for the next two years were going to exceed $100 million annually.” (p. 126)
“But the fact remains that Chrysler shut down the AMC brand even though American Motors had a bright future ahead of it. Ironically, AMC was closed down just as it finally turned profitable and was on the road to new glory. Plans were to introduce the Allure coupe for 1989, the new Jeep ZJ — which became the Grand Cherokee — for 1990 while work continued on a new small Jeep JJ suited for world markets.” (p. 204)
OTHER REVIEWS:
Driving | Automoblog | Goodreads | Amazon
NOTES:
This review was originally posted on Jan. 1, 2014 and expanded on Dec. 13, 2021 and Sept. 30, 2025. Production figures calculated from the Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975 (Gunnell, 2002).
RE:SOURCES
- Cranswick, Marc; 2022. The Legend of American Motors. Veloce Publishing, UK.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 1993. American Motors: The Last Independent. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Foster, Patrick R. and Tom Glatch; 2024. The Complete Book of AMC Cars: American Motors Corporation 1954-1988. Motorbooks, Beverly MA.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: AMC Eagle (1981); Rambler (1956)
- oldcarbrochures.org: AMC Pacer (1976)
The loss of American Motors was sad – no doubt – but somehow the Company was on death watch from 1979 onward. Not many knew that Jeep was producing vehicles at that time – though I remember seeing them in New YOrk in the 1950’s. Though the great age of the SUV was still in the future. What was left of AMC in those last sad days ? The 4 wheel drive was viable – but of limited interest. Ambassador , MAtador Hornet were long gone as well as the fabulous JAvelin. I suppose few really noticed or shed a tear that the red white and blue folks stole it from us. Chrysler later on had no interest in the car side of things -Iacoccas blunder. Those miserable K cars. Wouldve much prefered revived AMC cars- sedans were still selling then.
The 2013 book is the one I bought when it was new. It’s the first book of bought solely on AMC history. For starters it does enough things right to get started on the history of the company.
More musings on what mightve been – from a company known for its imagination and historical significance . AMC perhaps was written off as a viable automaker around the turn of decade. The Big 2 1/2 had their own problems and serious ones .
Ford barely survived due to a decent for the time line up of freshened Panther bodies – expanded Fox bodies and more. GM still struggled mightily with the redundancy issues and a too top heavy line up. Chrysler was sputtering back to some semblance of life.
Iacocca was now the Donald Trump of the industry – with the succesful minie van lineup. He turned corporate raider with his eyes on AMC – mostly for Jeep. These were every forward thinking moves – again proving the old Iacocca trademark genious.
True the cars were long gone Ambassador and the rest. Couldnt Iacocca and his team revive the old AMC models ? Madness ? Perhaps he and his team thought that America has turned a page on those 1970’s workhorses. I believe there was a place for them. Chrysler corp had no cars at that time – except the little recession mobiles the K Cars. They were the NAsh- Rambler of the period . Laughed at.
They bought the company in 1984 so they must have analyed throuroghly its possiblities. They shouldve revived the line as follows.
Ambassador II fully loaded luxury type car – and Matador and up level MAtador Classic – both on a 114” Wheelbase. A shorter frame 111” for a Classic Matador Coupe to compete with Cutlass and a version to reconstitute the Javelin.
The Eagle/Hornet/ and up level Concord on the same frame. The Ambassador II could have 4 wheel drive standard – optional on the MAtador sedan . Specially equipped Matadors for police with 4 wheel drive. Would all this be so hard? If carefully planned out this plan could span the rest of the 1980’s. Iacocco drops a few points here – he had toe plants and Chrylser resources. What a waste.