Debate within the Ford Motor Company about whether it should come out with a smaller, more economical car was discussed at a number of points in a corporate history by Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill (1962). For example:
“The company’s Product Planning Committee was considering anew the question of an economy (light) car. A report on February 17 (1949) held that there were 4,000,0000 potential customers for such a car and that the first company to produce one ‘would enjoy the distinct advantage of exclusive penetration’ of the market, and that public interest warranted at least ‘continuing and intensifying engineering development work’ in the field. However, Earle S. MacPherson of Engineering opposed such activity. ‘It has to be a kind of religion if the job is to be done successfully,’ he asserted, and felt that such an absorbing venture would interfere with the discharge of other engineering work” (p. 350).
The question of whether American cars were getting too big lingered in Detroit as the 1950s progressed. Ironically, the introduction of “compact” cars by four independent automakers would be used as an excuse for Ford to not follow suit:
“That the movement away from the small cars, evident in the 1940s, should continue was taken for granted. The Ford Division, brandishing the results of expert studies, told the Executive Committee that ‘as the general standard of living has increased, the consumer has tended to purchase a better car.’ It looked down its nose at the small car, that annoying incubus that every few years lifted a contentious head into the automotive scene. In 1952, as in earlier years, the Division had firmly opposed the intruder. ‘To the average American our present car and its size represent an outward symbol of prestige and well being.’ It again pointed to small cars struggling in the wake of Ford and Chevrolet sales: the Henry J, the Hudson Jet, the Nash, and the Willys. All but one would soon sink beneath the churning waters marking the progress of their betters” (p. 379).
Compacts from independents weren’t a good test case
The Ford Division’s argument against compacts had a kernel of truth, but it was disingenuous from the standpoint that none of the independents possessed adequate scale to price their compacts so that they could siphon significant sales from “standard-sized” cars.
The Nash Rambler hinted at the the potential of compacts when its lineup was expanded in 1954 to include entry-level models priced below those of the Big Three. Even so, the top sellers were higher-priced models such as the Custom two- and four-door wagon.
At least in 1954, offering unique qualities such as the versatility of a wagon in a small but well-appointed car presumably had more appeal than a strippo two-door sedan sold primarily on price and superior gas mileage.
NOTES:
Product specifications and production figures are from Flory (2004, 2013).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2009. American Cars, 1946-1959: Every Model, Year by Year. McFarland & Co.
- Nevins, Allan and Frank Ernest Hill; 1962. Ford: Decline and Rebirth 1933-1962. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, NY.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcarbrochures.org: Nash Rambler (1954)
I think executives essentially over-estimated the toutness of the buying public’s convictions and wishes.
It is true that normies are conformist by nature and prefer to delegate their thinking to a herd rather than doing the thinking themselves, but exactly because they are conformist, as a belief begins to spread it leads to a very quick collective change of mind.
Take big cars: because some in the press highlighted that they were getting too long and, crucially, too individually styled for what the average person would tolerate, then the demand for more spartanly styled and smaller automobiles boomed.
I wasn’t aware that Rambler wagons had that distinctive roofline from the beginning. I assume they used the same body shell for ten years.
There is an assumption here that FoMoCo was stable and organized when the company was on the verge of going out of business in 1943 when F.D.R. and “Big Bill” Knudsen sprang Hank the Deuce from the Navy to get the company back on track after Edsel Ford’s death. Ford was a company at war with itself with a senile founder and his henchman Harry Bennett. Ford was in no condition to develop new products until the 1949 model year, let alone develop a car smaller than the basic Ford sedan. Frankly, in retrospect, one has to wonder why Ford still produced the Continental in 1946 through 1948, although I doubt if there was any real development other than routine running changes due to material improvements. Ford correctly focused on the 1949 Ford. Afterwards, the focus had to be on making the Ford a better car along with the Mercury and Lincoln. The standard Ford was the right-sized car for 1949 through 1954 and the Ford F-100 series was the right truck for its time as well.
Where do you get the idea that there is an assumption that Ford was stable in the 1940s? The book I have quoted from documented the enormous changes — and drama — that Ford when through in the second half of the 1940s. The first quote (above) notes that in 1949 MacPherson was against a light car because there was inadequate engineering capacity. The second quote is more interesting to me because it didn’t talk about capacity issues but instead challenged the idea that a small car could be successful.
If we are going to talk about 1949-54, it would be useful to note that the “standard-sized” Ford grew during that time period. Length and width were up around an inch and a half and weight increased roughly 150 pounds for a base four-door sedan. That meant that even the entry-level Fords topped 3,000 pounds and had the footprint of a 1960s intermediate. The much-maligned 1953-54 Plymouth was in most respects closer to the 1949 Ford in size and weight than its 1954 successor. Ford could have maintained the size of the 1949 models but instead chose to make them bigger.
It also strikes me as making the most sense to talk about small cars on a spectrum. For example, the 1949 Studebaker Champion was a notch smaller and lighter than a Ford but it was bigger than a 1953 Willys Aero or Hudson Jet — to say nothing of a Henry J. I think that the Champion was a reasonably sized six-passenger family car.
My point: I think that Ford had more options than to come out with a “compact.” The automaker could have either not increased the size of the standard Ford or it could have created a two-tiered lineup akin to what Studebaker did in the late-40s, where the Champion used the same basic body as the Commander and Land Cruiser but had a shorter wheelbase.
One other point: Earle S. MacPherson also had the perspective of being on the ground-floor of the development of the G.M. Cadet project and so his insight on a “small” Ford in terms of cost to manufacture and sell such a car under the price of a Ford Mainline sedan had to point that it was not really economically feasible. I do not know if Ford (Dearborn) considered in the late 1940s or early 1950s thought about importing the Englsih Ford Prefect / Anglia.